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- Upstream patches from Jan

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25927-x86-domctl-ioport-mapping-range.patch
  25929-tmem-restore-pool-version.patch
  25931-x86-domctl-iomem-mapping-checks.patch
  25940-x86-S3-flush-cache.patch
  25952-x86-MMIO-remap-permissions.patch
  25961-x86-HPET-interrupts.patch
  25962-x86-assign-irq-vector-old.patch
  25965-x86-ucode-Intel-resume.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/xen?expand=0&rev=205
This commit is contained in:
Charles Arnold 2012-10-02 22:08:01 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
parent 09c30bad0c
commit 08af757235
15 changed files with 613 additions and 621 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

28
25927-x86-domctl-ioport-mapping-range.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1348039675 -7200
# Node ID 3e3959413b2fbef584993beb434285d0691d5c67
# Parent 4a0438fe1e6afe01e46023bcb2c828c5aaeefb1d
x86: properly check XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping arguments for invalid range
In particular, the case of "np" being a very large value wasn't handled
correctly. The range start checks also were off by one (except that in
practice, when "np" is properly range checked, this would still have
been caught by the range end checks).
Also, is a GFN wrap in XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping really okay?
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
@@ -888,7 +888,7 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
int found = 0;
ret = -EINVAL;
- if ( (np == 0) || (fgp > MAX_IOPORTS) || (fmp > MAX_IOPORTS) ||
+ if ( ((fgp | fmp | (np - 1)) >= MAX_IOPORTS) ||
((fgp + np) > MAX_IOPORTS) || ((fmp + np) > MAX_IOPORTS) )
{
printk(XENLOG_G_ERR

26
25929-tmem-restore-pool-version.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
# Date 1348069127 -7200
# Node ID fee83ac77d8c7339abf5185690603ea5b0c548cf
# Parent 7b045d43e59dcb42340097058502bf456e151180
tmem: bump pool version to 1 to fix restore issue when tmem enabled
Restore fails when tmem is enabled both in hypervisor and guest. This
is due to spec version mismatch when restoring a pool.
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/common/tmem.c
+++ b/xen/common/tmem.c
@@ -2407,7 +2407,8 @@ static NOINLINE int tmemc_save_subop(int
break;
rc = (pool->persistent ? TMEM_POOL_PERSIST : 0) |
(pool->shared ? TMEM_POOL_SHARED : 0) |
- (pool->pageshift << TMEM_POOL_PAGESIZE_SHIFT);
+ (pool->pageshift << TMEM_POOL_PAGESIZE_SHIFT) |
+ (TMEM_SPEC_VERSION << TMEM_POOL_VERSION_SHIFT);
break;
case TMEMC_SAVE_GET_POOL_NPAGES:
if ( pool == NULL )

