- bnc#797014 - no way to control live migrations

- bnc#803712 - after live migration rcu_sched_state detected stalls xen.migrate.tools-xend_move_assert_to_exception_block.patch xen.migrate.tools-libxc_print_stats_if_migration_is_aborted.patch xen.migrate.tools_set_number_of_dirty_pages_during_migration.patch xen.migrate.tools_notify_restore_to_hangup_during_migration_--abort_if_busy.patch - bnc#811764 - XEN (hypervisor or kernel) has a problem with EFI variable services x86-EFI-set-variable-permit-attrs.patch - Upstream patches from Jan 26060-ACPI-ERST-table-size-checks.patch 26692-x86-fully-protect-MSI-X-table-from-PV-guest-accesses.patch 26702-powernow-add-fixups-for-AMD-P-state-figures.patch 26704-x86-MCA-suppress-bank-clearing-for-certain-injected-events.patch (bnc#805579) 26731-AMD-IOMMU-Process-softirqs-while-building-dom0-iommu-mappings.patch 26733-VT-d-Enumerate-IOMMUs-when-listing-capabilities.patch 26734-ACPI-ERST-Name-table-in-otherwise-opaque-error-messages.patch 26736-ACPI-APEI-Unlock-apei_iomaps_lock-on-error-path.patch 26737-ACPI-APEI-Add-apei_exec_run_optional.patch 26742-IOMMU-properly-check-whether-interrupt-remapping-is-enabled.patch 26743-VT-d-deal-with-5500-5520-X58-errata.patch (bnc#801910) 26744-AMD-IOMMU-allow-disabling-only-interrupt-remapping.patch - PVonHVM: __devinit was removed in linux-3.8 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/xen?expand=0&rev=234
2013-04-04 17:05:57 +00:00 · 2013-04-04 17:05:57 +00:00 · 387129caad
commit 387129caad
parent 440dc06691
38 changed files with 1633 additions and 52 deletions
--- a/26060-ACPI-ERST-table-size-checks.patch
+++ b/26060-ACPI-ERST-table-size-checks.patch
@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+References: bnc#785211
+
+# HG changeset patch
+# User Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
+# Date 1350401196 -7200
+# Node ID 4fc87c2f31a02c770655518c9e4d389302564f00
+# Parent  c1c549c4fe9ebdc460cbf51e296edad157b6e518
+ACPI: fix APEI related table size checking
+
+On Huang Ying's machine:
+
+erst_tab->header_length == sizeof(struct acpi_table_einj)
+
+but Yinghai reported that on his machine,
+
+erst_tab->header_length == sizeof(struct acpi_table_einj) -
+sizeof(struct acpi_table_header)
+
+To make erst table size checking code works on all systems, both
+testing are treated as PASS.
+
+Same situation applies to einj_tab->header_length, so corresponding
+table size checking is changed in similar way too.
+
+Originally-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
+
+- use switch() for better readability
+- add comment explaining why a formally invalid size it also being
+  accepted
+- check erst_tab->header.length before even looking at
+  erst_tab->header_length
+- prefer sizeof(*erst_tab) over sizeof(struct acpi_table_erst)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
+Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+
+--- a/xen/drivers/acpi/apei/erst.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/acpi/apei/erst.c
+@@ -715,12 +715,23 @@ int erst_clear(u64 record_id)
+ 
+ static int __init erst_check_table(struct acpi_table_erst *erst_tab)
+ {
+-	if (erst_tab->header_length != sizeof(struct acpi_table_erst))
+	if (erst_tab->header.length < sizeof(*erst_tab))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+-	if (erst_tab->header.length < sizeof(struct acpi_table_erst))
+
+	switch (erst_tab->header_length) {
+	case sizeof(*erst_tab) - sizeof(erst_tab->header):
+	/*
+	 * While invalid per specification, there are (early?) systems
+	 * indicating the full header size here, so accept that value too.
+	 */
+	case sizeof(*erst_tab):
+		break;
+	default:
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+ 	if (erst_tab->entries !=
+-	    (erst_tab->header.length - sizeof(struct acpi_table_erst)) /
+	    (erst_tab->header.length - sizeof(*erst_tab)) /
+ 	    sizeof(struct acpi_erst_entry))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
--- a/26062-ACPI-ERST-move-data.patch
+++ b/26062-ACPI-ERST-move-data.patch
@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+References: bnc#785211
+
 # HG changeset patch
 # User Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
 # Date 1350475926 -7200
--- a/26692-x86-fully-protect-MSI-X-table-from-PV-guest-accesses.patch
+++ b/26692-x86-fully-protect-MSI-X-table-from-PV-guest-accesses.patch
@ -0,0 +1,369 @@
+# Commit 4245d331e0e75de8d1bddbbb518f3a8ce6d0bb7e
+# Date 2013-03-08 14:05:34 +0100
+# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+x86/MSI: add mechanism to fully protect MSI-X table from PV guest accesses
+
+This adds two new physdev operations for Dom0 to invoke when resource
+allocation for devices is known to be complete, so that the hypervisor
+can arrange for the respective MMIO ranges to be marked read-only
+before an eventual guest getting such a device assigned even gets
+started, such that it won't be able to set up writable mappings for
+these MMIO ranges before Xen has a chance to protect them.
+
+This also addresses another issue with the code being modified here,
+in that so far write protection for the address ranges in question got
+set up only once during the lifetime of a device (i.e. until either
+system shutdown or device hot removal), while teardown happened when
+the last interrupt was disposed of by the guest (which at least allowed
+the tables to be writable when the device got assigned to a second
+guest [instance] after the first terminated).
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
+@@ -649,8 +649,8 @@ static u64 read_pci_mem_bar(u16 seg, u8 
+  * @entries: pointer to an array of struct msix_entry entries
+  * @nvec: number of @entries
+  *
+- * Setup the MSI-X capability structure of device function with a
+- * single MSI-X irq. A return of zero indicates the successful setup of
+ * Setup the MSI-X capability structure of device function with the requested
+ * number MSI-X irqs. A return of zero indicates the successful setup of
+  * requested MSI-X entries with allocated irqs or non-zero for otherwise.
+  **/
+ static int msix_capability_init(struct pci_dev *dev,
+@@ -658,86 +658,69 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct p
+                                 struct msi_desc **desc,
+                                 unsigned int nr_entries)
+ {
+-    struct msi_desc *entry;
+-    int pos;
+    struct msi_desc *entry = NULL;
+    int pos, vf;
+     u16 control;
+-    u64 table_paddr, entry_paddr;
+-    u32 table_offset, entry_offset;
+-    u8 bir;
+-    void __iomem *base;
+-    int idx;
+    u64 table_paddr;
+    u32 table_offset;
+    u8 bir, pbus, pslot, pfunc;
+     u16 seg = dev->seg;
+     u8 bus = dev->bus;
+     u8 slot = PCI_SLOT(dev->devfn);
+     u8 func = PCI_FUNC(dev->devfn);
+ 
+     ASSERT(spin_is_locked(&pcidevs_lock));
+-    ASSERT(desc);
+ 
+     pos = pci_find_cap_offset(seg, bus, slot, func, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
+     control = pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, slot, func, msix_control_reg(pos));
+     msix_set_enable(dev, 0);/* Ensure msix is disabled as I set it up */
+ 
+-    /* MSI-X Table Initialization */
+-    entry = alloc_msi_entry();
+-    if ( !entry )
+-        return -ENOMEM;
+    if ( desc )
+    {
+        entry = alloc_msi_entry();
+        if ( !entry )
+            return -ENOMEM;
+        ASSERT(msi);
+    }
+ 
+-    /* Request & Map MSI-X table region */
+    /* Locate MSI-X table region */
+     table_offset = pci_conf_read32(seg, bus, slot, func,
+                                    msix_table_offset_reg(pos));
+     bir = (u8)(table_offset & PCI_MSIX_BIRMASK);
+     table_offset &= ~PCI_MSIX_BIRMASK;
+-    entry_offset = msi->entry_nr * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE;
+ 
+-    table_paddr = msi->table_base + table_offset;
+-    entry_paddr = table_paddr + entry_offset;
+-    idx = msix_get_fixmap(dev, table_paddr, entry_paddr);
+-    if ( idx < 0 )
+-    {
+-        xfree(entry);
+-        return idx;
+-    }
+-    base = (void *)(fix_to_virt(idx) +
+-        ((unsigned long)entry_paddr & ((1UL << PAGE_SHIFT) - 1)));
+-
+-    entry->msi_attrib.type = PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX;
+-    entry->msi_attrib.is_64 = 1;
+-    entry->msi_attrib.entry_nr = msi->entry_nr;
+-    entry->msi_attrib.maskbit = 1;
+-    entry->msi_attrib.masked = 1;
+-    entry->msi_attrib.pos = pos;
+-    entry->irq = msi->irq;
+-    entry->dev = dev;
+-    entry->mask_base = base;
+-
+-    list_add_tail(&entry->list, &dev->msi_list);
+-
+-    if ( !dev->msix_nr_entries )
+    if ( !dev->info.is_virtfn )
+     {
+-        u8 pbus, pslot, pfunc;
+-        int vf;
+-        u64 pba_paddr;
+-        u32 pba_offset;
+        pbus = bus;
+        pslot = slot;
+        pfunc = func;
+        vf = -1;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        pbus = dev->info.physfn.bus;
+        pslot = PCI_SLOT(dev->info.physfn.devfn);
+        pfunc = PCI_FUNC(dev->info.physfn.devfn);
+        vf = PCI_BDF2(dev->bus, dev->devfn);
+    }
+ 
+-        if ( !dev->info.is_virtfn )
+-        {
+-            pbus = bus;
+-            pslot = slot;
+-            pfunc = func;
+-            vf = -1;
+-        }
+-        else
+    table_paddr = read_pci_mem_bar(seg, pbus, pslot, pfunc, bir, vf);
+    WARN_ON(msi && msi->table_base != table_paddr);
+    if ( !table_paddr )
+    {
+        if ( !msi || !msi->table_base )
+         {
+-            pbus = dev->info.physfn.bus;
+-            pslot = PCI_SLOT(dev->info.physfn.devfn);
+-            pfunc = PCI_FUNC(dev->info.physfn.devfn);
+-            vf = PCI_BDF2(dev->bus, dev->devfn);
+            xfree(entry);
+            return -ENXIO;
+         }
+        table_paddr = msi->table_base;
+    }
+    table_paddr += table_offset;
+ 
+-        ASSERT(!dev->msix_used_entries);
+-        WARN_ON(msi->table_base !=
+-                read_pci_mem_bar(seg, pbus, pslot, pfunc, bir, vf));
+    if ( !dev->msix_used_entries )
+    {
+        u64 pba_paddr;
+        u32 pba_offset;
+ 
+         dev->msix_nr_entries = nr_entries;
+         dev->msix_table.first = PFN_DOWN(table_paddr);
+@@ -758,7 +741,42 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct p
+                                       BITS_TO_LONGS(nr_entries) - 1);
+         WARN_ON(rangeset_overlaps_range(mmio_ro_ranges, dev->msix_pba.first,
+                                         dev->msix_pba.last));
+    }
+
+    if ( entry )
+    {
+        /* Map MSI-X table region */
+        u64 entry_paddr = table_paddr + msi->entry_nr * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE;
+        int idx = msix_get_fixmap(dev, table_paddr, entry_paddr);
+        void __iomem *base;
