checked in

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/devel:tools/systemtap?expand=0&rev=8

systemtap-0.9.9.tar.bz2

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:c57c639399982ad2d0f6e903066397a7cac0b99babdaa611901b5d3083ffabb6
+size 1172877

systemtap-1.0.tar.bz2

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
-oid sha256:9a942ba85d6360023e6f8503a8dd4c8493d16b17cb474cc8f0ad5a50cec3607a
-size 1205746

systemtap-CVE-limit-dwarf-expression-stack-size.patch

@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@redhat.com>
-Subject: Three SystemTap-1.0 denial of service issues
-References: CVE-2009-2911, BNC#548361
-Upstream: yes
-
-  Three denial of service flaws were found in the SystemTap
-instrumentation system of version 1.0, when the --unprivileged mode was
-activated:
-
-b, Kernel stack frame overflow allows local attackers to cause denial 
-of service via specially-crafted user-provided DWARF information.
-
-diff --git a/dwflpp.cxx b/dwflpp.cxx
-index 636cd38..c31548d 100644
---- a/dwflpp.cxx
-+++ b/dwflpp.cxx
-@@ -2272,7 +2272,15 @@ dwflpp::express_as_string (string prelude,
- 
-   fprintf(memstream, "{\n");
-   fprintf(memstream, "%s", prelude.c_str());
--  bool deref = c_emit_location (memstream, head, 1);
-+
-+  unsigned int stack_depth;
-+  bool deref = c_emit_location (memstream, head, 1, &stack_depth);
-+
-+  // Ensure that DWARF keeps loc2c to a "reasonable" stack size
-+  // 32 intptr_t leads to max 256 bytes on the stack
-+  if (stack_depth > 32)
-+    throw semantic_error("oversized DWARF stack");
-+
-   fprintf(memstream, "%s", postlude.c_str());
-   fprintf(memstream, "  goto out;\n");
- 
-diff --git a/loc2c-test.c b/loc2c-test.c
-index 495a95f..ed7aa4b 100644
---- a/loc2c-test.c
-+++ b/loc2c-test.c
-@@ -329,11 +329,14 @@ handle_variable (Dwarf_Die *lscopes, int lnscopes, int out,
- 	"{\n"
- 	"  intptr_t value;");
- 
--  bool deref = c_emit_location (stdout, head, 1);
-+  unsigned int stack_depth;
-+  bool deref = c_emit_location (stdout, head, 1, &stack_depth);
- 
-   obstack_free (&pool, NULL);
- 
--  puts (store ? " return;" :
-+  printf ("  /* max expression stack depth %u */\n", stack_depth);
-+
-+  puts (store ? "  return;" :
- 	"  printk (\" ---> %ld\\n\", (unsigned long) value);\n"
- 	"  return;");
- 
-diff --git a/loc2c.c b/loc2c.c
-index 5d6b549..0716c7d 100644
---- a/loc2c.c
-+++ b/loc2c.c
-@@ -2071,7 +2071,8 @@ emit_loc_address (FILE *out, struct location *loc, unsigned int indent,
-    assign it to an address-sized value.  */
- static void
- emit_loc_value (FILE *out, struct location *loc, unsigned int indent,
--		const char *target, bool declare)
-+		const char *target, bool declare,
-+		bool *used_deref, unsigned int *max_stack)
- {
-   if (declare)
-     emit ("%*s%s %s;\n", indent * 2, "", STACK_TYPE, target);
-@@ -2091,6 +2092,9 @@ emit_loc_value (FILE *out, struct location *loc, unsigned int indent,
-     case loc_address:
-     case loc_value:
-       emit_loc_address (out, loc, indent, target);
-+      *used_deref = *used_deref || loc->address.used_deref;
-+      if (loc->address.stack_depth > *max_stack)
-+	*max_stack = loc->address.stack_depth;
-       break;
-     }
- 
-@@ -2098,7 +2102,8 @@ emit_loc_value (FILE *out, struct location *loc, unsigned int indent,
- }
- 
- bool
--c_emit_location (FILE *out, struct location *loc, int indent)
-+c_emit_location (FILE *out, struct location *loc, int indent,
-+		 unsigned int *max_stack)
- {
-   emit ("%*s{\n", indent * 2, "");
- 
-@@ -2134,9 +2139,11 @@ c_emit_location (FILE *out, struct location *loc, int indent)
-       }
- 
-   bool deref = false;
-+  *max_stack = 0;
- 
-   if (loc->frame_base != NULL)
--    emit_loc_value (out, loc->frame_base, indent, "frame_base", true);
-+    emit_loc_value (out, loc->frame_base, indent, "frame_base", true,
-+		    &deref, max_stack);
- 
-   for (; loc->next != NULL; loc = loc->next)
-     switch (loc->type)
-@@ -2144,8 +2151,7 @@ c_emit_location (FILE *out, struct location *loc, int indent)
-       case loc_address:
-       case loc_value:
- 	/* Emit the program fragment to calculate the address.  */
--	emit_loc_value (out, loc, indent + 1, "addr", false);
--	deref = deref || loc->address.used_deref;
-+	emit_loc_value (out, loc, indent + 1, "addr", false, &deref, max_stack);
- 	break;
- 
-       case loc_fragment:
-@@ -2172,6 +2178,9 @@ c_emit_location (FILE *out, struct location *loc, int indent)
- 
-   emit ("%s%*s}\n", loc->address.program, indent * 2, "");
- 
-+  if (loc->address.stack_depth > *max_stack)
-+    *max_stack = loc->address.stack_depth;
-+
-   return deref || loc->address.used_deref;
- }
- 
-diff --git a/loc2c.h b/loc2c.h
-index becf2d8..45d9382 100644
---- a/loc2c.h
-+++ b/loc2c.h
-@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct location *c_translate_argument (struct obstack *,
- 
-    Writes complete lines of C99, code forming a complete C block, to STREAM.
-    Return value is true iff that code uses the `deref' runtime macros.  */
--bool c_emit_location (FILE *stream, struct location *loc, int indent);
-+bool c_emit_location (FILE *stream, struct location *loc, int indent,
-+		      unsigned int *max_stack);
- 
- /* vim: set sw=2 ts=8 cino=>4,n-2,{2,^-2,t0,(0,u0,w1,M1 : */
-

