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forked from pool/openvpn

Accepting request 489820 from home:ndas:branches:network:vpn

- Preform deferred authentication in the background to not
  cause main daemon processing delays when the underlying pam mechanism (e.g.
  ldap) needs longer to response (bsc#959511).
  [+ 0001-preform-deferred-authentication-in-the-background.patch]
- Added fix for possible heap overflow on read accessing getaddrinfo 
  result (bsc#959714).
  [+openvpn-2.3.9-Fix-heap-overflow-on-getaddrinfo-result.patch]
- Added a patch to fix multiple low severity issues (bsc#934237).
  [+openvpn-2.3.x-fixed-multiple-low-severity-issues.patch]

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/489820
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network:vpn/openvpn?expand=0&rev=115
This commit is contained in:
Marius Tomaschewski 2017-04-27 09:50:39 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
parent 9779642307
commit 9c3259ca06
5 changed files with 486 additions and 0 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
From 8c39dbd45d3551e838310732a73e05f6d2d2e784 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nirmoy Das <ndas@suse.de>
Date: Thu, 12 May 2016 12:08:56 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] preform deferred authentication in the background to not
cause main daemon processing delays when the underlying pam mechanism (e.g.
ldap) needs longer to response.
References: bsc#959511
diff --git a/src/plugins/auth-pam/auth-pam.c b/src/plugins/auth-pam/auth-pam.c
index bd71792..119fc31 100644
--- a/src/plugins/auth-pam/auth-pam.c
+++ b/src/plugins/auth-pam/auth-pam.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
/* Command codes for foreground -> background communication */
#define COMMAND_VERIFY 0
#define COMMAND_EXIT 1
+#define COMMAND_VERIFY_V2 2
/* Response codes for background -> foreground communication */
#define RESPONSE_INIT_SUCCEEDED 10
@@ -108,6 +109,7 @@ struct user_pass {
char username[128];
char password[128];
char common_name[128];
+ char auth_control_file[PATH_MAX];
const struct name_value_list *name_value_list;
};
@@ -687,6 +689,21 @@ pam_auth (const char *service, const struct user_pass *up)
return ret;
}
+static int handle_auth_control_file(char *auth_control_file, int status)
+{
+ FILE *fp = fopen(auth_control_file, "w");
+
+ if (fp) {
+ if (fprintf (fp, "%d\n", status) < 0) {
+ fclose(fp);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
/*
* Background process -- runs with privilege.
*/
@@ -781,6 +798,41 @@ pam_server (int fd, const char *service, int verb, const struct name_value_list
}
break;
+ case COMMAND_VERIFY_V2:
+ if (recv_string (fd, up.username, sizeof (up.username)) == -1
+ || recv_string (fd, up.password, sizeof (up.password)) == -1
+ || recv_string (fd, up.common_name, sizeof (up.common_name)) == -1
+ || recv_string (fd, up.auth_control_file, sizeof (up.auth_control_file)) == -1)
+ {
+ fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: BACKGROUND: read error on command channel: code=%d, exiting\n",
+ command);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (DEBUG (verb))
+ {
+#if 0
+ fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: BACKGROUND: USER/PASS: %s/%s\n",
+ up.username, up.password);
+#else
+ fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: BACKGROUND: USER: %s\n", up.username);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (pam_auth (service, &up)) /* Succeeded */
+ {
+ if (handle_auth_control_file(up.auth_control_file, 1) == -1) {
+ fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: BACKGROUND: write error on control file\n");
+ }
+ }
+ else /* Failed */
+ {
+ if (handle_auth_control_file(up.auth_control_file, 0) == -1) {
+ fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: BACKGROUND: write error on control file\n");
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
case COMMAND_EXIT:
goto done;
@@ -804,3 +856,56 @@ pam_server (int fd, const char *service, int verb, const struct name_value_list
return;
}
+
+int
+handle_auth_pass_verify_v2(struct auth_pam_context *context, const char *argv[], const char *envp[])
+{
+
+ /* get username/password from envp string array */
+ const char *username = get_env ("username", envp);
+ const char *password = get_env ("password", envp);
+ const char *common_name = get_env ("common_name", envp) ? get_env ("common_name", envp) : "";
+ const char *auth_control_file = get_env ("auth_control_file", envp);
+
+ if (!username || !*username || !password)
+ return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR;
+
+ if (!auth_control_file || !*auth_control_file || access( auth_control_file, F_OK ) == -1)
+ return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR;
+
+ if (send_control (context->foreground_fd, COMMAND_VERIFY_V2) == -1
+ || send_string (context->foreground_fd, username) == -1
+ || send_string (context->foreground_fd, password) == -1
+ || send_string (context->foreground_fd, common_name) == -1
+ || send_string (context->foreground_fd, auth_control_file) == -1)
+ {
+ fprintf (stderr, "AUTH-PAM: Error sending auth info to background process\n");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_DEFERRED;
+ }
+
+ return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR;
+}
+
+OPENVPN_EXPORT int
+openvpn_plugin_func_v2 (openvpn_plugin_handle_t handle,
+ const int type,
+ const char *argv[],
+ const char *envp[],
+ void *per_client_context,
+ struct openvpn_plugin_string_list **return_list)
+{
+ struct auth_pam_context *context = (struct auth_pam_context *) handle;
+
+ switch (type)
+ {
+ case OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY:
+ printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY\n");
+ return handle_auth_pass_verify_v2 (context, argv, envp);
+ default:
+ printf ("OPENVPN_PLUGIN_?\n");
+ return OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/src/plugins/auth-pam/auth-pam.exports b/src/plugins/auth-pam/auth-pam.exports
index b07937c..11a80f1 100644
--- a/src/plugins/auth-pam/auth-pam.exports
+++ b/src/plugins/auth-pam/auth-pam.exports
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
openvpn_plugin_open_v1
openvpn_plugin_func_v1
+openvpn_plugin_func_v2
openvpn_plugin_close_v1
openvpn_plugin_abort_v1
--
2.6.2

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@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
Author: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Date: Tue Nov 10 22:58:39 2015 +0100
Fix possible heap overflow on read accessing getaddrinfo() result.
The code always tried to copy-out a "struct sockaddr_in6" even for IPv4
results, which reads more bytes than getaddrinfo() is guaranteed to
allocate.
Now, look at ai->ai_family and only copy "struct sockaddr" for IPv4.
Also, reformat this block of code to comply to coding style.
This is a specific 2.3 bug as the code in master (to be 2.4) has been
completely rewritten to properly handle dual-stack and multiple responses
from getaddrinfo() proper.
Bug found by Daniel Hirche using "gcc -fsanitize=address". No possible
exploits are known.
