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forked from pool/pam_kwallet

Plasma 5.11 Beta - hopefully everything addressed now (if it builds fine)

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/KDE:Frameworks5/pam_kwallet?expand=0&rev=43
This commit is contained in:
OBS User mrdocs 2017-09-15 03:22:18 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
parent 0e8b88f628
commit 96cbdc2328
7 changed files with 21 additions and 285 deletions

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@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
From a6369519e080b741fea731ab42bb19e84c6e6fdb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Fabian Vogt <fabian@ritter-vogt.de>
Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2017 09:02:14 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Several cleanups
- No cppcheck warnings anymore
- Use snprintf everywhere
- Avoid pointless multiplication with sizeof(char)
- Avoid memory leaks
---
pam_kwallet.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/pam_kwallet.c b/pam_kwallet.c
index d88c5e0..cba57e7 100644
--- a/pam_kwallet.c
+++ b/pam_kwallet.c
@@ -151,13 +151,14 @@ static int set_env(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name, const char *value)
//We do not return because pam_putenv might work
}
- char *pamEnv = malloc(strlen(name) + strlen(value) + 2); //2 is for = and \0
+ size_t pamEnvSize = strlen(name) + strlen(value) + 2; //2 is for = and \0
+ char *pamEnv = malloc(pamEnvSize);
if (!pamEnv) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING, "%s: Impossible to allocate memory for pamEnv", logPrefix);
return -1;
}
- sprintf (pamEnv, "%s=%s", name, value);
+ snprintf (pamEnv, pamEnvSize, "%s=%s", name, value);
int ret = pam_putenv(pamh, pamEnv);
free(pamEnv);
@@ -240,6 +241,11 @@ cleanup:
return result;
}
+static void cleanup_free(pam_handle_t *pamh, void *ptr, int error_status)
+{
+ free(ptr);
+}
+
PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
{
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "%s: pam_sm_authenticate\n", logPrefix);
@@ -297,14 +303,17 @@ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, cons
return PAM_IGNORE;
}
- char *key = malloc(sizeof(char) * KWALLET_PAM_KEYSIZE);
- if (kwallet_hash(password, userInfo, key) != 0) {
+ char *key = malloc(KWALLET_PAM_KEYSIZE);
+ if (!key || kwallet_hash(password, userInfo, key) != 0) {
+ free(key);
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "%s: Fail into creating the hash", logPrefix);
return PAM_IGNORE;
}
- result = pam_set_data(pamh, kwalletPamDataKey, key, NULL);
+ result = pam_set_data(pamh, kwalletPamDataKey, key, cleanup_free);
+
if (result != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ free(key);
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "%s: Impossible to store the hashed password: %s", logPrefix
, pam_strerror(pamh, result));
return PAM_IGNORE;
@@ -385,9 +394,8 @@ cleanup:
static int better_write(int fd, const char *buffer, int len)
{
size_t writtenBytes = 0;
- int result;
while(writtenBytes < len) {
- result = write(fd, buffer + writtenBytes, len - writtenBytes);
+ int result = write(fd, buffer + writtenBytes, len - writtenBytes);
if (result < 0) {
if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR) {
