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Accepting request 69993 from Virtualization

Browse Source 
- bnc#691256 - move modprobe of xen backend modules from xend to
  xencommons initscript
  tmp-initscript-modprobe.patch

- bnc#691738 - Xen does not find device create with npiv block
  xen-qemu-iscsi-fix.patch

- Upstream patches from Jan
  22998-x86-get_page_from_l1e-retcode.patch
  22999-x86-mod_l1_entry-retcode.patch
  23000-x86-mod_l2_entry-retcode.patch
  23096-x86-hpet-no-cpumask_lock.patch
  23099-x86-rwlock-scalability.patch
  23103-x86-pirq-guest-eoi-check.patch
  23127-vtd-bios-settings.patch
  23153-x86-amd-clear-DramModEn.patch
  23154-x86-amd-iorr-no-rdwr.patch
  23199-amd-iommu-unmapped-intr-fault.patch
  23200-amd-iommu-intremap-sync.patch
  23228-x86-conditional-write_tsc.patch

- update xenalyze to revision 98
  * Unify setting of vcpu data type
  * Unify record size checks
  * Fix cr3_switch not to access hvm struct before it's initialized
- add xenalyze.gcc46.patch to fix unused-but-set-variable errors

- bnc#688473 - VUL-0: potential buffer overflow in tools
  cve-2011-1583-4.0.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/69993
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/xen?expand=0&rev=133
This commit is contained in:
Berthold Gunreben 2011-05-12 09:16:47 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
commit 670e49529b
28 changed files with 2308 additions and 121 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

236
22998-x86-get_page_from_l1e-retcode.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
References: bnc#675363
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1299687371 0
# Node ID e9fab50d7b61d151d51a4b1088930c9e1ca2da47
# Parent 5f28dcea13555f7ab948c9cb95de3e79e0fbfc4b
x86: make get_page_from_l1e() return a proper error code
... so that the guest can actually know the reason for the (hypercall)
failure.
ptwr_do_page_fault() could propagate the error indicator received from
get_page_from_l1e() back to the guest in the high half of the error
code (entry_vector), provided we're sure all existing guests can deal
with that (or indicate so by means of a to-be-added guest feature
flag). Alternatively, a second virtual status register (like CR2)
could be introduced.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ shadow_get_page_from_l1e(shadow_l1e_t sl
// If a privileged domain is attempting to install a map of a page it does
// not own, we let it succeed anyway.
//
- if ( unlikely(!res) &&
+ if ( unlikely(res < 0) &&
!shadow_mode_translate(d) &&
mfn_valid(mfn = shadow_l1e_get_mfn(sl1e)) &&
(owner = page_get_owner(mfn_to_page(mfn))) &&
@@ -883,11 +883,11 @@ shadow_get_page_from_l1e(shadow_l1e_t sl
SHADOW_PRINTK("privileged domain %d installs map of mfn %05lx "
"which is owned by domain %d: %s\n",
d->domain_id, mfn_x(mfn), owner->domain_id,
- res ? "success" : "failed");
+ res >= 0 ? "success" : "failed");
}
/* Okay, it might still be a grant mapping PTE. Try it. */
- if ( unlikely(!res) &&
+ if ( unlikely(res < 0) &&
(type == p2m_grant_map_rw ||
(type == p2m_grant_map_ro &&
!(shadow_l1e_get_flags(sl1e) & _PAGE_RW))) )
@@ -900,7 +900,7 @@ shadow_get_page_from_l1e(shadow_l1e_t sl
res = get_page_from_l1e(sl1e, d, page_get_owner(mfn_to_page(mfn)));
}
- if ( unlikely(!res) )
+ if ( unlikely(res < 0) )
{
perfc_incr(shadow_get_page_fail);
SHADOW_PRINTK("failed: l1e=" SH_PRI_pte "\n");
@@ -1229,15 +1229,15 @@ static int shadow_set_l1e(struct vcpu *v
TRACE_SHADOW_PATH_FLAG(TRCE_SFLAG_SHADOW_L1_GET_REF);
switch ( shadow_get_page_from_l1e(new_sl1e, d, new_type) )
{
- case 0:
+ default:
/* Doesn't look like a pagetable. */
flags |= SHADOW_SET_ERROR;
new_sl1e = shadow_l1e_empty();
break;
- case -1:
+ case 1:
shadow_l1e_remove_flags(new_sl1e, _PAGE_RW);
/* fall through */
- default:
+ case 0:
shadow_vram_get_l1e(new_sl1e, sl1e, sl1mfn, d);
break;
}
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -799,12 +799,12 @@ get_page_from_l1e(
bool_t write;
if ( !(l1f & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
- return 1;
+ return 0;
if ( unlikely(l1f & l1_disallow_mask(l1e_owner)) )
{
MEM_LOG("Bad L1 flags %x", l1f & l1_disallow_mask(l1e_owner));
- return 0;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
if ( !mfn_valid(mfn) ||
@@ -821,18 +821,21 @@ get_page_from_l1e(
if ( !iomem_access_permitted(pg_owner, mfn, mfn) )
{
if ( mfn != (PADDR_MASK >> PAGE_SHIFT) ) /* INVALID_MFN? */
+ {
MEM_LOG("Non-privileged (%u) attempt to map I/O space %08lx",
pg_owner->domain_id, mfn);
- return 0;
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
}
if ( !(l1f & _PAGE_RW) || IS_PRIV(pg_owner) ||
!rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn) )
- return 1;
+ return 0;
dprintk(XENLOG_G_WARNING,
"d%d: Forcing read-only access to MFN %lx\n",
l1e_owner->domain_id, mfn);
- return -1;
+ return 1;
}
if ( unlikely(real_pg_owner != pg_owner) )
@@ -863,6 +866,7 @@ get_page_from_l1e(
{
unsigned long x, nx, y = page->count_info;
unsigned long cacheattr = pte_flags_to_cacheattr(l1f);
+ int err;
if ( is_xen_heap_page(page) )
{
@@ -870,7 +874,7 @@ get_page_from_l1e(
put_page_type(page);
put_page(page);
MEM_LOG("Attempt to change cache attributes of Xen heap page");
- return 0;
+ return -EACCES;
}
do {
@@ -878,7 +882,8 @@ get_page_from_l1e(
nx = (x & ~PGC_cacheattr_mask) | (cacheattr << PGC_cacheattr_base);
} while ( (y = cmpxchg(&page->count_info, x, nx)) != x );
- if ( unlikely(update_xen_mappings(mfn, cacheattr) != 0) )
+ err = update_xen_mappings(mfn, cacheattr);
+ if ( unlikely(err) )
{
cacheattr = y & PGC_cacheattr_mask;
do {
@@ -894,11 +899,11 @@ get_page_from_l1e(
" from L1 entry %" PRIpte ") for %d",
mfn, get_gpfn_from_mfn(mfn),
l1e_get_intpte(l1e), l1e_owner->domain_id);
- return 0;
+ return err;
}
}
- return 1;
+ return 0;
could_not_pin:
MEM_LOG("Error getting mfn %lx (pfn %lx) from L1 entry %" PRIpte
@@ -907,7 +912,7 @@ get_page_from_l1e(
l1e_get_intpte(l1e), l1e_owner->domain_id, pg_owner->domain_id);
if ( real_pg_owner != NULL )
put_page(page);
- return 0;
+ return -EBUSY;
}
@@ -1197,17 +1202,20 @@ static int alloc_l1_table(struct page_in
unsigned long pfn = page_to_mfn(page);
l1_pgentry_t *pl1e;
unsigned int i;
+ int ret = 0;
pl1e = map_domain_page(pfn);
for ( i = 0; i < L1_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES; i++ )
{
if ( is_guest_l1_slot(i) )
- switch ( get_page_from_l1e(pl1e[i], d, d) )
+ switch ( ret = get_page_from_l1e(pl1e[i], d, d) )
{
- case 0:
+ default:
goto fail;
- case -1:
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case 1:
l1e_remove_flags(pl1e[i], _PAGE_RW);
break;
}
@@ -1225,7 +1233,7 @@ static int alloc_l1_table(struct page_in
put_page_from_l1e(pl1e[i], d);
unmap_domain_page(pl1e);
- return -EINVAL;
+ return ret;
}
static int create_pae_xen_mappings(struct domain *d, l3_pgentry_t *pl3e)
@@ -1794,11 +1802,13 @@ static int mod_l1_entry(l1_pgentry_t *pl
return rc;
}
- switch ( get_page_from_l1e(nl1e, pt_dom, pg_dom) )
+ switch ( rc = get_page_from_l1e(nl1e, pt_dom, pg_dom) )
{
- case 0:
+ default:
return 0;
- case -1:
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case 1:
l1e_remove_flags(nl1e, _PAGE_RW);
break;
}
@@ -4948,7 +4958,7 @@ static int ptwr_emulated_update(
nl1e = l1e_from_intpte(val);
switch ( get_page_from_l1e(nl1e, d, d) )
{
- case 0:
+ default:
if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(d) && (bytes == 4) && (unaligned_addr & 4) &&
!do_cmpxchg && (l1e_get_flags(nl1e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
{
@@ -4968,7 +4978,9 @@ static int ptwr_emulated_update(
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
}
break;
- case -1:
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case 1:
l1e_remove_flags(nl1e, _PAGE_RW);
break;
}