257
25931-x86-domctl-iomem-mapping-checks.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1348125713 -7200
# Node ID 14980591956954584f3cd87bf4e8d306360e7f27
# Parent 4e93cbeac98b3e6be98e5ec0881b44b68ee95974
x86: tighten checks in XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping handler
Properly checking the MFN implies knowing the physical address width
supported by the platform, so to obtain this consistently the
respective code gets moved out of the MTRR subdir.
Btw., the model specific workaround in that code is likely unnecessary
- I believe those CPU models don't support 64-bit mode. But I wasn't
able to formally verify this, so I preferred to retain that code for
now.
But domctl code here also was lacking other error checks (as was,
looking at it again from that angle) the XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping one.
Besides adding the missing checks, printing is also added for the case
where revoking access permissions didn't work (as that may have
implications for the host operator, e.g. wanting to not pass through
affected devices to another guest until the one previously using them
did actually die).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/centaur.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/centaur.c
@@ -56,6 +56,9 @@ static void __init init_c3(struct cpuinf
if (c->x86_model >=6 && c->x86_model <9)
set_bit(X86_FEATURE_3DNOW, c->x86_capability);
+ if (cpuid_eax(0x80000000) < 0x80000008)
+ paddr_bits = 32;
+
get_model_name(c);
display_cacheinfo(c);
}
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ integer_param("cpuid_mask_ext_edx", opt_
struct cpu_dev * cpu_devs[X86_VENDOR_NUM] = {};
+unsigned int paddr_bits __read_mostly = 36;
+
/*
* Default host IA32_CR_PAT value to cover all memory types.
* BIOS usually sets it to 0x07040600070406.
@@ -265,6 +267,8 @@ static void __cpuinit generic_identify(s
}
if ( xlvl >= 0x80000004 )
get_model_name(c); /* Default name */
+ if ( xlvl >= 0x80000008 )
+ paddr_bits = cpuid_eax(0x80000008) & 0xff;
}
/* Intel-defined flags: level 0x00000007 */
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cyrix.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cyrix.c
@@ -255,7 +255,9 @@ static void __init init_cyrix(struct cpu
}
safe_strcpy(c->x86_model_id, Cx86_model[dir0_msn & 7]);
if (p) safe_strcat(c->x86_model_id, p);
- return;
+
+ if (cpu_has_cyrix_arr)
+ paddr_bits = 32;
}
/*
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
@@ -144,6 +144,11 @@ void __devinit early_intel_workaround(st
c->cpuid_level);
}
}
+
+ /* CPUID workaround for Intel 0F33/0F34 CPU */
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0xF && boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 3 &&
+ (boot_cpu_data.x86_mask == 3 || boot_cpu_data.x86_mask == 4))
+ paddr_bits = 36;
}
/*
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mtrr/main.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mtrr/main.c
@@ -587,8 +587,6 @@ struct mtrr_value {
unsigned long lsize;
};
-unsigned int paddr_bits __read_mostly = 36;
-
/**
* mtrr_bp_init - initialize mtrrs on the boot CPU
*
@@ -602,48 +600,12 @@ void __init mtrr_bp_init(void)
if (cpu_has_mtrr) {
mtrr_if = &generic_mtrr_ops;
- size_or_mask = 0xff000000; /* 36 bits */
- size_and_mask = 0x00f00000;
-
- /* This is an AMD specific MSR, but we assume(hope?) that
- Intel will implement it to when they extend the address
- bus of the Xeon. */
- if (cpuid_eax(0x80000000) >= 0x80000008) {
- paddr_bits = cpuid_eax(0x80000008) & 0xff;
- /* CPUID workaround for Intel 0F33/0F34 CPU */
- if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
- boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0xF &&
- boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 0x3 &&
- (boot_cpu_data.x86_mask == 0x3 ||
- boot_cpu_data.x86_mask == 0x4))
- paddr_bits = 36;
-
- size_or_mask = ~((1ULL << (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) - 1);
- size_and_mask = ~size_or_mask & 0xfffff00000ULL;
- } else if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR &&
- boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) {
- /* VIA C* family have Intel style MTRRs, but
- don't support PAE */
- size_or_mask = 0xfff00000; /* 32 bits */
- size_and_mask = 0;
- }
} else {
#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) {
- case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
- if (cpu_has_k6_mtrr) {
- /* Pre-Athlon (K6) AMD CPU MTRRs */
- mtrr_if = mtrr_ops[X86_VENDOR_AMD];
- size_or_mask = 0xfff00000; /* 32 bits */
- size_and_mask = 0;
- }
- break;
case X86_VENDOR_CYRIX:
- if (cpu_has_cyrix_arr) {
+ if (cpu_has_cyrix_arr)
mtrr_if = mtrr_ops[X86_VENDOR_CYRIX];
- size_or_mask = 0xfff00000; /* 32 bits */
- size_and_mask = 0;
- }
break;
default:
break;
@@ -652,6 +614,8 @@ void __init mtrr_bp_init(void)
}
if (mtrr_if) {
+ size_or_mask = ~((1ULL << (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) - 1);
+ size_and_mask = ~size_or_mask & 0xfffff00000ULL;
set_num_var_ranges();
init_table();
if (use_intel())
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
@@ -829,10 +829,12 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
unsigned long mfn = domctl->u.memory_mapping.first_mfn;
unsigned long nr_mfns = domctl->u.memory_mapping.nr_mfns;
int add = domctl->u.memory_mapping.add_mapping;
- int i;
+ unsigned long i;
ret = -EINVAL;
- if ( (mfn + nr_mfns - 1) < mfn ) /* wrap? */
+ if ( (mfn + nr_mfns - 1) < mfn || /* wrap? */
+ ((mfn | (mfn + nr_mfns - 1)) >> (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) ||
+ (gfn + nr_mfns - 1) < gfn ) /* wrap? */
break;
ret = -EPERM;
@@ -857,8 +859,25 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns);
ret = iomem_permit_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
- for ( i = 0; i < nr_mfns; i++ )
- set_mmio_p2m_entry(d, gfn+i, _mfn(mfn+i));
+ if ( !ret && paging_mode_translate(d) )
+ {
+ for ( i = 0; !ret && i < nr_mfns; i++ )
+ if ( !set_mmio_p2m_entry(d, gfn + i, _mfn(mfn + i)) )
+ ret = -EIO;
+ if ( ret )
+ {
+ printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
+ "memory_map:fail: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx\n",
+ d->domain_id, gfn + i, mfn + i);
+ while ( i-- )
+ clear_mmio_p2m_entry(d, gfn + i);
+ if ( iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1) &&
+ IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
+ printk(XENLOG_ERR
+ "memory_map: failed to deny dom%d access to [%lx,%lx]\n",
+ d->domain_id, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
+ }
+ }
}
else
{
@@ -866,9 +885,17 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
"memory_map:remove: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n",
d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns);
- for ( i = 0; i < nr_mfns; i++ )
- clear_mmio_p2m_entry(d, gfn+i);
+ if ( paging_mode_translate(d) )
+ for ( i = 0; i < nr_mfns; i++ )
+ add |= !clear_mmio_p2m_entry(d, gfn + i);
ret = iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
+ if ( !ret && add )
+ ret = -EIO;
+ if ( ret && IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
+ printk(XENLOG_ERR
+ "memory_map: error %ld %s dom%d access to [%lx,%lx]\n",
+ ret, add ? "removing" : "denying", d->domain_id,
+ mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);
}
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
@@ -930,12 +957,23 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
if ( !found )
{
g2m_ioport = xmalloc(struct g2m_ioport);
+ if ( !g2m_ioport )
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ if ( !found && !ret )
+ {
g2m_ioport->gport = fgp;
g2m_ioport->mport = fmp;
g2m_ioport->np = np;
list_add_tail(&g2m_ioport->list, &hd->g2m_ioport_list);
}
- ret = ioports_permit_access(d, fmp, fmp + np - 1);
+ if ( !ret )
+ ret = ioports_permit_access(d, fmp, fmp + np - 1);
+ if ( ret && !found && g2m_ioport )
+ {
+ list_del(&g2m_ioport->list);
+ xfree(g2m_ioport);
+ }
}
else
{
@@ -950,6 +988,10 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
break;
}
ret = ioports_deny_access(d, fmp, fmp + np - 1);
+ if ( ret && IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
+ printk(XENLOG_ERR
+ "ioport_map: error %ld denying dom%d access to [%x,%x]\n",
+ ret, d->domain_id, fmp, fmp + np - 1);
}
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
}

