forked from pool/openssl-1_1
5a11d9c32d
- Update to 1.1.1g
* Fixed segmentation fault in SSL_check_chain (CVE-2020-1967, bsc#1169407)
Server or client applications that call the SSL_check_chain() function
during or after a TLS 1.3 handshake may crash due to a NULL pointer
dereference as a result of incorrect handling of the
"signature_algorithms_cert" TLS extension. The crash occurs if an invalid
or unrecognised signature algorithm is received from the peer. This could
be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial of Service attack.
* Added AES consttime code for no-asm configurations
an optional constant time support for AES was added
when building openssl for no-asm.
- refresh patches:
* openssl-1.1.1-fips.patch
* openssl-1.1.1-fips-crng-test.patch
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/796077
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-1_1?expand=0&rev=68
415 lines
14 KiB
Diff
415 lines
14 KiB
Diff
Index: openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/rand.h
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===================================================================
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--- openssl-1.1.1g.orig/include/crypto/rand.h 2020-04-21 15:59:25.552654754 +0200
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+++ openssl-1.1.1g/include/crypto/rand.h 2020-04-21 15:59:27.208663772 +0200
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@@ -49,6 +49,14 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(RAN
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void rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out);
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+/* CRNG test entropy filter callbacks. */
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+size_t rand_crngt_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
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+ unsigned char **pout,
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+ int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
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+ int prediction_resistance);
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+void rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
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+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
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+
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/*
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* RAND_POOL functions
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*/
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Index: openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/build.info
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===================================================================
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--- openssl-1.1.1g.orig/crypto/rand/build.info 2020-04-21 15:59:27.208663772 +0200
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+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/build.info 2020-04-21 16:00:32.869021309 +0200
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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LIBS=../../libcrypto
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SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
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- randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c \
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+ randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_crng_test.c rand_egd.c \
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rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c drbg_lib.c drbg_ctr.c
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INCLUDE[drbg_ctr.o]=../modes
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Index: openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
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===================================================================
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--- openssl-1.1.1g.orig/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c 2020-04-21 15:59:25.552654754 +0200
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+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c 2020-04-21 15:59:27.208663772 +0200
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@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg;
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/* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */
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-static const char ossl_pers_string[] = "OpenSSL NIST SP 800-90A DRBG";
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+static const char ossl_pers_string[] = DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING;
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static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_drbg_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
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@@ -201,8 +201,13 @@ static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secu
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drbg->parent = parent;
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if (parent == NULL) {
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+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
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+ drbg->get_entropy = rand_crngt_get_entropy;
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+ drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy;
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+#else
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drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
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drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
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+#endif
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#ifndef RAND_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
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drbg->get_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce;
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drbg->cleanup_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce;
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Index: openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c
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===================================================================
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--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
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+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c 2020-04-21 15:59:27.208663772 +0200
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@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
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+/*
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+ * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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+ * Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
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+ *
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+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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+ */
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+
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+/*
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+ * Implementation of the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests.
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+ */
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+
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+#include <string.h>
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+#include <openssl/evp.h>
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+#include "crypto/rand.h"
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+#include "internal/thread_once.h"
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+#include "rand_local.h"
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+
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+static RAND_POOL *crngt_pool;
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+static unsigned char crngt_prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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+
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+int (*crngt_get_entropy)(unsigned char *, unsigned char *, unsigned int *)
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+ = &rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb;
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+
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+int rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
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+ unsigned int *md_size)
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+{
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+ int r;
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+ size_t n;
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+ unsigned char *p;
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+
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+ n = rand_pool_acquire_entropy(crngt_pool);
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+ if (n >= CRNGT_BUFSIZ) {
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+ p = rand_pool_detach(crngt_pool);
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+ r = EVP_Digest(p, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, md, md_size, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
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+ if (r != 0)
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+ memcpy(buf, p, CRNGT_BUFSIZ);
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+ rand_pool_reattach(crngt_pool, p);
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+ return r;
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+ }
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+
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+void rand_crngt_cleanup(void)
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+{
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+ rand_pool_free(crngt_pool);
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+ crngt_pool = NULL;
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+}
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+
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+int rand_crngt_init(void)
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+{
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+ unsigned char buf[CRNGT_BUFSIZ];
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+
