diff --git a/5000-coredump-adjust-whitespace.patch b/5000-coredump-adjust-whitespace.patch deleted file mode 100644 index ab21a57e..00000000 --- a/5000-coredump-adjust-whitespace.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,101 +0,0 @@ -From 2f427f96135fbf3743eb58cfa9216fb605f0891d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= -Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 09:00:16 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 5000/5001] coredump: adjust whitespace - ---- - src/coredump/coredump.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- - 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/coredump/coredump.c b/src/coredump/coredump.c -index 98e7492811..7a181bdeeb 100644 ---- a/src/coredump/coredump.c -+++ b/src/coredump/coredump.c -@@ -110,16 +110,16 @@ enum { - }; - - static const char * const meta_field_names[_META_MAX] = { -- [META_ARGV_PID] = "COREDUMP_PID=", -- [META_ARGV_UID] = "COREDUMP_UID=", -- [META_ARGV_GID] = "COREDUMP_GID=", -- [META_ARGV_SIGNAL] = "COREDUMP_SIGNAL=", -- [META_ARGV_TIMESTAMP] = "COREDUMP_TIMESTAMP=", -- [META_ARGV_RLIMIT] = "COREDUMP_RLIMIT=", -- [META_ARGV_HOSTNAME] = "COREDUMP_HOSTNAME=", -- [META_COMM] = "COREDUMP_COMM=", -- [META_EXE] = "COREDUMP_EXE=", -- [META_UNIT] = "COREDUMP_UNIT=", -+ [META_ARGV_PID] = "COREDUMP_PID=", -+ [META_ARGV_UID] = "COREDUMP_UID=", -+ [META_ARGV_GID] = "COREDUMP_GID=", -+ [META_ARGV_SIGNAL] = "COREDUMP_SIGNAL=", -+ [META_ARGV_TIMESTAMP] = "COREDUMP_TIMESTAMP=", -+ [META_ARGV_RLIMIT] = "COREDUMP_RLIMIT=", -+ [META_ARGV_HOSTNAME] = "COREDUMP_HOSTNAME=", -+ [META_COMM] = "COREDUMP_COMM=", -+ [META_EXE] = "COREDUMP_EXE=", -+ [META_UNIT] = "COREDUMP_UNIT=", - }; - - typedef struct Context { -@@ -138,9 +138,9 @@ typedef enum CoredumpStorage { - } CoredumpStorage; - - static const char* const coredump_storage_table[_COREDUMP_STORAGE_MAX] = { -- [COREDUMP_STORAGE_NONE] = "none", -+ [COREDUMP_STORAGE_NONE] = "none", - [COREDUMP_STORAGE_EXTERNAL] = "external", -- [COREDUMP_STORAGE_JOURNAL] = "journal", -+ [COREDUMP_STORAGE_JOURNAL] = "journal", - }; - - DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(coredump_storage, CoredumpStorage); -@@ -156,13 +156,13 @@ static uint64_t arg_max_use = UINT64_MAX; - - static int parse_config(void) { - static const ConfigTableItem items[] = { -- { "Coredump", "Storage", config_parse_coredump_storage, 0, &arg_storage }, -- { "Coredump", "Compress", config_parse_bool, 0, &arg_compress }, -- { "Coredump", "ProcessSizeMax", config_parse_iec_uint64, 0, &arg_process_size_max }, -- { "Coredump", "ExternalSizeMax", config_parse_iec_uint64_infinity, 0, &arg_external_size_max }, -- { "Coredump", "JournalSizeMax", config_parse_iec_size, 0, &arg_journal_size_max }, -- { "Coredump", "KeepFree", config_parse_iec_uint64, 0, &arg_keep_free }, -- { "Coredump", "MaxUse", config_parse_iec_uint64, 0, &arg_max_use }, -+ { "Coredump", "Storage", config_parse_coredump_storage, 0, &arg_storage }, -+ { "Coredump", "Compress", config_parse_bool, 0, &arg_compress }, -+ { "Coredump", "ProcessSizeMax", config_parse_iec_uint64, 0, &arg_process_size_max }, -+ { "Coredump", "ExternalSizeMax", config_parse_iec_uint64_infinity, 0, &arg_external_size_max }, -+ { "Coredump", "JournalSizeMax", config_parse_iec_size, 0, &arg_journal_size_max }, -+ { "Coredump", "KeepFree", config_parse_iec_uint64, 0, &arg_keep_free }, -+ { "Coredump", "MaxUse", config_parse_iec_uint64, 0, &arg_max_use }, - {} - }; - -@@ -208,15 +208,15 @@ static int fix_acl(int fd, uid_t