systemtap-CVE-limit-printf-arguments.patch

@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@redhat.com>
-Subject: Three SystemTap-1.0 denial of service issues
-References: CVE-2009-2911, BNC#548361
-Upstream: yes
-
-  Three denial of service flaws were found in the SystemTap
-instrumentation system of version 1.0, when the --unprivileged mode was
-activated:
-
-a, Kernel stack overflow allows local attackers to cause denial of service or
-execute arbitrary code via long number of parameters, provided to the print*
-call.
-
-diff --git a/buildrun.cxx b/buildrun.cxx
-index 100cbc4..c86a442 100644
---- a/buildrun.cxx
-+++ b/buildrun.cxx
-@@ -200,6 +200,9 @@ compile_pass (systemtap_session& s)
- 
-   // o << "CFLAGS += -fno-unit-at-a-time" << endl;
- 
-+  // 512 bytes should be enough for anybody
-+  o << "EXTRA_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Wframe-larger-than=512)" << endl;
-+
-   // Assumes linux 2.6 kbuild
-   o << "EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Wno-unused -Werror" << endl;
-   #if CHECK_POINTER_ARITH_PR5947
-diff --git a/testsuite/transko/varargs.stp b/testsuite/transko/varargs.stp
-new file mode 100755
-index 0000000..f38309a
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/testsuite/transko/varargs.stp
-@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
-+#! stap -p3
-+
-+probe begin {
-+    // PR10750 enforces at most 32 print args
-+    println(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
-+            9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
-+            17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
-+            25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
-+            33)
-+}
-diff --git a/testsuite/transok/varargs.stp b/testsuite/transok/varargs.stp
-new file mode 100755
-index 0000000..216166f
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/testsuite/transok/varargs.stp
-@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
-+#! stap -p3
-+
-+probe begin {
-+    // PR10750 enforces at most 32 print args
-+    println(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
-+            9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
-+            17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
-+            25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32)
-+}
-diff --git a/translate.cxx b/translate.cxx
-index 04a9247..c73a5bd 100644
---- a/translate.cxx
-+++ b/translate.cxx
-@@ -4151,6 +4151,11 @@ c_unparser::visit_print_format (print_format* e)
-     {
-       stmt_expr block(*this);
- 
-+      // PR10750: Enforce a reasonable limit on # of varargs
-+      // 32 varargs leads to max 256 bytes on the stack
-+      if (e->args.size() > 32)
-+        throw semantic_error("too many arguments to print", e->tok);
-+
-       // Compute actual arguments
-       vector<tmpvar> tmp;
- 
-

