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qemu/0072-slirp-check-len-against-dhcp-option.patch
2017-08-07 18:37:45 +00:00

36 lines
1.2 KiB
Diff

From 2c4c724d1ad6dfd316ca3941b29d50f52ab625eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2017 17:33:26 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] slirp: check len against dhcp options array end
While parsing dhcp options string in 'dhcp_decode', if an options'
length 'len' appeared towards the end of 'bp_vend' array, ensuing
read could lead to an OOB memory access issue. Add check to avoid it.
This is CVE-2017-11434.
Reported-by: Reno Robert <renorobert@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
(cherry picked from commit 413d463f43fbc4dd3a601e80a5724aa384a265a0)
[BR: BSC#1049381 CVE-2017-11434]
Signed-off-by: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>
---
slirp/bootp.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/slirp/bootp.c b/slirp/bootp.c
index 5a4646c182..5dd1a415b5 100644
--- a/slirp/bootp.c
+++ b/slirp/bootp.c
@@ -123,6 +123,9 @@ static void dhcp_decode(const struct bootp_t *bp, int *pmsg_type,
if (p >= p_end)
break;
len = *p++;
+ if (p + len > p_end) {
+ break;
+ }
DPRINTF("dhcp: tag=%d len=%d\n", tag, len);
switch(tag) {