114
22999-x86-mod_l1_entry-retcode.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
References: bnc#675363
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
# Date 1299687409 0
# Node ID 82b5f8d12903e140f957ae8d13d66e44be076b05
# Parent e9fab50d7b61d151d51a4b1088930c9e1ca2da47
x86: make mod_l1_entry() return a proper error code
... again is so that the guest can actually know the reason for the
(hypercall) failure.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -1765,15 +1765,16 @@ static int mod_l1_entry(l1_pgentry_t *pl
struct domain *pt_dom = pt_vcpu->domain;
unsigned long mfn;
p2m_type_t p2mt;
- int rc = 1;
+ int rc = 0;
if ( unlikely(__copy_from_user(&ol1e, pl1e, sizeof(ol1e)) != 0) )
- return 0;
+ return -EFAULT;
if ( unlikely(paging_mode_refcounts(pt_dom)) )
{
- rc = UPDATE_ENTRY(l1, pl1e, ol1e, nl1e, gl1mfn, pt_vcpu, preserve_ad);
- return rc;
+ if ( UPDATE_ENTRY(l1, pl1e, ol1e, nl1e, gl1mfn, pt_vcpu, preserve_ad) )
+ return 0;
+ return -EBUSY;
}
if ( l1e_get_flags(nl1e) & _PAGE_PRESENT )
@@ -1782,7 +1783,7 @@ static int mod_l1_entry(l1_pgentry_t *pl
mfn = mfn_x(gfn_to_mfn(p2m_get_hostp2m(pg_dom),
l1e_get_pfn(nl1e), &p2mt));
if ( !p2m_is_ram(p2mt) || unlikely(mfn == INVALID_MFN) )
- return 0;
+ return -EINVAL;
ASSERT((mfn & ~(PADDR_MASK >> PAGE_SHIFT)) == 0);
nl1e = l1e_from_pfn(mfn, l1e_get_flags(nl1e));
@@ -1790,22 +1791,23 @@ static int mod_l1_entry(l1_pgentry_t *pl
{
MEM_LOG("Bad L1 flags %x",
l1e_get_flags(nl1e) & l1_disallow_mask(pt_dom));
- return 0;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
/* Fast path for identical mapping, r/w and presence. */
if ( !l1e_has_changed(ol1e, nl1e, _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_PRESENT) )
{
adjust_guest_l1e(nl1e, pt_dom);
- rc = UPDATE_ENTRY(l1, pl1e, ol1e, nl1e, gl1mfn, pt_vcpu,
- preserve_ad);
- return rc;
+ if ( UPDATE_ENTRY(l1, pl1e, ol1e, nl1e, gl1mfn, pt_vcpu,
+ preserve_ad) )
+ return 0;
+ return -EBUSY;
}
switch ( rc = get_page_from_l1e(nl1e, pt_dom, pg_dom) )
{
default:
- return 0;
+ return rc;
case 0:
break;
case 1:
@@ -1818,13 +1820,13 @@ static int mod_l1_entry(l1_pgentry_t *pl
preserve_ad)) )
{
ol1e = nl1e;
- rc = 0;
+ rc = -EBUSY;
}
}
else if ( unlikely(!UPDATE_ENTRY(l1, pl1e, ol1e, nl1e, gl1mfn, pt_vcpu,
preserve_ad)) )
{
- return 0;
+ return -EBUSY;
}
put_page_from_l1e(ol1e, pt_dom);
@@ -3516,9 +3518,10 @@ int do_mmu_update(
}
#endif
- okay = mod_l1_entry(va, l1e, mfn,
- cmd == MMU_PT_UPDATE_PRESERVE_AD, v,
- pg_owner);
+ rc = mod_l1_entry(va, l1e, mfn,
+ cmd == MMU_PT_UPDATE_PRESERVE_AD, v,
+ pg_owner);
+ okay = !rc;
}
break;
case PGT_l2_page_table:
@@ -4300,7 +4303,7 @@ static int __do_update_va_mapping(
goto out;
}
- rc = mod_l1_entry(pl1e, val, gl1mfn, 0, v, pg_owner) ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+ rc = mod_l1_entry(pl1e, val, gl1mfn, 0, v, pg_owner);
page_unlock(gl1pg);
put_page(gl1pg);

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@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
# Date 1299687446 0
# Node ID d428fa67abaa0db20b915a697f1d5ba16e554185
# Parent 82b5f8d12903e140f957ae8d13d66e44be076b05
x86: make mod_l2_entry() return a proper error code
... so that finally all mod_lN_entry() functions behave identically,
allowing some cleanup in do_mmu_update() (which no longer needs to
track both an okay status and an error code).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -1845,16 +1845,16 @@ static int mod_l2_entry(l2_pgentry_t *pl
struct domain *d = vcpu->domain;
struct page_info *l2pg = mfn_to_page(pfn);
unsigned long type = l2pg->u.inuse.type_info;
- int rc = 1;
+ int rc = 0;
if ( unlikely(!is_guest_l2_slot(d, type, pgentry_ptr_to_slot(pl2e))) )
{
MEM_LOG("Illegal L2 update attempt in Xen-private area %p", pl2e);
- return 0;
+ return -EPERM;
}
if ( unlikely(__copy_from_user(&ol2e, pl2e, sizeof(ol2e)) != 0) )
- return 0;
+ return -EFAULT;
if ( l2e_get_flags(nl2e) & _PAGE_PRESENT )
{
@@ -1862,32 +1862,33 @@ static int mod_l2_entry(l2_pgentry_t *pl
{
MEM_LOG("Bad L2 flags %x",
l2e_get_flags(nl2e) & L2_DISALLOW_MASK);
- return 0;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
/* Fast path for identical mapping and presence. */
if ( !l2e_has_changed(ol2e, nl2e, _PAGE_PRESENT) )
{
adjust_guest_l2e(nl2e, d);
- rc = UPDATE_ENTRY(l2, pl2e, ol2e, nl2e, pfn, vcpu, preserve_ad);
- return rc;
+ if ( UPDATE_ENTRY(l2, pl2e, ol2e, nl2e, pfn, vcpu, preserve_ad) )
+ return 0;
+ return -EBUSY;
}
- if ( unlikely(get_page_from_l2e(nl2e, pfn, d) < 0) )
- return 0;
+ if ( unlikely((rc = get_page_from_l2e(nl2e, pfn, d)) < 0) )
+ return rc;
adjust_guest_l2e(nl2e, d);
if ( unlikely(!UPDATE_ENTRY(l2, pl2e, ol2e, nl2e, pfn, vcpu,
preserve_ad)) )
{
ol2e = nl2e;
- rc = 0;
+ rc = -EBUSY;
}
}
else if ( unlikely(!UPDATE_ENTRY(l2, pl2e, ol2e, nl2e, pfn, vcpu,
preserve_ad)) )
{
- return 0;
+ return -EBUSY;
}
put_page_from_l2e(ol2e, pfn);
@@ -3367,7 +3368,7 @@ int do_mmu_update(
void *va;
unsigned long gpfn, gmfn, mfn;
struct page_info *page;
- int rc = 0, okay = 1, i = 0;
+ int rc = 0, i = 0;
unsigned int cmd, done = 0, pt_dom;
struct vcpu *v = current;
struct domain *d = v->domain, *pt_owner = d, *pg_owner;
@@ -3434,7 +3435,6 @@ int do_mmu_update(
}
cmd = req.ptr & (sizeof(l1_pgentry_t)-1);
- okay = 0;
switch ( cmd )
{
@@ -3451,6 +3451,7 @@ int do_mmu_update(
rc = xsm_mmu_normal_update(d, pg_owner, req.val);
if ( rc )
break;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
req.ptr -= cmd;
gmfn = req.ptr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -3521,7 +3522,6 @@ int do_mmu_update(
rc = mod_l1_entry(va, l1e, mfn,
cmd == MMU_PT_UPDATE_PRESERVE_AD, v,
pg_owner);
- okay = !rc;
}
break;
case PGT_l2_page_table:
@@ -3545,13 +3545,12 @@ int do_mmu_update(
else if ( p2m_ram_shared == l2e_p2mt )
{
MEM_LOG("Unexpected attempt to map shared page.\n");
- rc = -EINVAL;
break;
}
- okay = mod_l2_entry(va, l2e, mfn,
- cmd == MMU_PT_UPDATE_PRESERVE_AD, v);
+ rc = mod_l2_entry(va, l2e, mfn,
+ cmd == MMU_PT_UPDATE_PRESERVE_AD, v);
}
break;
case PGT_l3_page_table:
@@ -3575,13 +3574,11 @@ int do_mmu_update(
else if ( p2m_ram_shared == l3e_p2mt )
{
MEM_LOG("Unexpected attempt to map shared page.\n");
- rc = -EINVAL;
break;
}
rc = mod_l3_entry(va, l3e, mfn,
cmd == MMU_PT_UPDATE_PRESERVE_AD, 1, v);
- okay = !rc;
}
break;
#if CONFIG_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
@@ -3607,20 +3604,18 @@ int do_mmu_update(
else if ( p2m_ram_shared == l4e_p2mt )
{
MEM_LOG("Unexpected attempt to map shared page.\n");
- rc = -EINVAL;
break;
}
rc = mod_l4_entry(va, l4e, mfn,
cmd == MMU_PT_UPDATE_PRESERVE_AD, 1, v);
- okay = !rc;
}
break;
#endif
case PGT_writable_page:
perfc_incr(writable_mmu_updates);
- okay = paging_write_guest_entry(
- v, va, req.val, _mfn(mfn));
+ if ( paging_write_guest_entry(v, va, req.val, _mfn(mfn)) )
+ rc = 0;
break;
}
page_unlock(page);
@@ -3630,8 +3625,8 @@ int do_mmu_update(
else if ( get_page_type(page, PGT_writable_page) )
{
perfc_incr(writable_mmu_updates);
- okay = paging_write_guest_entry(
- v, va, req.val, _mfn(mfn));
+ if ( paging_write_guest_entry(v, va, req.val, _mfn(mfn)) )
+ rc = 0;
put_page_type(page);
}
@@ -3652,17 +3647,18 @@ int do_mmu_update(
if ( unlikely(!get_page_from_pagenr(mfn, pg_owner)) )
{
MEM_LOG("Could not get page for mach->phys update");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if ( unlikely(paging_mode_translate(pg_owner)) )
{
MEM_LOG("Mach-phys update on auto-translate guest");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
break;
}
set_gpfn_from_mfn(mfn, gpfn);
- okay = 1;
paging_mark_dirty(pg_owner, mfn);
@@ -3672,15 +3668,11 @@ int do_mmu_update(
default:
MEM_LOG("Invalid page update command %x", cmd);
rc = -ENOSYS;
- okay = 0;
break;
}
- if ( unlikely(!okay) )
- {
- rc = rc ? rc : -EINVAL;
+ if ( unlikely(rc) )
break;
- }
guest_handle_add_offset(ureqs, 1);
}

