Accepting request 699413 from Virtualization:containers

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/699413
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/runc?expand=0&rev=23

CVE-2019-5736.patch

@@ -1,337 +0,0 @@
-From 0a8e4117e7f715d5fbeef398405813ce8e88558b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
-Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2019 13:40:01 +1100
-Subject: [PATCH] nsenter: clone /proc/self/exe to avoid exposing host binary
- to container
-
-There are quite a few circumstances where /proc/self/exe pointing to a
-pretty important container binary is a _bad_ thing, so to avoid this we
-have to make a copy (preferably doing self-clean-up and not being
-writeable).
-
-We require memfd_create(2) -- though there is an O_TMPFILE fallback --
-but we can always extend this to use a scratch MNT_DETACH overlayfs or
-tmpfs. The main downside to this approach is no page-cache sharing for
-the runc binary (which overlayfs would give us) but this is far less
-complicated.
-
-This is only done during nsenter so that it happens transparently to the
-Go code, and any libcontainer users benefit from it. This also makes
-ExtraFiles and --preserve-fds handling trivial (because we don't need to
-worry about it).
-
-Fixes: CVE-2019-5736
-Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
-Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
----
- libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c | 268 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c        |  11 ++
- 2 files changed, 279 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
-
-diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000000..c8a42c23f73f
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
-+ * Copyright (C) 2019 SUSE LLC
-+ *
-+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
-+ *
-+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-+ *
-+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-+ * limitations under the License.
-+ */
-+
-+#define _GNU_SOURCE
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <stdbool.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <limits.h>
-+#include <fcntl.h>
-+#include <errno.h>
-+
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <sys/stat.h>
-+#include <sys/vfs.h>
-+#include <sys/mman.h>
-+#include <sys/sendfile.h>
-+#include <sys/syscall.h>
-+
-+/* Use our own wrapper for memfd_create. */
-+#if !defined(SYS_memfd_create) && defined(__NR_memfd_create)
-+#  define SYS_memfd_create __NR_memfd_create
-+#endif
-+#ifdef SYS_memfd_create
-+#  define HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
-+/* memfd_create(2) flags -- copied from <linux/memfd.h>. */
-+#  ifndef MFD_CLOEXEC
-+#    define MFD_CLOEXEC       0x0001U
-+#    define MFD_ALLOW_SEALING 0x0002U
-+#  endif
-+int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags)
-+{
-+	return syscall(SYS_memfd_create, name, flags);
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+/* This comes directly from <linux/fcntl.h>. */
-+#ifndef F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE
-+#  define F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE 1024
-+#endif
-+#ifndef F_ADD_SEALS
-+#  define F_ADD_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 9)
-+#  define F_GET_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 10)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef F_SEAL_SEAL
-+#  define F_SEAL_SEAL   0x0001	/* prevent further seals from being set */
-+#  define F_SEAL_SHRINK 0x0002	/* prevent file from shrinking */
-+#  define F_SEAL_GROW   0x0004	/* prevent file from growing */
-+#  define F_SEAL_WRITE  0x0008	/* prevent writes */
-+#endif
-+
-+#define RUNC_SENDFILE_MAX 0x7FFFF000 /* sendfile(2) is limited to 2GB. */
-+#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
-+#  define RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT "runc_cloned:/proc/self/exe"
-+#  define RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS \
-+	(F_SEAL_SEAL | F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_WRITE)
-+#endif
-+
-+static void *must_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size)
-+{
-+	void *old = ptr;
-+	do {
-+		ptr = realloc(old, size);
-+	} while(!ptr);
-+	return ptr;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Verify whether we are currently in a self-cloned program (namely, is
-+ * /proc/self/exe a memfd). F_GET_SEALS will only succeed for memfds (or rather
-+ * for shmem files), and we want to be sure it's actually sealed.
-+ */
-+static int is_self_cloned(void)
-+{
-+	int fd, ret, is_cloned = 0;
-+
-+	fd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
-+	if (fd < 0)
-+		return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
-+	ret = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS);
-+	is_cloned = (ret == RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS);
-+#else
-+	struct stat statbuf = {0};
-+	ret = fstat(fd, &statbuf);
-+	if (ret >= 0)
-+		is_cloned = (statbuf.st_nlink == 0);
-+#endif
-+	close(fd);
