Index: fedora-policy-20230206/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te =================================================================== --- fedora-policy-20230206.orig/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te +++ fedora-policy-20230206/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te @@ -393,6 +393,13 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files(kernel_t) ') +# this is a temporary fix. This permission doesn't make a lot of sense, but +# without a kernel change there's not much we can do about it. I don't want to +# audit it due to the unknown impact (happens e.g. during firewall changes) +optional_policy(` + modutils_execute_kmod_tmpfs_files(kernel_t) +') + optional_policy(` abrt_filetrans_named_content(kernel_t) abrt_dump_oops_domtrans(kernel_t) @@ -418,6 +425,7 @@ optional_policy(` init_dbus_chat(kernel_t) init_sigchld(kernel_t) init_dyntrans(kernel_t) + init_read_state(kernel_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -519,6 +527,7 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + xserver_read_xdm_state(kernel_t) xserver_xdm_manage_spool(kernel_t) xserver_filetrans_home_content(kernel_t) ') Index: fedora-policy-20230206/policy/modules/system/modutils.if =================================================================== --- fedora-policy-20230206.orig/policy/modules/system/modutils.if +++ fedora-policy-20230206/policy/modules/system/modutils.if @@ -525,3 +525,21 @@ interface(`modutils_dontaudit_kmod_tmpfs dontaudit $1 kmod_tmpfs_t:file { getattr }; ') + +####################################### +## +## Execute accesses to tmp file type. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`modutils_execute_kmod_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + type kmod_tmpfs_t; + ') + + allow $1 kmod_tmpfs_t:file { execute execute_no_trans }; +')