uid) { - static int fix_xattr(int fd, const Context *context) { - - static const char * const xattrs[_META_MAX] = { -- [META_ARGV_PID] = "user.coredump.pid", -- [META_ARGV_UID] = "user.coredump.uid", -- [META_ARGV_GID] = "user.coredump.gid", -- [META_ARGV_SIGNAL] = "user.coredump.signal", -- [META_ARGV_TIMESTAMP] = "user.coredump.timestamp", -- [META_ARGV_RLIMIT] = "user.coredump.rlimit", -- [META_ARGV_HOSTNAME] = "user.coredump.hostname", -- [META_COMM] = "user.coredump.comm", -- [META_EXE] = "user.coredump.exe", -+ [META_ARGV_PID] = "user.coredump.pid", -+ [META_ARGV_UID] = "user.coredump.uid", -+ [META_ARGV_GID] = "user.coredump.gid", -+ [META_ARGV_SIGNAL] = "user.coredump.signal", -+ [META_ARGV_TIMESTAMP] = "user.coredump.timestamp", -+ [META_ARGV_RLIMIT] = "user.coredump.rlimit", -+ [META_ARGV_HOSTNAME] = "user.coredump.hostname", -+ [META_COMM] = "user.coredump.comm", -+ [META_EXE] = "user.coredump.exe", - }; - - int r = 0; --- -2.35.3 - diff --git a/5001-coredump-do-not-allow-user-to-access-coredumps-with-.patch b/5001-coredump-do-not-allow-user-to-access-coredumps-with-.patch deleted file mode 100644 index aedc307c..00000000 --- a/5001-coredump-do-not-allow-user-to-access-coredumps-with-.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,385 +0,0 @@ -From 87cad85ebec62e63893df46ff78becf82e984bee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= -Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2022 12:12:55 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 5001/5001] coredump: do not allow user to access coredumps - with changed uid/gid/capabilities - -When the user starts a program which elevates its permissions via setuid, -setgid, or capabilities set on the file, it may access additional information -which would then be visible in the coredump. We shouldn't make the the coredump -visible to the user in such cases. - -Reported-by: Matthias Gerstner - -This reads the /proc//auxv file and attaches it to the process metadata as -PROC_AUXV. Before the coredump is submitted, it is parsed and if either -at_secure was set (which the kernel will do for processes that are setuid, -setgid, or setcap), or if the effective uid/gid don't match uid/gid, the file -is not made accessible to the user. If we can't access this data, we assume the -file should not be made accessible either. In principle we could also access -the auxv data from a note in the core file, but that is much more complex and -it seems better to use the stand-alone file that is provided by the kernel. - -Attaching auxv is both convient for this patch (because this way it's passed -between the stages along with other fields), but I think it makes sense to save -it in general. - -We use the information early in the core file to figure out if the program was -32-bit or 64-bit and its endianness. This way we don't need heuristics to guess -whether the format of the auxv structure. This test might reject some cases on -fringe architecutes. But the impact would be limited: we just won't grant the -user permissions to view the coredump file. If people report that we're missing -some cases, we can always enhance this to support more architectures. - -I tested auxv parsing on amd64, 32-bit program on amd64, arm64, arm32, and -ppc64el, but not the whole coredump handling. - -[fbui: fixes bsc#1205000] -[fbui: fixes CVE-2022-4415] ---- - src/basic/io-util.h | 9 ++ - src/coredump/coredump.c | 196 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- - 2 files changed, 192 