systemtap-CVE-unwind-table-size-checks.patch

@@ -1,193 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@redhat.com>
-Subject: Three SystemTap-1.0 denial of service issues
-References: CVE-2009-2911, BNC#548361
-Upstream: yes
-
-  Three denial of service flaws were found in the SystemTap
-instrumentation system of version 1.0, when the --unprivileged mode was
-activated:
-
-c, Absent check(s) for the upper bound of the size of the unwind table
-   and for the upper bound of the size of each of the CIE/CFI records, could
-   allow an attacker to cause a denial of service (infinite loop).
-
-diff --git a/runtime/unwind.c b/runtime/unwind.c
-index 00108a3..7607770 100644
---- a/runtime/unwind.c
-+++ b/runtime/unwind.c
-@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static sleb128_t get_sleb128(const u8 **pcur, const u8 *end)
- 
- /* given an FDE, find its CIE */
- static const u32 *cie_for_fde(const u32 *fde, void *unwind_data,
--			      int is_ehframe)
-+			      uint32_t table_len, int is_ehframe)
- {
- 	const u32 *cie;
- 
-@@ -118,6 +118,11 @@ static const u32 *cie_for_fde(const u32 *fde, void *unwind_data,
- 	else
- 		cie = unwind_data + fde[1];
- 
-+	/* Make sure address falls in the table */
-+	if (((void *)cie) < ((void*)unwind_data)
-+	    || ((void*)cie) > ((void*)(unwind_data + table_len)))
-+	  return NULL;
-+
- 	if (*cie <= sizeof(*cie) + 4 || *cie >= fde[1] - sizeof(*fde)
- 	    || (*cie & (sizeof(*cie) - 1))
- 	    || (cie[1] != 0xffffffff && cie[1] != 0)) {
-@@ -200,7 +205,8 @@ static unsigned long read_pointer(const u8 **pLoc, const void *end, signed ptrTy
- 	return value;
- }
- 
--static signed fde_pointer_type(const u32 *cie)
-+static signed fde_pointer_type(const u32 *cie, void *unwind_data,
-+			       uint32_t table_len)
- {
- 	const u8 *ptr = (const u8 *)(cie + 2);
- 	unsigned version = *ptr;
-@@ -212,11 +218,16 @@ static signed fde_pointer_type(const u32 *cie)
- 		const u8 *end = (const u8 *)(cie + 1) + *cie;
- 		uleb128_t len;
- 
-+		/* end of cie should fall within unwind table. */
-+		if (((void*)end) < ((void *)unwind_data)
-+		    || ((void *)end) > ((void *)(unwind_data + table_len)))
-+		  return -1;
-+
- 		/* check if augmentation size is first (and thus present) */
- 		if (*ptr != 'z')
- 			return -1;
- 		/* check if augmentation string is nul-terminated */
--		if ((ptr = memchr(aug = (const void *)ptr, 0, end - ptr)) == NULL)
-+		if ((ptr = memchr(aug = (const void *)ptr, 0, end - ptr)) == NULL) 
- 			return -1;
- 		++ptr;		/* skip terminator */
- 		get_uleb128(&ptr, end);	/* skip code alignment */
-@@ -267,6 +278,10 @@ static void set_rule(uleb128_t reg, enum item_location where, uleb128_t value, s
- 	}
- }
- 
-+/* Limit the number of instructions we process. Arbitrary limit.
-+   512 should be enough for anybody... */
-+#define MAX_CFI 512
-+
- static int processCFI(const u8 *start, const u8 *end, unsigned long targetLoc, signed ptrType, struct unwind_state *state)
- {
- 	union {
-@@ -276,6 +291,9 @@ static int processCFI(const u8 *start, const u8 *end, unsigned long targetLoc, s
- 	} ptr;
- 	int result = 1;
- 
-+	if (end - start > MAX_CFI)
-+	  return 0;
-+
- 	dbug_unwind(1, "targetLoc=%lx state->loc=%lx\n", targetLoc, state->loc);
- 	if (start != state->cieStart) {
- 		state->loc = state->org;
-@@ -606,10 +624,10 @@ static int unwind_frame(struct unwind_frame_info *frame,
- 
- 	/* found the fde, now set startLoc and endLoc */
- 	if (fde != NULL) {
--		cie = cie_for_fde(fde, table, is_ehframe);
-+		cie = cie_for_fde(fde, table, table_len, is_ehframe);
- 		if (likely(cie != NULL && cie != &bad_cie && cie != &not_fde)) {
- 			ptr = (const u8 *)(fde + 2);
--			ptrType = fde_pointer_type(cie);
-+			ptrType = fde_pointer_type(cie, table, table_len);
- 			startLoc = read_pointer(&ptr, (const u8 *)(fde + 1) + *fde, ptrType);