53
25940-x86-S3-flush-cache.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Ben Guthro <ben@guthro.net>
# Date 1348555094 -7200
# Node ID c8d65d91a6f20fa7fae905bbf172e59b335d6371
# Parent b49f7bf52fa92626517386cba89350243b808871
x86/S3: add cache flush on secondary CPUs before going to sleep
Secondary CPUs, between doing their final memory writes (particularly
updating cpu_initialized) and getting a subsequent INIT, may not write
back all modified data. The INIT itself then causes those modifications
to be lost, so in the cpu_initialized case the CPU would find itself
already initialized, (intentionally) entering an infinite loop instead
of actually coming online.
Signed-off-by: Ben Guthro <ben@guthro.net>
Make acpi_dead_idle() call default_dead_idle() rather than duplicating
the logic there.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
@@ -647,6 +647,12 @@ static void acpi_dead_idle(void)
}
default_halt:
+ /*
+ * When going into S3, without flushing caches modified data may be
+ * held by the CPUs spinning here indefinitely, and get discarded by
+ * a subsequent INIT.
+ */
+ wbinvd();
for ( ; ; )
halt();
}
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -86,6 +86,12 @@ static void default_idle(void)
static void default_dead_idle(void)
{
+ /*
+ * When going into S3, without flushing caches modified data may be
+ * held by the CPUs spinning here indefinitely, and get discarded by
+ * a subsequent INIT.
+ */
+ wbinvd();
for ( ; ; )
halt();
}

41
25952-x86-MMIO-remap-permissions.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
# Date 1348653367 -7200
# Node ID 8278d7d8fa485996f51134c5265fceaf239adf6a
# Parent b83f414ccf7a6e4e077a10bc422cf3f6c7d30566
x86: check remote MMIO remap permissions
When a domain is mapping pages from a different pg_owner domain, the
iomem_access checks are currently only applied to the pg_owner domain,
potentially allowing a domain with a more restrictive iomem_access
policy to have the pages mapped into its page tables. To catch this,
also check the owner of the page tables. The current domain does not
need to be checked because the ability to manipulate a domain's page
tables implies full access to the target domain, so checking that
domain's permission is sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -870,6 +870,19 @@ get_page_from_l1e(
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if ( pg_owner != l1e_owner &&
+ !iomem_access_permitted(l1e_owner, mfn, mfn) )
+ {
+ if ( mfn != (PADDR_MASK >> PAGE_SHIFT) ) /* INVALID_MFN? */
+ {
+ MEM_LOG("Dom%u attempted to map I/O space %08lx in dom%u to dom%u",
+ curr->domain->domain_id, mfn, pg_owner->domain_id,
+ l1e_owner->domain_id);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
if ( !(l1f & _PAGE_RW) ||
!rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn) )
return 0;

36
25961-x86-HPET-interrupts.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1348816934 -7200
# Node ID 6a581212909478bba0c7b4dfc6c370270dee825c
# Parent 6bf8b882df8f66ab5500e4d9cc0c3338ae5a6cb9
x86/HPET: don't disable interrupt delivery right after setting it up
We shouldn't clear HPET_TN_FSB right after we (indirectly, via
request_irq()) enabled it for the channels we intend to use for
broadcasts.
This fixes a regression introduced by c/s 25103:0b0e42dc4f0a.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c
@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ void __init hpet_broadcast_init(void)
{
/* set HPET Tn as oneshot */
cfg = hpet_read32(HPET_Tn_CFG(hpet_events[i].idx));
- cfg &= ~(HPET_TN_LEVEL | HPET_TN_PERIODIC | HPET_TN_FSB);
+ cfg &= ~(HPET_TN_LEVEL | HPET_TN_PERIODIC);
cfg |= HPET_TN_ENABLE | HPET_TN_32BIT;
hpet_write32(cfg, HPET_Tn_CFG(hpet_events[i].idx));
@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ void hpet_broadcast_resume(void)
/* set HPET Tn as oneshot */
cfg = hpet_read32(HPET_Tn_CFG(hpet_events[i].idx));
- cfg &= ~(HPET_TN_LEVEL | HPET_TN_PERIODIC | HPET_TN_FSB);
+ cfg &= ~(HPET_TN_LEVEL | HPET_TN_PERIODIC);
cfg |= HPET_TN_ENABLE | HPET_TN_32BIT;
hpet_write32(cfg, HPET_Tn_CFG(hpet_events[i].idx));

35
25962-x86-assign-irq-vector-old.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1348817014 -7200
# Node ID 41f523f1b5e5af9cf8e85160f2412456da83050f
# Parent 6a581212909478bba0c7b4dfc6c370270dee825c
x86/IRQ: fix valid-old-vector checks in __assign_irq_vector()
There are two greater-than-zero checks for the old vector retrieved,
which don't work when a negative value got stashed into the respective
arch_irq_desc field. The effect of this was that for interrupts that
are intended to get their affinity adjusted the first time before the
first interrupt occurs, the affinity change would fail, because the
original vector assignment would have caused the move_in_progress flag
to get set (which causes subsequent re-assignments to fail until it
gets cleared, which only happens from the ->ack() actor, i.e. when an
interrupt actually occurred).
This addresses a problem introduced in c/s 23816:7f357e1ef60a (by
changing IRQ_VECTOR_UNASSIGNED from 0 to -1).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
@@ -430,8 +430,7 @@ static int __assign_irq_vector(
* 0x80, because int 0x80 is hm, kind of importantish. ;)
*/
static int current_vector = FIRST_DYNAMIC_VECTOR, current_offset = 0;
- unsigned int old_vector;
- int cpu, err;
+ int cpu, err, old_vector;
cpumask_t tmp_mask;
vmask_t *irq_used_vectors = NULL;

