diff --git a/CVE-2021-28861-double-slash-path.patch b/CVE-2021-28861-double-slash-path.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c2afec2 --- /dev/null +++ b/CVE-2021-28861-double-slash-path.patch @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +Index: Python-2.7.18/Lib/BaseHTTPServer.py +=================================================================== +--- Python-2.7.18.orig/Lib/BaseHTTPServer.py ++++ Python-2.7.18/Lib/BaseHTTPServer.py +@@ -287,6 +287,14 @@ class BaseHTTPRequestHandler(SocketServe + return False + self.command, self.path, self.request_version = command, path, version + ++ # CVE-2021-28861: The purpose of replacing '//' with '/' is to ++ # protect against open redirect attacks possibly triggered if the ++ # path starts with '//' because http clients treat //path as an ++ # absolute URI without scheme (similar to http://path) rather than ++ # a path. ++ if self.path.startswith('//'): ++ self.path = '/' + self.path.lstrip('/') # Reduce to a single / ++ + # Examine the headers and look for a Connection directive + self.headers = self.MessageClass(self.rfile, 0) + +Index: Python-2.7.18/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py +=================================================================== +--- Python-2.7.18.orig/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py ++++ Python-2.7.18/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py +@@ -417,6 +417,52 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestC + self.assertEqual(response.getheader("Location"), + self.tempdir_name + "/?hi=1") + ++ def test_get_dir_redirect_location_domain_injection_bug(self): ++ """Ensure //evil.co/..%2f../../X does not put //evil.co/ in Location. ++ //netloc/ in a Location header is a redirect to a new host. ++ https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/87389 ++ This checks that a path resolving to a directory on our server cannot ++ resolve into a redirect to another server. ++ """ ++ os.mkdir(os.path.join(self.tempdir, 'existing_directory')) ++ url = '/python.org/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f../%0a%0d/../' + self.tempdir_name + '/existing_directory' ++ expected_location = url + '/' # /python.org.../ single slash single prefix, trailing slash ++ # Canonicalizes to /tmp/tempdir_name/existing_directory which does ++ # exist and is a dir, triggering the 301 redirect logic. ++ response = self.request(url) ++ self.check_status_and_reason(response, 301) ++ location = response.getheader('Location') ++ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location, msg='non-attack failed!') ++ ++ # //python.org... multi-slash prefix, no trailing slash ++ attack_url = '/' + url ++ response = self.request(attack_url) ++ self.check_status_and_reason(response, 301) ++ location = response.getheader('Location') ++ self.assertFalse(location.startswith('//'), msg=location) ++ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location, ++ msg='Expected Location header to start with a single / and ' ++ 'end with a / as this is a directory redirect.') ++ # ///python.org... triple-slash prefix, no trailing slash ++ attack3_url = '//' + url ++ response = self.request(attack3_url) ++ self.check_status_and_reason(response, 301) ++ self.assertEqual(response.getheader('Location'), expected_location) ++ ++ # If the second word in the http request (Request-URI for the http ++ # method) is a full URI, we don't worry about it, as that'll be parsed ++ # and reassembled as a full URI within BaseHTTPRequestHandler.send_head ++ # so no errant scheme-less //netloc//evil.co/ domain mixup can happen. ++ attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url = 'https://pypi.org/' + url ++ expected_scheme_netloc_location = attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url + '/' ++ response = self.request(attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url) ++ self.check_status_and_reason(response, 301) ++ location = response.getheader('Location') ++ # We're just ensuring that the scheme and domain make it through, if ++ # there are or aren't multiple slashes at the start of the path that ++ # follows that isn't important in this Location: header. ++ self.assertTrue(location.startswith('https://pypi.org/'), msg=location) ++ + + cgi_file1 = """\ + #!