diff --git a/CVE-2022-2211-options-fix-buffer-overflow-in-get_keys.patch b/CVE-2022-2211-options-fix-buffer-overflow-in-get_keys.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b966203 --- /dev/null +++ b/CVE-2022-2211-options-fix-buffer-overflow-in-get_keys.patch @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +Subject: options: fix buffer overflow in get_keys() [CVE-2022-2211] +From: Laszlo Ersek lersek@redhat.com Tue Jun 28 13:49:04 2022 +0200 +Date: Wed Jun 29 15:17:17 2022 +0200: +Git: 35467027f657de76aca34b48a6f23e9608b23a57 + +When calculating the greatest possible number of matching keys in +get_keys(), the current expression + + MIN (1, ks->nr_keys) + +is wrong -- it will return at most 1. + +If all "nr_keys" keys match however, then we require "nr_keys" non-NULL +entries in the result array; in other words, we need + + MAX (1, ks->nr_keys) + +(The comment just above the expression is correct; the code is wrong.) + +This buffer overflow is easiest to trigger in those guestfs tools that +parse the "--key" option in C; that is, with "OPTION_key". For example, +the command + +$ virt-cat $(seq -f '--key /dev/sda2:key:%g' 200) -d DOMAIN /no-such-file + +which passes 200 (different) passphrases for the LUKS-encrypted block +device "/dev/sda2", crashes with a SIGSEGV. + +A slightly better reproducer from Rich Jones is the following, since it +doesn't require an encrypted guest disk image: + +$ echo TEST | guestfish --keys-from-stdin -N part luks-format /dev/sda1 0 +$ virt-cat $(seq -f '--key /dev/sda1:key:%g' 200) -a test1.img /no-such-file +Segmentation fault (core dumped) +$ rm test1.img + +( + + The buffer overflow is possible to trigger in OCaml-language tools as + well; that is, those that call "create_standard_options" with + ~key_opts:true. + + Triggering the problem that way is less trivial. The reason is that when + the OCaml tools parse the "--key" options, they de-duplicate the options + first, based on the device identifier. + + Thus, in theory, this de-duplication masks the issue, as (one would + think) only one "--key" option could belong to a single device, and + therefore the buffer overflow would not be triggered in practice. + + This is not the case however: the de-duplication does not collapse keys + that are provided for the same device, but use different identifier + types (such as pathname of device node versus LUKS UUID) -- in that + situation, two entries in the keystore will match the device, and the + terminating NULL entry will not be present once get_keys() returns. In + this scenario, we don't have an out-of-bounds write, but an + out-of-bounds read, in decrypt_mountables() [options/decrypt.c]. + + There is *yet another* bug in get_keys() though that undoes the above + "masking". The "uuid" parameter of get_keys() may be NULL (for example + when the device to decrypt uses BitLocker and not LUKS). When this + happens, get_keys() adds all keys in the keystore to the result array. + Therefore, the out-of-bounds write is easy to trigger with + OCaml-language tools as well, as long as we attempt to decrypt a + BitLocker (not LUKS) device, and we pass the "--key" options with + different device identifiers. + + Subsequent patches in this series fix all of the above; this patch fixes + the security bug. + +) + +Rather than replacing MIN with MAX, open-code the comparison, as we first +set "len" to 1 anyway. + +While at it, rework the NULL-termination such that the (len+1) addition +not go unchecked. + +Fixes: c10c8baedb88e7c2988a01b70fc5f81fa8e4885c +Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1809453 +Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2100862 +Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek +Message-Id: <20220628114915.5030-2-lersek@redhat.com> +Reviewed-by: Richard W.M. Jones + +--- a/common/options/keys.c ++++ b/common/options/keys.c +@@ -128,17 +128,23 @@ read_first_line_from_file (const char *f + char ** + get_keys (struct key_store *ks, const char *device, const char *uuid) + { +- size_t i, j, len; ++ size_t i, j, nmemb; + char **r; + char *s; + + /* We know the returned list must have at least one element and not + * more than ks->nr_keys. + */ +- len = 1; +- if (ks) +- len = MIN (1, ks->nr_keys); +- r = calloc (len+1, sizeof (char *)); ++ nmemb = 1; ++ if (ks && ks->nr_keys > nmemb) ++ nmemb = ks->nr_keys; ++ ++ /* make room for the terminating NULL */ ++ if (nmemb == (size_t)-1) ++ error (EXIT_FAILURE, 0, _("size_t overflow")); ++ nmemb++; ++ ++ r = calloc (nmemb, sizeof (char *)); + if (r == NULL) + error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, "calloc"); + diff --git a/virt-v2v.changes b/virt-v2v.changes index 3f6d26d..cada5bd 100644 --- a/virt-v2v.changes +++ b/virt-v2v.changes @@ -1,3 +1,10 @@ +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Wed Jun 29 09:51:03 MDT 2022 - carnold@suse.com + +- bsc#1201064 - Libguestfs: Buffer overflow in get_keys leads + to DOS - CVE-2022-2211 + CVE-2022-2211-options-fix-buffer-overflow-in-get_keys.patch + ------------------------------------------------------------------- Thu May 26 11:39:38 MDT 2022 - carnold@suse.com diff --git a/virt-v2v.spec b/virt-v2v.spec index 72623fe..cb6f5c9 100644 --- a/virt-v2v.spec +++ b/virt-v2v.spec @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ Group: System/Management URL: https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v Source0: https://download.libguestfs.org/virt-v2v/%{source_directory}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz Source1: https://download.libguestfs.org/virt-v2v/%{source_directory}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz.sig +Patch1: CVE-2022-2211-options-fix-buffer-overflow-in-get_keys.patch BuildRequires: augeas-devel BuildRequires: file-devel #BuildRequires: /usr/bin/pod2man