Index: fedora-policy-20230206/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te
===================================================================
--- fedora-policy-20230206.orig/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te
+++ fedora-policy-20230206/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te
@@ -393,6 +393,13 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files(kernel_t)
')
+# this is a temporary fix. This permission doesn't make a lot of sense, but
+# without a kernel change there's not much we can do about it. I don't want to
+# audit it due to the unknown impact (happens e.g. during firewall changes)
+optional_policy(`
+ modutils_execute_kmod_tmpfs_files(kernel_t)
+')
+
optional_policy(`
abrt_filetrans_named_content(kernel_t)
abrt_dump_oops_domtrans(kernel_t)
@@ -418,6 +425,7 @@ optional_policy(`
init_dbus_chat(kernel_t)
init_sigchld(kernel_t)
init_dyntrans(kernel_t)
+ init_read_state(kernel_t)
')
optional_policy(`
@@ -519,6 +527,7 @@ optional_policy(`
')
optional_policy(`
+ xserver_read_xdm_state(kernel_t)
xserver_xdm_manage_spool(kernel_t)
xserver_filetrans_home_content(kernel_t)
')
Index: fedora-policy-20230206/policy/modules/system/modutils.if
===================================================================
--- fedora-policy-20230206.orig/policy/modules/system/modutils.if
+++ fedora-policy-20230206/policy/modules/system/modutils.if
@@ -525,3 +525,21 @@ interface(`modutils_dontaudit_kmod_tmpfs
dontaudit $1 kmod_tmpfs_t:file { getattr };
')
+
+#######################################
+##
+## Execute accesses to tmp file type.
+##
+##
+##
+## Domain allowed access.
+##
+##
+#
+interface(`modutils_execute_kmod_tmpfs_files',`
+ gen_require(`
+ type kmod_tmpfs_t;
+ ')
+
+ allow $1 kmod_tmpfs_t:file { execute execute_no_trans };
+')