93
23096-x86-hpet-no-cpumask_lock.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
# Date 1301043797 0
# Node ID a65612bcbb921e98a8843157bf365e4ab16e8144
# Parent 941119d58655f2b2df86d9ecc4cb502bbc5e783c
x86/hpet: eliminate cpumask_lock
According to the (now getting removed) comment in struct
hpet_event_channel, this was to prevent accessing a CPU's
timer_deadline after it got cleared from cpumask. This can be done
without a lock altogether - hpet_broadcast_exit() can simply clear
the bit, and handle_hpet_broadcast() can read timer_deadline before
looking at the mask a second time (the cpumask bit was already
found set by the surrounding loop).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Acked-by: Gang Wei <gang.wei@intel.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c
@@ -34,18 +34,6 @@ struct hpet_event_channel
int shift;
s_time_t next_event;
cpumask_t cpumask;
- /*
- * cpumask_lock is used to prevent hpet intr handler from accessing other
- * cpu's timer_deadline after the other cpu's mask was cleared --
- * mask cleared means cpu waken up, then accessing timer_deadline from
- * other cpu is not safe.
- * It is not used for protecting cpumask, so set ops needn't take it.
- * Multiple cpus clear cpumask simultaneously is ok due to the atomic
- * feature of cpu_clear, so hpet_broadcast_exit() can take read lock for
- * clearing cpumask, and handle_hpet_broadcast() have to take write lock
- * for read cpumask & access timer_deadline.
- */
- rwlock_t cpumask_lock;
spinlock_t lock;
void (*event_handler)(struct hpet_event_channel *);
@@ -208,17 +196,18 @@ again:
/* find all expired events */
for_each_cpu_mask(cpu, ch->cpumask)
{
- write_lock_irq(&ch->cpumask_lock);
+ s_time_t deadline;
- if ( cpu_isset(cpu, ch->cpumask) )
- {
- if ( per_cpu(timer_deadline, cpu) <= now )
- cpu_set(cpu, mask);
- else if ( per_cpu(timer_deadline, cpu) < next_event )
- next_event = per_cpu(timer_deadline, cpu);
- }
+ rmb();
+ deadline = per_cpu(timer_deadline, cpu);
+ rmb();
+ if ( !cpu_isset(cpu, ch->cpumask) )
+ continue;
- write_unlock_irq(&ch->cpumask_lock);
+ if ( deadline <= now )
+ cpu_set(cpu, mask);
+ else if ( deadline < next_event )
+ next_event = deadline;
}
/* wakeup the cpus which have an expired event. */
@@ -598,7 +587,6 @@ void hpet_broadcast_init(void)
hpet_events[i].shift = 32;
hpet_events[i].next_event = STIME_MAX;
spin_lock_init(&hpet_events[i].lock);
- rwlock_init(&hpet_events[i].cpumask_lock);
wmb();
hpet_events[i].event_handler = handle_hpet_broadcast;
}
@@ -634,7 +622,6 @@ void hpet_broadcast_init(void)
legacy_hpet_event.idx = 0;
legacy_hpet_event.flags = 0;
spin_lock_init(&legacy_hpet_event.lock);
- rwlock_init(&legacy_hpet_event.cpumask_lock);
wmb();
legacy_hpet_event.event_handler = handle_hpet_broadcast;
@@ -713,9 +700,7 @@ void hpet_broadcast_exit(void)
if ( !reprogram_timer(this_cpu(timer_deadline)) )
raise_softirq(TIMER_SOFTIRQ);
- read_lock_irq(&ch->cpumask_lock);
cpu_clear(cpu, ch->cpumask);
- read_unlock_irq(&ch->cpumask_lock);
if ( ch != &legacy_hpet_event )
{

290
23099-x86-rwlock-scalability.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1301126601 0
# Node ID 612171ff82ea51aaf65d98fd1a551eb8d50fb481
# Parent c9f745c153ec8c3775e2ee03adc3cb30370b84f6
rwlock: Allow to scale to 2^31-1 readers on x86.
Also rework to match the 'trylock' style of raw function used for
spinlocks.
Inspired by Jan Beulich's patch to do similar improved scaling.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1301214635 -3600
# Node ID 0bc1c4746c8939337f693a513fd837fc03477db1
# Parent 48dac730a93b27ff60a340564e9a7afd7f9385f4
x86_32: Fix _raw_read_trylock() build on some gcc versions.
Was broken by 23099:612171ff82ea.
A bool_t is a single byte, and needs a 'q' register constraint. Avoid
the whole issue by changing the variable to an int, and explicitly
specify the operand suffix as 'l' for good measure.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/common/spinlock.c
+++ b/xen/common/spinlock.c
@@ -234,7 +234,11 @@ void _spin_unlock_recursive(spinlock_t *
void _read_lock(rwlock_t *lock)
{
check_lock(&lock->debug);
- _raw_read_lock(&lock->raw);
+ while ( unlikely(!_raw_read_trylock(&lock->raw)) )
+ {
+ while ( likely(_raw_rw_is_write_locked(&lock->raw)) )
+ cpu_relax();
+ }
preempt_disable();
}
@@ -243,7 +247,13 @@ void _read_lock_irq(rwlock_t *lock)
ASSERT(local_irq_is_enabled());
local_irq_disable();
check_lock(&lock->debug);
- _raw_read_lock(&lock->raw);
+ while ( unlikely(!_raw_read_trylock(&lock->raw)) )
+ {
+ local_irq_enable();
+ while ( likely(_raw_rw_is_write_locked(&lock->raw)) )
+ cpu_relax();
+ local_irq_disable();
+ }
preempt_disable();
}
@@ -252,11 +262,26 @@ unsigned long _read_lock_irqsave(rwlock_
unsigned long flags;
local_irq_save(flags);
check_lock(&lock->debug);
- _raw_read_lock(&lock->raw);
+ while ( unlikely(!_raw_read_trylock(&lock->raw)) )
+ {
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+ while ( likely(_raw_rw_is_write_locked(&lock->raw)) )
+ cpu_relax();
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ }
preempt_disable();
return flags;
}
+int _read_trylock(rwlock_t *lock)
+{
+ check_lock(&lock->debug);
+ if ( !_raw_read_trylock(&lock->raw) )
+ return 0;
+ preempt_disable();
+ return 1;
+}
+
void _read_unlock(rwlock_t *lock)
{
preempt_enable();
@@ -280,7 +305,11 @@ void _read_unlock_irqrestore(rwlock_t *l
void _write_lock(rwlock_t *lock)
{
check_lock(&lock->debug);
- _raw_write_lock(&lock->raw);
+ while ( unlikely(!_raw_write_trylock(&lock->raw)) )
+ {
+ while ( likely(_raw_rw_is_locked(&lock->raw)) )
+ cpu_relax();
+ }
preempt_disable();
}
@@ -289,7 +318,13 @@ void _write_lock_irq(rwlock_t *lock)
ASSERT(local_irq_is_enabled());
local_irq_disable();
check_lock(&lock->debug);
- _raw_write_lock(&lock->raw);
+ while ( unlikely(!_raw_write_trylock(&lock->raw)) )
+ {
+ local_irq_enable();
+ while ( likely(_raw_rw_is_locked(&lock->raw)) )
+ cpu_relax();
+ local_irq_disable();
+ }
preempt_disable();
}
@@ -298,7 +333,13 @@ unsigned long _write_lock_irqsave(rwlock
unsigned long flags;
local_irq_save(flags);
check_lock(&lock->debug);
- _raw_write_lock(&lock->raw);
+ while ( unlikely(!_raw_write_trylock(&lock->raw)) )
+ {
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+ while ( likely(_raw_rw_is_locked(&lock->raw)) )
+ cpu_relax();
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ }
preempt_disable();
return flags;
}
--- a/xen/include/asm-ia64/linux-xen/asm/spinlock.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-ia64/linux-xen/asm/spinlock.h
@@ -35,17 +35,6 @@ typedef struct {
} raw_rwlock_t;
#define _RAW_RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED /*(raw_rwlock_t)*/ { 0, 0 }
-#define _raw_read_lock(rw) \
-do { \
- raw_rwlock_t *__read_lock_ptr = (rw); \
- \
- while (unlikely(ia64_fetchadd(1, (int *) __read_lock_ptr, acq) < 0)) { \
- ia64_fetchadd(-1, (int *) __read_lock_ptr, rel); \
- while (*(volatile int *)__read_lock_ptr < 0) \
- cpu_relax(); \
- } \
-} while (0)
-
#define _raw_read_unlock(rw) \
do { \
raw_rwlock_t *__read_lock_ptr = (rw); \
@@ -53,20 +42,6 @@ do { \
} while (0)
#ifdef ASM_SUPPORTED
-#define _raw_write_lock(rw) \
-do { \
- __asm__ __volatile__ ( \
- "mov ar.ccv = r0\n" \
- "dep r29 = -1, r0, 31, 1;;\n" \
- "1:\n" \
- "ld4 r2 = [%0];;\n" \
- "cmp4.eq p0,p7 = r0,r2\n" \
- "(p7) br.cond.spnt.few 1b \n" \
- "cmpxchg4.acq r2 = [%0], r29, ar.ccv;;\n" \
- "cmp4.eq p0,p7 = r0, r2\n" \
- "(p7) br.cond.spnt.few 1b;;\n" \
- :: "r"(rw) : "ar.ccv", "p7", "r2", "r29", "memory"); \
-} while(0)
#define _raw_write_trylock(rw) \
({ \
@@ -82,16 +57,6 @@ do { \
#else /* !ASM_SUPPORTED */
-#define _raw_write_lock(l) \
-({ \
- __u64 ia64_val, ia64_set_val = ia64_dep_mi(-1, 0, 31, 1); \
- __u32 *ia64_write_lock_ptr = (__u32 *) (l); \
- do { \
- while (*ia64_write_lock_ptr) \
- ia64_barrier(); \
- ia64_val = ia64_cmpxchg4_acq(ia64_write_lock_ptr, ia64_set_val, 0); \
- } while (ia64_val); \
-})
#define _raw_write_trylock(rw) \
({ \
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spinlock.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spinlock.h
@@ -35,51 +35,29 @@ typedef struct {
volatile int lock;
} raw_rwlock_t;
-#define RW_LOCK_BIAS 0x01000000
-#define _RAW_RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED /*(raw_rwlock_t)*/ { RW_LOCK_BIAS }
+#define RW_WRITE_BIAS 0x7fffffff
+#define _RAW_RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED /*(raw_rwlock_t)*/ { 0 }
-static always_inline void _raw_read_lock(raw_rwlock_t *rw)
+static always_inline int _raw_read_trylock(raw_rwlock_t *rw)
{
- asm volatile (
- "1: lock; decl %0 \n"
- " jns 3f \n"
- " lock; incl %0 \n"
- "2: rep; nop \n"
- " cmpl $1,%0 \n"
- " js 2b \n"
- " jmp 1b \n"
- "3:"
- : "=m" (rw->lock) : : "memory" );
-}
+ int acquired;
-static always_inline void _raw_write_lock(raw_rwlock_t *rw)
-{
asm volatile (
- "1: lock; subl %1,%0 \n"
- " jz 3f \n"
- " lock; addl %1,%0 \n"
- "2: rep; nop \n"
- " cmpl %1,%0 \n"
- " jne 2b \n"
+ " lock; decl %0 \n"
+ " jns 2f \n"
+ "1: .subsection 1 \n"
+ "2: lock; incl %0 \n"
+ " decl %1 \n"
" jmp 1b \n"
- "3:"
- : "=m" (rw->lock) : "i" (RW_LOCK_BIAS) : "memory" );
+ " .subsection 0 \n"
+ : "=m" (rw->lock), "=r" (acquired) : "1" (1) : "memory" );
+
+ return acquired;
}
static always_inline int _raw_write_trylock(raw_rwlock_t *rw)
{
- int rc;
-
- asm volatile (
- " lock; subl %2,%0 \n"
- " jz 1f \n"
- " lock; addl %2,%0 \n"
- " dec %1 \n"
- "1:"
- : "=m" (rw->lock), "=r" (rc) : "i" (RW_LOCK_BIAS), "1" (1)
- : "memory" );
-
- return rc;
+ return (cmpxchg(&rw->lock, 0, RW_WRITE_BIAS) == 0);
}
static always_inline void _raw_read_unlock(raw_rwlock_t *rw)
@@ -92,11 +70,11 @@ static always_inline void _raw_read_unlo
static always_inline void _raw_write_unlock(raw_rwlock_t *rw)
{
asm volatile (
- "lock ; addl %1,%0"
- : "=m" ((rw)->lock) : "i" (RW_LOCK_BIAS) : "memory" );
+ "lock ; subl %1,%0"
+ : "=m" ((rw)->lock) : "i" (RW_WRITE_BIAS) : "memory" );
}
-#define _raw_rw_is_locked(x) ((x)->lock < RW_LOCK_BIAS)
-#define _raw_rw_is_write_locked(x) ((x)->lock <= 0)
+#define _raw_rw_is_locked(x) ((x)->lock != 0)
+#define _raw_rw_is_write_locked(x) ((x)->lock > 0)
#endif /* __ASM_SPINLOCK_H */
--- a/xen/include/xen/spinlock.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/spinlock.h
@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ unsigned long _read_lock_irqsave(rwlock_
void _read_unlock(rwlock_t *lock);
void _read_unlock_irq(rwlock_t *lock);
void _read_unlock_irqrestore(rwlock_t *lock, unsigned long flags);
+int _read_trylock(rwlock_t *lock);
void _write_lock(rwlock_t *lock);
void _write_lock_irq(rwlock_t *lock);
@@ -210,6 +211,7 @@ int _rw_is_write_locked(rwlock_t *lock);
#define read_unlock(l) _read_unlock(l)
#define read_unlock_irq(l) _read_unlock_irq(l)
#define read_unlock_irqrestore(l, f) _read_unlock_irqrestore(l, f)
+#define read_trylock(l) _read_trylock(l)
#define write_lock(l) _write_lock(l)
#define write_lock_irq(l) _write_lock_irq(l)