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+ if ((crngt_pool = rand_pool_new(0, 1, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, CRNGT_BUFSIZ)) == NULL)
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+ return 0;
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+ if (crngt_get_entropy(buf, crngt_prev, NULL)) {
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+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
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+ return 1;
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+ }
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+ rand_crngt_cleanup();
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+
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+static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_crngt_init_flag = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
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+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_crngt_init)
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+{
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+ return OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL)
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+ && rand_crngt_init()
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+ && OPENSSL_atexit(&rand_crngt_cleanup);
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+}
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+
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+int rand_crngt_single_init(void)
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+{
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+ return RUN_ONCE(&rand_crngt_init_flag, do_rand_crngt_init);
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+}
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+
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+size_t rand_crngt_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
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+ unsigned char **pout,
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+ int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
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+ int prediction_resistance)
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+{
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+ unsigned char buf[CRNGT_BUFSIZ], md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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+ unsigned int sz;
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+ RAND_POOL *pool;
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+ size_t q, r = 0, s, t = 0;
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+ int attempts = 3;
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+
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+ if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_crngt_init_flag, do_rand_crngt_init))
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+ return 0;
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+
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+ if ((pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len)) == NULL)
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+ return 0;
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+
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+ while ((q = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1)) > 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
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+ s = q > sizeof(buf) ? sizeof(buf) : q;
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+ if (!crngt_get_entropy(buf, md, &sz)
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+ || memcmp(crngt_prev, md, sz) == 0
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+ || !rand_pool_add(pool, buf, s, s * 8))
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+ goto err;
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+ memcpy(crngt_prev, md, sz);
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+ t += s;
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+ attempts++;
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+ }
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+ r = t;
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+ *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
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+err:
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+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
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+ rand_pool_free(pool);
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+ return r;
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+}
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+
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+void rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
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+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
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+{
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+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
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+}
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Index: openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_local.h
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===================================================================
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--- openssl-1.1.1g.orig/crypto/rand/rand_local.h 2020-04-21 15:59:25.552654754 +0200
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+++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/rand/rand_local.h 2020-04-21 15:59:27.208663772 +0200
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@@ -33,7 +33,15 @@
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# define MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL (60*60) /* 1 hour */
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# define SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL (7*60) /* 7 minutes */
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-
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+/*
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+ * The number of bytes that constitutes an atomic lump of entropy with respect
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+ * to the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests. The size is somewhat
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+ * arbitrary, the smaller the value, the less entropy is consumed on first
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+ * read but the higher the probability of the test failing by accident.
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+ *
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+ * The value is in bytes.
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+ */
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+#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ 16
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/*
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* Maximum input size for the DRBG (entropy, nonce, personalization string)
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@@ -44,6 +52,8 @@
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*/
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# define DRBG_MAX_LENGTH INT32_MAX
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+/* The default nonce */
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+# define DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING "OpenSSL NIST SP 800-90A DRBG"
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/*
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* Maximum allocation size for RANDOM_POOL buffers
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@@ -296,4 +306,22 @@ int rand_drbg_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *
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/* initializes the AES-CTR DRBG implementation */
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int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
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+/*
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+ * Entropy call back for the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests.
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+ * These need to be exposed for the unit tests.
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+ */
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+int rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
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+ unsigned int *md_size);
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+extern int (*crngt_get_entropy)(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
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+ unsigned int *md_size);
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+int rand_crngt_init(void);
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+void rand_crngt_cleanup(void);
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+
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+/*
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+ * Expose the run once initialisation function for the unit tests because.
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+ * they need to restart from scratch to validate the first block is skipped
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+ * properly.
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+ */
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+int rand_crngt_single_init(void);
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+
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#endif
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Index: openssl-1.1.1g/test/drbgtest.c
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===================================================================
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--- openssl-1.1.1g.orig/test/drbgtest.c 2020-04-21 15:59:25.552654754 +0200
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+++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/drbgtest.c 2020-04-21 15:59:27.208663772 +0200
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@@ -150,6 +150,31 @@ static size_t kat_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
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return t->noncelen;
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}
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+ /*
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+ * Disable CRNG testing if it is enabled.
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+ * If the DRBG is ready or in an error state, this means an instantiate cycle
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+ * for which the default personalisation string is used.