35
25965-x86-ucode-Intel-resume.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Date 1348817291 -7200
# Node ID 4496d56c68a0e57ed9f03b482028093f1e7fdf6c
# Parent 00c05b9d76247d063a8ebc75050246e488323f50
x86/ucode: fix Intel case of resume handling on boot CPU
Checking the stored version doesn't tell us anything about the need to
apply the update (during resume, what is stored doesn't necessarily
match what is loaded).
Note that the check can be removed altogether because once switched to
use what was read from the CPU (uci->cpu_sig.rev, as used in the
subsequent pr_debug()), it would become redundant with the checks that
lead to microcode_update_match() returning the indication that an
update should be applied.
Note further that this was not an issue on APs since they start with
uci->mc.mc_intel being NULL.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: Ben Guthro <ben@guthro.net>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/microcode_intel.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/microcode_intel.c
@@ -261,8 +261,6 @@ static int get_matching_microcode(const
}
return 0;
find:
- if ( uci->mc.mc_intel && uci->mc.mc_intel->hdr.rev >= mc_header->rev )
- return 0;
pr_debug("microcode: CPU%d found a matching microcode update with"
" version 0x%x (current=0x%x)\n",
cpu, mc_header->rev, uci->cpu_sig.rev);

2
blktap-pv-cdrom.patch
View File

@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h
@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ typedef struct msg_pid {
@@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ typedef struct msg_pid {
#define DISK_TYPE_RAM 3
#define DISK_TYPE_QCOW 4
#define DISK_TYPE_QCOW2 5

2
x86-dom-print.patch
View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -148,15 +148,30 @@ void dump_pageframe_info(struct domain *
@@ -154,15 +154,30 @@ void dump_pageframe_info(struct domain *
printk("Memory pages belonging to domain %u:\n", d->domain_id);

61
xen-destdir.diff
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@ -170,3 +170,64 @@ Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/Makefile
--source-path=$$source \
--extra-cflags="-I$(XEN_ROOT)/tools/include \
-I$(XEN_ROOT)/tools/libxc \
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/stubdom/Makefile
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/stubdom/Makefile
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/stubdom/Makefile
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ install-grub: pv-grub
install-xenstore: xenstore-stubdom
$(INSTALL_DIR) "$(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/xen/boot"
- $(INSTALL_PROG) mini-os-$(XEN_TARGET_ARCH)-xenstore/mini-os.gz "$(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/xen/boot/xenstore-stubdom.gz"
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) mini-os-$(XEN_TARGET_ARCH)-xenstore/mini-os.gz "$(DESTDIR)/usr/lib/xen/boot/xenstore-stubdom.gz"
#######
# clean
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR).$(LIBVHD-MINOR
install: all
$(INSTALL_DIR) -p $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
- $(INSTALL_PROG) libvhd.a $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) libvhd.a $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
$(INSTALL_PROG) libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR).$(LIBVHD-MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
ln -sf libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR).$(LIBVHD-MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)/libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR)
ln -sf libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR) $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)/libvhd.so
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap/lib/Makefile
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/blktap/lib/Makefile
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap/lib/Makefile
@@ -23,23 +23,26 @@ OBJS = $(SRCS:.c=.o)
OBJS_PIC = $(SRCS:.c=.opic)
IBINS :=
-LIB = libblktap.a libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR)
+LIB = libblktap.a
+LIB_SO = libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR)
+LIB_ALL = $(LIB) $(LIB_SO)
.PHONY: all
-all: $(LIB)
+all: $(LIB_ALL)
.PHONY: install
install: all
$(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)
$(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(INCLUDEDIR)
- $(INSTALL_PROG) $(LIB) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) $(LIB) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)
+ $(INSTALL_PROG) $(LIB_SO) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)
ln -sf libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)/libblktap.so.$(MAJOR)
ln -sf libblktap.so.$(MAJOR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)/libblktap.so
$(INSTALL_DATA) blktaplib.h $(DESTDIR)$(INCLUDEDIR)
.PHONY: clean
clean:
- rm -rf *.a *.so* *.o *.opic *.rpm $(LIB) *~ $(DEPS) xen TAGS
+ rm -rf *.a *.so* *.o *.opic *.rpm $(LIB_ALL) *~ $(DEPS) xen TAGS
libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR): $(OBJS_PIC)
$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -Wl,$(SONAME_LDFLAG) -Wl,$(SONAME) $(SHLIB_LDFLAGS) \