-+	return is_cloned;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Basic wrapper around mmap(2) that gives you the file length so you can
-+ * safely treat it as an ordinary buffer. Only gives you read access.
-+ */
-+static char *read_file(char *path, size_t *length)
-+{
-+	int fd;
-+	char buf[4096], *copy = NULL;
-+
-+	if (!length)
-+		return NULL;
-+
-+	fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
-+	if (fd < 0)
-+		return NULL;
-+
-+	*length = 0;
-+	for (;;) {
-+		int n;
-+
-+		n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
-+		if (n < 0)
-+			goto error;
-+		if (!n)
-+			break;
-+
-+		copy = must_realloc(copy, (*length + n) * sizeof(*copy));
-+		memcpy(copy + *length, buf, n);
-+		*length += n;
-+	}
-+	close(fd);
-+	return copy;
-+
-+error:
-+	close(fd);
-+	free(copy);
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * A poor-man's version of "xargs -0". Basically parses a given block of
-+ * NUL-delimited data, within the given length and adds a pointer to each entry
-+ * to the array of pointers.
-+ */
-+static int parse_xargs(char *data, int data_length, char ***output)
-+{
-+	int num = 0;
-+	char *cur = data;
-+
-+	if (!data || *output != NULL)
-+		return -1;
-+
-+	while (cur < data + data_length) {
-+		num++;
-+		*output = must_realloc(*output, (num + 1) * sizeof(**output));
-+		(*output)[num - 1] = cur;
-+		cur += strlen(cur) + 1;
-+	}
-+	(*output)[num] = NULL;
-+	return num;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * "Parse" out argv and envp from /proc/self/cmdline and /proc/self/environ.
-+ * This is necessary because we are running in a context where we don't have a
-+ * main() that we can just get the arguments from.
-+ */
-+static int fetchve(char ***argv, char ***envp)
-+{
-+	char *cmdline = NULL, *environ = NULL;
-+	size_t cmdline_size, environ_size;
-+
-+	cmdline = read_file("/proc/self/cmdline", &cmdline_size);
-+	if (!cmdline)
-+		goto error;
-+	environ = read_file("/proc/self/environ", &environ_size);
-+	if (!environ)
-+		goto error;
-+
-+	if (parse_xargs(cmdline, cmdline_size, argv) <= 0)
-+		goto error;
-+	if (parse_xargs(environ, environ_size, envp) <= 0)
-+		goto error;
-+
-+	return 0;
-+
-+error:
-+	free(environ);
-+	free(cmdline);
-+	return -EINVAL;
-+}
-+
-+static int clone_binary(void)
-+{
-+	int binfd, memfd;
-+	ssize_t sent = 0;
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
-+	memfd = memfd_create(RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT, MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
-+#else
-+	memfd = open("/tmp", O_TMPFILE | O_EXCL | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0711);
-+#endif
-+	if (memfd < 0)
-+		return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
-+
-+	binfd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
-+	if (binfd < 0)
-+		goto error;
-+
-+	sent = sendfile(memfd, binfd, NULL, RUNC_SENDFILE_MAX);
-+	close(binfd);
-+	if (sent < 0)
-+		goto error;
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
-+	int err = fcntl(memfd, F_ADD_SEALS, RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS);
-+	if (err < 0)
-+		goto error;
-+#else
-+	/* Need to re-open "memfd" as read-only to avoid execve(2) giving -EXTBUSY. */
-+	int newfd;
-+	char *fdpath = NULL;
-+
-+	if (asprintf(&fdpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", memfd) < 0)
-+		goto error;
-+	newfd = open(fdpath, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
-+	free(fdpath);
-+	if (newfd < 0)
-+		goto error;
-+
-+	close(memfd);
-+	memfd = newfd;
-+#endif
-+	return memfd;
-+
-+error:
-+	close(memfd);
-+	return -EIO;
-+}
-+
-+int ensure_cloned_binary(void)
-+{
-+	int execfd;
-+	char **argv = NULL, **envp = NULL;
-+
-+	/* Check that we're not self-cloned, and if we are then bail. */
-+	int cloned = is_self_cloned();
-+	if (cloned > 0 || cloned == -ENOTRECOVERABLE)
-+		return cloned;
-+
-+	if (fetchve(&argv, &envp) < 0)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	execfd = clone_binary();
-+	if (execfd < 0)
-+		return -EIO;
-+
-+	fexecve(execfd, argv, envp);
-+	return -ENOEXEC;
-+}
-diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c b/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
-index 28269dfc027f..7750af35ea92 100644
---- a/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
-+++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
-@@ -534,6 +534,9 @@ void join_namespaces(char *nslist)
- 	free(namespaces);
- }
- 
-+/* Defined in cloned_binary.c. */
-+extern int ensure_cloned_binary(void);
-+
- void nsexec(void)
- {
- 	int pipenum;
-@@ -549,6 +552,14 @@ void nsexec(void)
- 	if (pipenum == -1)
- 		return;
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * We need to re-exec if we are not in a cloned binary. This is necessary
-+	 * to ensure that containers won't be able to access the host binary
-+	 * through /proc/self/exe. See CVE-2019-5736.
-+	 */
-+	if (ensure_cloned_binary() < 0)
-+		bail("could not ensure we are a cloned binary");
-+
- 	/* Parse all of the netlink configuration. */
- 	nl_parse(pipenum, &config);
- 
--- 
-2.20.1
-