return -1;
@@ -450,6 +458,7 @@ static void start_kwallet(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct passwd *userInfo, const cha
if (result != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "%s: Impossible to set %s env, %s",
logPrefix, envVar, pam_strerror(pamh, result));
+ free(fullSocket);
return;
}
@@ -459,12 +468,15 @@ static void start_kwallet(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct passwd *userInfo, const cha
if (strlen(fullSocket) > sizeof(local.sun_path)) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "%s: socket path %s too long to open",
logPrefix, fullSocket);
+ free(fullSocket);
return;
}
strcpy(local.sun_path, fullSocket);
+ free(fullSocket);
+ fullSocket = NULL;
unlink(local.sun_path);//Just in case it exists from a previous login
- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "%s: final socket path: %s", logPrefix, fullSocket);
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "%s: final socket path: %s", logPrefix, local.sun_path);
size_t len = strlen(local.sun_path) + sizeof(local.sun_family);
if (bind(envSocket, (struct sockaddr *)&local, len) == -1) {
@@ -477,7 +489,7 @@ static void start_kwallet(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct passwd *userInfo, const cha
return;
}
- if (chown(fullSocket, userInfo->pw_uid, userInfo->pw_gid) == -1) {
+ if (chown(local.sun_path, userInfo->pw_uid, userInfo->pw_gid) == -1) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "%s: Couldn't change ownership of the socket", logPrefix);
return;
}
@@ -655,7 +667,8 @@ int kwallet_hash(const char *passphrase, struct passwd *userInfo, char *key)
#else
char *fixpath = "share/apps/kwallet/kdewallet.salt";
#endif
- char *path = (char*) malloc(strlen(userInfo->pw_dir) + strlen(kdehome) + strlen(fixpath) + 3);//3 == / and \0
+ size_t pathSize = strlen(userInfo->pw_dir) + strlen(kdehome) + strlen(fixpath) + 3;//3 == /, / and \0
+ char *path = (char*) malloc(pathSize);
sprintf(path, "%s/%s/%s", userInfo->pw_dir, kdehome, fixpath);
struct stat info;
@@ -666,21 +679,26 @@ int kwallet_hash(const char *passphrase, struct passwd *userInfo, char *key)
FILE *fd = fopen(path, "r");
if (fd == NULL) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: Couldn't open file: %s because: %d-%s", logPrefix, path, errno, strerror(errno));
+ free(path);
return 1;
}
- salt = (char*) malloc(sizeof(char) * KWALLET_PAM_SALTSIZE);
+ salt = (char*) malloc(KWALLET_PAM_SALTSIZE);
memset(salt, '\0', KWALLET_PAM_SALTSIZE);
fread(salt, KWALLET_PAM_SALTSIZE, 1, fd);
fclose(fd);
}
+ free(path);
+
if (salt == NULL) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s-kwalletd: Couldn't create or read the salt file", logPrefix);
return 1;
}
gcry_error_t error;
+
error = gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 32768, 0);
if (error != 0) {
+ free(salt);
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s-kwalletd: Can't get secure memory: %d", logPrefix, error);
return 1;
}
@@ -691,5 +709,7 @@ int kwallet_hash(const char *passphrase, struct passwd *userInfo, char *key)
GCRY_KDF_PBKDF2, GCRY_MD_SHA512,
salt, KWALLET_PAM_SALTSIZE,
KWALLET_PAM_ITERATIONS,KWALLET_PAM_KEYSIZE, key);
- return 0;
+
+ free(salt);
+ return (int) error; // gcry_kdf_derive returns 0 on success
}
--
2.13.2