+
+        if ( idx < 0 )
+        {
+            xfree(entry);
+            return idx;
+        }
+        base = (void *)(fix_to_virt(idx) +
+                        ((unsigned long)entry_paddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)));
+ 
+        /* Mask interrupt here */
+        writel(1, base + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL_OFFSET);
+
+        entry->msi_attrib.type = PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX;
+        entry->msi_attrib.is_64 = 1;
+        entry->msi_attrib.entry_nr = msi->entry_nr;
+        entry->msi_attrib.maskbit = 1;
+        entry->msi_attrib.masked = 1;
+        entry->msi_attrib.pos = pos;
+        entry->irq = msi->irq;
+        entry->dev = dev;
+        entry->mask_base = base;
+
+        list_add_tail(&entry->list, &dev->msi_list);
+        *desc = entry;
+    }
+
+    if ( !dev->msix_used_entries )
+    {
+         if ( rangeset_add_range(mmio_ro_ranges, dev->msix_table.first,
+                                 dev->msix_table.last) )
+             WARN();
+@@ -769,7 +787,7 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct p
+         if ( dev->domain )
+             p2m_change_entry_type_global(dev->domain,
+                                          p2m_mmio_direct, p2m_mmio_direct);
+-        if ( !dev->domain || !paging_mode_translate(dev->domain) )
+        if ( desc && (!dev->domain || !paging_mode_translate(dev->domain)) )
+         {
+             struct domain *d = dev->domain;
+ 
+@@ -783,6 +801,13 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct p
+                         break;
+             if ( d )
+             {
+                if ( !IS_PRIV(d) && dev->msix_warned != d->domain_id )
+                {
+                    dev->msix_warned = d->domain_id;
+                    printk(XENLOG_ERR
+                           "Potentially insecure use of MSI-X on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u by Dom%d\n",
+                           seg, bus, slot, func, d->domain_id);
+                }
+                 /* XXX How to deal with existing mappings? */
+             }
+         }
+@@ -791,10 +816,6 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct p
+     WARN_ON(dev->msix_table.first != (table_paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT));
+     ++dev->msix_used_entries;
+ 
+-    /* Mask interrupt here */
+-    writel(1, entry->mask_base + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL_OFFSET);
+-
+-    *desc = entry;
+     /* Restore MSI-X enabled bits */
+     pci_conf_write16(seg, bus, slot, func, msix_control_reg(pos), control);
+ 
+@@ -919,6 +940,19 @@ static int __pci_enable_msix(struct msi_
+     return status;
+ }
+ 
+static void _pci_cleanup_msix(struct pci_dev *dev)
+{
+    if ( !--dev->msix_used_entries )
+    {
+        if ( rangeset_remove_range(mmio_ro_ranges, dev->msix_table.first,
+                                   dev->msix_table.last) )
+            WARN();
+        if ( rangeset_remove_range(mmio_ro_ranges, dev->msix_pba.first,
+                                   dev->msix_pba.last) )
+            WARN();
+    }
+}
+
+ static void __pci_disable_msix(struct msi_desc *entry)
+ {
+     struct pci_dev *dev;
+@@ -942,15 +976,45 @@ static void __pci_disable_msix(struct ms
+ 
+     pci_conf_write16(seg, bus, slot, func, msix_control_reg(pos), control);
+ 
+-    if ( !--dev->msix_used_entries )
+    _pci_cleanup_msix(dev);
+}
+
+int pci_prepare_msix(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn, bool_t off)
+{
+    int rc;
+    struct pci_dev *pdev;
+    u8 slot = PCI_SLOT(devfn), func = PCI_FUNC(devfn);
+    unsigned int pos = pci_find_cap_offset(seg, bus, slot, func,
+                                           PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
+
+    if ( !use_msi )
+        return 0;
+
+    if ( !pos )
+        return -ENODEV;
+
+    spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock);
+    pdev = pci_get_pdev(seg, bus, devfn);
+    if ( !pdev )
+        rc = -ENODEV;
+    else if ( pdev->msix_used_entries != !!off )
+        rc = -EBUSY;
+    else if ( off )
+     {
+-        if ( rangeset_remove_range(mmio_ro_ranges, dev->msix_table.first,
+-                                  dev->msix_table.last) )
+-            WARN();
+-        if ( rangeset_remove_range(mmio_ro_ranges, dev->msix_pba.first,
+-                                   dev->msix_pba.last) )
+-            WARN();
+        _pci_cleanup_msix(pdev);
+        rc = 0;
+     }
+    else
+    {
+        u16 control = pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, slot, func,
+                                      msix_control_reg(pos));
+
+        rc = msix_capability_init(pdev, NULL, NULL,
+                                  multi_msix_capable(control));
+    }
+    spin_unlock(&pcidevs_lock);
+
+    return rc;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
+@@ -609,6 +609,18 @@ ret_t do_physdev_op(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_H
+         break;
+     }
+ 
+    case PHYSDEVOP_prepare_msix:
+    case PHYSDEVOP_release_msix: {
+        struct physdev_pci_device dev;
+
+        if ( copy_from_guest(&dev, arg, 1) )
+            ret = -EFAULT;
+        else
+            ret = pci_prepare_msix(dev.seg, dev.bus, dev.devfn,
+                                   cmd != PHYSDEVOP_prepare_msix);
+        break;
+    }
+
+ #ifdef __x86_64__
+     case PHYSDEVOP_pci_mmcfg_reserved: {
+         struct physdev_pci_mmcfg_reserved info;
+--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msi.h
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ struct msi_desc;
+ /* Helper functions */
+ extern int pci_enable_msi(struct msi_info *msi, struct msi_desc **desc);
+ extern void pci_disable_msi(struct msi_desc *desc);
+extern int pci_prepare_msix(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn, bool_t off);
+ extern void pci_cleanup_msi(struct pci_dev *pdev);
+ extern void setup_msi_handler(struct irq_desc *, struct msi_desc *);
+ extern void setup_msi_irq(struct irq_desc *);
+--- a/xen/include/public/physdev.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/physdev.h
+@@ -303,6 +303,12 @@ DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(physdev_pci_devi
+ 
+ #define PHYSDEVOP_pci_device_remove     26
+ #define PHYSDEVOP_restore_msi_ext       27
+/*
+ * Dom0 should use these two to announce MMIO resources assigned to
+ * MSI-X capable devices won't (prepare) or may (release) change.
+ */
+#define PHYSDEVOP_prepare_msix          30
+#define PHYSDEVOP_release_msix          31
+ struct physdev_pci_device {
+     /* IN */
+     uint16_t seg;
+--- a/xen/include/xen/pci.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/pci.h
+@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ struct pci_dev {
+     int msix_table_refcnt[MAX_MSIX_TABLE_PAGES];
+     int msix_table_idx[MAX_MSIX_TABLE_PAGES];
+     spinlock_t msix_table_lock;
+    domid_t msix_warned;
+ 
+     struct domain *domain;
+     const u16 seg;
--- a/26702-powernow-add-fixups-for-AMD-P-state-figures.patch
+++ b/26702-powernow-add-fixups-for-AMD-P-state-figures.patch
@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+# Commit 1d80765b504b34b63a42a63aff4291e07e29f0c5
+# Date 2013-03-12 15:34:22 +0100
+# Author Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
+# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+powernow: add fixups for AMD P-state figures
+
+In the Linux kernel, these two git commits:
+
+- f594065faf4f9067c2283a34619fc0714e79a98d
+  ACPI: Add fixups for AMD P-state figures
+- 9855d8ce41a7801548a05d844db2f46c3e810166
+  ACPI: Check MSR valid bit before using P-state frequencies
+
+Try to fix the the issue that "some AMD systems may round the
+frequencies in ACPI tables to 100MHz boundaries. We can obtain the real
+frequencies from MSRs, so add a quirk to fix these frequencies up
+on AMD systems." (from f594065..)
+
+In discussion (around 9855d8..) "it turned out that indeed real
+HW/BIOSes may choose to not set the valid bit and thus mark the
+P-state as invalid. So this could be considered a fix for broken
+BIOSes." (from 9855d8..)
+
+which is great for Linux. Unfortunatly the Linux kernel, when
+it tries to do the RDMSR under Xen it fails to get the right
+value (it gets zero) as Xen traps it and returns zero. Hence
+when dom0 uploads the P-states they will be unmodified and
+we should take care of updating the frequencies with the right
+values.
+
+I've tested it under Dell Inc. PowerEdge T105 /0RR825, BIOS 1.3.2
+08/20/2008 where this quirk can be observed (x86 == 0x10, model == 2).
+Also on other AMD (x86 == 0x12, A8-3850; x86 = 0x14, AMD E-350) to
+make sure the quirk is not applied there.
+
+Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
+Acked-by: stefan.bader@canonical.com
+
+Do the MSR access here (and while at it, also the one reading
+MSR_PSTATE_CUR_LIMIT) on the target CPU, and bound the loop over
+amd_fixup_frequency() by max_hw_pstate (matching the one in
+powernow_cpufreq_cpu_init()).
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpufreq/powernow.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpufreq/powernow.c
+@@ -159,6 +159,51 @@ static int powernow_cpufreq_target(struc
+     return result;
+ }
+ 
+static void amd_fixup_frequency(struct xen_processor_px *px)
+{
+    u32 hi, lo, fid, did;
+    int index = px->control & 0x00000007;
+    const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &current_cpu_data;
+
+    if ((c->x86 != 0x10 || c->x86_model >= 10) && c->x86 != 0x11)
+        return;
+
+    rdmsr(MSR_PSTATE_DEF_BASE + index, lo, hi);
+    /*
+     * MSR C001_0064+:
+     * Bit 63: PstateEn. Read-write. If set, the P-state is valid.
+     */
+    if (!(hi & (1U << 31)))
+        return;
+
+    fid = lo & 0x3f;
+    did = (lo >> 6) & 7;
+    if (c->x86 == 0x10)
+        px->core_frequency = (100 * (fid + 16)) >> did;
+    else
+        px->core_frequency = (100 * (fid + 8)) >> did;
+}
+
+struct amd_cpu_data {
+    struct processor_performance *perf;
+    u32 max_hw_pstate;
+};
+
+static void get_cpu_data(void *arg)
+{
+    struct amd_cpu_data *data = arg;
+    struct processor_performance *perf = data->perf;
+    uint64_t msr_content;
+    unsigned int i;
+
+    rdmsrl(MSR_PSTATE_CUR_LIMIT, msr_content);
+    data->max_hw_pstate = (msr_content & HW_PSTATE_MAX_MASK) >>
+                          HW_PSTATE_MAX_SHIFT;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < perf->state_count && i <= data->max_hw_pstate; i++)
+        amd_fixup_frequency(&perf->states[i]);
+}
+
+ static int powernow_cpufreq_verify(struct cpufreq_policy *policy)
+ {
+     struct acpi_cpufreq_data *data;