342
xen-warnings-unused.diff
View File

@ -1,342 +0,0 @@
--- a/tools/misc/gtraceview.c
+++ b/tools/misc/gtraceview.c
@@ -621,7 +621,8 @@ void crt_init(void)
void nr_addch(int nr, int ch)
{
int i;
- int y, x;
+ int x;
+ int __attribute__((__unused__)) y;
getyx(stdscr, y, x);
for (i = 0; i < nr; i++) {
if (x == COLS-1)
--- a/tools/xcutils/xc_restore.c
+++ b/tools/xcutils/xc_restore.c
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
unsigned int domid, store_evtchn, console_evtchn;
- unsigned int hvm, pae, apic;
+ unsigned int hvm, pae;
+ unsigned int __attribute__((__unused__)) apic;
xc_interface *xch;
int io_fd, ret;
int superpages;
--- a/tools/firmware/rombios/32bit/tcgbios/tcgbios.c
+++ b/tools/firmware/rombios/32bit/tcgbios/tcgbios.c
@@ -1064,7 +1064,7 @@ uint32_t HashLogEvent32(struct hlei *hle
uint32_t rc = 0;
uint16_t size;
uint32_t logdataptr;
- uint32_t logdatalen;
+ uint32_t __attribute__((__unused__)) logdatalen;
uint32_t hashdataptr;
uint32_t hashdatalen;
--- a/tools/console/client/main.c
+++ b/tools/console/client/main.c
@@ -277,7 +277,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
};
char *dom_path = NULL, *path = NULL;
- int spty, xsfd;
+ int spty;
+ int __attribute__((__unused__)) xsfd;
struct xs_handle *xs;
char *end;
console_type type = CONSOLE_INVAL;
--- a/tools/xenstat/xentop/xentop.c
+++ b/tools/xenstat/xentop/xentop.c
@@ -278,7 +278,8 @@ static void fail(const char *str)
/* Return the row containing the cursor. */
static int current_row(void)
{
- int y, x;
+ int __attribute__((__unused__)) x;
+ int y;
getyx(stdscr, y, x);
return y;
}
@@ -286,7 +287,8 @@ static int current_row(void)
/* Return the number of lines on the screen. */
static int lines(void)
{
- int y, x;
+ int __attribute__((__unused__)) x;
+ int y;
getmaxyx(stdscr, y, x);
return y;
}
--- a/tools/libxl/libxlu_cfg.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxlu_cfg.c
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ char *xlu__cfgl_dequote(CfgParseContext
#define NUMERIC_CHAR(minlen,maxlen,base,basetext) do{ \
char numbuf[(maxlen)+1], *ep; \
- unsigned long val; \
+ unsigned long __attribute__((__unused__)) val; \
\
strncpy(numbuf,p,(maxlen)); \
numbuf[(maxlen)]= 0; \
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_pci.c
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ int libxl__create_pci_backend(libxl__gc
flexarray_t *front = NULL;
flexarray_t *back = NULL;
libxl__device device;
- int ret = ERROR_NOMEM, i;
+ int i;
front = flexarray_make(16, 1);
if (!front)
@@ -80,8 +80,6 @@ int libxl__create_pci_backend(libxl__gc
if (!back)
goto out;
- ret = 0;
-
LIBXL__LOG(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_DEBUG, "Creating pci backend");
/* add pci device */
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
@@ -565,7 +565,6 @@ int libxl__build_hvm(libxl__gc *gc, uint
LIBXL__LOG_ERRNOVAL(ctx, LIBXL__LOG_ERROR, ret, "hvm build set params failed");
goto out;
}
- rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
}
--- a/tools/debugger/gdbsx/gx/gx_comm.c
+++ b/tools/debugger/gdbsx/gx/gx_comm.c
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ readchar(void)
static char buf[BUFSIZ];
static int bufcnt = 0;
static char *bufp;
- uint64_t ll;
+ uint64_t __attribute__((__unused__)) ll;
if (bufcnt-- > 0)
return *bufp++ & 0x7f;
--- a/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/checkpoint/libcheckpoint.c
+++ b/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/checkpoint/libcheckpoint.c
@@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ static int create_suspend_thread(checkpo
static void stop_suspend_thread(checkpoint_state* s)
{
- int err;
+ int __attribute__((__unused__)) err;
s->done = 1;
--- a/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/netlink/libnetlink.c
+++ b/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/netlink/libnetlink.c
@@ -433,7 +433,8 @@ int rtnl_from_file(FILE *rtnl, rtnl_filt
nladdr.nl_groups = 0;
while (1) {
- int err, len, type;
+ int err, len;
+ int __attribute__((__unused__)) type;
int l;
status = fread(&buf, 1, sizeof(*h), rtnl);
--- a/xen/common/cpupool.c
+++ b/xen/common/cpupool.c
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ int cpupool_add_domain(struct domain *d,
{
struct cpupool *c;
int rc;
- int n_dom = 0;
+ int __attribute__((__unused__)) n_dom = 0;
if ( poolid == CPUPOOLID_NONE )
return 0;
@@ -399,8 +399,8 @@ int cpupool_add_domain(struct domain *d,
*/
void cpupool_rm_domain(struct domain *d)
{
- int cpupool_id;
- int n_dom;
+ int __attribute__((__unused__)) cpupool_id;
+ int __attribute__((__unused__)) n_dom;
if ( d->cpupool == NULL )
return;
--- a/xen/common/kexec.c
+++ b/xen/common/kexec.c
@@ -817,7 +817,8 @@ static int kexec_exec(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(v
{
xen_kexec_exec_t exec;
xen_kexec_image_t *image;
- int base, bit, pos, ret = -EINVAL;
+ int base, bit, pos;
+ int __attribute__((__unused__)) ret = -EINVAL;
if ( unlikely(copy_from_guest(&exec, uarg, 1)) )
return -EFAULT;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/time.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/time.c
@@ -1012,7 +1012,8 @@ static void local_time_calibration(void)
* System timestamps, extrapolated from local and master oscillators,
* taken during this calibration and the previous calibration.
*/
- s_time_t prev_local_stime, curr_local_stime;
+ s_time_t curr_local_stime;