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Message-Id: <1447192719-31381-1-git-send-email-gert@greenie.muc.de>
URL: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/10479
References: bsc#959714
diff --git a/src/openvpn/socket.c b/src/openvpn/socket.c
index a143853..0f46bad 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/socket.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/socket.c
<at> <at> -1259,20 +1259,24 <at> <at> resolve_remote (struct link_socket *sock,
ASSERT (0);
}
- /* Temporary fix, this need to be changed for dual stack */
- status = openvpn_getaddrinfo(flags, sock->remote_host, retry,
- signal_received, af, &ai);
- if(status == 0) {
- sock->info.lsa->remote.addr.in6 = *((struct sockaddr_in6*)(ai->ai_addr));
- freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ /* Temporary fix, this need to be changed for dual stack */
+ status = openvpn_getaddrinfo(flags, sock->remote_host, retry,
+ signal_received, af, &ai);
+ if(status == 0)
+ {
+ if ( ai->ai_family == AF_INET6 )
+ sock->info.lsa->remote.addr.in6 = *((struct sockaddr_in6*)(ai->ai_addr));
+ else
+ sock->info.lsa->remote.addr.in4 = *((struct sockaddr_in*)(ai->ai_addr));
+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
- dmsg (D_SOCKET_DEBUG, "RESOLVE_REMOTE flags=0x%04x phase=%d rrs=%d sig=%d status=%d",
+ dmsg (D_SOCKET_DEBUG, "RESOLVE_REMOTE flags=0x%04x phase=%d rrs=%d sig=%d status=%d",
flags,
phase,
retry,
signal_received ? *signal_received : -1,
status);
- }
+ }
if (signal_received)
{
if (*signal_received)
--
2.4.9

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@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto.c b/src/openvpn/crypto.c
index 4261795..44c1f9e 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/crypto.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/crypto.c
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ openvpn_encrypt (struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
ASSERT (cipher_ctx_reset(ctx->cipher, iv_buf));
/* Buffer overflow check */
- if (!buf_safe (&work, buf->len + cipher_ctx_block_size(ctx->cipher)))
+ if (!buf_safe (&work, buf->len + OPENVPN_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH))
{
msg (D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "ENCRYPT: buffer size error, bc=%d bo=%d bl=%d wc=%d wo=%d wl=%d cbs=%d",
buf->capacity,
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ openvpn_decrypt (struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
const int iv_size = cipher_ctx_iv_length (ctx->cipher);
const cipher_kt_t *cipher_kt = cipher_ctx_get_cipher_kt (ctx->cipher);
uint8_t iv_buf[OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- int outlen;
+ int outlen = 0;
/* initialize work buffer with FRAME_HEADROOM bytes of prepend capacity */
ASSERT (buf_init (&work, FRAME_HEADROOM_ADJ (frame, FRAME_HEADROOM_MARKER_DECRYPT)));
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ openvpn_decrypt (struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
CRYPT_ERROR ("cipher init failed");
/* Buffer overflow check (should never happen) */
- if (!buf_safe (&work, buf->len + cipher_ctx_block_size(ctx->cipher)))
+ if (!buf_safe (&work, buf->len + OPENVPN_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH))
CRYPT_ERROR ("potential buffer overflow");
/* Decrypt packet ID, payload */
diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.h b/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.h
index 2ed0bef..ae9f24d 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.h
+++ b/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.h
@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ typedef HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx_t;
/** Maximum length of an IV */
#define OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+/** Maximum length of a cipher block */
+#define OPENVPN_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+
/** Cipher is in CBC mode */
#define OPENVPN_MODE_CBC EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