- 			startLoc = adjustStartLoc(startLoc, m, s, ptrType, is_ehframe);
- 
-@@ -632,12 +650,12 @@ static int unwind_frame(struct unwind_frame_info *frame,
- 	    for (fde = table, tableSize = table_len; cie = NULL, tableSize > sizeof(*fde)
- 		 && tableSize - sizeof(*fde) >= *fde; tableSize -= sizeof(*fde) + *fde, fde += 1 + *fde / sizeof(*fde)) {
- 			dbug_unwind(3, "fde=%lx tableSize=%d\n", (long)*fde, (int)tableSize);
--			cie = cie_for_fde(fde, table, is_ehframe);
-+			cie = cie_for_fde(fde, table, table_len, is_ehframe);
- 			if (cie == &bad_cie) {
- 				cie = NULL;
- 				break;
- 			}
--			if (cie == NULL || cie == &not_fde || (ptrType = fde_pointer_type(cie)) < 0)
-+			if (cie == NULL || cie == &not_fde || (ptrType = fde_pointer_type(cie, table, table_len)) < 0)
- 				continue;
- 
- 			ptr = (const u8 *)(fde + 2);
-@@ -666,6 +684,12 @@ static int unwind_frame(struct unwind_frame_info *frame,
- 	state.cieEnd = ptr;	/* keep here temporarily */
- 	ptr = (const u8 *)(cie + 2);
- 	end = (const u8 *)(cie + 1) + *cie;
-+
-+	/* end should fall within unwind table. */
-+	if (((void *)end) < table
-+	    || ((void *)end) > ((void *)(table + table_len)))
-+	  goto err;
-+
- 	frame->call_frame = 1;
- 	if ((state.version = *ptr) != 1) {
- 		dbug_unwind(1, "CIE version number is %d.  1 is supported.\n", state.version);
-@@ -723,6 +747,11 @@ static int unwind_frame(struct unwind_frame_info *frame,
- 	state.cieEnd = end;
- 	end = (const u8 *)(fde + 1) + *fde;
- 
-+	/* end should fall within unwind table. */
-+	if (((void*)end) < table
-+	    || ((void *)end) > ((void *)(table + table_len)))
-+	  goto err;
-+
- 	/* skip augmentation */
- 	if (((const char *)(cie + 2))[1] == 'z') {
- 		uleb128_t augSize = get_uleb128(&ptr, end);
-diff --git a/runtime/unwind/unwind.h b/runtime/unwind/unwind.h
-index 285a3a3..023ea60 100644
---- a/runtime/unwind/unwind.h
-+++ b/runtime/unwind/unwind.h
-@@ -143,8 +143,10 @@ static unsigned long read_pointer(const u8 **pLoc,
-                                   const void *end,
-                                   signed ptrType);
- static const u32 bad_cie, not_fde;
--static const u32 *cie_for_fde(const u32 *fde, void *table, int is_ehframe);
--static signed fde_pointer_type(const u32 *cie);
-+static const u32 *cie_for_fde(const u32 *fde, void *table,
-+			      uint32_t table_len, int is_ehframe);
-+static signed fde_pointer_type(const u32 *cie,
-+			       void *table, uint32_t table_len);
- 
- 
- #endif /* STP_USE_DWARF_UNWINDER */
-diff --git a/translate.cxx b/translate.cxx
-index bc5d615..9d456bc 100644
---- a/translate.cxx
-+++ b/translate.cxx
-@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ extern "C" {
- #include <elfutils/libdwfl.h>
- }
- 
-+// Max unwind table size (debug or eh) per module. Somewhat arbitrary
-+// limit (a bit more than twice the .debug_frame size of my local
-+// vmlinux for 2.6.31.4-83.fc12.x86_64)
-+#define MAX_UNWIND_TABLE_SIZE (3 * 1024 * 1024)
-+
- using namespace std;
- 
- struct var;
-@@ -4785,6 +4790,9 @@ dump_unwindsyms (Dwfl_Module *m,
-   get_unwind_data (m, &debug_frame, &eh_frame, &debug_len, &eh_len, &eh_addr);
-   if (debug_frame != NULL && debug_len > 0)
-     {
-+      if (debug_len > MAX_UNWIND_TABLE_SIZE)
-+	throw semantic_error ("module debug unwind table size too big");
-+
-       c->output << "#if defined(STP_USE_DWARF_UNWINDER) && defined(STP_NEED_UNWIND_DATA)\n";
-       c->output << "static uint8_t _stp_module_" << stpmod_idx
- 		<< "_debug_frame[] = \n";
-@@ -4802,6 +4810,9 @@ dump_unwindsyms (Dwfl_Module *m,
- 
-   if (eh_frame != NULL && eh_len > 0)
-     {
-+      if (eh_len > MAX_UNWIND_TABLE_SIZE)
-+	throw semantic_error ("module eh unwind table size too big");
-+
-       c->output << "#if defined(STP_USE_DWARF_UNWINDER) && defined(STP_NEED_UNWIND_DATA)\n";
-       c->output << "static uint8_t _stp_module_" << stpmod_idx
- 		<< "_eh_frame[] = \n";