25
23103-x86-pirq-guest-eoi-check.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1301132521 0
# Node ID 48dac730a93b27ff60a340564e9a7afd7f9385f4
# Parent 8f001d864fefac689b7662bc9979eaddf4fd6e9c
x86: __pirq_guest_eoi() must check it is called for a fully
guest-bound irq before accessing desc->action.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
@@ -1022,6 +1022,12 @@ static void __pirq_guest_eoi(struct doma
if ( desc == NULL )
return;
+ if ( !(desc->status & IRQ_GUEST) )
+ {
+ spin_unlock_irq(&desc->lock);
+ return;
+ }
+
action = (irq_guest_action_t *)desc->action;
irq = desc - irq_desc;

194
23127-vtd-bios-settings.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Allen Kay <allen.m.kay@intel.com>
# Date 1301755765 -3600
# Node ID 1046830079376a4b29fcad0cd037a834e808ed06
# Parent 89c23f58aa986092da0c9a7dfac1c41befbe1f3f
[VTD] check BIOS settings before enabling interrupt remapping or x2apic
Check flags field in ACPI DMAR structure before enabling interrupt
remapping or x2apic. This allows platform vendors to disable
interrupt remapping or x2apic features if on board BIOS does not
support them.
Signed-off-by: Allen Kay <allen.m.kay@intel.com>
# HG changeset patch
# User Allen Kay <allen.m.kay@intel.com>
# Date 1302077462 -3600
# Node ID c7916d6f4dfba9d6c7eeb0fc2796068d75e2fb4a
# Parent 42fa70e0761bbb0596618ca5323664f31a2faa76
[VTD] Fixes to ACPI DMAR flag checks.
* platform_supports_{intremap,x2apic} should not be marked __init as
they are used during S3 resume.
* DMAR flags should be taken from the table passed to
acpi_parse_dmar() -- this is the trusted copy of the DMAR, when
running in TXT mode.
Signed-off-by: Allen Kay <allen.m.kay@intel.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/apic.c
@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ static void resume_x2apic(void)
mask_8259A();
mask_IO_APIC_setup(ioapic_entries);
- iommu_enable_IR();
+ iommu_enable_x2apic_IR();
__enable_x2apic();
restore_IO_APIC_setup(ioapic_entries);
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ int lapic_suspend(void)
local_irq_save(flags);
disable_local_APIC();
- iommu_disable_IR();
+ iommu_disable_x2apic_IR();
local_irq_restore(flags);
return 0;
}
@@ -997,7 +997,7 @@ void __init x2apic_bsp_setup(void)
mask_8259A();
mask_IO_APIC_setup(ioapic_entries);
- if ( iommu_enable_IR() )
+ if ( iommu_enable_x2apic_IR() )
{
if ( x2apic_enabled )
panic("Interrupt remapping could not be enabled while "
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/dmar.c
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ LIST_HEAD(acpi_rmrr_units);
LIST_HEAD(acpi_atsr_units);
LIST_HEAD(acpi_rhsa_units);
+static int __read_mostly dmar_flags;
static u64 igd_drhd_address;
u8 dmar_host_address_width;
@@ -682,6 +683,7 @@ static int __init acpi_parse_dmar(struct
int ret = 0;
dmar = (struct acpi_table_dmar *)table;
+ dmar_flags = dmar->flags;
if ( !iommu_enabled )
{
@@ -802,3 +804,22 @@ void acpi_dmar_zap(void)
dmar_table->signature[0] = 'X';
dmar_table->checksum -= 'X'-'D';
}
+
+int platform_supports_intremap(void)
+{
+ unsigned int flags = 0;
+
+ flags = DMAR_INTR_REMAP;
+ return ((dmar_flags & flags) == DMAR_INTR_REMAP);
+}
+
+int platform_supports_x2apic(void)
+{
+ unsigned int flags = 0;
+
+ if (!cpu_has_x2apic)
+ return 0;
+
+ flags = DMAR_INTR_REMAP | DMAR_X2APIC_OPT_OUT;
+ return ((dmar_flags & flags) == DMAR_INTR_REMAP);
+}
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h
@@ -87,5 +87,7 @@ void vtd_ops_preamble_quirk(struct iommu
void vtd_ops_postamble_quirk(struct iommu* iommu);
void me_wifi_quirk(struct domain *domain, u8 bus, u8 devfn, int map);
void pci_vtd_quirk(struct pci_dev *pdev);
+int platform_supports_intremap(void);
+int platform_supports_x2apic(void);
#endif // _VTD_EXTERN_H_
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
@@ -735,6 +735,13 @@ int enable_intremap(struct iommu *iommu,
ASSERT(ecap_intr_remap(iommu->ecap) && iommu_intremap);
+ if ( !platform_supports_intremap() )
+ {
+ dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX,
+ "Platform firmware does not support interrupt remapping\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
ir_ctrl = iommu_ir_ctrl(iommu);
sts = dmar_readl(iommu->reg, DMAR_GSTS_REG);
@@ -821,10 +828,10 @@ out:
}
/*
- * This function is used to enable Interrutp remapping when
+ * This function is used to enable Interrupt remapping when
* enable x2apic
*/
-int iommu_enable_IR(void)
+int iommu_enable_x2apic_IR(void)
{
struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd;
struct iommu *iommu;
@@ -832,6 +839,9 @@ int iommu_enable_IR(void)
if ( !iommu_supports_eim() )
return -1;
+ if ( !platform_supports_x2apic() )
+ return -1;
+
for_each_drhd_unit ( drhd )
{
struct qi_ctrl *qi_ctrl = NULL;
@@ -881,7 +891,7 @@ int iommu_enable_IR(void)
* This function is used to disable Interrutp remapping when
* suspend local apic
*/
-void iommu_disable_IR(void)
+void iommu_disable_x2apic_IR(void)
{
struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd;
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -2014,7 +2014,7 @@ static int init_vtd_hw(void)
if ( enable_intremap(iommu, 0) != 0 )
{
dprintk(XENLOG_WARNING VTDPREFIX,
- "Failed to enable Interrupt Remapping!\n");
+ "Interrupt Remapping not enabled\n");
break;
}
}
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.h
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.h
@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@
#include <xen/types.h>
+/* DMAR Flags bits */
+#define DMAR_INTR_REMAP 0x1
+#define DMAR_X2APIC_OPT_OUT 0x2
+
/*
* Intel IOMMU register specification per version 1.0 public spec.
*/
--- a/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/iommu.h
@@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ struct iommu {
int iommu_setup(void);
int iommu_supports_eim(void);
-int iommu_enable_IR(void);
-void iommu_disable_IR(void);
+int iommu_enable_x2apic_IR(void);
+void iommu_disable_x2apic_IR(void);
int iommu_add_device(struct pci_dev *pdev);
int iommu_remove_device(struct pci_dev *pdev);