+ s_time_t __attribute__((__unused__)) prev_local_stime;
s_time_t prev_master_stime, curr_master_stime;
/* TSC timestamps taken during this calibration and prev calibration. */
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ p2m_remove_page(struct p2m_domain *p2m,
unsigned int page_order)
{
unsigned long i;
- mfn_t mfn_return;
+ mfn_t __attribute__((__unused__)) mfn_return;
p2m_type_t t;
p2m_access_t a;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel_cacheinfo.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel_cacheinfo.c
@@ -169,7 +169,8 @@ unsigned int __cpuinit init_intel_cachei
unsigned int trace = 0, l1i = 0, l1d = 0, l2 = 0, l3 = 0; /* Cache sizes */
unsigned int new_l1d = 0, new_l1i = 0; /* Cache sizes from cpuid(4) */
unsigned int new_l2 = 0, new_l3 = 0, i; /* Cache sizes from cpuid(4) */
- unsigned int l2_id = 0, l3_id = 0, num_threads_sharing, index_msb;
+ unsigned int num_threads_sharing, index_msb;
+ unsigned int __attribute__((__unused__)) l2_id = 0, l3_id = 0;
if (c->cpuid_level > 3) {
static int is_initialized;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian.c
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ int rdmsr_viridian_regs(uint32_t idx, ui
int viridian_hypercall(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
{
int mode = hvm_guest_x86_mode(current);
- unsigned long input_params_gpa, output_params_gpa;
+ unsigned long __attribute__((__unused__)) input_params_gpa, output_params_gpa;
uint16_t status = HV_STATUS_SUCCESS;
union hypercall_input {
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -4973,7 +4973,7 @@ static int ptwr_emulated_update(
{
unsigned long mfn;
unsigned long unaligned_addr = addr;
- struct page_info *page;
+ struct page_info __attribute__((__unused__)) *page;
l1_pgentry_t pte, ol1e, nl1e, *pl1e;
struct vcpu *v = current;
struct domain *d = v->domain;
--- a/xen/common/tmem.c
+++ b/xen/common/tmem.c
@@ -1352,7 +1352,8 @@ obj_unlock:
static int tmem_evict(void)
{
client_t *client = tmh_client_from_current();
- pgp_t *pgp = NULL, *pgp2, *pgp_del;
+ pgp_t *pgp = NULL, *pgp2;
+ pgp_t __attribute__((__unused__)) *pgp_del;
obj_t *obj;
pool_t *pool;
int ret = 0;
@@ -1589,7 +1590,8 @@ static NOINLINE int do_tmem_put(pool_t *
pagesize_t pfn_offset, pagesize_t len, tmem_cli_va_t clibuf)
{
obj_t *obj = NULL, *objfound = NULL, *objnew = NULL;
- pgp_t *pgp = NULL, *pgpdel = NULL;
+ pgp_t *pgp = NULL;
+ pgp_t __attribute__((__unused__)) *pgpdel = NULL;
client_t *client = pool->client;
int ret = client->frozen ? -EFROZEN : -ENOMEM;
--- a/xen/common/tmem_xen.c
+++ b/xen/common/tmem_xen.c
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ EXPORT int tmh_copy_from_client(pfp_t *p
EXPORT int tmh_compress_from_client(tmem_cli_mfn_t cmfn,
void **out_va, size_t *out_len, tmem_cli_va_t clibuf)
{
- int ret = 0;
+ int __attribute__((__unused__)) ret = 0;
unsigned char *dmem = this_cpu(dstmem);
unsigned char *wmem = this_cpu(workmem);
char *scratch = this_cpu(scratch_page);
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ EXPORT int tmh_decompress_to_client(tmem
void *cli_va = NULL;
char *scratch = this_cpu(scratch_page);
size_t out_len = PAGE_SIZE;
- int ret;
+ int __attribute__((__unused__)) ret;
if ( guest_handle_is_null(clibuf) )
{
@@ -405,15 +405,17 @@ static void tmh_persistent_pool_page_put
EXPORT tmh_client_t *tmh_client_init(cli_id_t cli_id)
{
tmh_client_t *tmh;
+#ifndef __i386__
char name[5];
int i, shift;
+#endif
if ( (tmh = xmalloc(tmh_client_t)) == NULL )
return NULL;
+#ifndef __i386__
for (i = 0, shift = 12; i < 4; shift -=4, i++)
name[i] = (((unsigned short)cli_id >> shift) & 0xf) + '0';
name[4] = '\0';
-#ifndef __i386__
tmh->persistent_pool = xmem_pool_create(name, tmh_persistent_pool_page_get,
tmh_persistent_pool_page_put, PAGE_SIZE, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
if ( tmh->persistent_pool == NULL )
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ set_shadow_status(struct vcpu *v, mfn_t
/* Put a shadow into the hash table */
{
struct domain *d = v->domain;
- int res;
+ int __attribute__((__unused__)) res;
SHADOW_PRINTK("d=%d, v=%d, gmfn=%05lx, type=%08x, smfn=%05lx\n",
d->domain_id, v->vcpu_id, mfn_x(gmfn),
@@ -4438,7 +4438,7 @@ sh_update_cr3(struct vcpu *v, int do_loc
int sh_rm_write_access_from_sl1p(struct vcpu *v, mfn_t gmfn,
mfn_t smfn, unsigned long off)
{
- int r;
+ int __attribute__((__unused__)) r;
shadow_l1e_t *sl1p, sl1e;
struct page_info *sp;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
@@ -377,8 +377,7 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
return rc;
/* compatibility check */
- compatible = 0;
- compat32 = 0;
+ compatible = compat32 = 0;
machine = elf_uval(&elf, elf.ehdr, e_machine);
switch (CONFIG_PAGING_LEVELS) {
case 3: /* x86_32p */
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -1910,7 +1910,11 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct
struct vcpu *v = current;
unsigned long *reg, eip = regs->eip;
u8 opcode, modrm_reg = 0, modrm_rm = 0, rep_prefix = 0, lock = 0, rex = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
enum { lm_seg_none, lm_seg_fs, lm_seg_gs } lm_ovr = lm_seg_none;
+#else
+ enum { lm_seg_none, lm_seg_fs, lm_seg_gs } __attribute__((__unused__)) lm_ovr = lm_seg_none;
+#endif
int rc;
unsigned int port, i, data_sel, ar, data, bpmatch = 0;
unsigned int op_bytes, op_default, ad_bytes, ad_default, opsize_prefix= 0;