systemtap-docs.changes

@@ -1,13 +1,3 @@
--------------------------------------------------------------------
-Wed Dec  2 23:52:10 UTC 2009 - tonyj@novell.com
-
-- Minor changes to spec file 
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------
-Fri Oct  2 18:57:14 CEST 2009 - tonyj@suse.de
-
-- updated to version 1.0.  See systemtap.changes for full changelog.
-
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Tue Jul 21 08:47:33 CEST 2009 - tiwai@suse.de
 

systemtap-docs.spec

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ BuildRequires:  latex2html
 %endif
 %define use_snapshot	0
 License:        GPL v2 or later
-Version:        1.0
+Version:        0.9.9
 Release:        1
 Summary:        Documents and examples for systemtap
 Group:          Development/Tools/Debuggers
@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ Url:            http://sourceware.org/systemtap/
 %endif
 Source:         ftp://sources.redhat.com/pub/systemtap/snapshots/systemtap-%{package_version}.tar.bz2
 Patch:          systemtap-docdir-fix.diff
-Patch2:         systemtap-xmlto-fop.diff
+# Patch2:         systemtap-ioblock-suse-kernel-fix.diff
+Patch3:         systemtap-xmlto-fop.diff
 BuildRoot:      %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
 BuildArch:      noarch
 
@@ -64,8 +65,9 @@ Authors:
 %setup -n systemtap-%{package_version} -q
 %endif
 %patch -p1
+# %patch2
 %if %suse_version > 1030
-%patch2 -p1
+%patch3 -p1
 %endif
 