57
23153-x86-amd-clear-DramModEn.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com>
# Date 1302076891 -3600
# Node ID 8fb61c9ebe499b576687907d164da07802414925
# Parent 97763efc41f9b664cf6f7db653c9c3f51e50b358
x86, amd, MTRR: correct DramModEn bit of SYS_CFG MSR
Some buggy BIOS might set SYS_CFG DramModEn bit to 1, which can cause
unexpected behavior on AMD platforms. This patch clears DramModEn bit
if it is 1.
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
@@ -318,6 +318,32 @@ static void check_disable_c1e(unsigned i
on_each_cpu(disable_c1e, NULL, 1);
}
+/*
+ * BIOS is expected to clear MtrrFixDramModEn bit. According to AMD BKDG :
+ * "The MtrrFixDramModEn bit should be set to 1 during BIOS initalization of
+ * the fixed MTRRs, then cleared to 0 for operation."
+ */
+static void check_syscfg_dram_mod_en(void)
+{
+ uint64_t syscfg;
+ static bool_t printed = 0;
+
+ if (!((boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) &&
+ (boot_cpu_data.x86 >= 0x0f)))
+ return;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, syscfg);
+ if (!(syscfg & K8_MTRRFIXRANGE_DRAM_MODIFY))
+ return;
+
+ if (!test_and_set_bool(printed))
+ printk(KERN_ERR "MTRR: SYSCFG[MtrrFixDramModEn] not "
+ "cleared by BIOS, clearing this bit\n");
+
+ syscfg &= ~K8_MTRRFIXRANGE_DRAM_MODIFY;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, syscfg);
+}
+
static void __devinit init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u32 l, h;
@@ -587,6 +613,8 @@ static void __devinit init_amd(struct cp
disable_c1_ramping();
set_cpuidmask(c);
+
+ check_syscfg_dram_mod_en();
}
static unsigned int __cpuinit amd_size_cache(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c, unsigned int size)

51
23154-x86-amd-iorr-no-rdwr.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com>
# Date 1302076933 -3600
# Node ID 42fa70e0761bbb0596618ca5323664f31a2faa76
# Parent 8fb61c9ebe499b576687907d164da07802414925
x86, amd, MTRR: remove k8_enable_fixed_iorrs()
AMD64 defines two special bits (bit 3 and 4) RdMem and WrMem in fixed
MTRR type. Their values are supposed to be 0 after BIOS hands the
control to OS according to AMD BKDG. Unless OS specificially turn them
on, they are kept 0 all the time. As a result, k8_enable_fixed_iorrs()
is unnecessary and removed from upstream kernel (see
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11425/). This patch does the same
thing.
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
@@ -116,20 +116,6 @@ void mtrr_wrmsr(unsigned int msr, uint64
}
/**
- * Enable and allow read/write of extended fixed-range MTRR bits on K8 CPUs
- * see AMD publication no. 24593, chapter 3.2.1 for more information
- */
-static inline void k8_enable_fixed_iorrs(void)
-{
- uint64_t msr_content;
-
- rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, msr_content);
- mtrr_wrmsr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, msr_content
- | K8_MTRRFIXRANGE_DRAM_ENABLE
- | K8_MTRRFIXRANGE_DRAM_MODIFY);
-}
-
-/**
* Checks and updates an fixed-range MTRR if it differs from the value it
* should have. If K8 extenstions are wanted, update the K8 SYSCFG MSR also.
* see AMD publication no. 24593, chapter 7.8.1, page 233 for more information
@@ -145,10 +131,6 @@ static void set_fixed_range(int msr, int
val = ((uint64_t)msrwords[1] << 32) | msrwords[0];
if (msr_content != val) {
- if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
- boot_cpu_data.x86 == 15 &&
- ((msrwords[0] | msrwords[1]) & K8_MTRR_RDMEM_WRMEM_MASK))
- k8_enable_fixed_iorrs();
mtrr_wrmsr(msr, val);
*changed = TRUE;
}

25
23199-amd-iommu-unmapped-intr-fault.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Wei Wang <wei.wang2@amd.com>
# Date 1302610857 -3600
# Node ID dbd98ab2f87facba8117bb881fa2ea5dfdb92960
# Parent 697ac895c11c6d5d82524de56796cee98fded2a5
amd iommu: Unmapped interrupt should generate IO page faults.
This helps us to debug interrupt issues.
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.wang2@amd.com>
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_map.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_map.c
@@ -327,8 +327,9 @@ void amd_iommu_set_intremap_table(u32 *d
set_field_in_reg_u32(0xB, entry,
IOMMU_DEV_TABLE_INT_TABLE_LENGTH_MASK,
IOMMU_DEV_TABLE_INT_TABLE_LENGTH_SHIFT, &entry);
- /* ignore unmapped interrupts */
- set_field_in_reg_u32(IOMMU_CONTROL_ENABLED, entry,
+
+ /* unmapped interrupt results io page faults*/
+ set_field_in_reg_u32(IOMMU_CONTROL_DISABLED, entry,
IOMMU_DEV_TABLE_INT_TABLE_IGN_UNMAPPED_MASK,
IOMMU_DEV_TABLE_INT_TABLE_IGN_UNMAPPED_SHIFT, &entry);
set_field_in_reg_u32(int_valid ? IOMMU_CONTROL_ENABLED :

179
23200-amd-iommu-intremap-sync.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
References: bnc#680824
# HG changeset patch
# User Wei Wang <wei.wang2@amd.com>
# Date 1302611179 -3600
# Node ID 995a0c01a076e9c4fb124c090bc146a10d76bc7b
# Parent dbd98ab2f87facba8117bb881fa2ea5dfdb92960
AMD IOMMU: Fix an interrupt remapping issue
Some device could generate bogus interrupts if an IO-APIC RTE and an
iommu interrupt remapping entry are not consistent during 2 adjacent
64bits IO-APIC RTE updates. For example, if the 2nd operation updates
destination bits in RTE for SATA device and unmask it, in some case,
SATA device will assert ioapic pin to generate interrupt immediately
using new destination but iommu could still translate it into the old
destination, then dom0 would be confused. To fix that, we sync up
interrupt remapping entry with IO-APIC IRE on every 32 bits operation
and forward IOAPIC RTE updates after interrupt.
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.wang2@amd.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_intr.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_intr.c
@@ -117,8 +117,7 @@ void invalidate_interrupt_table(struct a
static void update_intremap_entry_from_ioapic(
int bdf,
struct amd_iommu *iommu,
- struct IO_APIC_route_entry *ioapic_rte,
- unsigned int rte_upper, unsigned int value)
+ struct IO_APIC_route_entry *ioapic_rte)
{
unsigned long flags;
u32* entry;
@@ -130,28 +129,26 @@ static void update_intremap_entry_from_i
req_id = get_intremap_requestor_id(bdf);
lock = get_intremap_lock(req_id);
- /* only remap interrupt vector when lower 32 bits in ioapic ire changed */
- if ( likely(!rte_upper) )
- {
- delivery_mode = rte->delivery_mode;
- vector = rte->vector;
- dest_mode = rte->dest_mode;
- dest = rte->dest.logical.logical_dest;
- spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flags);
- offset = get_intremap_offset(vector, delivery_mode);
- entry = (u32*)get_intremap_entry(req_id, offset);
+ delivery_mode = rte->delivery_mode;
+ vector = rte->vector;
+ dest_mode = rte->dest_mode;
+ dest = rte->dest.logical.logical_dest;
- update_intremap_entry(entry, vector, delivery_mode, dest_mode, dest);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flags);
- if ( iommu->enabled )
- {
- spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->lock, flags);
- invalidate_interrupt_table(iommu, req_id);
- flush_command_buffer(iommu);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&iommu->lock, flags);
- }
+ offset = get_intremap_offset(vector, delivery_mode);
+ entry = (u32*)get_intremap_entry(req_id, offset);
+ update_intremap_entry(entry, vector, delivery_mode, dest_mode, dest);
+
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
+
+ if ( iommu->enabled )
+ {
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->lock, flags);
+ invalidate_interrupt_table(iommu, req_id);
+ flush_command_buffer(iommu);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&iommu->lock, flags);
}
}
@@ -199,7 +196,8 @@ int __init amd_iommu_setup_ioapic_remapp
spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flags);
offset = get_intremap_offset(vector, delivery_mode);
entry = (u32*)get_intremap_entry(req_id, offset);
- update_intremap_entry(entry, vector, delivery_mode, dest_mode, dest);
+ update_intremap_entry(entry, vector,
+ delivery_mode, dest_mode, dest);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
if ( iommu->enabled )
@@ -217,16 +215,17 @@ int __init amd_iommu_setup_ioapic_remapp
void amd_iommu_ioapic_update_ire(
unsigned int apic, unsigned int reg, unsigned int value)
{
- struct IO_APIC_route_entry ioapic_rte = { 0 };
- unsigned int rte_upper = (reg & 1) ? 1 : 0;
+ struct IO_APIC_route_entry old_rte = { 0 };
+ struct IO_APIC_route_entry new_rte = { 0 };
+ unsigned int rte_lo = (reg & 1) ? reg - 1 : reg;
int saved_mask, bdf;
struct amd_iommu *iommu;
- *IO_APIC_BASE(apic) = reg;
- *(IO_APIC_BASE(apic)+4) = value;
-
if ( !iommu_intremap )
+ {
+ __io_apic_write(apic, reg, value);
return;
+ }
/* get device id of ioapic devices */
bdf = ioapic_bdf[IO_APIC_ID(apic)];
@@ -235,30 +234,49 @@ void amd_iommu_ioapic_update_ire(
{
AMD_IOMMU_DEBUG("Fail to find iommu for ioapic device id = 0x%x\n",
bdf);
+ __io_apic_write(apic, reg, value);
return;
}
- if ( rte_upper )
- return;
- /* read both lower and upper 32-bits of rte entry */
- *IO_APIC_BASE(apic) = reg;
- *(((u32 *)&ioapic_rte) + 0) = *(IO_APIC_BASE(apic)+4);
- *IO_APIC_BASE(apic) = reg + 1;
- *(((u32 *)&ioapic_rte) + 1) = *(IO_APIC_BASE(apic)+4);
+ /* save io-apic rte lower 32 bits */
+ *((u32 *)&old_rte) = __io_apic_read(apic, rte_lo);
+ saved_mask = old_rte.mask;
+
+ if ( reg == rte_lo )
+ {
+ *((u32 *)&new_rte) = value;
+ /* read upper 32 bits from io-apic rte */
+ *(((u32 *)&new_rte) + 1) = __io_apic_read(apic, reg + 1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ *((u32 *)&new_rte) = *((u32 *)&old_rte);
+ *(((u32 *)&new_rte) + 1) = value;
+ }
/* mask the interrupt while we change the intremap table */
- saved_mask = ioapic_rte.mask;
- ioapic_rte.mask = 1;
- *IO_APIC_BASE(apic) = reg;
- *(IO_APIC_BASE(apic)+4) = *(((int *)&ioapic_rte)+0);
- ioapic_rte.mask = saved_mask;
+ if ( !saved_mask )
+ {
+ old_rte.mask = 1;
+ __io_apic_write(apic, rte_lo, *((u32 *)&old_rte));
+ }
- update_intremap_entry_from_ioapic(
- bdf, iommu, &ioapic_rte, rte_upper, value);
+ /* Update interrupt remapping entry */
+ update_intremap_entry_from_ioapic(bdf, iommu, &new_rte);
+
+ /* Forward write access to IO-APIC RTE */
+ __io_apic_write(apic, reg, value);
+
+ /* For lower bits access, return directly to avoid double writes */
+ if ( reg == rte_lo )
+ return;
/* unmask the interrupt after we have updated the intremap table */
- *IO_APIC_BASE(apic) = reg;
- *(IO_APIC_BASE(apic)+4) = *(((u32 *)&ioapic_rte)+0);
+ if ( !saved_mask )
+ {
+ old_rte.mask = saved_mask;
+ __io_apic_write(apic, rte_lo, *((u32 *)&old_rte));
+ }
}
static void update_intremap_entry_from_msi_msg(