diff --git a/src/openvpn/init.c b/src/openvpn/init.c
index 089e3c4..e03a3e6 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/init.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/init.c
@@ -2614,8 +2614,8 @@ init_context_buffers (const struct frame *frame)
b->aux_buf = alloc_buf (BUF_SIZE (frame));
#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO
- b->encrypt_buf = alloc_buf (BUF_SIZE (frame));
- b->decrypt_buf = alloc_buf (BUF_SIZE (frame));
+ b->encrypt_buf = alloc_buf (BUF_SIZE (frame) + OPENVPN_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+ b->decrypt_buf = alloc_buf (BUF_SIZE (frame) + OPENVPN_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH);
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_LZO
diff --git a/src/openvpn/proxy.c b/src/openvpn/proxy.c
index 89989d1..5809daa 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/proxy.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/proxy.c
@@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ recv_line (socket_descriptor_t sd,
struct buffer la;
int lastc = 0;
+ if (sd >= FD_SETSIZE)
+ return false;
+
CLEAR (la);
if (lookahead)
la = *lookahead;
@@ -283,11 +286,11 @@ get_proxy_authenticate (socket_descriptor_t sd,
struct gc_arena *gc,
volatile int *signal_received)
{
- char buf[256];
+ char buf[256] = {0};
int ret = HTTP_AUTH_NONE;
while (true)
{
- if (!recv_line (sd, buf, sizeof (buf), timeout, true, NULL, signal_received))
+ if (!recv_line (sd, buf, sizeof (buf) - 1, timeout, true, NULL, signal_received))
{
*data = NULL;
return HTTP_AUTH_NONE;
@@ -498,9 +501,9 @@ establish_http_proxy_passthru (struct http_proxy_info *p,
volatile int *signal_received)
{
struct gc_arena gc = gc_new ();
- char buf[512];
- char buf2[129];
- char get[80];
+ char buf[512] = {0};
+ char buf2[129] = {0};
+ char get[80] = {0};
int status;
int nparms;
bool ret = false;
@@ -586,7 +589,8 @@ establish_http_proxy_passthru (struct http_proxy_info *p,
goto error;
/* receive reply from proxy */
- if (!recv_line (sd, buf, sizeof(buf), p->options.timeout, true, NULL, signal_received))
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ if (!recv_line (sd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1 , p->options.timeout, true, NULL, signal_received))
goto error;
/* remove trailing CR, LF */
@@ -615,7 +619,8 @@ establish_http_proxy_passthru (struct http_proxy_info *p,
while (true)
{
- if (!recv_line (sd, buf, sizeof(buf), p->options.timeout, true, NULL, signal_received))
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ if (!recv_line (sd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, p->options.timeout, true, NULL, signal_received))
goto error;
chomp (buf);
msg (D_PROXY, "HTTP proxy returned: '%s'", buf);
@@ -685,7 +690,8 @@ establish_http_proxy_passthru (struct http_proxy_info *p,
goto error;
/* receive reply from proxy */
- if (!recv_line (sd, buf, sizeof(buf), p->options.timeout, true, NULL, signal_received))
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ if (!recv_line (sd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, p->options.timeout, true, NULL, signal_received))
goto error;
/* remove trailing CR, LF */
@@ -795,7 +801,8 @@ establish_http_proxy_passthru (struct http_proxy_info *p,
goto error;
/* receive reply from proxy */
- if (!recv_line (sd, buf, sizeof(buf), p->options.timeout, true, NULL, signal_received))
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ if (!recv_line (sd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, p->options.timeout, true, NULL, signal_received))
goto error;
/* remove trailing CR, LF */
diff --git a/src/openvpn/socket.c b/src/openvpn/socket.c
index 3474f18..dfd9d6c 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/socket.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/socket.c
@@ -832,6 +832,9 @@ socket_listen_accept (socket_descriptor_t sd,
struct openvpn_sockaddr remote_verify = act->dest;
int new_sd = SOCKET_UNDEFINED;
+ if (sd >= FD_SETSIZE)
+ return -1;
+
CLEAR (*act);
socket_do_listen (sd, local, do_listen, true);
