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systemd/fix-potential-bad-mem-access.patch
Stephan Kulow 22e9bed03a Accepting request 149704 from Base:System
- Add systemctl-options.patch: handle SYSTEMCTL_OPTIONS internaly
  (bnc#798620).
- Update crypt-loop-file.patch to correctly detect crypto loop
  files (bnc#799514).
- Add journalctl-remove-leftover-message.patch: remove debug
  message in systemctl.
- Add job-avoid-recursion-when-cancelling.patch: prevent potential
  recursion when cancelling a service.
- Add sysctl-parse-all-keys.patch: ensure sysctl file is fully
  parsed.
- Add journal-fix-cutoff-max-date.patch: fix computation of cutoff
  max date for journal.
- Add reword-rescue-mode-hints.patch: reword rescue prompt.
- Add improve-overflow-checks.patch: improve time overflow checks.
- Add fix-swap-behaviour-with-symlinks.patch: fix swap behaviour
  with symlinks.
- Add hostnamectl-fix-set-hostname-with-no-argument.patch: ensure
  hostnamectl requires an argument when called with set-hostname
  option.
- Add agetty-overrides-term.patch: pass correctly terminal type to
  agetty.
- Add check-for-empty-strings-in-strto-conversions.patch: better
  check for empty strings in strto* conversions.
- Add strv-cleanup-error-path-loops.patch: cleanup strv on error
  path.
- Add cryptsetup-handle-plain.patch: correctly handle "plain"
  option in cryptsetup.
- Add fstab-generator-improve-error-message.patch: improve error
  message in fstab-generator.
- Add delta-accept-t-option.patch: accept -t option in (forwarded request 149703 from fcrozat)

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/149704
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/systemd?expand=0&rev=122
2013-01-24 09:41:58 +00:00

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1.8 KiB
Diff

From ac97e2c559f5d386a332aba4a24bf9930cdb1c51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2012 16:36:38 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] core/load-fragment: fix (potential) bad memory access
strncmp() could be used with size bigger then the size of the string,
because MAX was used instead of MIN.
If failing, print just the offending mount flag.
---
src/core/load-fragment.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/core/load-fragment.c b/src/core/load-fragment.c
index 01f9484..6933e1a 100644
--- a/src/core/load-fragment.c
+++ b/src/core/load-fragment.c
@@ -1101,15 +1101,22 @@ int config_parse_exec_mount_flags(
assert(rvalue);
assert(data);
- FOREACH_WORD_QUOTED(w, l, rvalue, state) {
- if (strncmp(w, "shared", MAX(l, 6U)) == 0)
+ FOREACH_WORD_SEPARATOR(w, l, rvalue, ", ", state) {
+ char _cleanup_free_ *t;
+
+ t = strndup(w, l);
+ if (!t)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (streq(t, "shared"))
flags |= MS_SHARED;
- else if (strncmp(w, "slave", MAX(l, 5U)) == 0)
+ else if (streq(t, "slave"))
flags |= MS_SLAVE;
- else if (strncmp(w, "private", MAX(l, 7U)) == 0)
+ else if (streq(w, "private"))
flags |= MS_PRIVATE;
else {
- log_error("[%s:%u] Failed to parse mount flags, ignoring: %s", filename, line, rvalue);
+ log_error("[%s:%u] Failed to parse mount flag %s, ignoring: %s",
+ filename, line, t, rvalue);
return 0;
}
}
--
1.7.10.4