 %build

systemtap-ioblock-suse-kernel-fix.diff

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
---- a/tapset/ioblock.stp-dist	2008-12-05 08:14:19.000000000 +0100
+--- tapset/ioblock.stp-dist	2008-12-05 08:14:19.000000000 +0100
-+++ b/tapset/ioblock.stp	2008-12-05 08:14:27.000000000 +0100
++++ tapset/ioblock.stp	2008-12-05 08:14:27.000000000 +0100
 @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@
          vcnt = $bio->bi_vcnt
          idx = $bio->bi_idx

systemtap.changes

@@ -1,38 +1,3 @@
--------------------------------------------------------------------
-Wed Dec  2 23:51:24 UTC 2009 - tonyj@novell.com
-
-- Fixes for CVE-2009-2911, BNC#548361
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------
-Fri Oct  2 18:57:14 CEST 2009 - tonyj@suse.de
-
-- updated to version 1.0:
- * SystemTap frontend (stap) changes
-   - EXPERIMENTAL support for unprivileged users.
-   - -a ARCH allows cross compiling of scripts, stap-start-server arguments
-     extended to support starting a cross compiling server
-   - Change notion of architecture to be same as kernels
-   - Support output file switching by SIGUSR2
-   - New experimental transport mechanism using ftrace's ring_buffer
-   - Reduction in memory consumption for scripts using many uprobes
-   - Support for recognizing DW_OP_{stack,implicit}_value DWARF expressions
- * SystemTap script language changes
-   - Dwarf probes now support C++ scopes and so can be limited to classes or
-    namespaces.
-   - Preprocessor support for || and &&
-   - Probe alias names may be overloaded (multiple aliases of same name)
- * SystemTap tapset changes
-   - Enabling semaphore now used to reduce computation overhead of dorman
-     process().mark() probes.
-   - Many functions marked as usable by unprivileged users (return global info
-     or specific to user process).
-   - New netdev tapset probe points for monitoring network traffic and device 
-     configurations.
-   - New task_backtrace function returns the current hex backtrace of any
-     arbitrary task in the system.
-   - Function is_myproc returns whether the current process is owned by user
-     which started systemtap script.
-
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Thu Aug 13 15:55:14 CEST 2009 - tiwai@suse.de
 

systemtap.spec

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 #
-# spec file for package systemtap (Version 1.0)
+# spec file for package systemtap (Version 0.9.9)
 #
 # Copyright (c) 2009 SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
 #
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ BuildRequires:  gcc-c++ glib2-devel libcap-devel libebl-devel pkg-config sqlite-
 BuildRequires:  mozilla-nspr-devel mozilla-nss-devel mozilla-nss-tools
 %define use_snapshot	0
 License:        GPL v2 or later
-Version:        1.0
+Version:        0.9.9
 Release:        1
 Summary:        Instrumentation System
 Group:          Development/Tools/Debuggers
@@ -38,10 +38,7 @@ Url:            http://sourceware.org/systemtap/
 Source:         ftp://sources.redhat.com/pub/systemtap/snapshots/systemtap-%{package_version}.tar.bz2
 Patch:          systemtap-docdir-fix.diff
 Patch2:         systemtap-ioblock-suse-kernel-fix.diff
-Patch3:		systemtap-CVE-limit-dwarf-expression-stack-size.patch
+# Patch3:         systemtap-xmlto-fop.diff
-Patch4:		systemtap-CVE-limit-printf-arguments.patch
-Patch5:		systemtap-CVE-unwind-table-size-checks.patch
-
 Requires:       libebl1
 Requires:       %{name}-runtime = %{version}-%{release}
 BuildRoot:      %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
@@ -142,10 +139,10 @@ Authors:
 %setup -n %{name}-%{package_version} -q
 %endif
 %patch -p1
-%patch2 -p1
+%patch2
-%patch3 -p1
+# %if %suse_version > 1030
-%patch4 -p1
+# %patch3 -p1
-%patch5 -p1
+# %endif
 
 %build
 autoreconf -fi
@@ -200,7 +197,6 @@ rm -rf ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}
 %{_bindir}/stap-authorize*
 %{_bindir}/stap-env
 %{_bindir}/stap-gen-cert
-%{_bindir}/stap-sign-module
 %{_mandir}/man8/stap-server.*
 
 %files sdt-devel