@@ -919,6 +922,9 @@ openvpn_connect (socket_descriptor_t sd,
{
int status = 0;
+ if (sd >= FD_SETSIZE)
+ return -1;
+
#ifdef CONNECT_NONBLOCK
set_nonblock (sd);
status = connect (sd, &remote->addr.sa, af_addr_size(remote->addr.sa.sa_family));
diff --git a/src/openvpn/socks.c b/src/openvpn/socks.c
index 57dc02a..8954e91 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/socks.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/socks.c
@@ -97,13 +97,16 @@ socks_username_password_auth (struct socks_proxy_info *p,
socket_descriptor_t sd,
volatile int *signal_received)
{
- char to_send[516];
- char buf[2];
+ char to_send[516] = {0};
+ char buf[2] = {0};
int len = 0;
const int timeout_sec = 5;
struct user_pass creds;
ssize_t size;
+ if (sd >= FD_SETSIZE)
+ return false;
+
creds.defined = 0;
if (!get_user_pass (&creds, p->authfile, UP_TYPE_SOCKS, GET_USER_PASS_MANAGEMENT))
{
@@ -189,7 +192,7 @@ socks_handshake (struct socks_proxy_info *p,
socket_descriptor_t sd,
volatile int *signal_received)
{
- char buf[2];
+ char buf[2] = {0};
int len = 0;
const int timeout_sec = 5;
ssize_t size;
@@ -198,6 +201,8 @@ socks_handshake (struct socks_proxy_info *p,
char method_sel[3] = { 0x05, 0x01, 0x00 };
if (p->authfile[0])
method_sel[2] = 0x02; /* METHODS = [2 (plain login)] */
+ if (sd >= FD_SETSIZE)
+ return false;
size = send (sd, method_sel, sizeof (method_sel), MSG_NOSIGNAL);
if (size != sizeof (method_sel))
@@ -302,9 +307,12 @@ recv_socks_reply (socket_descriptor_t sd,
char atyp = '\0';
int alen = 0;
int len = 0;
- char buf[22];
+ char buf[22] = {0};
const int timeout_sec = 5;
+ if (sd >= FD_SETSIZE)
+ return false;
+
if (addr != NULL)
{
addr->addr.in4.sin_family = AF_INET;
@@ -381,7 +389,7 @@ recv_socks_reply (socket_descriptor_t sd,
}
/* store char in buffer */
- if (len < (int)sizeof(buf))
+ if (len < (int)sizeof(buf) && len >= 0)
buf[len] = c;
++len;
}
@@ -411,7 +419,7 @@ establish_socks_proxy_passthru (struct socks_proxy_info *p,
const int port, /* openvpn server port */
volatile int *signal_received)
{
- char buf[128];
+ char buf[128] = {0};
size_t len;
if (!socks_handshake (p, sd, signal_received))

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@ -1,3 +1,16 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fri Apr 21 14:55:09 CEST 2017 - ndas@suse.de
- Preform deferred authentication in the background to not
cause main daemon processing delays when the underlying pam mechanism (e.g.
ldap) needs longer to response (bsc#959511).
[+ 0001-preform-deferred-authentication-in-the-background.patch]
- Added fix for possible heap overflow on read accessing getaddrinfo
result (bsc#959714).
[+openvpn-2.3.9-Fix-heap-overflow-on-getaddrinfo-result.patch]
- Added a patch to fix multiple low severity issues (bsc#934237).
[+openvpn-2.3.x-fixed-multiple-low-severity-issues.patch]
------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------
Sun Jan 22 15:21:17 UTC 2017 - mrueckert@suse.de Sun Jan 22 15:21:17 UTC 2017 - mrueckert@suse.de

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@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ Source10: %{name}-tmpfile.conf
Source11: rc%{name} Source11: rc%{name}
Patch1: %{name}-2.3-plugin-man.dif Patch1: %{name}-2.3-plugin-man.dif
Patch6: %{name}-fips140-2.3.2.patch Patch6: %{name}-fips140-2.3.2.patch
Patch7: openvpn-2.3.9-Fix-heap-overflow-on-getaddrinfo-result.patch
Patch8: openvpn-2.3.x-fixed-multiple-low-severity-issues.patch
Patch9: 0001-preform-deferred-authentication-in-the-background.patch
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
BuildRequires: iproute2 BuildRequires: iproute2
BuildRequires: lzo-devel BuildRequires: lzo-devel
@ -135,6 +138,9 @@ This package provides the header file to build external plugins.
%setup -q -n %{name}-%{version} %setup -q -n %{name}-%{version}
%patch1 -p0 %patch1 -p0
%patch6 -p1 %patch6 -p1
%patch7 -p1
%patch8 -p1
%patch9 -p1
sed -e "s|\" __DATE__|$(date '+%b %e %Y' -r version.m4)\"|g" \ sed -e "s|\" __DATE__|$(date '+%b %e %Y' -r version.m4)\"|g" \
-i src/openvpn/options.c -i src/openvpn/options.c