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+ */
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+static int disable_crngt(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
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+{
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+ static const char pers[] = DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING;
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+ const int instantiate = drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
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+
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+ if (drbg->get_entropy != rand_crngt_get_entropy)
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+ return 1;
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+
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+ if ((instantiate && !RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg))
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+ || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, &rand_drbg_get_entropy,
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+ &rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy,
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+ &rand_drbg_get_nonce,
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+ &rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce))
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+ || (instantiate
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+ && !RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, (const unsigned char *)pers,
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+ sizeof(pers) - 1)))
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+ return 0;
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+ return 1;
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+}
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+
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static int uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
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{
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int ret = drbg == NULL ? 1 : RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
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@@ -175,7 +200,8 @@ static int single_kat(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA
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if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(td->nid, td->flags, NULL)))
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return 0;
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if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, kat_entropy, NULL,
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- kat_nonce, NULL))) {
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+ kat_nonce, NULL))
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+ || !TEST_true(disable_crngt(drbg))) {
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failures++;
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goto err;
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}
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@@ -293,7 +319,8 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DAT
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unsigned int reseed_counter_tmp;
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int ret = 0;
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- if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, NULL)))
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+ if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(0, 0, NULL))
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+ || !TEST_true(disable_crngt(drbg)))
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goto err;
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/*
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@@ -740,6 +767,10 @@ static int test_rand_drbg_reseed(void)
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|| !TEST_ptr_eq(private->parent, master))
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return 0;
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+ /* Disable CRNG testing for the master DRBG */
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+ if (!TEST_true(disable_crngt(master)))
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+ return 0;
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+
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/* uninstantiate the three global DRBGs */
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RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(private);
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RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(public);
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@@ -964,7 +995,8 @@ static int test_rand_seed(void)
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size_t rand_buflen;
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size_t required_seed_buflen = 0;
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- if (!TEST_ptr(master = RAND_DRBG_get0_master()))
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+ if (!TEST_ptr(master = RAND_DRBG_get0_master())
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+ || !TEST_true(disable_crngt(master)))
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return 0;
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#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE
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@@ -1013,6 +1045,95 @@ static int test_rand_add(void)
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return 1;
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}
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+/*
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+ * A list of the FIPS DRGB types.
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+ */
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+static const struct s_drgb_types {
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+ int nid;
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+ int flags;
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+} drgb_types[] = {
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+ { NID_aes_128_ctr, 0 },
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+ { NID_aes_192_ctr, 0 },
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+ { NID_aes_256_ctr, 0 },
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+};
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+
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+/* Six cases for each covers seed sizes up to 32 bytes */
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+static const size_t crngt_num_cases = 6;
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+
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+static size_t crngt_case, crngt_idx;
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+
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+static int crngt_entropy_cb(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
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+ unsigned int *md_size)
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+{
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+ size_t i, z;
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+
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+ if (!TEST_int_lt(crngt_idx, crngt_num_cases))
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+ return 0;
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+ /* Generate a block of unique data unless this is the duplication point */
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+ z = crngt_idx++;
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+ if (z > 0 && crngt_case == z)
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+ z--;
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+ for (i = 0; i < CRNGT_BUFSIZ; i++)
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+ buf[i] = (unsigned char)(i + 'A' + z);
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+ return EVP_Digest(buf, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, md, md_size, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
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+}
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+
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+static int test_crngt(int n)
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+{
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+ const struct s_drgb_types *dt = drgb_types + n / crngt_num_cases;
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+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = NULL;
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+ unsigned char buff[100];
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+ size_t ent;
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+ int res = 0;
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+ int expect;
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+
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+ if (!TEST_true(rand_crngt_single_init()))
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+ return 0;
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+ rand_crngt_cleanup();
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+
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+ if (!TEST_ptr(drbg = RAND_DRBG_new(dt->nid, dt->flags, NULL)))
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+ return 0;
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+ ent = (drbg->min_entropylen + CRNGT_BUFSIZ - 1) / CRNGT_BUFSIZ;
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+ crngt_case = n % crngt_num_cases;
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+ crngt_idx = 0;
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+ crngt_get_entropy = &crngt_entropy_cb;
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+ if (!TEST_true(rand_crngt_init()))
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+ goto err;
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+#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
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+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, &rand_crngt_get_entropy,
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+ &rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy,
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+ &rand_drbg_get_nonce,
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+ &rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce)))
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+ goto err;
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+#endif
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+ expect = crngt_case == 0 || crngt_case > ent;
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+ if (!TEST_int_eq(RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg, NULL, 0), expect))
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+ goto err;
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+ if (!expect)
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+ goto fin;
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+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, sizeof(buff), 0, NULL, 0)))
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+ goto err;
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+
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+ expect = crngt_case == 0 || crngt_case > 2 * ent;
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+ if (!TEST_int_eq(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0), expect))
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+ goto err;
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+ if (!expect)
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+ goto fin;
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+ if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, sizeof(buff), 0, NULL, 0)))
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+ goto err;
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+
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+fin:
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+ res = 1;
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+err:
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+ if (!res)
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+ TEST_note("DRBG %zd case %zd block %zd", n / crngt_num_cases,
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+ crngt_case, crngt_idx);
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+ uninstantiate(drbg);
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+ RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
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+ crngt_get_entropy = &rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb;
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+ return res;
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+}
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+
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int setup_tests(void)
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{
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app_data_index = RAND_DRBG_get_ex_new_index(0L, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
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@@ -1025,5 +1146,6 @@ int setup_tests(void)
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#if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS)
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ADD_TEST(test_multi_thread);
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#endif
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|
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_crngt, crngt_num_cases * OSSL_NELEM(drgb_types));
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|