+@@ -205,8 +250,7 @@ static int powernow_cpufreq_cpu_init(str
+     struct acpi_cpufreq_data *data;
+     unsigned int result = 0;
+     struct processor_performance *perf;
+-    u32 max_hw_pstate;
+-    uint64_t msr_content;
+    struct amd_cpu_data info;
+     struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data[policy->cpu];
+ 
+     data = xzalloc(struct acpi_cpufreq_data);
+@@ -217,7 +261,7 @@ static int powernow_cpufreq_cpu_init(str
+ 
+     data->acpi_data = &processor_pminfo[cpu]->perf;
+ 
+-    perf = data->acpi_data;
+    info.perf = perf = data->acpi_data;
+     policy->shared_type = perf->shared_type;
+ 
+     if (policy->shared_type == CPUFREQ_SHARED_TYPE_ALL ||
+@@ -239,8 +283,6 @@ static int powernow_cpufreq_cpu_init(str
+         result = -ENODEV;
+         goto err_unreg;
+     }
+-    rdmsrl(MSR_PSTATE_CUR_LIMIT, msr_content);
+-    max_hw_pstate = (msr_content & HW_PSTATE_MAX_MASK) >> HW_PSTATE_MAX_SHIFT;
+ 
+     if (perf->control_register.space_id != perf->status_register.space_id) {
+         result = -ENODEV;
+@@ -265,8 +307,10 @@ static int powernow_cpufreq_cpu_init(str
+ 
+     policy->governor = cpufreq_opt_governor ? : CPUFREQ_DEFAULT_GOVERNOR;
+ 
+    on_selected_cpus(cpumask_of(cpu), get_cpu_data, &info, 1);
+
+     /* table init */
+-    for (i = 0; i < perf->state_count && i <= max_hw_pstate; i++) {
+    for (i = 0; i < perf->state_count && i <= info.max_hw_pstate; i++) {
+         if (i > 0 && perf->states[i].core_frequency >=
+             data->freq_table[valid_states-1].frequency / 1000)
+             continue;
--- a/26704-x86-MCA-suppress-bank-clearing-for-certain-injected-events.patch
+++ b/26704-x86-MCA-suppress-bank-clearing-for-certain-injected-events.patch
@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+References: bnc#805579
+
+# Commit b0583c0e64cc8bb6229c95c3304fdac2051f79b3
+# Date 2013-03-12 15:53:30 +0100
+# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+x86/MCA: suppress bank clearing for certain injected events
+
+As the bits indicating validity of the ADDR and MISC bank MSRs may be
+injected in a way that isn't consistent with what the underlying
+hardware implements (while the bank must be valid for injection to
+work, the auxiliary MSRs may not be implemented - and hence cause #GP
+upon access - if the hardware never sets the corresponding valid bits.
+
+Consequently we need to do the clearing writes only if no value was
+interposed for the respective MSR (which also makes sense the other way
+around: there's no point in clearing a hardware register when all data
+read came from software). Of course this all requires the injection
+tool to do things in a consistent way (but that had been a requirement
+before already).
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Tested-by: Ren Yongjie <yongjie.ren@intel.com>
+Acked-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
+@@ -1145,13 +1145,15 @@ static void intpose_add(unsigned int cpu
+     printk("intpose_add: interpose array full - request dropped\n");
+ }
+ 
+-void intpose_inval(unsigned int cpu_nr, uint64_t msr)
+bool_t intpose_inval(unsigned int cpu_nr, uint64_t msr)
+ {
+-    struct intpose_ent *ent;
+    struct intpose_ent *ent = intpose_lookup(cpu_nr, msr, NULL);
+ 
+-    if ((ent = intpose_lookup(cpu_nr, msr, NULL)) != NULL) {
+-        ent->cpu_nr = -1;
+-    }
+    if ( !ent )
+        return 0;
+
+    ent->cpu_nr = -1;
+    return 1;
+ }
+ 
+ #define IS_MCA_BANKREG(r) \
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.h
+@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ extern void mce_recoverable_register(mce
+ /* Read an MSR, checking for an interposed value first */
+ extern struct intpose_ent *intpose_lookup(unsigned int, uint64_t,
+     uint64_t *);
+-extern void intpose_inval(unsigned int, uint64_t);
+extern bool_t intpose_inval(unsigned int, uint64_t);
+ 
+ static inline uint64_t mca_rdmsr(unsigned int msr)
+ {
+@@ -101,9 +101,9 @@ static inline uint64_t mca_rdmsr(unsigne
+ 
+ /* Write an MSR, invalidating any interposed value */
+ #define mca_wrmsr(msr, val) do { \
+-       intpose_inval(smp_processor_id(), msr); \
+-       wrmsrl(msr, val); \
+-} while (0)
+    if ( !intpose_inval(smp_processor_id(), msr) ) \
+        wrmsrl(msr, val); \
+} while ( 0 )
+ 
+ 
+ /* Utility function to "logout" all architectural MCA telemetry from the MCA
--- a/26731-AMD-IOMMU-Process-softirqs-while-building-dom0-iommu-mappings.patch
+++ b/26731-AMD-IOMMU-Process-softirqs-while-building-dom0-iommu-mappings.patch
@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+# Commit 0f7b6f91ac1bbfd33b23c291b14874b9561909d2
+# Date 2013-03-20 10:00:01 +0100
+# Author Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+AMD/IOMMU: Process softirqs while building dom0 iommu mappings
+
+Recent changes which have made their way into xen-4.2 stable have pushed the
+runtime of construct_dom0() over 5 seconds, which has caused regressions in
+XenServer testing because of our 5 second watchdog.
+
+The root cause is that amd_iommu_dom0_init() does not process softirqs and in
+particular the nmi_timer which causes the watchdog to decide that no useful
+progress is being made.
+
+This patch adds periodic calls to process_pending_softirqs() at the same
+interval as the Intel variant of this function.  The server which was failing
+with the watchdog test now boots reliably with a timeout of 1 second.
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/pci_amd_iommu.c
+@@ -285,6 +285,9 @@ static void __init amd_iommu_dom0_init(s
+             if ( mfn_valid(pfn) )
+                 amd_iommu_map_page(d, pfn, pfn, 
+                                    IOMMUF_readable|IOMMUF_writable);
+
+            if ( !(i & 0xfffff) )
+                process_pending_softirqs();
+         }
+     }
+ 
--- a/26733-VT-d-Enumerate-IOMMUs-when-listing-capabilities.patch
+++ b/26733-VT-d-Enumerate-IOMMUs-when-listing-capabilities.patch
@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Commit 32861c537781ac94bf403fb778505c3679b85f67
+# Date 2013-03-20 10:02:26 +0100
+# Author Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+VT-d: Enumerate IOMMUs when listing capabilities
+
+This saves N identical console log lines on a multi-iommu server.
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+@@ -2135,7 +2135,8 @@ int __init intel_vtd_setup(void)
+     {
+         iommu = drhd->iommu;
+ 
+-        printk("Intel VT-d supported page sizes: 4kB");
+        printk("Intel VT-d iommu %"PRIu32" supported page sizes: 4kB",
+               iommu->index);
+         if (cap_sps_2mb(iommu->cap))
+             printk(", 2MB");
+ 
--- a/26734-ACPI-ERST-Name-table-in-otherwise-opaque-error-messages.patch
+++ b/26734-ACPI-ERST-Name-table-in-otherwise-opaque-error-messages.patch
@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# Commit 759847e44401176401e86e7c55b644cb9f93c781
+# Date 2013-03-20 10:02:52 +0100
+# Author Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+ACPI/ERST: Name table in otherwise opaque error messages
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+
+Fix spelling and lower severities.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+
+--- a/xen/drivers/acpi/apei/erst.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/acpi/apei/erst.c
+@@ -799,11 +799,11 @@ int __init erst_init(void)
+ 	status = acpi_get_table(ACPI_SIG_ERST, 0,
+ 				(struct acpi_table_header **)&erst_tab);
+ 	if (status == AE_NOT_FOUND) {
+-		printk(KERN_ERR "Table is not found!\n");
+		printk(KERN_INFO "ERST table was not found\n");
+ 		return -ENODEV;
+ 	} else if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) {
+ 		const char *msg = acpi_format_exception(status);
+-		printk(KERN_ERR "Failed to get table, %s\n", msg);
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "Failed to get ERST table: %s\n", msg);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+ 
--- a/26736-ACPI-APEI-Unlock-apei_iomaps_lock-on-error-path.patch
+++ b/26736-ACPI-APEI-Unlock-apei_iomaps_lock-on-error-path.patch
@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+References: bnc#785211
+
+# Commit 0611689d9153227831979c7bafe594214b8505a3
+# Date 2013-03-22 09:43:38 +0100
+# Author Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+ACPI/APEI: Unlock apei_iomaps_lock on error path
+
+This causes deadlocks during early boot on hardware with broken/buggy
+APEI implementations, such as a Dell Poweredge 2950 with the latest
+currently available BIOS.
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+
+Don't use goto or another special error path, as handling the error
+case in normal flow is quite simple.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+
+--- a/xen/drivers/acpi/apei/apei-io.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/acpi/apei/apei-io.c
+@@ -146,10 +146,8 @@ static void __init apei_post_unmap(paddr
+ 
+ 	spin_lock_irqsave(&apei_iomaps_lock, flags);
+ 	map = __apei_find_iomap(paddr, size);
+-	if (!map)
+-		return;
+-
+-	list_del(&map->list);
+	if (map)
+		list_del(&map->list);
+ 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&apei_iomaps_lock, flags);
+ 
+ 	xfree(map);
--- a/26737-ACPI-APEI-Add-apei_exec_run_optional.patch
+++ b/26737-ACPI-APEI-Add-apei_exec_run_optional.patch
@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+References: bnc#785211
+
+# Commit 72af01bf6f7489e54ad59270222a29d3e8c501d1
+# Date 2013-03-22 12:46:25 +0100
+# Author Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
+# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+ACPI, APEI: Add apei_exec_run_optional
+
+Some actions in APEI ERST and EINJ tables are optional, for example,
+ACPI_EINJ_BEGIN_OPERATION action is used to do some preparation for
+error injection, and firmware may choose to do nothing here.  While
+some other actions are mandatory, for example, firmware must provide
+ACPI_EINJ_GET_ERROR_TYPE implementation.
+
+Original implementation treats all actions as optional (that is, can
+have no instructions), that may cause issue if firmware does not
+provide some mandatory actions.  To fix this, this patch adds
+apei_exec_run_optional, which should be used for optional actions.
+The original apei_exec_run should be used for mandatory actions.
+
+Signed-off-by: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/drivers/acpi/apei/apei-base.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/acpi/apei/apei-base.c
+@@ -154,9 +154,10 @@ int apei_exec_noop(struct apei_exec_cont
+  * Interpret the specified action. Go through whole action table,
+  * execute all instructions belong to the action.
+  */
+-int apei_exec_run(struct apei_exec_context *ctx, u8 action)
+int __apei_exec_run(struct apei_exec_context *ctx, u8 action,