runc-1.0.0-rc6.tar.xz

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
-oid sha256:8c8ddc5c62b8d6b0dac197a09ea1680dc2cec38e4c5c8ca09c5483839b18e8b0
-size 540196

runc-1.0.0-rc6.tar.xz.asc

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
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runc-1.0.0-rc8.tar.xz

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:5d46f01bca203ae226f107f8e3351211f492d43038af19b8337acffab6c4f576
+size 605828

runc-1.0.0-rc8.tar.xz.asc

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runc.changes

@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Mon Apr 29 11:56:21 UTC 2019 - Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.com>
+
+- Upgrade to runc v1.0.0~rc8. Upstream changelog is available from
+  https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/releases/tag/v1.0.0-rc8
+- Includes upstreamed patches for regressions (bsc#1131314 bsc#1131553).
+- Remove upstreamed patches:
+  - CVE-2019-5736.patch
+
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Wed Feb  6 08:10:47 UTC 2019 - Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.com>
 

runc.spec

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
 # Package-wide golang version
 %define go_version 1.10
 %define go_tool go
-%define _version 1.0.0-rc6
+%define _version 1.0.0-rc8
 %define project github.com/opencontainers/runc
 
 # enable libseccomp for sle >= sle12sp2
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
 %endif
 
 Name:           runc
-Version:        1.0.0~rc6
+Version:        1.0.0~rc8
 Release:        0
 Summary:        Tool for spawning and running OCI containers
 License:        Apache-2.0
@@ -50,8 +50,6 @@ Url:            https://github.com/opencontainers/runc
 Source0:        https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/releases/download/v%{_version}/runc.tar.xz#/runc-%{_version}.tar.xz
 Source1:        https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/releases/download/v%{_version}/runc.tar.xz.asc#/runc-%{_version}.tar.xz.asc
 Source2:        runc.keyring
-# FIX-UPSTREAM: Fix for CVE-2019-5736. bsc#1121967
-Patch:          CVE-2019-5736.patch
 BuildRequires:  fdupes
 BuildRequires:  go-go-md2man
 BuildRequires:  golang(API) = %{go_version}
@@ -60,7 +58,6 @@ BuildRequires:  libseccomp-devel
 %endif
 BuildRequires:  libselinux-devel
 Recommends:     criu
-BuildRoot:      %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
 
 %description
 runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI
@@ -87,8 +84,6 @@ Test package for runc. It contains the source code and the tests.
 
 %prep
 %setup -q -n %{name}-%{_version}
-# CVE-2019-5736 bsc#1121967
-%patch -p1
 
 %build
 # Do not use symlinks. If you want to run the unit tests for this package at