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/basic/io-util.h b/src/basic/io-util.h -index 39728e06bc..3afb134266 100644 ---- a/src/basic/io-util.h -+++ b/src/basic/io-util.h -@@ -91,7 +91,16 @@ struct iovec_wrapper *iovw_new(void); - struct iovec_wrapper *iovw_free(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw); - struct iovec_wrapper *iovw_free_free(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw); - void iovw_free_contents(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, bool free_vectors); -+ - int iovw_put(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, void *data, size_t len); -+static inline int iovw_consume(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, void *data, size_t len) { -+ /* Move data into iovw or free on error */ -+ int r = iovw_put(iovw, data, len); -+ if (r < 0) -+ free(data); -+ return r; -+} -+ - int iovw_put_string_field(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, const char *field, const char *value); - int iovw_put_string_field_free(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, const char *field, char *value); - void iovw_rebase(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, char *old, char *new); -diff --git a/src/coredump/coredump.c b/src/coredump/coredump.c -index 7a181bdeeb..ea3d8c415a 100644 ---- a/src/coredump/coredump.c -+++ b/src/coredump/coredump.c -@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include - #include - #include - -@@ -106,6 +107,7 @@ enum { - - META_EXE = _META_MANDATORY_MAX, - META_UNIT, -+ META_PROC_AUXV, - _META_MAX - }; - -@@ -120,10 +122,12 @@ static const char * const meta_field_names[_META_MAX] = { - [META_COMM] = "COREDUMP_COMM=", - [META_EXE] = "COREDUMP_EXE=", - [META_UNIT] = "COREDUMP_UNIT=", -+ [META_PROC_AUXV] = "COREDUMP_PROC_AUXV=", - }; - - typedef struct Context { - const char *meta[_META_MAX]; -+ size_t meta_size[_META_MAX]; - pid_t pid; - bool is_pid1; - bool is_journald; -@@ -185,13 +189,16 @@ static uint64_t storage_size_max(void) { - return 0; - } - --static int fix_acl(int fd, uid_t uid) { -+static int fix_acl(int fd, uid_t uid, bool allow_user) { -+ assert(fd >= 0); -+ assert(uid_is_valid(uid)); - - #if HAVE_ACL - int r; - -- assert(fd >= 0); -- assert(uid_is_valid(uid)); -+ /* We don't allow users to read coredumps if the uid or capabilities were changed. */ -+ if (!allow_user) -+ return 0; - - if (uid_is_system(uid) || uid_is_dynamic(uid) || uid == UID_NOBODY) - return 0; -@@ -251,7 +258,8 @@ static int fix_permissions( - const char *filename, - const char *target, - const Context *context, -- uid_t uid) { -+ uid_t uid, -+ bool allow_user) { - - int r; - -@@ -261,7 +269,7 @@ static int fix_permissions( - - /* Ignore errors on these */ - (void) fchmod(fd, 0640); -- (void) fix_acl(fd, uid); -+ (void) fix_acl(fd, uid, allow_user); - (void) fix_xattr(fd, context); - - r = fsync_full(fd); -@@ -331,6 +339,153 @@ static int make_filename(const Context *context, char **ret) { - return 0; - } - -+static int parse_auxv64( -+ const uint64_t *auxv, -+ size_t size_bytes, -+ int *at_secure, -+ uid_t *uid, -+ uid_t *euid, -+ gid_t *gid, -+ gid_t *egid) { -+ -+ assert(auxv || size_bytes == 0); -+ -+ if (size_bytes % (2 * sizeof(uint64_t)) != 0) -+ return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), "Incomplete auxv structure (%zu bytes).", size_bytes); -+ -+ size_t words = size_bytes / sizeof(uint64_t); -+ -+ /* Note that we set output variables even on error. */ -+ -+ for (size_t i = 0; i + 1 < words; i += 2) -+ switch (auxv[i]) { -+ case AT_SECURE: -+ *at_secure = auxv[i + 1] != 0; -+ break; -+ case AT_UID: -+ *uid = auxv[i + 1]; -+ break; -+ case AT_EUID: -+ *euid = auxv[i + 1]; -+ break; -+ case AT_GID: -+ *gid = auxv[i + 1]; -+ break; -+ case AT_EGID: -+ *egid = auxv[i + 1]; -+ break; -+ case AT_NULL: -+ if (auxv[i + 1] != 0) -+ goto error; -+ return 0; -+ } -+ error: -+ return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENODATA), -+ "AT_NULL terminator not found, cannot parse auxv structure."); -+} -+ -+static int parse_auxv32( -+ const uint32_t *auxv, -+ size_t size_bytes, -+ int *at_secure, -+ uid_t *uid, -+ uid_t *euid, -+ gid_t *gid, -+ gid_t *egid) { -+ -+ assert(auxv || size_bytes == 0); -+ -+ size_t words = size_bytes / sizeof(uint32_t); -+ -+ if (size_bytes % (2 * sizeof(uint32_t)) != 0) -+ return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), "Incomplete auxv structure (%zu bytes).", size_bytes); -+ -+ /* Note that we set output variables even on error. */ -+ -+ for (size_t i = 0; i + 1 < words; i += 2) -+ switch (auxv[i]) { -+ case AT_SECURE: -+ *at_secure = auxv[i + 1] != 0; -+ break; -+ case AT_UID: -+ *uid = auxv[i + 1]; -+ break; -+ case AT_EUID: -+ *euid = auxv[i + 1]; -+ break; -+ case AT_GID: -+ *gid = auxv[i + 1]; -+ break; -+ case AT_EGID: -+ *egid = auxv[i + 1]; -+ break; -+ case AT_NULL: -+ if (auxv[i + 1] != 0) -+ goto error; -+ return 0; -+ } -+ error: -+ return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENODATA), -+ "AT_NULL terminator not found, cannot parse auxv structure."); -+} -+ -+static int grant_user_access(int core_fd, const Context *context) { -+ int at_secure = -1; -+ uid_t uid = UID_INVALID, euid = UID_INVALID; -+ uid_t gid = GID_INVALID, egid = GID_INVALID; -+ int r; -+ -+ assert(core_fd >= 0); -+ assert(context); -+ -+ if (!context->meta[META_PROC_AUXV]) -+ return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENODATA), "No auxv data, not adjusting permissions."); -+ -+ uint8_t elf[EI_NIDENT]; -+ errno = 0; -+ if (pread(core_fd, &elf, sizeof(elf), 0) != sizeof(elf)) -+ return log_warning_errno(errno_or_else(EIO), -+ "Failed to pread from coredump fd: %s", STRERROR_OR_EOF(errno)); -+ -+ if (elf[EI_MAG0] != ELFMAG0 || -+ elf[EI_MAG1] != ELFMAG1 || -+ elf[EI_MAG2] != ELFMAG2 || -+ elf[EI_MAG3] != ELFMAG3 || -+ elf[EI_VERSION] != EV_CURRENT) -+ return log_info_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EUCLEAN), -+ "Core file does not have ELF header, not adjusting permissions."); -+ if (!IN_SET(elf[EI_CLASS], ELFCLASS32, ELFCLASS64) || -+ !IN_SET(elf[EI_DATA], ELFDATA2LSB, ELFDATA2MSB)) -+ return log_info_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EUCLEAN), -+ "Core file has strange ELF class, not adjusting permissions."); -+ -+ if ((elf[EI_DATA] == ELFDATA2LSB) != (__BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN)) -+ return log_info_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EUCLEAN), -+ "Core file has non-native endianness, not adjusting permissions."); -+ -+ if (elf[EI_CLASS] == ELFCLASS64) -+ r = parse_auxv64((const uint64_t*) context->meta[META_PROC_AUXV], -+ context->meta_size[META_PROC_AUXV], -+ &at_secure, &uid, &euid, &gid, &egid); -+ else -+ r = parse_auxv32((const uint32_t*) context->meta[META_PROC_AUXV], -+ context->meta_size[META_PROC_AUXV], -+ &at_secure, &uid, &euid, &gid, &egid); -+ if (r < 0) -+ return r; -+ -+ /* We allow access if we got all the data and at_secure is not set and -+ * the uid/gid matches euid/egid. */ -+ bool ret = -+ at_secure == 0 && -+ uid != UID_INVALID && euid != UID_INVALID && uid == euid && -+ gid != GID_INVALID && egid != GID_INVALID && gid == egid; -+ log_debug("Will %s access (uid="UID_FMT " euid="UID_FMT " gid="GID_FMT " egid="GID_FMT " at_secure=%s)", -+ ret ? "permit" : "restrict", -+ uid, euid, gid, egid, yes_no(at_secure)); -+ return ret; -+} -+ - static int save_external_coredump( - const Context *context, - int input_fd, -@@ -453,6 +608,8 @@ static int save_external_coredump( - context->meta[META_ARGV_PID], context->meta[META_COMM]); - truncated = r == 1; - -+ bool allow_user = grant_user_access(fd, context) > 0; -+ - #if HAVE_COMPRESSION - if (arg_compress) { - _cleanup_(unlink_and_freep) char *tmp_compressed = NULL; -@@ -490,7 +647,7 @@ static int save_external_coredump( - uncompressed_size += partial_uncompressed_size; - } - -- r = fix_permissions(fd_compressed, tmp_compressed, fn_compressed, context, uid); -+ r = fix_permissions(fd_compressed, tmp_compressed, fn_compressed, context, uid, allow_user); - if (r < 0) - return r; - -@@ -517,7 +674,7 @@ static int save_external_coredump( - "SIZE_LIMIT=%"PRIu64, max_size, - "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_TRUNCATED_CORE_STR); - -- r = fix_permissions(fd, tmp, fn, context, uid); -+ r = fix_permissions(fd, tmp, fn, context, uid, allow_user); - if (r < 0) - return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to fix permissions and finalize coredump %s into %s: %m", coredump_tmpfile_name(tmp), fn); - -@@ -765,7 +922,7 @@ static int change_uid_gid(const Context *context) { - } - - static int submit_coredump( -- Context *context, -+ const Context *context, - struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, - int input_fd) { - -@@ -944,16 +1101,15 @@ static int save_context(Context *context, const struct iovec_wrapper *iovw) { - struct iovec *iovec = iovw->iovec + n; - - for (size_t i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(meta_field_names); i++) { -- char *p; -- - /* Note that these strings are NUL terminated, because we made sure that a - * trailing NUL byte is in the buffer, though not included in the iov_len - * count (see process_socket() and gather_pid_metadata_*()) */ - assert(((char*) iovec->iov_base)[iovec->iov_len] == 0); - -- p = startswith(iovec->iov_base, meta_field_names[i]); -+ const char *p = startswith(iovec->iov_base, meta_field_names[i]); - if (p) { - context->meta[i] = p; -+ context->meta_size[i] = iovec->iov_len - strlen(meta_field_names[i]); - break; - } - } -@@ -1190,6 +1346,7 @@ static int gather_pid_metadata(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, Context *context) { - uid_t owner_uid; - pid_t pid; - char *t; -+ size_t size; - const char *p; - int r; - -@@ -1254,13 +1411,26 @@ static int gather_pid_metadata(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, Context *context) { - (void) iovw_put_string_field_free(iovw, "COREDUMP_PROC_LIMITS=", t); - - p = procfs_file_alloca(pid, "cgroup"); -- if (read_full_virtual_file(p, &t, NULL) >=0) -+ if (read_full_virtual_file(p, &t, NULL) >= 0) - (void) iovw_put_string_field_free(iovw, "COREDUMP_PROC_CGROUP=", t); - - p = procfs_file_alloca(pid, "mountinfo"); -- if (read_full_virtual_file(p, &t, NULL) >=0) -+ if (read_full_virtual_file(p, &t, NULL) >= 0) - (void) iovw_put_string_field_free(iovw, "COREDUMP_PROC_MOUNTINFO=", t); - -+ /* We attach /proc/auxv here. ELF coredumps also contain a note for this (NT_AUXV), see elf(5). */ -+ p = procfs_file_alloca(pid, "auxv"); -+ if (read_full_virtual_file(p, &t, &size) >= 0) { -+ char *buf = malloc(strlen("COREDUMP_PROC_AUXV=") + size + 1); -+ if (buf) { -+ /* Add a dummy terminator to make save_context() happy. */ -+ *((uint8_t*) mempcpy(stpcpy(buf, "COREDUMP_PROC_AUXV="), t, size)) = '\0'; -+ (void) iovw_consume(iovw, buf, size + strlen("COREDUMP_PROC_AUXV=")); -+ } -+ -+ free(t); -+ } -+ - if (get_process_cwd(pid, &t) >= 0) - (void) iovw_put_string_field_free(iovw, "COREDUMP_CWD=", t); - --- -2.35.3 - diff --git a/systemd-v252.3+suse.40.gbf3fef9988.tar.xz b/systemd-v252.3+suse.40.gbf3fef9988.tar.xz deleted file mode 100644 index a630a377..00000000 --- a/systemd-v252.3+suse.40.gbf3fef9988.tar.xz +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ -version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 -oid sha256:4274c52c308874f73756af1fe91d0cf35ab72112f6ba593399398eddd17cc0c4 -size 8040380 diff --git a/systemd-v252.4+suse.44.g5a506d73bd.tar.xz b/systemd-v252.4+suse.44.g5a506d73bd.tar.xz new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0421d76b --- /dev/null +++ b/systemd-v252.4+suse.44.g5a506d73bd.tar.xz @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:2c897cd9b3d3b7ba9fdb5600ddb2f9aff285abc479f190bbbdcec8ca37c95b8b +size 8042788 diff --git a/systemd.changes b/systemd.changes index 7d06424f..564a5a19 100644 --- a/systemd.changes +++ b/systemd.changes @@ -1,3 +1,25 @@ +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Wed Dec 21 07:31:38 UTC 2022 - Franck Bui + +- Import commit 5a506d73bde7ba9261985f8e9ce084044a519432 (merge of v252.4) + + It includes the following fixes: + + 9b75a3d050 coredump: do not allow user to access coredumps with changed uid/gid/capabilities (bsc#1205000 CVE-2022-4415) + + For a complete list of changes, visit: + https://github.com/openSUSE/systemd/compare/bf3fef99886bd977a1c7a51d20087bc8977fff44...5a506d73bde7ba9261985f8e9ce084044a519432 + + Additionally, it also includes the following backports: + + - 20ca3155c5 localed: reload PID1 configuration after modifying /etc/locale.conf + - 3538c202fd test: update TEST-73-LOCALE to define several locale settings in initial PID1 environment + +- Drop 5000-coredump-adjust-whitespace.patch + 5001-coredump-do-not-allow-user-to-access-coredumps-with-.patch + + They are part of v252.4. + ------------------------------------------------------------------- Mon Dec 19 07:50:15 UTC 2022 - Franck Bui diff --git a/systemd.spec b/systemd.spec index 4037f598..6f3b93b7 100644 --- a/systemd.spec +++ b/systemd.spec @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ %global flavor @BUILD_FLAVOR@%{nil} %define min_kernel_version 4.5 -%define archive_version +suse.40.gbf3fef9988 +%define archive_version +suse.44.g5a506d73bd %define _testsuitedir /usr/lib/systemd/tests %define xinitconfdir %{?_distconfdir}%{!?_distconfdir:%{_sysconfdir}}/X11/xinit @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ Name: systemd%{?mini} URL: http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd -Version: 252.3 +Version: 252.4 Release: 0 Summary: A System and Session Manager License: LGPL-2.1-or-later @@ -216,8 +216,6 @@ Patch1000: 1000-Revert-getty-Pass-tty-to-use-by-agetty-via-stdin.patch # very few cases, some stuff might be broken in upstream and need to be fixed # quickly. But even in these cases, the patches are temporary and should be # removed as soon as a fix is merged by upstream. -Patch5000: 5000-coredump-adjust-whitespace.patch -Patch5001: 5001-coredump-do-not-allow-user-to-access-coredumps-with-.patch %description Systemd is a system and service manager, compatible with SysV and LSB