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@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
From a8153375a5006f5ca766b58a1a8f488699314a74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Fabian Vogt <fabian@ritter-vogt.de>
Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2017 09:27:10 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Avoid dropping privileges by initializing gcrypt secmem
It's a documented side effect that initialization of secure memory in gcrypt
drops privileges if getuid() != geteuid(). This results in breaking setuid
callers, like sudo or su.
---
pam_kwallet.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/pam_kwallet.c b/pam_kwallet.c
index cba57e7..dc61115 100644
--- a/pam_kwallet.c
+++ b/pam_kwallet.c
@@ -696,12 +696,18 @@ int kwallet_hash(const char *passphrase, struct passwd *userInfo, char *key)
gcry_error_t error;
+ /* We cannot call GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM as it drops privileges if getuid() != geteuid().
+ * PAM modules are in many cases executed through setuid binaries, which this call
+ * would break.
+ * It was never effective anyway as neither key nor passphrase are in secure memory,
+ * which is a prerequisite for secure operation...
error = gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 32768, 0);
if (error != 0) {
free(salt);
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s-kwalletd: Can't get secure memory: %d", logPrefix, error);
return 1;
}
+ */
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0);
--
2.13.2

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@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
From f5f27799e1b6875be7f34edac3a9f98a2b550b2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Fabian Vogt <fabian@ritter-vogt.de>
Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2017 09:50:30 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Check for a graphical session
Avoid running if it detects a text session. This can be overridden by adding
"force_run" as argument.
---
pam_kwallet.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
diff --git a/pam_kwallet.c b/pam_kwallet.c
index dc61115..34bc045 100644
--- a/pam_kwallet.c
+++ b/pam_kwallet.c
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ const static char *kwalletd = NULL;
const static char *socketPath = NULL;
const static char *kwalletPamDataKey = NULL;
const static char *logPrefix = NULL;
+static int force_run = 0;
#ifdef KWALLET5
const static char *envVar = "PAM_KWALLET5_LOGIN";
@@ -98,6 +99,8 @@ static void parseArguments(int argc, const char **argv)
kwalletd = argv[x] + 9;
} else if (strstr(argv[x], "socketPath=") != NULL) {
socketPath= argv[x] + 11;
+ } else if (strcmp(argv[x], "force_run") == 0) {
+ force_run = 1;
}
}
#ifdef KWALLET5
@@ -241,6 +244,24 @@ cleanup:
return result;
}
+static int is_graphical_session(pam_handle_t *pamh)
+{
+ //Detect a graphical session
+ const char *pam_tty = NULL, *pam_xdisplay = NULL,
+ *xdg_session_type = NULL, *display = NULL;
+
+ pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, (const void**) &pam_tty);
+#ifdef PAM_XDISPLAY
+ pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_XDISPLAY, (const void**) &pam_xdisplay);
+#endif
+ xdg_session_type = get_env(pamh, "XDG_SESSION_TYPE");
+
+ return (pam_xdisplay && strlen(pam_xdisplay) != 0)
+ || (pam_tty && pam_tty[0] == ':')
+ || (xdg_session_type && strcmp(xdg_session_type, "x11") == 0)
+ || (xdg_session_type && strcmp(xdg_session_type, "wayland") == 0);
+}
+
static void cleanup_free(pam_handle_t *pamh, void *ptr, int error_status)
{
free(ptr);
@@ -537,6 +558,11 @@ PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, cons
parseArguments(argc, argv);
+ if (!force_run && !is_graphical_session(pamh)) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "%s: not a graphical session, skipping. Use force_run parameter to ignore this.", logPrefix);
+ return PAM_IGNORE;
+ }
+
int result;
result = pam_set_data(pamh, "sm_open_session", "1", NULL);
if (result != PAM_SUCCESS) {
--
2.13.2

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@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:c42e444c9c85dc5bbc60bbd666d20ea72162ddd38dc18254c47c48a0ca404073
size 17908

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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:d715b88be84387edc2421655267451d76a624f8b67b04fb7a2ac19e157d2cf56
size 18724

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@ -1,3 +1,20 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Sep 14 14:29:06 CEST 2017 - fabian@ritter-vogt.de
- Update to 5.10.95
* New feature release
* For more details please see:
* https://www.kde.org/announcements/plasma-5.10.95.php
- Changes since 5.10.5:
* Avoid dropping privileges by initializing gcrypt secmem
* Check for a graphical session
* Several cleanups
* Handle differences in PAM headers
- Remove patches, now upstream:
* pam_kwallet/0001-Several-cleanups.patch
* pam_kwallet/0002-Avoid-dropping-privileges-by-initializing-gcrypt-sec.patch
* pam_kwallet/0003-Check-for-a-graphical-session.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fri Aug 25 13:55:26 UTC 2017 - jengelh@inai.de

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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
Name: pam_kwallet
Version: 5.10.5
Version: 5.10.95
Release: 0
Summary: A PAM Module for KWallet signing
License: LGPL-2.1 and GPL-2.0+ and GPL-3.0
@ -25,12 +25,6 @@ Group: System/GUI/KDE
Url: http://www.kde.org/
Source0: http://download.kde.org/stable/plasma/%{version}/kwallet-pam-%{version}.tar.xz
Source1: baselibs.conf
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM
Patch1: 0001-Several-cleanups.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM
Patch2: 0002-Avoid-dropping-privileges-by-initializing-gcrypt-sec.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM
Patch3: 0003-Check-for-a-graphical-session.patch
BuildRequires: extra-cmake-modules >= 1.2.0
BuildRequires: kf5-filesystem
BuildRequires: libgcrypt-devel >= 1.5.0
@ -59,9 +53,6 @@ module.
%prep
%setup -q -n kwallet-pam-%{version}
%patch1 -p1
%patch2 -p1
%patch3 -p1
%build
%cmake_kf5 -d build -- -DLIBEXEC_INSTALL_DIR=%{_kf5_libexecdir} -DCMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX=/