+		    bool_t optional)
+ {
+-	int rc;
+	int rc = -ENOENT;
+ 	u32 i, ip;
+ 	struct acpi_whea_header *entry;
+ 	apei_exec_ins_func_t run;
+@@ -195,7 +196,7 @@ rewind:
+ 			goto rewind;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	return 0;
+	return !optional && rc < 0 ? rc : 0;
+ }
+ 
+ typedef int (*apei_exec_entry_func_t)(struct apei_exec_context *ctx,
+--- a/xen/drivers/acpi/apei/apei-internal.h
+++ b/xen/drivers/acpi/apei/apei-internal.h
+@@ -48,7 +48,18 @@ static inline u64 apei_exec_ctx_get_outp
+ 	return ctx->value;
+ }
+ 
+-int apei_exec_run(struct apei_exec_context *ctx, u8 action);
+int __apei_exec_run(struct apei_exec_context *ctx, u8 action, bool_t optional);
+
+static inline int apei_exec_run(struct apei_exec_context *ctx, u8 action)
+{
+	return __apei_exec_run(ctx, action, 0);
+}
+
+/* It is optional whether the firmware provides the action */
+static inline int apei_exec_run_optional(struct apei_exec_context *ctx, u8 action)
+{
+	return __apei_exec_run(ctx, action, 1);
+}
+ 
+ /* Common instruction implementation */
+ 
--- a/26742-IOMMU-properly-check-whether-interrupt-remapping-is-enabled.patch
+++ b/26742-IOMMU-properly-check-whether-interrupt-remapping-is-enabled.patch
@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+# Commit fae0372140befb88d890a30704a8ec058c902af8
+# Date 2013-03-25 14:28:31 +0100
+# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+IOMMU: properly check whether interrupt remapping is enabled
+
+... rather than the IOMMU as a whole.
+
+That in turn required to make sure iommu_intremap gets properly
+cleared when the respective initialization fails (or isn't being
+done at all).
+
+Along with making sure interrupt remapping doesn't get inconsistently
+enabled on some IOMMUs and not on others in the VT-d code, this in turn
+allowed quite a bit of cleanup on the VT-d side (removed from the
+backport).
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
+@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static void read_msi_msg(struct msi_desc
+         BUG();
+     }
+ 
+-    if ( iommu_enabled )
+    if ( iommu_intremap )
+         iommu_read_msi_from_ire(entry, msg);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static void write_msi_msg(struct msi_des
+ {
+     entry->msg = *msg;
+ 
+-    if ( iommu_enabled )
+    if ( iommu_intremap )
+     {
+         ASSERT(msg != &entry->msg);
+         iommu_update_ire_from_msi(entry, msg);
+@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ int msi_free_irq(struct msi_desc *entry)
+     }
+ 
+     /* Free the unused IRTE if intr remap enabled */
+-    if ( iommu_enabled )
+    if ( iommu_intremap )
+         iommu_update_ire_from_msi(entry, NULL);
+ 
+     list_del(&entry->list);
+--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
+@@ -469,6 +469,8 @@ int __init iommu_setup(void)
+         rc = iommu_hardware_setup();
+         iommu_enabled = (rc == 0);
+     }
+    if ( !iommu_enabled )
+        iommu_intremap = 0;
+ 
+     if ( (force_iommu && !iommu_enabled) ||
+          (force_intremap && !iommu_intremap) )
+@@ -485,9 +487,12 @@ int __init iommu_setup(void)
+     }
+     printk("I/O virtualisation %sabled\n", iommu_enabled ? "en" : "dis");
+     if ( iommu_enabled )
+    {
+         printk(" - Dom0 mode: %s\n",
+                iommu_passthrough ? "Passthrough" :
+                iommu_dom0_strict ? "Strict" : "Relaxed");
+        printk("Interrupt remapping %sabled\n", iommu_intremap ? "en" : "dis");
+    }
+ 
+     return rc;
+ }
+--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+@@ -2072,6 +2072,9 @@ static int init_vtd_hw(void)
+                 break;
+             }
+         }
+        if ( !iommu_intremap )
+            for_each_drhd_unit ( drhd )
+                disable_intremap(drhd->iommu);
+     }
+ 
+     /*
+--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/io_apic.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/io_apic.h
+@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ struct IO_APIC_route_entry {
+ extern struct mpc_config_ioapic mp_ioapics[MAX_IO_APICS];
+ 
+ /* Only need to remap ioapic RTE (reg: 10~3Fh) */
+-#define ioapic_reg_remapped(reg) (iommu_enabled && ((reg) >= 0x10))
+#define ioapic_reg_remapped(reg) (iommu_intremap && ((reg) >= 0x10))
+ 
+ static inline unsigned int __io_apic_read(unsigned int apic, unsigned int reg)
+ {
--- a/26743-VT-d-deal-with-5500-5520-X58-errata.patch
+++ b/26743-VT-d-deal-with-5500-5520-X58-errata.patch
@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+References: bnc#801910
+
+# Commit 6890cebc6a987d0e896f5d23a8de11a3934101cf
+# Date 2013-03-25 14:31:27 +0100
+# Author Malcolm Crossley <malcolm.crossley@citrix.com>
+# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+VT-d: deal with 5500/5520/X58 errata
+
+http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/chipsets/5520-and-5500-chipset-ioh-specification-update.html
+
+Stepping B-3 has two errata (#47 and #53) related to Interrupt
+remapping, to which the workaround is for the BIOS to completely disable
+interrupt remapping.  These errata are fixed in stepping C-2.
+
+Unfortunately this chipset stepping is very common and many BIOSes are
+not disabling interrupt remapping on this stepping .  We can detect this in
+Xen and prevent Xen from using the problematic interrupt remapping feature.
+
+The Intel 5500/5520/X58 chipset does not support VT-d
+Extended Interrupt Mode(EIM). This means the iommu_supports_eim() check
+always fails and so x2apic mode cannot be enabled in Xen before this quirk
+disables the interrupt remapping feature.
+
+Signed-off-by: Malcolm Crossley <malcolm.crossley@citrix.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
+
+Gate the function call to check the quirk on interrupt remapping being
+requested to get enabled, and upon failure disable the IOMMU to be in
+line with what the changes for XSA-36 (plus follow-ups) did.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
+
+--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+@@ -2129,6 +2129,11 @@ int __init intel_vtd_setup(void)
+     }
+ 
+     platform_quirks_init();
+    if ( !iommu_enabled )
+    {
+        ret = -ENODEV;
+        goto error;
+    }
+ 
+     /* We enable the following features only if they are supported by all VT-d
+      * engines: Snoop Control, DMA passthrough, Queued Invalidation and
+--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
+@@ -248,6 +248,29 @@ void vtd_ops_postamble_quirk(struct iomm
+     }
+ }
+ 
+/* 5500/5520/X58 Chipset Interrupt remapping errata, for stepping B-3.
+ * Fixed in stepping C-2. */
+static void __init tylersburg_intremap_quirk(void)
+{
+    uint32_t bus, device;
+    uint8_t rev;
+
+    for ( bus = 0; bus < 0x100; bus++ )
+    {
+        /* Match on System Management Registers on Device 20 Function 0 */
+        device = pci_conf_read32(0, bus, 20, 0, PCI_VENDOR_ID);
+        rev = pci_conf_read8(0, bus, 20, 0, PCI_REVISION_ID);
+
+        if ( rev == 0x13 && device == 0x342e8086 )
+        {
+            printk(XENLOG_WARNING VTDPREFIX
+                   "Disabling IOMMU due to Intel 5500/5520/X58 Chipset errata #47, #53\n");
+            iommu_enabled = 0;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+ /* initialize platform identification flags */
+ void __init platform_quirks_init(void)
+ {
+@@ -268,6 +291,10 @@ void __init platform_quirks_init(void)
+ 
+     /* ioremap IGD MMIO+0x2000 page */
+     map_igd_reg();
+
+    /* Tylersburg interrupt remap quirk */
+    if ( iommu_intremap )
+        tylersburg_intremap_quirk();
+ }
+ 
+ /*
--- a/26744-AMD-IOMMU-allow-disabling-only-interrupt-remapping.patch
+++ b/26744-AMD-IOMMU-allow-disabling-only-interrupt-remapping.patch
@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+# Commit 92b8bc03bd4b582cb524db51494d0dba7607e7ac
+# Date 2013-03-25 16:55:22 +0100
+# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+AMD IOMMU: allow disabling only interrupt remapping when certain IVRS consistency checks fail
+
+After some more thought on the XSA-36 and specifically the comments we
+got regarding disabling the IOMMU in this situation altogether making
+things worse instead of better, I came to the conclusion that we can
+actually restrict the action in affected cases to just disabling
+interrupt remapping. That doesn't make the situation worse than prior
+to the XSA-36 fixes (where interrupt remapping didn't really protect
+domains from one another), but allows at least DMA isolation to still
+be utilized.
+
+To do so, disabling of interrupt remapping must be explicitly requested
+on the command line - respective checks will then be skipped.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Suravee Suthikulanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
+
+--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_acpi.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_acpi.c
+@@ -664,6 +664,9 @@ static u16 __init parse_ivhd_device_spec
+         return dev_length;
+     }
+ 
+    if ( !iommu_intremap )
+        return dev_length;
+
+     /*
+      * Some BIOSes have IOAPIC broken entries so we check for IVRS
+      * consistency here --- whether entry's IOAPIC ID is valid and
+@@ -902,7 +905,7 @@ static int __init parse_ivrs_table(struc
+     }
+ 
+     /* Each IO-APIC must have been mentioned in the table. */
+-    for ( apic = 0; !error && apic < nr_ioapics; ++apic )
+    for ( apic = 0; !error && iommu_intremap && apic < nr_ioapics; ++apic )
+     {
+         if ( !nr_ioapic_entries[apic] ||
+              ioapic_sbdf[IO_APIC_ID(apic)].pin_setup )
+--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c
+@@ -1192,7 +1192,8 @@ int __init amd_iommu_init(void)
+ 
+     BUG_ON( !iommu_found() );
+ 
+-    if ( amd_iommu_perdev_intremap && amd_sp5100_erratum28() )
+    if ( iommu_intremap && amd_iommu_perdev_intremap &&
+         amd_sp5100_erratum28() )
+         goto error_out;
+ 
+     ivrs_bdf_entries = amd_iommu_get_ivrs_dev_entries();
+@@ -1209,7 +1210,7 @@ int __init amd_iommu_init(void)
+         goto error_out;
+ 
+     /* initialize io-apic interrupt remapping entries */
+-    if ( amd_iommu_setup_ioapic_remapping() != 0 )
+    if ( iommu_intremap && amd_iommu_setup_ioapic_remapping() != 0 )
+         goto error_out;
+ 
+     /* allocate and initialize a global device table shared by all iommus */
--- a/32on64-extra-mem.patch
+++ b/32on64-extra-mem.patch
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 ===================================================================
 --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
-@@ -2982,7 +2982,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -2984,7 +2984,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
 
