forked from pool/openssl-1_1
Pedro Monreal Gonzalez
8f01c56ec8
- Update to 1.1.1w:
* Fix POLY1305 MAC implementation corrupting XMM registers on Windows.
The POLY1305 MAC (message authentication code) implementation in OpenSSL
does not save the contents of non-volatile XMM registers on Windows 64
platform when calculating the MAC of data larger than 64 bytes. Before
returning to the caller all the XMM registers are set to zero rather than
restoring their previous content. The vulnerable code is used only on newer
x86_64 processors supporting the AVX512-IFMA instructions.
The consequences of this kind of internal application state corruption can
be various - from no consequences, if the calling application does not
depend on the contents of non-volatile XMM registers at all, to the worst
consequences, where the attacker could get complete control of the
application process. However given the contents of the registers are just
zeroized so the attacker cannot put arbitrary values inside, the most likely
consequence, if any, would be an incorrect result of some application
dependent calculations or a crash leading to a denial of service.
(CVE-2023-4807)
- Add missing FIPS patches from SLE:
* Add patches:
- bsc1185319-FIPS-KAT-for-ECDSA.patch
- bsc1198207-FIPS-add-hash_hmac-drbg-kat.patch
- openssl-1.1.1-fips-fix-memory-leaks.patch
- openssl-1_1-FIPS-PBKDF2-KAT-requirements.patch
- openssl-1_1-FIPS_drbg-rewire.patch
- openssl-1_1-Zeroization.patch
- openssl-1_1-fips-drbg-selftest.patch
- openssl-1_1-fips-list-only-approved-digest-and-pubkey-algorithms.patch
- openssl-1_1-jitterentropy-3.4.0.patch
- openssl-1_1-ossl-sli-000-fix-build-error.patch
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1111331
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/security:tls/openssl-1_1?expand=0&rev=144
81 lines
2.4 KiB
Diff
81 lines
2.4 KiB
Diff
---
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crypto/fips/fips_entropy.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
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1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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--- a/crypto/fips/fips_entropy.c
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+++ b/crypto/fips/fips_entropy.c
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@@ -4,35 +4,71 @@
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#include "jitterentropy.h"
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static struct rand_data* ec = NULL;
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+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *jent_lock = NULL;
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+static int stop = 0;
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struct rand_data* FIPS_entropy_init(void)
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{
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- if (ec != NULL)
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+ if (ec != NULL) {
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/* Entropy source has been initiated and collector allocated */
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return ec;
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+ }
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+ if (stop != 0) {
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+ /* FIPS_entropy_cleanup() already called, don't initialize it again */
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+ if (jent_lock == NULL) {
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+ /* Allocates a new lock to serialize access to jent library */
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+ jent_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
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+ if (jent_lock == NULL) {
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ if (CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(jent_lock) == 0) {
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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/* If the initialization is successful, the call returns with 0 */
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if (jent_entropy_init_ex(1, JENT_FORCE_FIPS) == 0)
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/* Allocate entropy collector */
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ec = jent_entropy_collector_alloc(1, JENT_FORCE_FIPS);
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+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(jent_lock);
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return ec;
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}
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void FIPS_entropy_cleanup(void)
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{
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+ if (jent_lock != NULL && stop == 0) {
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+ CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(jent_lock);
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+ }
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+ /* Disable re-initialization in FIPS_entropy_init() */
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+ stop = 1;
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/* Free entropy collector */
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if (ec != NULL) {
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jent_entropy_collector_free(ec);
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ec = NULL;
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}
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+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(jent_lock);
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+ jent_lock = NULL;
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}
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ssize_t FIPS_jitter_entropy(unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
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{
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ssize_t ent_bytes = -1;
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- if (buf != NULL && buflen != 0 && FIPS_entropy_init()) {
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+ /*
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+ * Order is important. We need to call FIPS_entropy_init() before we
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+ * acquire jent_lock, otherwise it can lead to deadlock. Once we have
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+ * jent_lock, we need to ensure that FIPS_entropy_cleanup() was not called
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+ * in the meantime. Then it's safe to read entropy.
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+ */
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+ if (buf != NULL
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+ && buflen != 0
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+ && FIPS_entropy_init()
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+ && CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(jent_lock) != 0
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+ && stop == 0) {
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/* Get entropy */
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ent_bytes = jent_read_entropy_safe(&ec, (char *)buf, buflen);
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+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(jent_lock);
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}
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return ent_bytes;
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}
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