220
23228-x86-conditional-write_tsc.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
References: bnc#623680
# HG changeset patch
# User Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
# Date 1302853928 -3600
# Node ID 1329d99b4f161b7617a667f601077cc92559f248
# Parent b5165fb66b56d9438d77b475eaa9db67318d1ea1
x86: don't write_tsc() non-zero values on CPUs updating only the lower 32 bits
This means suppressing the uses in time_calibration_tsc_rendezvous(),
cstate_restore_tsc(), and synchronize_tsc_slave(), and fixes a boot
hang of Linux Dom0 when loading processor.ko on such systems that
have support for C states above C1.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c
@@ -1099,3 +1099,7 @@ void cpuidle_disable_deep_cstate(void)
hpet_disable_legacy_broadcast();
}
+bool_t cpuidle_using_deep_cstate(void)
+{
+ return xen_cpuidle && max_cstate > (local_apic_timer_c2_ok ? 2 : 1);
+}
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hpet.c
@@ -634,6 +634,9 @@ void hpet_disable_legacy_broadcast(void)
u32 cfg;
unsigned long flags;
+ if ( !legacy_hpet_event.shift )
+ return;
+
spin_lock_irqsave(&legacy_hpet_event.lock, flags);
legacy_hpet_event.flags |= HPET_EVT_DISABLE;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
#include <asm/flushtlb.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/mtrr.h>
+#include <asm/time.h>
#include <mach_apic.h>
#include <mach_wakecpu.h>
#include <smpboot_hooks.h>
@@ -134,6 +135,12 @@ static void smp_store_cpu_info(int id)
;
}
+/*
+ * TSC's upper 32 bits can't be written in earlier CPUs (before
+ * Prescott), there is no way to resync one AP against BP.
+ */
+bool_t disable_tsc_sync;
+
static atomic_t tsc_count;
static uint64_t tsc_value;
static cpumask_t tsc_sync_cpu_mask;
@@ -142,6 +149,9 @@ static void synchronize_tsc_master(unsig
{
unsigned int i;
+ if ( disable_tsc_sync )
+ return;
+
if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE) &&
!cpu_isset(slave, tsc_sync_cpu_mask) )
return;
@@ -163,6 +173,9 @@ static void synchronize_tsc_slave(unsign
{
unsigned int i;
+ if ( disable_tsc_sync )
+ return;
+
if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE) &&
!cpu_isset(slave, tsc_sync_cpu_mask) )
return;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/time.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/time.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <xen/smp.h>
#include <xen/irq.h>
#include <xen/softirq.h>
+#include <xen/cpuidle.h>
#include <xen/keyhandler.h>
#include <xen/guest_access.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
@@ -682,6 +683,8 @@ void cstate_restore_tsc(void)
if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC) )
return;
+ ASSERT(boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE));
+
write_tsc(stime2tsc(read_platform_stime()));
}
@@ -1384,6 +1387,66 @@ void init_percpu_time(void)
}
}
+/*
+ * On certain older Intel CPUs writing the TSC MSR clears the upper 32 bits.
+ * Obviously we must not use write_tsc() on such CPUs.
+ *
+ * Additionally, AMD specifies that being able to write the TSC MSR is not an
+ * architectural feature (but, other than their manual says, also cannot be
+ * determined from CPUID bits).
+ */
+static void __init tsc_check_writability(void)
+{
+ const char *what = NULL;
+ uint64_t tsc;
+
+ /*
+ * If all CPUs are reported as synchronised and in sync, we never write
+ * the TSCs (except unavoidably, when a CPU is physically hot-plugged).
+ * Hence testing for writability is pointless and even harmful.
+ */
+ if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE) )
+ return;
+
+ rdtscll(tsc);
+ if ( wrmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_TSC, 0) == 0 )
+ {
+ uint64_t tmp, tmp2;
+ rdtscll(tmp2);
+ write_tsc(tsc | (1ULL << 32));
+ rdtscll(tmp);
+ if ( ABS((s64)tmp - (s64)tmp2) < (1LL << 31) )
+ what = "only partially";
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ what = "not";
+ }
+
+ /* Nothing to do if the TSC is fully writable. */
+ if ( !what )
+ {
+ /*
+ * Paranoia - write back original TSC value. However, APs get synced
+ * with BSP as they are brought up, so this doesn't much matter.
+ */
+ write_tsc(tsc);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ printk(XENLOG_WARNING "TSC %s writable\n", what);
+
+ /* time_calibration_tsc_rendezvous() must not be used */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC);
+
+ /* cstate_restore_tsc() must not be used (or do nothing) */
+ if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC) )
+ cpuidle_disable_deep_cstate();
+
+ /* synchronize_tsc_slave() must do nothing */
+ disable_tsc_sync = 1;
+}
+
/* Late init function (after all CPUs are booted). */
int __init init_xen_time(void)
{
@@ -1400,6 +1463,8 @@ int __init init_xen_time(void)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);
}
+ tsc_check_writability();
+
/* If we have constant-rate TSCs then scale factor can be shared. */
if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC) )
{
@@ -1451,7 +1516,7 @@ static int disable_pit_irq(void)
* XXX dom0 may rely on RTC interrupt delivery, so only enable
* hpet_broadcast if FSB mode available or if force_hpet_broadcast.
*/
- if ( xen_cpuidle && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARAT) )
+ if ( cpuidle_using_deep_cstate() && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARAT) )
{
hpet_broadcast_init();
if ( !hpet_broadcast_is_available() )
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/setup.h
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
#include <xen/multiboot.h>
extern bool_t early_boot;
-extern s8 xen_cpuidle;
extern unsigned long xenheap_initial_phys_start;
void init_done(void);
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/time.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/time.h
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
typedef u64 cycles_t;
+extern bool_t disable_tsc_sync;
+
static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
{
cycles_t c;
--- a/xen/include/xen/cpuidle.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/cpuidle.h
@@ -85,7 +85,10 @@ struct cpuidle_governor
void (*reflect) (struct acpi_processor_power *dev);
};
+extern s8 xen_cpuidle;
extern struct cpuidle_governor *cpuidle_current_governor;
+
+bool_t cpuidle_using_deep_cstate(void);
void cpuidle_disable_deep_cstate(void);
extern void cpuidle_wakeup_mwait(cpumask_t *mask);

2
32on64-extra-mem.patch
View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Index: xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
===================================================================
--- xen-4.1.0-testing.orig/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
+++ xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
@@ -2912,7 +2912,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
@@ -2913,7 +2913,7 @@ class XendDomainInfo:
self.guest_bitsize = self.image.getBitSize()
# Make sure there's enough RAM available for the domain

2
bdrv_open2_flags_2.patch
View File

@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ Index: xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
pstrcpy(bs->filename, sizeof(bs->filename), params);
}
#else
@@ -710,7 +723,7 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv
@@ -716,7 +729,7 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv
fprintf(stderr, "Using file %s in read-%s mode\n", bs->filename, is_readonly ? "only" : "write");