265
xen-warnings.diff
View File

@ -1,265 +0,0 @@
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/misc/miniterm/miniterm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/misc/miniterm/miniterm.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/misc/miniterm/miniterm.c
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
case 0:
close(1); /* stdout not needed */
for ( c = (char)getchar(); c != ENDMINITERM; c = (char)getchar() )
- write(fd,&c,1);
+ if (write(fd,&c,1)) ;
tcsetattr(fd,TCSANOW,&oldsertio);
tcsetattr(0,TCSANOW,&oldstdtio);
close(fd);
@@ -169,19 +169,19 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
close(fd);
exit(-1);
default:
- write(1, start_str, strlen(start_str));
+ if (write(1, start_str, strlen(start_str))) ;
close(0); /* stdin not needed */
sa.sa_handler = child_handler;
sa.sa_flags = 0;
sigaction(SIGCHLD,&sa,NULL); /* handle dying child */
while ( !stop )
{
- read(fd,&c,1); /* modem */
+ if (read(fd,&c,1)) ; /* modem */
c = (char)c;
- write(1,&c,1); /* stdout */
+ if (write(1,&c,1)) ; /* stdout */
}
wait(NULL); /* wait for child to die or it will become a zombie */
- write(1, end_str, strlen(end_str));
+ if (write(1, end_str, strlen(end_str))) ;
break;
}
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/libxc/xc_dom_elfloader.c
@@ -228,8 +228,9 @@ static int xc_dom_load_elf_symtab(struct
if ( load )
{
+ void * dst = (void*)elf_section_start(&syms, shdr);
shdr2 = elf_shdr_by_index(elf, h);
- memcpy((void*)elf_section_start(&syms, shdr),
+ memcpy(dst,
elf_section_start(elf, shdr2),
size);
}
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/xenstore/Makefile
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/xenstore/Makefile
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/xenstore/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ include $(XEN_ROOT)/tools/Rules.mk
MAJOR = 3.0
MINOR = 1
-CFLAGS += -Werror
+CFLAGS += -Werror -fno-strict-aliasing
CFLAGS += -I.
CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_libxenctrl)
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
@@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ static void check_store(void);
int quota_nb_entry_per_domain = 1000;
int quota_nb_watch_per_domain = 128;
-int quota_max_entry_size = 2048; /* 2K */
-int quota_max_transaction = 10;
+unsigned int quota_max_entry_size = 2048; /* 2K */
+unsigned int quota_max_transaction = 10;
TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_context(struct connection *conn)
{
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ void trace(const char *fmt, ...)
va_list arglist;
char *str;
char sbuf[1024];
- int ret, dummy;
+ int ret, __attribute__((__unused__)) dummy;
if (tracefd < 0)
return;
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ void trace_destroy(const void *data, con
static void trigger_reopen_log(int signal __attribute__((unused)))
{
char c = 'A';
- int dummy;
+ int __attribute__((__unused__)) dummy;
dummy = write(reopen_log_pipe[1], &c, 1);
}
@@ -1807,10 +1807,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
remove_local = false;
break;
case 'S':
- quota_max_entry_size = strtol(optarg, NULL, 10);
+ quota_max_entry_size = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
break;
case 't':
- quota_max_transaction = strtol(optarg, NULL, 10);
+ quota_max_transaction = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
break;
case 'T':
tracefile = optarg;
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ void handle_event(void)
{
evtchn_port_t port;
- if ((port = xc_evtchn_pending(xce_handle)) == -1)
+ if ((port = xc_evtchn_pending(xce_handle)) == (evtchn_port_t)-1)
barf_perror("Failed to read from event fd");
if (port == virq_port)
@@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ static int dom0_init(void)
struct domain *dom0;
port = xenbus_evtchn();
- if (port == -1)
+ if (port == (evtchn_port_t)-1)
return -1;
dom0 = new_domain(NULL, 0, port);
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/xenstore/xenstored_transaction.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ struct transaction
struct list_head changed_domains;
};
-extern int quota_max_transaction;
+extern unsigned int quota_max_transaction;
static unsigned int generation;
/* Return tdb context to use for this connection. */
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/xenstore/xenstore_client.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/xenstore/xenstore_client.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/xenstore/xenstore_client.c
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ do_chmod(char *path, struct xs_permissio
char **xsval = xs_directory(xsh, xth, path, &xsval_n);
if (xsval) {
- int i;
+ unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < xsval_n; i++) {
snprintf(buf, MAX_PATH_LEN, "%s/%s", path, xsval[i]);
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/libxen/src/xen_common.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/libxen/src/xen_common.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/libxen/src/xen_common.c
@@ -1057,6 +1057,8 @@ static size_t size_of_member(const abstr
default:
assert(false);
}
+
+ return 0; /* prevents a compiler warning */
}
@@ -1568,6 +1570,8 @@ get_val_as_string(const struct abstract_
default:
assert(false);
}
+
+ return NULL; /* prevents a compiler warning */
}
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap2/drivers/block-remus.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/blktap2/drivers/block-remus.c
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap2/drivers/block-remus.c
@@ -1636,7 +1636,7 @@ static int tdremus_open(td_driver_t *dri
td_flag_t flags)
{
struct tdremus_state *s = (struct tdremus_state *)driver->data;
- int rc;
+ int rc = 0;
RPRINTF("opening %s\n", name);
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap/lib/blktaplib.h
@@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ typedef struct msg_pid {
} msg_pid_t;
#define READ 0
+#undef WRITE
#define WRITE 1
/*Control Messages between manager and tapdev*/
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap2/include/blktaplib.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/blktap2/include/blktaplib.h
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap2/include/blktaplib.h
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ typedef struct msg_lock {
} msg_lock_t;
#define READ 0
+#undef WRITE
#define WRITE 1
/*Control Messages between manager and tapdev*/
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap/lib/Makefile
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/blktap/lib/Makefile
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap/lib/Makefile
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ OBJS_PIC = $(SRCS:.c=.opic)
IBINS :=
LIB = libblktap.a libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR)
+LIB_SO = libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR)
+LIB_AR = libblktap.a
.PHONY: all
all: $(LIB)
@@ -32,7 +34,8 @@ all: $(LIB)
install: all
$(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)
$(INSTALL_DIR) $(DESTDIR)$(INCLUDEDIR)
- $(INSTALL_PROG) $(LIB) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)
+ $(INSTALL_PROG) $(LIB_SO) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) $(LIB_AR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)
ln -sf libblktap.so.$(MAJOR).$(MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)/libblktap.so.$(MAJOR)
ln -sf libblktap.so.$(MAJOR) $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDIR)/libblktap.so
$(INSTALL_DATA) blktaplib.h $(DESTDIR)$(INCLUDEDIR)
Index: xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile
===================================================================
--- xen-4.2.0-testing.orig/tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile
+++ xen-4.2.0-testing/tools/blktap2/vhd/lib/Makefile
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ LIB-OBJS += $(LVM-UTIL-OBJ)
LIB-PICOBJS = $(patsubst %.o,%.opic,$(LIB-OBJS))
LIBVHD = libvhd.a libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR).$(LIBVHD-MINOR)
+LIBVHD_SO = libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR).$(LIBVHD-MINOR)
+LIBVHD_AR = libvhd.a
all: build
@@ -68,8 +70,8 @@ libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR).$(LIBVHD-MINOR
install: all
$(INSTALL_DIR) -p $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
- $(INSTALL_PROG) libvhd.a $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
- $(INSTALL_PROG) libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR).$(LIBVHD-MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
+ $(INSTALL_PROG) $(LIBVHD_SO) $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
+ $(INSTALL_DATA) $(LIBVHD_AR) $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)
ln -sf libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR).$(LIBVHD-MINOR) $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)/libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR)
ln -sf libvhd.so.$(LIBVHD-MAJOR) $(DESTDIR)$(INST-DIR)/libvhd.so