%s diff --git a/python-base.changes b/python-base.changes index 1dde24e..8f30fd1 100644 --- a/python-base.changes +++ b/python-base.changes @@ -1,3 +1,10 @@ +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Wed Sep 7 04:46:44 UTC 2022 - Steve Kowalik + +- Add patch CVE-2021-28861-double-slash-path.patch: + * BaseHTTPServer: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the HTTP server + when an URI path starts with //. (bsc#1202624, CVE-2021-28861) + ------------------------------------------------------------------- Thu Jun 9 16:43:30 UTC 2022 - Matej Cepl diff --git a/python-base.spec b/python-base.spec index 5519b27..3fa676f 100644 --- a/python-base.spec +++ b/python-base.spec @@ -130,6 +130,9 @@ Patch69: CVE-2022-0391-urllib_parse-newline-parsing.patch # PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2015-20107-mailcap-unsafe-filenames.patch bsc#1198511 mcepl@suse.com # avoid the command injection in the mailcap module. Patch70: CVE-2015-20107-mailcap-unsafe-filenames.patch +# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2021-28861 bsc#1202624 +# Coerce // to / in Lib/BaseHTTPServer.py +Patch71: CVE-2021-28861-double-slash-path.patch # COMMON-PATCH-END %define python_version %(echo %{tarversion} | head -c 3) BuildRequires: automake @@ -266,6 +269,7 @@ other applications. %patch68 -p1 %patch69 -p1 %patch70 -p1 +%patch71 -p1 # For patch 66 cp -v %{SOURCE66} Lib/test/recursion.tar diff --git a/python-doc.changes b/python-doc.changes index 1dde24e..8f30fd1 100644 --- a/python-doc.changes +++ b/python-doc.changes @@ -1,3 +1,10 @@ +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Wed Sep 7 04:46:44 UTC 2022 - Steve Kowalik + +- Add patch CVE-2021-28861-double-slash-path.patch: + * BaseHTTPServer: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the HTTP server + when an URI path starts with //. (bsc#1202624, CVE-2021-28861) + ------------------------------------------------------------------- Thu Jun 9 16:43:30 UTC 2022 - Matej Cepl diff --git a/python-doc.spec b/python-doc.spec index 4c7c9cf..0ac768b 100644 --- a/python-doc.spec +++ b/python-doc.spec @@ -129,6 +129,9 @@ Patch69: CVE-2022-0391-urllib_parse-newline-parsing.patch # PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2015-20107-mailcap-unsafe-filenames.patch bsc#1198511 mcepl@suse.com # avoid the command injection in the mailcap module. Patch70: CVE-2015-20107-mailcap-unsafe-filenames.patch +# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2021-28861 bsc#1202624 +# Coerce // to / in Lib/BaseHTTPServer.py +Patch71: CVE-2021-28861-double-slash-path.patch # COMMON-PATCH-END Provides: pyth_doc = %{version} Provides: pyth_ps = %{version} @@ -203,6 +206,7 @@ Python, and Macintosh Module Reference in PDF format. %patch68 -p1 %patch69 -p1 %patch70 -p1 +%patch71 -p1 # For patch 66 cp -v %{SOURCE66} Lib/test/recursion.tar diff --git a/python.changes b/python.changes index 1dde24e..8f30fd1 100644 --- a/python.changes +++ b/python.changes @@ -1,3 +1,10 @@ +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Wed Sep 7 04:46:44 UTC 2022 - Steve Kowalik + +- Add patch CVE-2021-28861-double-slash-path.patch: + * BaseHTTPServer: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the HTTP server + when an URI path starts with //. (bsc#1202624, CVE-2021-28861) + ------------------------------------------------------------------- Thu Jun 9 16:43:30 UTC 2022 - Matej Cepl diff --git a/python.spec b/python.spec index cef4aa7..eb4d3ee 100644 --- a/python.spec +++ b/python.spec @@ -129,6 +129,9 @@ Patch69: CVE-2022-0391-urllib_parse-newline-parsing.patch # PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2015-20107-mailcap-unsafe-filenames.patch bsc#1198511 mcepl@suse.com # avoid the command injection in the mailcap module. Patch70: CVE-2015-20107-mailcap-unsafe-filenames.patch +# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2021-28861 bsc#1202624 +# Coerce // to / in Lib/BaseHTTPServer.py +Patch71: CVE-2021-28861-double-slash-path.patch # COMMON-PATCH-END BuildRequires: automake BuildRequires: db-devel @@ -319,6 +322,7 @@ that rely on earlier non-verification behavior. %patch68 -p1 %patch69 -p1 %patch70 -p1 +%patch71 -p1 # For patch 66 cp -v %{SOURCE66} Lib/test/recursion.tar