217
cve-2011-1583-4.1.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
diff -r dbf2ddf652dc tools/libxc/xc_dom_bzimageloader.c
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_bzimageloader.c Thu Apr 07 15:26:58 2011 +0100
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_bzimageloader.c Thu Apr 21 12:05:57 2011 +0100
@@ -82,8 +82,29 @@ static int xc_try_bzip2_decode(
for ( ; ; )
{
ret = BZ2_bzDecompress(&stream);
- if ( (stream.avail_out == 0) || (ret != BZ_OK) )
+ if ( ret == BZ_STREAM_END )
{
+ DOMPRINTF("BZIP2: Saw data stream end");
+ retval = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ( ret != BZ_OK )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("BZIP2: error %d", ret);
+ free(out_buf);
+ goto bzip2_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ( stream.avail_out == 0 )
+ {
+ /* Protect against output buffer overflow */
+ if ( outsize > INT_MAX / 2 )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("BZIP2: output buffer overflow");
+ free(out_buf);
+ goto bzip2_cleanup;
+ }
+
tmp_buf = realloc(out_buf, outsize * 2);
if ( tmp_buf == NULL )
{
@@ -97,16 +118,18 @@ static int xc_try_bzip2_decode(
stream.avail_out = (outsize * 2) - outsize;
outsize *= 2;
}
-
- if ( ret != BZ_OK )
+ else if ( stream.avail_in == 0 )
{
- if ( ret == BZ_STREAM_END )
- {
- DOMPRINTF("BZIP2: Saw data stream end");
- retval = 0;
- break;
- }
- DOMPRINTF("BZIP2: error");
+ /*
+ * If there is output buffer available then this indicates
+ * that BZ2_bzDecompress would like more input data to be
+ * provided. However our complete input buffer is in
+ * memory and provided upfront so if avail_in is zero this
+ * actually indicates a truncated input.
+ */
+ DOMPRINTF("BZIP2: not enough input");
+ free(out_buf);
+ goto bzip2_cleanup;
}
}
@@ -180,31 +203,14 @@ static int xc_try_lzma_decode(
for ( ; ; )
{
ret = lzma_code(&stream, action);
- if ( (stream.avail_out == 0) || (ret != LZMA_OK) )
+ if ( ret == LZMA_STREAM_END )
{
- tmp_buf = realloc(out_buf, outsize * 2);
- if ( tmp_buf == NULL )
- {
- DOMPRINTF("LZMA: Failed to realloc memory");
- free(out_buf);
- goto lzma_cleanup;
- }
- out_buf = tmp_buf;
-
- stream.next_out = out_buf + outsize;
- stream.avail_out = (outsize * 2) - outsize;
- outsize *= 2;
+ DOMPRINTF("LZMA: Saw data stream end");
+ retval = 0;
+ break;
}
-
if ( ret != LZMA_OK )
{
- if ( ret == LZMA_STREAM_END )
- {
- DOMPRINTF("LZMA: Saw data stream end");
- retval = 0;
- break;
- }
-
switch ( ret )
{
case LZMA_MEM_ERROR:
@@ -238,7 +244,32 @@ static int xc_try_lzma_decode(
}
DOMPRINTF("%s: LZMA decompression error %s",
__FUNCTION__, msg);
- break;
+ free(out_buf);
+ goto lzma_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ( stream.avail_out == 0 )
+ {
+ /* Protect against output buffer overflow */
+ if ( outsize > INT_MAX / 2 )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("LZMA: output buffer overflow");
+ free(out_buf);
+ goto lzma_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ tmp_buf = realloc(out_buf, outsize * 2);
+ if ( tmp_buf == NULL )
+ {
+ DOMPRINTF("LZMA: Failed to realloc memory");
+ free(out_buf);
+ goto lzma_cleanup;
+ }
+ out_buf = tmp_buf;
+
+ stream.next_out = out_buf + outsize;
+ stream.avail_out = (outsize * 2) - outsize;
+ outsize *= 2;
}
}
@@ -489,18 +520,18 @@ struct setup_header {
extern struct xc_dom_loader elf_loader;
-static unsigned int payload_offset(struct setup_header *hdr)
+static int check_magic(struct xc_dom_image *dom, const void *magic, size_t len)
{
- unsigned int off;
+ if (len > dom->kernel_size)
+ return 0;
- off = (hdr->setup_sects + 1) * 512;
- off += hdr->payload_offset;
- return off;
+ return (memcmp(dom->kernel_blob, magic, len) == 0);
}
static int xc_dom_probe_bzimage_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
{
struct setup_header *hdr;
+ uint64_t payload_offset, payload_length;
int ret;
if ( dom->kernel_blob == NULL )
@@ -533,10 +564,30 @@ static int xc_dom_probe_bzimage_kernel(s
return -EINVAL;
}
- dom->kernel_blob = dom->kernel_blob + payload_offset(hdr);
- dom->kernel_size = hdr->payload_length;
- if ( memcmp(dom->kernel_blob, "\037\213", 2) == 0 )
+ /* upcast to 64 bits to avoid overflow */
+ /* setup_sects is u8 and so cannot overflow */
+ payload_offset = (hdr->setup_sects + 1) * 512;
+ payload_offset += hdr->payload_offset;
+ payload_length = hdr->payload_length;
+
+ if ( payload_offset >= dom->kernel_size )
+ {
+ xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_INVALID_KERNEL, "%s: payload offset overflow",
+ __FUNCTION__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if ( (payload_offset + payload_length) > dom->kernel_size )
+ {
+ xc_dom_panic(dom->xch, XC_INVALID_KERNEL, "%s: payload length overflow",
+ __FUNCTION__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ dom->kernel_blob = dom->kernel_blob + payload_offset;
+ dom->kernel_size = payload_length;
+
+ if ( check_magic(dom, "\037\213", 2) )
{
ret = xc_dom_try_gunzip(dom, &dom->kernel_blob, &dom->kernel_size);
if ( ret == -1 )
@@ -546,7 +597,7 @@ static int xc_dom_probe_bzimage_kernel(s
return -EINVAL;
}
}
- else if ( memcmp(dom->kernel_blob, "\102\132\150", 3) == 0 )
+ else if ( check_magic(dom, "\102\132\150", 3) )
{
ret = xc_try_bzip2_decode(dom, &dom->kernel_blob, &dom->kernel_size);
if ( ret < 0 )
@@ -557,7 +608,7 @@ static int xc_dom_probe_bzimage_kernel(s
return -EINVAL;
}
}
- else if ( memcmp(dom->kernel_blob, "\135\000", 2) == 0 )
+ else if ( check_magic(dom, "\135\000", 2) )
{
ret = xc_try_lzma_decode(dom, &dom->kernel_blob, &dom->kernel_size);
if ( ret < 0 )
@@ -568,7 +619,7 @@ static int xc_dom_probe_bzimage_kernel(s
return -EINVAL;
}
}
- else if ( memcmp(dom->kernel_blob, "\x89LZO", 5) == 0 )
+ else if ( check_magic(dom, "\x89LZO", 5) )
{
ret = xc_try_lzo1x_decode(dom, &dom->kernel_blob, &dom->kernel_size);
if ( ret < 0 )

34
hotplug.losetup.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
Improve busy loop device detection after changeset 22773:02c0af2bf280
The intention is not to find the file to be mounted in the losetup -a
output. What matters are existing mounted files with the same dev:inode
as the new file. So the fix is to apply variable expansion which
happens only without double quotes. Otherwise $dev will contain
newlines for hardlinked files, as mentioned in the commit message from
the changeset above.
losetup -a does also truncate long filenames to 62 chars due to ioctl
limitations. This part is fixed with 2.6.37 where the filename can be
obtained from sysfs. As a result very long filenames will be missed.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
---
tools/hotplug/Linux/block | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Index: xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/block
===================================================================
--- xen-4.1.0-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/block
+++ xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/block
@@ -280,8 +280,8 @@ mount it read-write in a guest domain."
fi
shared_list=$(losetup -a |
- sed -n -e "s@^\([^:]\+\)\(:[[:blank:]]\[${dev}\]:${inode}[[:blank:]](${file})\)@\1@p" )
- for dev in "$shared_list"
+ sed -n -e "s@^\([^:]\+\)\(:[[:blank:]]\[${dev}\]:${inode}[[:blank:]](.*)\)@\1@p" )
+ for dev in $shared_list
do
if [ -n "$dev" ]
then

13
init.xend
View File

@ -81,19 +81,6 @@ case "$1" in
else
cleanup
fi
# Load XEN backend modules
# Sidenote: They could be loaded later:
# - netbk and blkbk when the dom0 hotplug events occur
# (in xen-network-common.sh and block-common.sh)
# - xenblk when xend prepares for bootloader
# but for now it's safest to have them loaded when xend starts in dom0.
modprobe evtchn 2>/dev/null || true
modprobe blktap 2>/dev/null || true
modprobe blkbk 2>/dev/null || true
modprobe xenblk 2>/dev/null || true
modprobe netbk 2>/dev/null || true
modprobe gntdev 2>/dev/null || true
modprobe usbbk 2>/dev/null || true
xend start
await_daemons_up
;;

2
ioemu-disable-emulated-ide-if-pv.patch
View File

@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ Index: xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
{
char **e_danger = NULL;
char *buf = NULL;
@@ -754,15 +754,19 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv
@@ -760,15 +760,19 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv
#endif

2
snapshot-ioemu-delete.patch
View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Index: xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.1.0-testing.orig/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
+++ xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
@@ -972,6 +972,18 @@ static void xenstore_process_dm_command_
@@ -978,6 +978,18 @@ static void xenstore_process_dm_command_
}
snapshot_name = xs_read(xsh, XBT_NULL, path, &len);

4
snapshot-ioemu-restore.patch
View File

@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Index: xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
static int pasprintf(char **buf, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
@@ -708,8 +710,33 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv
@@ -714,8 +716,33 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv
fprintf(stderr, "Using file %s in read-%s mode\n", bs->filename, is_readonly ? "only" : "write");
@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ Index: xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
}
#endif
@@ -839,6 +866,23 @@ int xenstore_parse_disable_pf_config ()
@@ -845,6 +872,23 @@ int xenstore_parse_disable_pf_config ()
return disable_pf;
}

6
snapshot-ioemu-save.patch
View File

@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ Index: xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
#include "console.h"
#include "hw.h"
@@ -899,6 +900,7 @@ static void xenstore_process_dm_command_
@@ -905,6 +906,7 @@ static void xenstore_process_dm_command_
{
char *path = NULL, *command = NULL, *par = NULL;
unsigned int len;
@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ Index: xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
if (pasprintf(&path,
"/local/domain/0/device-model/%u/command", domid) == -1) {
@@ -914,7 +916,18 @@ static void xenstore_process_dm_command_
@@ -920,7 +922,18 @@ static void xenstore_process_dm_command_
if (!strncmp(command, "save", len)) {
fprintf(logfile, "dm-command: pause and save state\n");
@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ Index: xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
} else if (!strncmp(command, "continue", len)) {
fprintf(logfile, "dm-command: continue after state save\n");
xen_pause_requested = 0;
@@ -1077,6 +1090,13 @@ static void xenstore_process_vcpu_set_ev
@@ -1083,6 +1096,13 @@ static void xenstore_process_vcpu_set_ev
return;
}