13
xen.changes
View File

@ -1,3 +1,16 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Oct 1 10:09:24 MDT 2012 - carnold@novell.com
- Upstream patches from Jan
25927-x86-domctl-ioport-mapping-range.patch
25929-tmem-restore-pool-version.patch
25931-x86-domctl-iomem-mapping-checks.patch
25940-x86-S3-flush-cache.patch
25952-x86-MMIO-remap-permissions.patch
25961-x86-HPET-interrupts.patch
25962-x86-assign-irq-vector-old.patch
25965-x86-ucode-Intel-resume.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tue Sep 25 14:24:29 CEST 2012 - ohering@suse.de

38
xen.spec
View File

@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
# Please submit bugfixes or comments via http://bugs.opensuse.org/
#
Name: xen
ExclusiveArch: %ix86 x86_64
%define xvers 4.2
@ -48,6 +47,7 @@ BuildRequires: automake
BuildRequires: bin86
BuildRequires: curl-devel
BuildRequires: dev86
BuildRequires: fdupes
BuildRequires: glib2-devel
BuildRequires: graphviz
BuildRequires: latex2html
@ -97,10 +97,10 @@ BuildRequires: gcc46
BuildRequires: libgcc46
BuildRequires: libgcc46-32bit
%endif
BuildRequires: gcc-32bit
BuildRequires: gcc43-32bit
BuildRequires: glibc-32bit
BuildRequires: glibc-devel-32bit
BuildRequires: gcc-32bit
BuildRequires: gcc43-32bit
%define max_cpus 256
%define pae_enabled n
%else
@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ BuildRequires: kernel-syms
BuildRequires: module-init-tools
BuildRequires: xorg-x11
%endif
Version: 4.2.0_01
Version: 4.2.0_02
Release: 0
PreReq: %insserv_prereq %fillup_prereq
Summary: Xen Virtualization: Hypervisor (aka VMM aka Microkernel)
@ -185,18 +185,24 @@ Patch25866: 25866-sercon-ns16550-pci-irq.patch
Patch25867: 25867-sercon-ns16550-parse.patch
Patch25874: 25874-x86-EFI-chain-cfg.patch
Patch25909: 25909-xenpm-consistent.patch
Patch25927: 25927-x86-domctl-ioport-mapping-range.patch
Patch25929: 25929-tmem-restore-pool-version.patch
Patch25931: 25931-x86-domctl-iomem-mapping-checks.patch
Patch25940: 25940-x86-S3-flush-cache.patch
Patch25941: 25941-pygrub_always_append_--args.patch
Patch25952: 25952-x86-MMIO-remap-permissions.patch
Patch25961: 25961-x86-HPET-interrupts.patch
Patch25962: 25962-x86-assign-irq-vector-old.patch
Patch25965: 25965-x86-ucode-Intel-resume.patch
# Upstream qemu patches
# Our patches
Patch301: xend-config.diff
Patch302: xen-destdir.diff
Patch303: xen-rpmoptflags.diff
Patch304: xen-warnings.diff
Patch305: xen-warnings-unused.diff
Patch306: xen-changeset.diff
Patch307: xen-paths.diff
Patch308: xen-xmexample.diff
Patch309: xen-xmexample-vti.diff
Patch304: xen-changeset.diff
Patch305: xen-paths.diff
Patch306: xen-xmexample.diff
Patch307: xen-xmexample-vti.diff
Patch310: xen-fixme-doc.diff
Patch311: xen-domUloader.diff
Patch312: xen-no-dummy-nfs-ip.diff
@ -669,7 +675,15 @@ tar xfj %{SOURCE6} -C $RPM_BUILD_DIR/%{xen_build_dir}/tools
%patch25867 -p1
%patch25874 -p1
%patch25909 -p1
%patch25927 -p1
%patch25929 -p1
%patch25931 -p1
%patch25940 -p1
%patch25941 -p1
%patch25952 -p1
%patch25961 -p1
%patch25962 -p1
%patch25965 -p1
# Qemu
# Our patches
%patch301 -p1
@ -679,8 +693,6 @@ tar xfj %{SOURCE6} -C $RPM_BUILD_DIR/%{xen_build_dir}/tools
%patch305 -p1
%patch306 -p1
%patch307 -p1
%patch308 -p1
%patch309 -p1
%patch310 -p1
%patch311 -p1
%patch312 -p1
@ -1025,6 +1037,8 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/local/share/doc/qemu/qemu-tech.html
#/usr/share/SuSEfirewall2/services/TEMPLATE
mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_fwdefdir}
install -m 644 %{S:26} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_fwdefdir}/xend-relocation-server
# create symlinks for keymaps
%fdupes -s $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_datadir}
%else
# 32 bit hypervisor no longer supported. Remove dom0 tools.
rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_datadir}/doc