forked from pool/openssl-1_1
1d99f4ef85
- OpenSSL Security Advisory [16 Apr 2018]
* Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation
(CVE-2018-0737, bsc#1089039)
* add openssl-CVE-2018-0737.patch
- Fix escaping in c_rehash (boo#1091961, bsc#1091963)
* add 0001-Revert-util-dofile.pl-only-quote-stuff-that-actually.patch
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/606162
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-1_1?expand=0&rev=10
113 lines
3.5 KiB
Diff
113 lines
3.5 KiB
Diff
The CVE-2018-0737 fix consists of commits:
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9db724cfede4ba7a3668bff533973ee70145ec07
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011f82e66f4bf131c733fd41a8390039859aafb2
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7150a4720af7913cae16f2e4eaf768b578c0b298
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(the three above are included in 1.1.0h)
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6939eab03a6e23d2bd2c3f5e34fe1d48e542e787
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and additional changes to our fips_rsa_keygen()
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From 6939eab03a6e23d2bd2c3f5e34fe1d48e542e787 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 10:10:58 +0300
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Subject: [PATCH] RSA key generation: ensure BN_mod_inverse and BN_mod_exp_mont
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both get called with BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag set.
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CVE-2018-0737
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Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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---
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crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c | 2 ++
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1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
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Index: openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
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===================================================================
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--- openssl-1.1.0h.orig/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c 2018-05-10 11:50:53.298706226 +0200
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+++ openssl-1.1.0h/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c 2018-05-10 12:55:39.394968170 +0200
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@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ static int fips_rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *
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int n = 0;
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int test = 0;
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int pbits = bits / 2;
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+ unsigned long error = 0;
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if (FIPS_selftest_failed()) {
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FIPSerr(FIPS_F_FIPS_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
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@@ -191,6 +192,10 @@ retry:
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if (!BN_lshift(r3, r3, pbits - 100))
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goto err;
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+ BN_set_flags(rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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+ BN_set_flags(rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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+ BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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+
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/* generate p and q */
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for (i = 0; i < 5 * pbits; i++) {
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ploop:
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@@ -205,9 +210,9 @@ retry:
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if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
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goto err;
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- if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
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- goto err;
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- if (BN_is_one(r1)) {
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+ ERR_set_mark();
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+ if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
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+ /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
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int r;
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r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(rsa->p, pbits > 1024 ? 4 : 5, ctx, 0,
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cb);
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@@ -217,6 +222,15 @@ retry:
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break;
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}
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+ error = ERR_peek_last_error();
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+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
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+ && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
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+ /* GCD != 1 */
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+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
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+ } else {
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+ goto err;
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+ }
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+
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if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
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goto err;
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}
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@@ -248,9 +262,9 @@ retry:
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if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
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goto err;
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- if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
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- goto err;
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- if (BN_is_one(r1)) {
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+ ERR_set_mark();
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+ if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
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+ /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
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int r;
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r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(rsa->q, pbits > 1024 ? 4 : 5, ctx, 0,
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cb);
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@@ -260,6 +274,15 @@ retry:
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break;
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}
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+ error = ERR_peek_last_error();
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+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
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+ && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
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+ /* GCD != 1 */
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+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
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+ } else {
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+ goto err;
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+ }
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+
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if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
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goto err;
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}
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@@ -457,6 +480,8 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa,
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if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL)
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goto err;
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+ BN_set_flags(rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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+ BN_set_flags(rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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/* generate p and q */
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for (;;) {
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