             self.guest_bitsize = self.image.getBitSize()
             # Make sure there's enough RAM available for the domain
--- a/blktap.patch
+++ b/blktap.patch
@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 ===================================================================
 --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
-@@ -3315,7 +3315,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -3317,7 +3317,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
                          (fn, BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE))
 
                 vbd = {
--- a/change-vnc-passwd.patch
+++ b/change-vnc-passwd.patch
@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 ===================================================================
 --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
-@@ -1504,6 +1504,20 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -1506,6 +1506,20 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
                 target = max_target
         self.setMemoryTarget(target)
 
--- a/change_home_server.patch
+++ b/change_home_server.patch
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 ===================================================================
 --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
-@@ -3153,6 +3153,11 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -3155,6 +3155,11 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
         self._cleanup_phantom_devs(paths)
         self._cleanupVm()
 
--- a/checkpoint-rename.patch
+++ b/checkpoint-rename.patch
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
 ===================================================================
 --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
 +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
-@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ def save(fd, dominfo, network, live, dst
+@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ def save(fd, dominfo, network, live, dst
             dominfo.destroy()
             dominfo.testDeviceComplete()
         try:
--- a/multi-xvdp.patch
+++ b/multi-xvdp.patch
@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 
 xc = xen.lowlevel.xc.xc()
 xoptions = XendOptions.instance()
-@@ -3322,33 +3322,38 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -3324,33 +3324,38 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
                 # This is a file, not a device.  pygrub can cope with a
                 # file if it's raw, but if it's QCOW or other such formats
                 # used through blktap, then we need to mount it first.
--- a/x86-EFI-set-variable-permit-attrs.patch
+++ b/x86-EFI-set-variable-permit-attrs.patch
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+References: bnc#811764
+
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/efi/runtime.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/efi/runtime.c
+@@ -380,9 +380,6 @@ int efi_runtime_call(struct xenpf_efi_ru
+         long len;
+         unsigned char *data;
+ 
+-        if ( op->misc )
+-            return -EINVAL;
+-
+         len = gwstrlen(guest_handle_cast(op->u.set_variable.name, CHAR16));
+         if ( len < 0 )
+             return len;
--- a/xen-domUloader.diff
+++ b/xen-domUloader.diff
@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 ===================================================================
 --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
-@@ -2347,6 +2347,10 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -2349,6 +2349,10 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
         deviceClass, config = self.info['devices'].get(dev_uuid)
         self._waitForDevice(deviceClass, config['devid'])
 
@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
     def _waitForDevice_destroy(self, deviceClass, devid, backpath):
         return self.getDeviceController(deviceClass).waitForDevice_destroy(
             devid, backpath)
-@@ -3297,7 +3301,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -3299,7 +3303,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
                 from xen.xend import XendDomain
                 dom0 = XendDomain.instance().privilegedDomain()
                 mounted_vbd_uuid = dom0.create_vbd(vbd, disk);
@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
                 fn = BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE
 
             try:
-@@ -3307,10 +3312,10 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -3309,10 +3314,10 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
                 if mounted:
                     log.info("Unmounting %s from %s." %
                              (fn, BOOTLOADER_LOOPBACK_DEVICE))
--- a/xen-managed-pci-device.patch
+++ b/xen-managed-pci-device.patch
@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
             # If there is no device left, destroy pci and remove config.
             if num_devs == 0:
                 if self.info.is_hvm():
-@@ -3168,6 +3197,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -3170,6 +3199,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
                 log.debug("%s KiB need to add to Memory pool" %self.alloc_mem)
                 MemoryPool.instance().increase_memory(self.alloc_mem)
 
--- a/xen-max-free-mem.diff
+++ b/xen-max-free-mem.diff
@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 ===================================================================
 --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
-@@ -1473,6 +1473,27 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -1475,6 +1475,27 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
         self.info['abort_if_busy'] = str(abort_if_busy)
         self.info['log_save_progress'] = str(log_save_progress)
 
--- a/xen.changes
+++ b/xen.changes
@ -1,3 +1,33 @@
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Tue Apr  2 15:41:19 CEST 2013 - ohering@suse.de
+
+- bnc#797014 - no way to control live migrations
+- bnc#803712 - after live migration rcu_sched_state detected stalls
+  xen.migrate.tools-xend_move_assert_to_exception_block.patch
+  xen.migrate.tools-libxc_print_stats_if_migration_is_aborted.patch
+  xen.migrate.tools_set_number_of_dirty_pages_during_migration.patch
+  xen.migrate.tools_notify_restore_to_hangup_during_migration_--abort_if_busy.patch
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Tue Mar 26 10:37:43 MDT 2013 - carnold@suse.com
+
+- bnc#811764 - XEN (hypervisor or kernel) has a problem with EFI
+  variable services
+  x86-EFI-set-variable-permit-attrs.patch
+- Upstream patches from Jan
+  26060-ACPI-ERST-table-size-checks.patch
+  26692-x86-fully-protect-MSI-X-table-from-PV-guest-accesses.patch
+  26702-powernow-add-fixups-for-AMD-P-state-figures.patch
+  26704-x86-MCA-suppress-bank-clearing-for-certain-injected-events.patch (bnc#805579)
+  26731-AMD-IOMMU-Process-softirqs-while-building-dom0-iommu-mappings.patch
+  26733-VT-d-Enumerate-IOMMUs-when-listing-capabilities.patch
+  26734-ACPI-ERST-Name-table-in-otherwise-opaque-error-messages.patch
+  26736-ACPI-APEI-Unlock-apei_iomaps_lock-on-error-path.patch
+  26737-ACPI-APEI-Add-apei_exec_run_optional.patch
+  26742-IOMMU-properly-check-whether-interrupt-remapping-is-enabled.patch
+  26743-VT-d-deal-with-5500-5520-X58-errata.patch (bnc#801910)
+  26744-AMD-IOMMU-allow-disabling-only-interrupt-remapping.patch 
+
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Thu Mar 14 09:58:38 MDT 2013 - jfehlig@suse.com

