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openssh/openssh-6.5p1-disable-openssl-abi-check.patch
Petr Cerny 08f9072513 Accepting request 222365 from home:pcerny:factory
- Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.5p1

- Update to 6.5p1
  Features since 6.4p1:
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for key exchange using ECDH in
    Daniel Bernstein's Curve25519; default when both the client
    and server support it.
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): support for Ed25519 as a public key type fo
    rboth server and client.  Ed25519 is an EC signature offering
    better security than ECDSA and DSA and good performance.
  * Add a new private key format that uses a bcrypt KDF to better
    protect keys at rest. Used unconditionally for Ed25519 keys,
    on demand for other key types via the -o ssh-keygen(1)
    option.  Intended to become default in the near future.
    Details documented in PROTOCOL.key.
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): new transport cipher
    "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" combining Daniel Bernstein's
    ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an
    authenticated encryption mode. Details documented
    PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305.
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients
    and servers that use the obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme.
    It will still be possible to connect with these
    clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and
    OpenSSH will refuse connection entirely in a future release.
  * ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse old proprietary clients and servers
    that use a weaker key exchange hash calculation.
  * ssh(1): increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups
    requested for each symmetric key size. New values from NIST
    Special Publication 800-57 with the upper limit specified by

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/222365
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=63
2014-02-14 14:54:10 +00:00

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1.2 KiB
Diff

# disable run-time check for OpenSSL ABI by version number as that is not a
# reliable indicator of ABI changes and doesn't make much sense in a
# distribution package
diff --git a/openssh-6.5p1/entropy.c b/openssh-6.5p1/entropy.c
--- a/openssh-6.5p1/entropy.c
+++ b/openssh-6.5p1/entropy.c
@@ -212,22 +212,23 @@ seed_rng(void)
#endif
/*
* OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
* We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
* After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
* allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
* within a patch series.
*/
+#if 0
u_long version_mask = SSLeay() >= 0x1000000f ? ~0xffff0L : ~0xff0L;
if (((SSLeay() ^ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) & version_mask) ||
(SSLeay() >> 12) < (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >> 12))
fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
"have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
-
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
if (RAND_status() == 1) {
debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
return;
}
if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd");