SHA256
1
0
forked from pool/qemu
qemu/virtiofsd-Drop-membership-of-all-supplem.patch
Dario Faggioli 0251d2a2c0 Accepting request 959502 from home:dfaggioli:experimental:Virtualization
- Build PPC firmwares from sources on non-PPC builds as well (bsc#1193545)
- Build RiscV firmwares on non-RiscV builds as well
- While there, refactor (and simplify!) the firmware building logic and code
  * Patches added:
     Makefile-define-endianess-for-cross-buil.patch
- Include vmxcap in the qemu-tools package (is being very useful for debugging bsc#1193364)
- The qemu package should require qemu-x86, qemu-arm, etc, as there's no point installing it without _any_ of them. Additionally, right now, the user does not get a working qemu, if recommended packages are disabled (e.g., on MicroOS or SLE Micro). bsc#1196087
- Give clearer instructions on how to modify the package patches from the output of update_git.sh (docs change only, no functional change)
- qemu,kvm: potential privilege escalation via virtiofsd (bsc#1195161, CVE-2022-0358)
  * Patches added:
     virtiofsd-Drop-membership-of-all-supplem.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/959502
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/qemu?expand=0&rev=691
2022-03-04 18:04:00 +00:00

102 lines
3.1 KiB
Diff

From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 13:51:14 -0500
Subject: virtiofsd: Drop membership of all supplementary groups
(CVE-2022-0358)
Git-commit: 449e8171f96a6a944d1f3b7d3627ae059eae21ca
References: bsc#1195161
At the start, drop membership of all supplementary groups. This is
not required.
If we have membership of "root" supplementary group and when we switch
uid/gid using setresuid/setsgid, we still retain membership of existing
supplemntary groups. And that can allow some operations which are not
normally allowed.
For example, if root in guest creates a dir as follows.
$ mkdir -m 03777 test_dir
This sets SGID on dir as well as allows unprivileged users to write into
this dir.
And now as unprivileged user open file as follows.
$ su test
$ fd = open("test_dir/priviledge_id", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 02755);
This will create SGID set executable in test_dir/.
And that's a problem because now an unpriviliged user can execute it,
get egid=0 and get access to resources owned by "root" group. This is
privilege escalation.
Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2044863
Fixes: CVE-2022-0358
Reported-by: JIETAO XIAO <shawtao1125@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <YfBGoriS38eBQrAb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
dgilbert: Fixed missing {}'s style nit
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
---
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
index 64b5b4fbb18670075eedd1f3d158..b3d0674f6d2f267664d1c4558856 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/xattr.h>
#include <syslog.h>
+#include <grp.h>
#include "qemu/cutils.h"
#include "passthrough_helpers.h"
@@ -1161,6 +1162,30 @@ static void lo_lookup(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent, const char *name)
#define OURSYS_setresuid SYS_setresuid
#endif
+static void drop_supplementary_groups(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = getgroups(0, NULL);
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "getgroups() failed with error=%d:%s\n",
+ errno, strerror(errno));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ if (!ret) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Drop all supplementary groups. We should not need it */
+ ret = setgroups(0, NULL);
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "setgroups() failed with error=%d:%s\n",
+ errno, strerror(errno));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Change to uid/gid of caller so that file is created with
* ownership of caller.
@@ -3926,6 +3951,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
qemu_init_exec_dir(argv[0]);
+ drop_supplementary_groups();
+
pthread_mutex_init(&lo.mutex, NULL);
lo.inodes = g_hash_table_new(lo_key_hash, lo_key_equal);
lo.root.fd = -1;