--- a/xen.migrate.tools-libxc_print_stats_if_migration_is_aborted.patch
+++ b/xen.migrate.tools-libxc_print_stats_if_migration_is_aborted.patch
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+user:        Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
+date:        Thu Mar 28 15:36:07 2013 +0100
+files:       tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
+description:
+tools/libxc: print stats if migration is aborted
+
+Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
+
+
+---
+ tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c |    1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
+===================================================================
+--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
+@@ -1536,6 +1536,7 @@ int xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, in
+                     ERROR("Live migration aborted, as requested. (guest too busy?)"
+                      " total_sent %lu iter %d, max_iters %u max_factor %u",
+                       total_sent, iter, max_iters, max_factor);
+                    print_stats(xch, dom, sent_this_iter, &time_stats, &shadow_stats, 1);
+                     rc = 1;
+                     goto out;
+                 }
--- a/xen.migrate.tools-xend_move_assert_to_exception_block.patch
+++ b/xen.migrate.tools-xend_move_assert_to_exception_block.patch
@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+user:        Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
+date:        Thu Mar 28 15:36:02 2013 +0100
+files:       tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
+description:
+tools/xend: move assert to exception block
+
+The two assert in restore trigger sometimes after hundreds of
+migrations. If they trigger the destination host will not destroy the
+newly created, still empty guest. After a second migration attempt to
+this host there will be two guets with the same name and uuid. This
+situation is poorly handled by the xm tools.
+With this change the guest will be destroyed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
+
+---
+ tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py |    6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
+===================================================================
+--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
+@@ -262,9 +262,6 @@ def restore(xd, fd, dominfo = None, paus
+     store_port   = dominfo.getStorePort()
+     console_port = dominfo.getConsolePort()
+ 
+-    assert store_port
+-    assert console_port
+-
+     # if hvm, pass mem size to calculate the store_mfn
+     if is_hvm:
+         apic = int(dominfo.info['platform'].get('apic', 0))
+@@ -276,6 +273,9 @@ def restore(xd, fd, dominfo = None, paus
+         pae  = 0
+ 
+     try:
+        assert store_port
+        assert console_port
+
+         restore_image = image.create(dominfo, dominfo.info)
+         memory = restore_image.getRequiredAvailableMemory(
+             dominfo.info['memory_dynamic_max'] / 1024)
--- a/xen.migrate.tools_notify_restore_to_hangup_during_migration_--abort_if_busy.patch
+++ b/xen.migrate.tools_notify_restore_to_hangup_during_migration_--abort_if_busy.patch
@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+user:        Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
+date:        Thu Mar 28 15:42:23 2013 +0100
+files:       tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c tools/libxc/xg_save_restore.h
+description:
+tools: notify restore to hangup during migration --abort_if_busy
+
+If a guest is too busy to finish migration, the remote side is not
+notified and as a result an imcomplete, paused guest will remain on the
+remote side. Add a new flag to notify the receiver about the aborted
+migration so that both sides can cleanup properly.
+
+Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
+
+
+Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c
+===================================================================
+--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_restore.c
+@@ -932,6 +932,10 @@ static int pagebuf_get_one(xc_interface
+         DPRINTF("read generation id buffer address");
+         return pagebuf_get_one(xch, ctx, buf, fd, dom);
+ 
+    case XC_SAVE_ID_BUSY_ABORT:
+        ERROR("Source host requested cancelation, guest is busy.");
+        errno = EBUSY;
+        return -1;
+     default:
+         if ( (count > MAX_BATCH_SIZE) || (count < 0) ) {
+             ERROR("Max batch size exceeded (%d). Giving up.", count);
+Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
+===================================================================
+--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
+@@ -1535,9 +1535,11 @@ int xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, in
+             {
+                 if ( !min_reached && abort_if_busy )
+                 {
+                    unsigned int cmd = XC_SAVE_ID_BUSY_ABORT;
+                     ERROR("Live migration aborted, as requested. (guest too busy?)"
+                      " total_sent %lu iter %d, max_iters %u max_factor %u",
+                       total_sent, iter, max_iters, max_factor);
+                    wrexact(io_fd, &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
+                     print_stats(xch, dom, sent_this_iter, &time_stats, &shadow_stats, 1);
+                     rc = 1;
+                     goto out;
+Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xg_save_restore.h
+===================================================================
+--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xg_save_restore.h
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xg_save_restore.h
+@@ -259,6 +259,7 @@
+ #define XC_SAVE_ID_HVM_ACCESS_RING_PFN  -16
+ #define XC_SAVE_ID_HVM_SHARING_RING_PFN -17
+ #define XC_SAVE_ID_TOOLSTACK          -18 /* Optional toolstack specific info */
+#define XC_SAVE_ID_BUSY_ABORT         -19 /* Source requested cancelation */
+ 
+ /*
+ ** We process save/restore/migrate in batches of pages; the below
--- a/xen.migrate.tools_set_migration_constraints_from_cmdline.patch
+++ b/xen.migrate.tools_set_migration_constraints_from_cmdline.patch
@ -69,6 +69,15 @@ v2:
 Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>


+---
+ tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c            |   13 ++++++++++++-
+ tools/libxc/xenguest.h                  |    1 +
+ tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py |   14 ++++++++++++--
+ tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py     |   12 ++++++++++++
+ tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py |   12 ++++++++++++
+ tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py          |   16 ++++++++++++++++
+ 6 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
 Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
 ===================================================================
 --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
@ -195,15 +204,15 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py
           fn=set_true, default=0,
           use="Change home server for managed domains.")
 
-+gopts.opt('max_iters', short='M', val='max_iters',
+gopts.opt('max_iters', val='max_iters',
 +          fn=set_int, default=0,
 +          use="Number of iterations before final suspend (default: 30).")
 +
-+gopts.opt('max_factor', short='m', val='max_factor',
+gopts.opt('max_factor', val='max_factor',
 +          fn=set_int, default=0,
 +          use="Max amount of memory to transfer before final suspend (default: 3*RAM).")
 +
-+gopts.opt('abort_if_busy', short='A',
+gopts.opt('abort_if_busy',
 +          fn=set_true, default=0,
 +          use="Abort migration instead of doing final suspend.")
 +
--- a/xen.migrate.tools_set_number_of_dirty_pages_during_migration.patch
+++ b/xen.migrate.tools_set_number_of_dirty_pages_during_migration.patch
@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+user:        Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
+date:        Thu Mar 28 15:42:14 2013 +0100
+files:       docs/man/xl.pod.1 tools/libxc/Makefile tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c tools/libxc/xc_nomigrate.c tools/libxc/xenguest.h tools/libxl/libxl.c tools/libxl/libxl.h tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h tools/libxl/libxl_save_callout.c tools/libxl/libxl_save_helper.c tools/libxl/xl_cmdimpl.c tools/libxl/xl_cmdtable.c tools/python/xen/lowlevel/checkpoint/libcheckpoint.c tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py tools/xcutils/xc_save.c
+description:
+tools: set number of dirty pages during migration
+
+If a guest is really busy it will not reach the low number of remaining
+50 dirty pages for the final suspend. As a result the guest is either
+suspendend for a long time during the final transfer, or if the number
+of iterations is increased the migration will take a long time.
+
+Add a new option xm/xl migrate --min_remaing <pages> to increase the
+default from command line. The default of 50 is 200kb, which is
+appearently an arbitrary number. With todays network speeds a larger
+block of memory can be transfered quickly without causing too much
+suspension time. This knob gives the admin the chance to adapt the
+suspension time to the given workload.
+
+The existing default of 50 pages is not altered by this change.
+
+Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
+
+
+---
+ tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_linux_save.c                |    2 +-
+ tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c                         |    6 ++++--
+ tools/libxc/xc_nomigrate.c                           |    2 +-
+ tools/libxc/xenguest.h                               |    2 +-
+ tools/libxl/libxl_save_helper.c                      |    2 +-
+ tools/python/xen/lowlevel/checkpoint/libcheckpoint.c |    2 +-
+ tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py              |    5 ++++-
+ tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py                  |    5 +++--
+ tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py              |    8 +++++---
+ tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py                       |    5 +++++
+ tools/xcutils/xc_save.c                              |   11 ++++++-----
+ 11 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
+
+Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_linux_save.c
+===================================================================
+--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_linux_save.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/ia64/xc_ia64_linux_save.c
+@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ out:
+ 
+ int
+ xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, int io_fd, uint32_t dom, uint32_t max_iters,
+-               uint32_t max_factor, uint32_t flags,
+               uint32_t max_factor, uint32_t min_remaining, uint32_t flags,
+                struct save_callbacks* callbacks, int hvm,
+                unsigned long vm_generationid_addr)
+ {
+Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
+===================================================================
+--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_domain_save.c
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
+ */
+ #define DEF_MAX_ITERS   29   /* limit us to 30 times round loop   */
+ #define DEF_MAX_FACTOR   3   /* never send more than 3x p2m_size  */
+#define DEF_MIN_REMAINING 50 /* low water mark of dirty pages */
+ 
+ struct save_ctx {
+     unsigned long hvirt_start; /* virtual starting address of the hypervisor */
+@@ -803,7 +804,7 @@ static int save_tsc_info(xc_interface *x
+ }
+ 
+ int xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, int io_fd, uint32_t dom, uint32_t max_iters,
+-                   uint32_t max_factor, uint32_t flags,
+                   uint32_t max_factor, uint32_t min_remaining, uint32_t flags,
+                    struct save_callbacks* callbacks, int hvm,
+                    unsigned long vm_generationid_addr)
+ {
+@@ -914,6 +915,7 @@ int xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, in
+     /* If no explicit control parameters given, use defaults */
+     max_iters  = max_iters  ? : DEF_MAX_ITERS;
+     max_factor = max_factor ? : DEF_MAX_FACTOR;
+    min_remaining = min_remaining ? : DEF_MIN_REMAINING;
+ 
+     if ( !get_platform_info(xch, dom,
+                             &ctx->max_mfn, &ctx->hvirt_start, &ctx->pt_levels, &dinfo->guest_width) )
+@@ -1526,7 +1528,7 @@ int xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, in
+ 
+         if ( live )
+         {
+-            int min_reached = sent_this_iter + skip_this_iter < 50;
+            int min_reached = sent_this_iter + skip_this_iter < min_remaining;
+             if ( (iter >= max_iters) ||
+                  min_reached ||
+                  (total_sent > dinfo->p2m_size*max_factor) )
+Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_nomigrate.c
+===================================================================
+--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xc_nomigrate.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xc_nomigrate.c
+@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
+ #include <xenguest.h>
+ 
+ int xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, int io_fd, uint32_t dom, uint32_t max_iters,
+-                   uint32_t max_factor, uint32_t flags,
+                   uint32_t max_factor, uint32_t min_remaining, uint32_t flags,
+                    struct save_callbacks* callbacks, int hvm,
+                    unsigned long vm_generationid_addr)
+ {
+Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xenguest.h
+===================================================================
+--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxc/xenguest.h
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxc/xenguest.h
+@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ struct save_callbacks {
+  * @return 0 on success, -1 on failure
+  */
+ int xc_domain_save(xc_interface *xch, int io_fd, uint32_t dom, uint32_t max_iters,
+-                   uint32_t max_factor, uint32_t flags /* XCFLAGS_xxx */,
+                   uint32_t max_factor, uint32_t min_remaining, uint32_t flags /* XCFLAGS_xxx */,
+                    struct save_callbacks* callbacks, int hvm,
+                    unsigned long vm_generationid_addr);
+ 
+Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_save_helper.c
+===================================================================
+--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/libxl/libxl_save_helper.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/libxl/libxl_save_helper.c
+@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+         helper_setcallbacks_save(&helper_save_callbacks, cbflags);
+ 
+         startup("save");
+-        r = xc_domain_save(xch, io_fd, dom, max_iters, max_factor, flags,
+        r = xc_domain_save(xch, io_fd, dom, max_iters, max_factor, 0, flags,
+                            &helper_save_callbacks, hvm, genidad);
+         complete(r);
+ 
+Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/checkpoint/libcheckpoint.c
+===================================================================
+--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/checkpoint/libcheckpoint.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/checkpoint/libcheckpoint.c
+@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ int checkpoint_start(checkpoint_state* s
+ 
+     callbacks->switch_qemu_logdirty = noop_switch_logdirty;
+ 
+-    rc = xc_domain_save(s->xch, fd, s->domid, 0, 0, flags, callbacks, hvm,
+    rc = xc_domain_save(s->xch, fd, s->domid, 0, 0, 0, flags, callbacks, hvm,
+                         vm_generationid_addr);
+ 
+     if (hvm)
+Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
+===================================================================
+--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
+@@ -120,19 +120,22 @@ def save(fd, dominfo, network, live, dst
+         # more information.
+         max_iters = dominfo.info.get('max_iters', "0")
+         max_factor = dominfo.info.get('max_factor', "0")
+        min_remaining = dominfo.info.get('min_remaining', "0")
+         abort_if_busy = dominfo.info.get('abort_if_busy', "0")
+         log_save_progress = dominfo.info.get('log_save_progress', "0")
+         if max_iters == "None":
+             max_iters = "0"
+         if max_factor == "None":
+             max_factor = "0"
+        if min_remaining == "None":
+            min_remaining = "0"
+         if abort_if_busy == "None":
+             abort_if_busy = "0"
+         if log_save_progress == "None":
+             log_save_progress = "0"
+         cmd = [xen.util.auxbin.pathTo(XC_SAVE), str(fd),
+                str(dominfo.getDomid()),
+-               max_iters, max_factor,
+               max_iters, max_factor, min_remaining,
+                str( int(live) | (int(hvm) << 2) | (int(abort_if_busy) << 5) | (int(log_save_progress) << 6) ) ]
+         log.debug("[xc_save]: %s", string.join(cmd))
+ 
+Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py
+===================================================================
+--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py
+@@ -1832,18 +1832,19 @@ class XendDomain:
+             log.exception(ex)
+             raise XendError(str(ex))
+ 
+-    def domain_migrate_constraints_set(self, domid, max_iters, max_factor, abort_if_busy, log_save_progress):
+    def domain_migrate_constraints_set(self, domid, max_iters, max_factor, min_remaining, abort_if_busy, log_save_progress):
+         """Set the Migrate Constraints of this domain.
+         @param domid: Domain ID or Name
+         @param max_iters: Number of iterations before final suspend
+         @param max_factor: Max amount of memory to transfer before final suspend
+        @param min_remaining: Number of dirty pages before final suspend
+         @param abort_if_busy: Abort migration instead of doing final suspend
+         @param log_save_progress: Log progress of migrate to xend.log
+         """
+         dominfo = self.domain_lookup_nr(domid)
+         if not dominfo:
+             raise XendInvalidDomain(str(domid))
+-        dominfo.setMigrateConstraints(max_iters, max_factor, abort_if_busy, log_save_progress)
+        dominfo.setMigrateConstraints(max_iters, max_factor, min_remaining, abort_if_busy, log_save_progress)
+ 
+     def domain_maxmem_set(self, domid, mem):
+         """Set the memory limit for a domain.
+Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+===================================================================
+--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+@@ -1459,17 +1459,19 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+         pci_conf = self.info['devices'][dev_uuid][1]
+         return map(pci_dict_to_bdf_str, pci_conf['devs'])
+ 
+-    def setMigrateConstraints(self, max_iters, max_factor, abort_if_busy, log_save_progress):
+    def setMigrateConstraints(self, max_iters, max_factor, min_remaining, abort_if_busy, log_save_progress):
+         """Set the Migrate Constraints of this domain.
+         @param max_iters: Number of iterations before final suspend
+         @param max_factor: Max amount of memory to transfer before final suspend
+        @param min_remaining: Number of dirty pages before final suspend
+         @param abort_if_busy: Abort migration instead of doing final suspend
+         @param log_save_progress: Log progress of migrate to xend.log
+         """
+-        log.debug("Setting migration constraints of domain %s (%s) to '%s' '%s' '%s'.",
+-                  self.info['name_label'], str(self.domid), max_iters, max_factor, abort_if_busy)
+        log.debug("Setting migration constraints of domain %s (%s) to '%s' '%s' '%s' '%s'.",
+                  self.info['name_label'], str(self.domid), max_iters, max_factor, min_remaining, abort_if_busy)
+         self.info['max_iters'] = str(max_iters)
+         self.info['max_factor'] = str(max_factor)
+        self.info['min_remaining'] = str(min_remaining)
+         self.info['abort_if_busy'] = str(abort_if_busy)
+         self.info['log_save_progress'] = str(log_save_progress)
+ 
+Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py
+===================================================================
+--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xm/migrate.py
+@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ gopts.opt('max_factor', val='max_factor'
+           fn=set_int, default=0,
+           use="Max amount of memory to transfer before final suspend (default: 3*RAM).")
+ 
+gopts.opt('min_remaining', val='min_remaining',
+          fn=set_int, default=0,
+          use="Number of dirty pages before final suspend (default: 50).")
+
+ gopts.opt('abort_if_busy',
+           fn=set_true, default=0,
+           use="Abort migration instead of doing final suspend.")
+@@ -99,6 +103,7 @@ def main(argv):
+         server.xend.domain.migrate_constraints_set(dom,
+                                                    opts.vals.max_iters,
+                                                    opts.vals.max_factor,
+                                                   opts.vals.min_remaining,
+                                                    opts.vals.abort_if_busy,
+                                                    opts.vals.log_progress)
+         server.xend.domain.migrate(dom, dst, opts.vals.live,
+Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c
+===================================================================
+--- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c
+++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/xcutils/xc_save.c
+@@ -179,20 +179,21 @@ int
+ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+     xc_interface *xch;
+-    unsigned int maxit, max_f, lflags;
+    unsigned int maxit, max_f, min_r, lflags;
+     int io_fd, ret, port;
+     struct save_callbacks callbacks;
+     xentoollog_level lvl;
+     xentoollog_logger *l;
+ 
+-    if (argc != 6)
+-        errx(1, "usage: %s iofd domid maxit maxf flags", argv[0]);
+    if (argc != 7)
+        errx(1, "usage: %s iofd domid maxit maxf minr flags", argv[0]);
+ 
+     io_fd = atoi(argv[1]);
+     si.domid = atoi(argv[2]);
+     maxit = atoi(argv[3]);
+     max_f = atoi(argv[4]);
+-    si.flags = atoi(argv[5]);
+    min_r = atoi(argv[5]);
+    si.flags = atoi(argv[6]);
+ 
+     si.suspend_evtchn = -1;
+ 
+@@ -226,7 +227,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+     memset(&callbacks, 0, sizeof(callbacks));
+     callbacks.suspend = suspend;
+     callbacks.switch_qemu_logdirty = switch_qemu_logdirty;
+-    ret = xc_domain_save(si.xch, io_fd, si.domid, maxit, max_f, si.flags, 
+    ret = xc_domain_save(si.xch, io_fd, si.domid, maxit, max_f, min_r, si.flags,
+                          &callbacks, !!(si.flags & XCFLAGS_HVM), 0);
+ 
+     if (si.suspend_evtchn > 0)
--- a/xen.spec
+++ b/xen.spec
@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
 # Please submit bugfixes or comments via http://bugs.opensuse.org/
 #

+# needssslcertforbuild
+
 Name:           xen
 ExclusiveArch:  %ix86 x86_64
 %define xvers 4.2
@ -114,7 +116,7 @@ BuildRequires:  kernel-syms
 BuildRequires:  module-init-tools
 BuildRequires:  xorg-x11
 %endif
-Version:        4.2.1_10
+Version:        4.2.1_11
 Release:        0
 PreReq:         %insserv_prereq %fillup_prereq
 Summary:        Xen Virtualization: Hypervisor (aka VMM aka Microkernel)
@ -181,6 +183,7 @@ Patch25957:     25957-x86-TSC-adjust-HVM.patch
 Patch25958:     25958-x86-TSC-adjust-sr.patch
 Patch25959:     25959-x86-TSC-adjust-expose.patch
 Patch25975:     25975-x86-IvyBridge.patch
+Patch26060:     26060-ACPI-ERST-table-size-checks.patch
 Patch26062:     26062-ACPI-ERST-move-data.patch
 Patch26077:     26077-stubdom_fix_compile_errors_in_grub.patch
 Patch26078:     26078-hotplug-Linux_remove_hotplug_support_rely_on_udev_instead.patch
@ -275,6 +278,17 @@ Patch26679:     26679-x86-defer-processing-events-on-the-NMI-exit-path.patch
 Patch26683:     26683-credit1-Use-atomic-bit-operations-for-the-flags-structure.patch
 Patch26686:     26686-xentrace-fix-off-by-one-in-calculate_tbuf_size.patch
 Patch26689:     26689-fix-domain-unlocking-in-some-xsm-error-paths.patch
+Patch26692:     26692-x86-fully-protect-MSI-X-table-from-PV-guest-accesses.patch
+Patch26702:     26702-powernow-add-fixups-for-AMD-P-state-figures.patch
+Patch26704:     26704-x86-MCA-suppress-bank-clearing-for-certain-injected-events.patch
+Patch26731:     26731-AMD-IOMMU-Process-softirqs-while-building-dom0-iommu-mappings.patch
+Patch26733:     26733-VT-d-Enumerate-IOMMUs-when-listing-capabilities.patch
+Patch26734:     26734-ACPI-ERST-Name-table-in-otherwise-opaque-error-messages.patch
+Patch26736:     26736-ACPI-APEI-Unlock-apei_iomaps_lock-on-error-path.patch
+Patch26737:     26737-ACPI-APEI-Add-apei_exec_run_optional.patch
+Patch26742:     26742-IOMMU-properly-check-whether-interrupt-remapping-is-enabled.patch
+Patch26743:     26743-VT-d-deal-with-5500-5520-X58-errata.patch
+Patch26744:     26744-AMD-IOMMU-allow-disabling-only-interrupt-remapping.patch
 Patch34:        CVE-2013-0151-xsa34.patch
 Patch41:        CVE-2012-6075-xsa41.patch
 Patch88:        xen.migrate.tools-xc_print_messages_from_xc_save_with_xc_report.patch
@ -282,6 +296,10 @@ Patch89:        xen.migrate.tools-xc_document_printf_calls_in_xc_restore.patch
 Patch90:        xen.migrate.tools-xc_rework_xc_save.cswitch_qemu_logdirty.patch
 Patch91:        xen.migrate.tools_set_migration_constraints_from_cmdline.patch
 Patch92:        xen.migrate.tools_add_xm_migrate_--log_progress_option.patch
+Patch93:        xen.migrate.tools-xend_move_assert_to_exception_block.patch
+Patch94:        xen.migrate.tools-libxc_print_stats_if_migration_is_aborted.patch
+Patch95:        xen.migrate.tools_set_number_of_dirty_pages_during_migration.patch
+Patch96:        xen.migrate.tools_notify_restore_to_hangup_during_migration_--abort_if_busy.patch
 # Upstream qemu patches
 Patch100:       VNC-Support-for-ExtendedKeyEvent-client-message.patch
 # Our patches
@ -374,11 +392,11 @@ Patch457:       xen-cpupool-xl-config-format.patch
 Patch458:       ipxe-enable-nics.patch
 Patch459:       blktap-close-fifos.patch
 Patch460:       blktap-disable-debug-printf.patch
-Patch461:       xen-glibc217.patch
-Patch462:       xen-migration-bridge-check.patch
-Patch463:       pygrub-netware-xnloader.patch
-Patch464:       xen-managed-pci-device.patch
-Patch465:       xend-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch
+Patch461:       xen-migration-bridge-check.patch
+Patch462:       pygrub-netware-xnloader.patch
+Patch463:       xen-managed-pci-device.patch
+Patch464:       xend-hvm-firmware-passthrough.patch
+Patch465:       xen-glibc217.patch
 # Jim's domain lock patch
 Patch480:       xend-domain-lock.patch
 Patch481:       xend-domain-lock-sfex.patch
@ -389,8 +407,9 @@ Patch502:       x86-cpufreq-report.patch
 Patch503:       x86-dom-print.patch
 Patch504:       pvdrv-import-shared-info.patch
 Patch505:       x86-extra-trap-info.patch
-Patch506:       pvdrv_emulation_control.patch
-Patch507:       blktap-pv-cdrom.patch
+Patch506:       x86-EFI-set-variable-permit-attrs.patch
+Patch507:       pvdrv_emulation_control.patch
+Patch508:       blktap-pv-cdrom.patch
 Patch511:       supported_module.diff
 Patch512:       magic_ioport_compat.patch
 Patch513:       xen.sles11sp1.fate311487.xen_platform_pci.dmistring.patch
@ -755,6 +774,7 @@ tar xfj %{SOURCE6} -C $RPM_BUILD_DIR/%{xen_build_dir}/tools
 %patch25958 -p1
 %patch25959 -p1
 %patch25975 -p1
+%patch26060 -p1
 %patch26062 -p1
 %patch26077 -p1
 %patch26078 -p1
@ -850,12 +870,27 @@ tar xfj %{SOURCE6} -C $RPM_BUILD_DIR/%{xen_build_dir}/tools
 %patch26683 -p1
 %patch26686 -p1
 %patch26689 -p1
+%patch26692 -p1
+%patch26702 -p1
+%patch26704 -p1
+%patch26731 -p1
+%patch26733 -p1
+%patch26734 -p1
+%patch26736 -p1
+%patch26737 -p1
+%patch26742 -p1
+%patch26743 -p1
+%patch26744 -p1
 %patch41 -p1
 %patch88 -p1
 %patch89 -p1
 %patch90 -p1
 %patch91 -p1
 %patch92 -p1
+%patch93 -p1
+%patch94 -p1
+%patch95 -p1
+%patch96 -p1
 # Qemu
 %patch100 -p1
 # Our patches
@ -960,6 +995,7 @@ tar xfj %{SOURCE6} -C $RPM_BUILD_DIR/%{xen_build_dir}/tools
 %patch505 -p1
 %patch506 -p1
 %patch507 -p1
+%patch508 -p1
 %patch511 -p1
 %patch512 -p1
 %patch513 -p1
--- a/xenapi-console-protocol.patch
+++ b/xenapi-console-protocol.patch
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 ===================================================================
 --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
-@@ -3954,6 +3954,14 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -3956,6 +3956,14 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
             if not config.has_key('backend'):
                 config['backend'] = "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"
 
