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tigervnc/0001-Make-ZlibInStream-more-robust-against-failures.patch
Stefan Dirsch d26ec6dbd4 - TigerVNC security fix:
0001-Make-ZlibInStream-more-robust-against-failures.patch
  0002-Encapsulate-PixelBuffer-internal-details.patch
  0003-Restrict-PixelBuffer-dimensions-to-safe-values.patch
  0004-Add-write-protection-to-OffsetPixelBuffer.patch
  0005-Handle-empty-Tight-gradient-rects.patch
  0006-Add-unit-test-for-PixelFormat-sanity-checks.patch
  0007-Fix-depth-sanity-test-in-PixelFormat.patch
  0008-Add-sanity-checks-for-PixelFormat-shift-values.patch
  0009-Remove-unused-FixedMemOutStream.patch
  0010-Use-size_t-for-lengths-in-stream-objects.patch
  0011-Be-defensive-about-overflows-in-stream-objects.patch
  0012-Add-unit-tests-for-PixelFormat.is888-detection.patch
  0013-Handle-pixel-formats-with-odd-shift-values.patch
  * stack use-after-return due to incorrect usage of stack memory
    in ZRLEDecoder (CVE-2019-15691, bsc#1159856)
  * improper value checks in CopyRectDecode may lead to heap
    buffer overflow (CVE-2019-15692, bsc#1160250)
  * heap buffer overflow in TightDecoder::FilterGradient
    (CVE-2019-15693, bsc#1159858)
  * improper error handling in processing MemOutStream may lead
    to heap buffer overflow (CVE-2019-15694, bsc#1160251
  * stack buffer overflow, which could be triggered from
    CMsgReader::readSetCurso (CVE-2019-15695, bsc#1159860)

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/X11:XOrg/tigervnc?expand=0&rev=168
2020-01-07 16:03:18 +00:00

148 lines
4.2 KiB
Diff

From d61a767d6842b530ffb532ddd5a3d233119aad40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pierre Ossman <ossman@cendio.se>
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2019 11:05:48 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Make ZlibInStream more robust against failures
Move the checks around to avoid missing cases where we might access
memory that is no longer valid. Also avoid touching the underlying
stream implicitly (e.g. via the destructor) as it might also no
longer be valid.
A malicious server could theoretically use this for remote code
execution in the client.
Issue found by Pavel Cheremushkin from Kaspersky Lab
---
common/rdr/ZlibInStream.cxx | 13 +++++++------
common/rdr/ZlibInStream.h | 2 +-
common/rfb/CMsgReader.cxx | 3 ++-
common/rfb/SMsgReader.cxx | 3 ++-
common/rfb/TightDecoder.cxx | 3 ++-
common/rfb/zrleDecode.h | 3 ++-
6 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/common/rdr/ZlibInStream.cxx b/common/rdr/ZlibInStream.cxx
index 4053bd19..a361010c 100644
--- a/common/rdr/ZlibInStream.cxx
+++ b/common/rdr/ZlibInStream.cxx
@@ -52,16 +52,16 @@ int ZlibInStream::pos()
return offset + ptr - start;
}
-void ZlibInStream::removeUnderlying()
+void ZlibInStream::flushUnderlying()
{
ptr = end = start;
- if (!underlying) return;
while (bytesIn > 0) {
decompress(true);
end = start; // throw away any data
}
- underlying = 0;
+
+ setUnderlying(NULL, 0);
}
void ZlibInStream::reset()
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ void ZlibInStream::init()
void ZlibInStream::deinit()
{
assert(zs != NULL);
- removeUnderlying();
+ setUnderlying(NULL, 0);
inflateEnd(zs);
delete zs;
zs = NULL;
@@ -100,8 +100,6 @@ int ZlibInStream::overrun(int itemSize, int nItems, bool wait)
{
if (itemSize > bufSize)
throw Exception("ZlibInStream overrun: max itemSize exceeded");
- if (!underlying)
- throw Exception("ZlibInStream overrun: no underlying stream");
if (end - ptr != 0)
memmove(start, ptr, end - ptr);
@@ -127,6 +125,9 @@ int ZlibInStream::overrun(int itemSize, int nItems, bool wait)
bool ZlibInStream::decompress(bool wait)
{
+ if (!underlying)
+ throw Exception("ZlibInStream overrun: no underlying stream");
+
zs->next_out = (U8*)end;
zs->avail_out = start + bufSize - end;
diff --git a/common/rdr/ZlibInStream.h b/common/rdr/ZlibInStream.h
index 6bd4da4c..86ba1ff1 100644
--- a/common/rdr/ZlibInStream.h
+++ b/common/rdr/ZlibInStream.h
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ namespace rdr {
virtual ~ZlibInStream();
void setUnderlying(InStream* is, int bytesIn);
- void removeUnderlying();
+ void flushUnderlying();
int pos();
void reset();
diff --git a/common/rfb/CMsgReader.cxx b/common/rfb/CMsgReader.cxx
index a9e12d70..52d40ce7 100644
--- a/common/rfb/CMsgReader.cxx
+++ b/common/rfb/CMsgReader.cxx
@@ -242,7 +242,8 @@ void CMsgReader::readExtendedClipboard(rdr::S32 len)
num++;
}
- zis.removeUnderlying();
+ zis.flushUnderlying();
+ zis.setUnderlying(NULL, 0);
handler->handleClipboardProvide(flags, lengths, buffers);
diff --git a/common/rfb/SMsgReader.cxx b/common/rfb/SMsgReader.cxx
index ab42e59a..dc7ddea6 100644
--- a/common/rfb/SMsgReader.cxx
+++ b/common/rfb/SMsgReader.cxx
@@ -293,7 +293,8 @@ void SMsgReader::readExtendedClipboard(rdr::S32 len)
num++;
}
- zis.removeUnderlying();
+ zis.flushUnderlying();
+ zis.setUnderlying(NULL, 0);
handler->handleClipboardProvide(flags, lengths, buffers);
diff --git a/common/rfb/TightDecoder.cxx b/common/rfb/TightDecoder.cxx
index 5b7c553d..ebc98b06 100644
--- a/common/rfb/TightDecoder.cxx
+++ b/common/rfb/TightDecoder.cxx
@@ -341,7 +341,8 @@ void TightDecoder::decodeRect(const Rect& r, const void* buffer,
zis[streamId].readBytes(netbuf, dataSize);
- zis[streamId].removeUnderlying();
+ zis[streamId].flushUnderlying();
+ zis[streamId].setUnderlying(NULL, 0);
delete ms;
bufptr = netbuf;
diff --git a/common/rfb/zrleDecode.h b/common/rfb/zrleDecode.h
index 32b5c92b..f4325385 100644
--- a/common/rfb/zrleDecode.h
+++ b/common/rfb/zrleDecode.h
@@ -174,7 +174,8 @@ void ZRLE_DECODE (const Rect& r, rdr::InStream* is,
}
}
- zis->removeUnderlying();
+ zis->flushUnderlying();
+ zis->setUnderlying(NULL, 0);
}
#undef ZRLE_DECODE
--
2.16.4