diff --git a/rebased-v2.6-0009-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch b/rebased-v2.6-0009-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..99b0549 --- /dev/null +++ b/rebased-v2.6-0009-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From 3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mathy Vanhoef +Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2018 01:25:53 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] WPA: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data + +Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant +processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted +flag set, but not the MIC flag. + +When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but +not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying +the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when +negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that +unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary +could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information +in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key). +(CVE-2018-14526) + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef +--- + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 11 +++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) + +diff -upr wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +--- wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c 2016-10-02 21:51:11.000000000 +0300 ++++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c 2018-08-08 16:55:11.506831029 +0300 +@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, c + + if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) && + (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) { ++ /* ++ * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity ++ * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not ++ * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0 ++ * which is the case in this code branch. ++ */ ++ if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) { ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, ++ "WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but unauthenticated data"); ++ goto out; ++ } + if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data, + &key_data_len)) + goto out; diff --git a/wpa_supplicant.changes b/wpa_supplicant.changes index 166cc6a..d307de3 100644 --- a/wpa_supplicant.changes +++ b/wpa_supplicant.changes @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Thu Oct 11 11:58:33 UTC 2018 - Karol Babioch + +- Added 0009-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch: Ignore + unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data (CVE-2018-14526, bsc#1104205). + ------------------------------------------------------------------- Fri Sep 21 09:15:34 UTC 2018 - Karol Babioch diff --git a/wpa_supplicant.spec b/wpa_supplicant.spec index 1c3855d..1ac2e2f 100644 --- a/wpa_supplicant.spec +++ b/wpa_supplicant.spec @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ # license that conforms to the Open Source Definition (Version 1.9) # published by the Open Source Initiative. -# Please submit bugfixes or comments via http://bugs.opensuse.org/ +# Please submit bugfixes or comments via https://bugs.opensuse.org/ # @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ Patch16: rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pen Patch17: rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch Patch18: wpa_supplicant-bnc-1099835-fix-private-key-password.patch Patch19: wpa_supplicant-bnc-1099835-clear-default_passwd_cb.patch +Patch20: rebased-v2.6-0009-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch BuildRequires: openssl-devel BuildRequires: pkgconfig @@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ cp %{SOURCE1} wpa_supplicant/.config %patch17 -p1 %patch18 -p1 %patch19 -p1 +%patch20 -p1 %build cd wpa_supplicant