--- a/xend-console-port-restore.patch
+++ b/xend-console-port-restore.patch
@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
 ===================================================================
 --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
 +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
-@@ -342,8 +342,7 @@ def restore(xd, fd, dominfo = None, paus
+@@ -345,8 +345,7 @@ def restore(xd, fd, dominfo = None, paus
         restore_image.setCpuid()
 
         # xc_restore will wait for source to close connection
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 ===================================================================
 --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
-@@ -3076,7 +3076,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -3078,7 +3078,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
     # TODO: recategorise - called from XendCheckpoint
     # 
 
@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 
         log.debug("XendDomainInfo.completeRestore")
 
-@@ -3087,6 +3087,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -3089,6 +3089,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
         self.image = image.create(self, self.info)
         if self.image:
             self.image.createDeviceModel(True)
--- a/xend-core-dump-loc.diff
+++ b/xend-core-dump-loc.diff
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 ===================================================================
 --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
-@@ -2318,7 +2318,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -2320,7 +2320,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
             # To prohibit directory traversal
             based_name = os.path.basename(self.info['name_label'])
             
--- a/xend-domain-lock-sfex.patch
+++ b/xend-domain-lock-sfex.patch
@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 ===================================================================
 --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
-@@ -4570,8 +4570,14 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -4572,8 +4572,14 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
 
     # Return name of host contained in lock file.
     def get_lock_host(self, path):
@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
         hostname = "unknown"
 
         try:
-@@ -4593,6 +4599,16 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -4595,6 +4601,16 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
         path = xoptions.get_xend_domain_lock_path()
         path = os.path.join(path, self.get_uuid())
 
@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
         try:
             if not os.path.exists(path):
                 mkdir.parents(path, stat.S_IRWXU)
-@@ -4600,12 +4616,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -4602,12 +4618,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
             log.exception("%s could not be created." % path)
             raise XendError("%s could not be created." % path)
 
@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
         if status != 0:
             log.debug("Failed to aqcuire lock: status = %d" % status)
             raise XendError("The VM is locked and appears to be running on host %s." % self.get_lock_host(path))
-@@ -4622,12 +4633,18 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -4624,12 +4635,18 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
 
         path = xoptions.get_xend_domain_lock_path()
         path = os.path.join(path, self.get_uuid())
--- a/xend-domain-lock.patch
+++ b/xend-domain-lock.patch
@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
 ===================================================================
 --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
 +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
-@@ -136,6 +136,11 @@ def save(fd, dominfo, network, live, dst
+@@ -139,6 +139,11 @@ def save(fd, dominfo, network, live, dst
                str( int(live) | (int(hvm) << 2) | (int(abort_if_busy) << 5) | (int(log_save_progress) << 6) ) ]
         log.debug("[xc_save]: %s", string.join(cmd))
 
@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
         def saveInputHandler(line, tochild):
             log.debug("In saveInputHandler %s", line)
             if line == "suspend":
-@@ -200,6 +205,9 @@ def save(fd, dominfo, network, live, dst
+@@ -203,6 +208,9 @@ def save(fd, dominfo, network, live, dst
         log.exception("Save failed on domain %s (%s) - resuming.", domain_name,
                       dominfo.getDomid())
         dominfo.resumeDomain()
@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
  
         try:
             dominfo.setName(domain_name)
-@@ -366,6 +374,7 @@ def restore(xd, fd, dominfo = None, paus
+@@ -369,6 +377,7 @@ def restore(xd, fd, dominfo = None, paus
         if not paused:
             dominfo.unpause()
 
@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
                 XendTask.log_progress(0, 30, self._constructDomain)
                 XendTask.log_progress(31, 60, self._initDomain)
                 
-@@ -3053,6 +3054,11 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -3055,6 +3056,11 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
 
             self._stateSet(DOM_STATE_HALTED)
             self.domid = None  # Do not push into _stateSet()!
@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
         finally:
             self.refresh_shutdown_lock.release()
 
-@@ -4562,6 +4568,74 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -4564,6 +4570,74 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
     def has_device(self, dev_class, dev_uuid):
         return (dev_uuid in self.info['%s_refs' % dev_class.lower()])
 
--- a/xend-migration-domname-fix.patch
+++ b/xend-migration-domname-fix.patch
@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 ===================================================================
 --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
-@@ -1961,6 +1961,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -1963,6 +1963,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
         self.info['name_label'] = name
         if to_store:
             self.storeVm("name", name)
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
 ===================================================================
 --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
 +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendCheckpoint.py
-@@ -185,7 +185,10 @@ def save(fd, dominfo, network, live, dst
+@@ -188,7 +188,10 @@ def save(fd, dominfo, network, live, dst
             dominfo.destroy()
             dominfo.testDeviceComplete()
         try:
--- a/xend-vcpu-affinity-fix.patch
+++ b/xend-vcpu-affinity-fix.patch
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 ===================================================================
 --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
-@@ -2799,7 +2799,10 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -2801,7 +2801,10 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
                 from xen.xend import XendDomain
                 doms = XendDomain.instance().list('all')
                 for dom in filter (lambda d: d.domid != self.domid, doms):
--- a/xenpaging.autostart.patch
+++ b/xenpaging.autostart.patch
@ -124,9 +124,9 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py
 ===================================================================
 --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py
 +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomain.py
-@@ -1848,6 +1848,21 @@ class XendDomain:
+@@ -1849,6 +1849,21 @@ class XendDomain:
             raise XendInvalidDomain(str(domid))
-         dominfo.setMigrateConstraints(max_iters, max_factor, abort_if_busy, log_save_progress)
+         dominfo.setMigrateConstraints(max_iters, max_factor, min_remaining, abort_if_busy, log_save_progress)
 
 +    def domain_swaptarget_set(self, domid, mem):
 +        """Set the memory limit for a domain.
@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 ===================================================================
 --- xen-4.2.1-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
 +++ xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
-@@ -1548,6 +1548,17 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -1550,6 +1550,17 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
                 break
         xen.xend.XendDomain.instance().managed_config_save(self)
 
@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
     def setMemoryTarget(self, target):
         """Set the memory target of this domain.
         @param target: In MiB.
-@@ -2338,6 +2349,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -2340,6 +2351,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
                  self.info['name_label'], self.domid, self.info['uuid'],
                  new_name, new_uuid)
         self._unwatchVm()
@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
         self._releaseDevices()
         # Remove existing vm node in xenstore
         self._removeVm()
-@@ -3017,6 +3030,9 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -3019,6 +3032,9 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
 
             self._createDevices()
 
@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
             self.image.cleanupTmpImages()
 
             self.info['start_time'] = time.time()
-@@ -3041,6 +3057,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -3043,6 +3059,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
         self.refresh_shutdown_lock.acquire()
         try:
             self.unwatchShutdown()
@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
             self._releaseDevices()
             bootloader_tidy(self)
 
-@@ -3125,6 +3143,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -3127,6 +3145,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
         self.image = image.create(self, self.info)
         if self.image:
             self.image.createDeviceModel(True)
@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
         self.console_port = console_port
         self._storeDomDetails()
         self._registerWatches()
-@@ -3267,6 +3286,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -3269,6 +3288,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
             # could also fetch a parsed note from xenstore
             fast = self.info.get_notes().get('SUSPEND_CANCEL') and 1 or 0
             if not fast:
@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ Index: xen-4.2.1-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
                 self._releaseDevices()
                 self.testDeviceComplete()
                 self.testvifsComplete()
-@@ -3282,6 +3303,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
+@@ -3284,6 +3305,8 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
                 self._storeDomDetails()
 
                 self._createDevices()