23
tmp-initscript-modprobe.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
Index: xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/xencommons
===================================================================
--- xen-4.1.0-testing.orig/tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/xencommons
+++ xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/init.d/xencommons
@@ -45,6 +45,18 @@ do_start () {
local time=0
local timeout=30
+ # Load XEN backend modules
+ # NB: They could be loaded later, e.g. when dom0 hotplug events occur,
+ # but for now it's safest to have them loaded here.
+ modprobe evtchn 2>/dev/null || true
+ modprobe gntdev 2>/dev/null || true
+ modprobe blktap 2>/dev/null || true
+ modprobe blkbk 2>/dev/null || true
+ modprobe netbk 2>/dev/null || true
+ modprobe usbbk 2>/dev/null || true
+ # xenblk (frontend module) is needed in dom0, allowing it to use vbds
+ modprobe xenblk 2>/dev/null || true
+
if ! `xenstore-read -s / >/dev/null 2>&1`
then
test -z "$XENSTORED_ROOTDIR" || XENSTORED_ROOTDIR="/var/lib/xenstored"

84
vif-route-ifup.patch
View File

@ -1,42 +1,9 @@
Index: xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-route-ifup
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-route-ifup
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#============================================================================
+# /etc/xen/vif-route-ifup
+#
+# Script for configuring a vif in routed mode.
+# The hotplugging system will call this script if it is specified either in
+# the device configuration given to Xend, or the default Xend configuration
+# in /etc/xen/xend-config.sxp. If the script is specified in neither of those
+# places, then vif-bridge is the default.
+#
+# Usage:
+# vif-route-ifup (add|remove|online|offline)
+#
+# Environment vars:
+# vif vif interface name (required).
+#============================================================================
+
+dir=$(dirname "$0")
+. "$dir/vif-common.sh"
+
+case "$command" in
+ online)
+ ifup ${vif}
+ ;;
+ offline)
+ do_without_error ifdown ${vif}
+ ;;
+esac
+
+log debug "Successful vif-route-ifup $command for $vif."
+if [ "$command" = "online" ]
+then
+ success
+fi
---
tools/examples/xend-config.sxp | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile | 2 +-
tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-route-ifup | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Index: xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp
===================================================================
--- xen-4.1.0-testing.orig/tools/examples/xend-config.sxp
@ -81,3 +48,42 @@ Index: xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/Makefile
XEN_SCRIPTS += network-nat vif-nat
XEN_SCRIPTS += vif2
XEN_SCRIPTS += vif-setup
Index: xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-route-ifup
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/hotplug/Linux/vif-route-ifup
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#============================================================================
+# /etc/xen/vif-route-ifup
+#
+# Script for configuring a vif in routed mode.
+# The hotplugging system will call this script if it is specified either in
+# the device configuration given to Xend, or the default Xend configuration
+# in /etc/xen/xend-config.sxp. If the script is specified in neither of those
+# places, then vif-bridge is the default.
+#
+# Usage:
+# vif-route-ifup (add|remove|online|offline)
+#
+# Environment vars:
+# dev vif interface name (required).
+#============================================================================
+
+dir=$(dirname "$0")
+. "$dir/vif-common.sh"
+
+case "$command" in
+ online)
+ ifup ${dev}
+ ;;
+ offline)
+ do_without_error ifdown ${dev}
+ ;;
+esac
+
+log debug "Successful vif-route-ifup $command for ${dev}."
+if [ "$command" = "online" ]
+then
+ success
+fi

13
xen-qemu-iscsi-fix.patch
View File

@ -61,3 +61,16 @@ Index: xen-4.1.0-testing/tools/ioemu-qemu-xen/xenstore.c
/* Obtain blktap sub-type prefix */
if ((!strcmp(drv, "tap") || !strcmp(drv, "qdisk")) && params[0]) {
char *offset = strchr(params, ':');
@@ -657,6 +681,12 @@ void xenstore_parse_domain_config(int hv
format = &bdrv_host_device;
else
format = &bdrv_raw;
+ } else if (!strcmp(drv,"iscsi")) {
+ format = &bdrv_raw;
+ } else if (!strcmp(drv,"npiv")) {
+ format = &bdrv_raw;
+ } else if (!strcmp(drv,"dmmd")) {
+ format = &bdrv_raw;
} else {
format = bdrv_find_format(drv);
if (!format) {

57
xen.changes
View File

@ -1,3 +1,60 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tue May 10 08:53:27 MDT 2011 - jfehlig@novell.com
- bnc#691256 - move modprobe of xen backend modules from xend to
xencommons initscript
tmp-initscript-modprobe.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon May 9 16:26:06 MDT 2011 - jfehlig@novell.com
- bnc#691738 - Xen does not find device create with npiv block
xen-qemu-iscsi-fix.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tue May 3 11:11:05 MDT 2011 - carnold@novell.com
- Upstream patches from Jan
22998-x86-get_page_from_l1e-retcode.patch
22999-x86-mod_l1_entry-retcode.patch
23000-x86-mod_l2_entry-retcode.patch
23096-x86-hpet-no-cpumask_lock.patch
23099-x86-rwlock-scalability.patch
23103-x86-pirq-guest-eoi-check.patch
23127-vtd-bios-settings.patch
23153-x86-amd-clear-DramModEn.patch
23154-x86-amd-iorr-no-rdwr.patch
23199-amd-iommu-unmapped-intr-fault.patch
23200-amd-iommu-intremap-sync.patch
23228-x86-conditional-write_tsc.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon May 2 12:42:16 CEST 2011 - ohering@suse.de
- update xenalyze to revision 98
* Unify setting of vcpu data type
* Unify record size checks
* Fix cr3_switch not to access hvm struct before it's initialized
- add xenalyze.gcc46.patch to fix unused-but-set-variable errors
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Apr 28 14:12:13 MDT 2011 - jfehlig@novell.com
- bnc#688473 - VUL-0: potential buffer overflow in tools
cve-2011-1583-4.0.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Apr 28 17:18:57 CEST 2011 - ohering@suse.de
- hotplug.losetup.patch
correct dev:inode detection and use variable expansion
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Apr 21 16:30:30 CEST 2011 - ohering@suse.de
- bnc#685189: update vif-route-ifup.patch to use correct variable
after upstream commit 22910:d4bc41a8cecb
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Wed Apr 20 17:50:04 CEST 2011 - ohering@suse.de

150
xen.spec
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#
# spec file for package xen
# spec file for package xen (Version 4.1.0_01)
#
# Copyright (c) 2011 SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
#
@ -31,39 +31,39 @@ ExclusiveArch: %ix86 x86_64
%else
%define with_xend 1
%endif
BuildRequires: LibVNCServer-devel
BuildRequires: SDL-devel
BuildRequires: automake
BuildRequires: bin86
BuildRequires: curl-devel
BuildRequires: dev86
BuildRequires: graphviz
BuildRequires: latex2html
BuildRequires: libjpeg-devel
BuildRequires: libxml2-devel
BuildRequires: ncurses-devel
BuildRequires: openssl
BuildRequires: openssl-devel
BuildRequires: pciutils-devel
BuildRequires: python-devel
BuildRequires: texinfo
BuildRequires: transfig
BuildRequires: libbz2-devel
BuildRequires: LibVNCServer-devel
BuildRequires: SDL-devel
BuildRequires: automake
BuildRequires: bin86
BuildRequires: curl-devel
BuildRequires: dev86
BuildRequires: graphviz
BuildRequires: latex2html
BuildRequires: libjpeg-devel
BuildRequires: libxml2-devel
BuildRequires: ncurses-devel
BuildRequires: openssl
BuildRequires: openssl-devel
BuildRequires: pciutils-devel
BuildRequires: python-devel
BuildRequires: texinfo
BuildRequires: transfig
BuildRequires: libbz2-devel
%if %suse_version >= 1120
BuildRequires: xz-devel
BuildRequires: xz-devel
%endif
%if %suse_version <= 1110
BuildRequires: pmtools
BuildRequires: pmtools
%else
BuildRequires: acpica
BuildRequires: acpica
%endif
%if %suse_version >= 1030
BuildRequires: texlive
BuildRequires: texlive-latex
BuildRequires: texlive
BuildRequires: texlive-latex
%else
BuildRequires: te_ams
BuildRequires: te_latex
BuildRequires: tetex
BuildRequires: te_ams
BuildRequires: te_latex
BuildRequires: tetex
%endif
%ifarch x86_64
BuildRequires: glibc-32bit glibc-devel-32bit
@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ BuildRequires: glibc-devel
BuildRequires: kernel-source kernel-syms module-init-tools xorg-x11
%endif
Version: 4.1.0_01
Release: 9
Release: 1
License: GPLv2+
Group: System/Kernel
AutoReqProv: on
@ -117,9 +117,22 @@ Source24: xenapiusers
# sysconfig hook script for Xen
Source25: xen-updown.sh
Source99: baselibs.conf
# http://xenbits.xensource.com/ext/xenalyze.hg
# http://xenbits.xensource.com/ext/xenalyze
Source20000: xenalyze.hg.tar.bz2
# Upstream patches
Patch0: cve-2011-1583-4.1.patch
Patch1: 22998-x86-get_page_from_l1e-retcode.patch
Patch2: 22999-x86-mod_l1_entry-retcode.patch
Patch3: 23000-x86-mod_l2_entry-retcode.patch
Patch4: 23096-x86-hpet-no-cpumask_lock.patch
Patch5: 23099-x86-rwlock-scalability.patch
Patch6: 23103-x86-pirq-guest-eoi-check.patch
Patch7: 23127-vtd-bios-settings.patch
Patch8: 23153-x86-amd-clear-DramModEn.patch
Patch9: 23154-x86-amd-iorr-no-rdwr.patch
Patch10: 23199-amd-iommu-unmapped-intr-fault.patch
Patch11: 23200-amd-iommu-intremap-sync.patch
Patch12: 23228-x86-conditional-write_tsc.patch
# Upstream qemu patches
# Our patches
Patch300: xen-config.diff
@ -172,7 +185,7 @@ Patch370: xend-sysconfig.patch
Patch371: domu-usb-controller.patch
Patch372: usb-list.patch
Patch373: xend-devid-or-name.patch
Patch374: suspend_evtchn_lock.patch
Patch374: suspend_evtchn_lock.patch
# Patches for snapshot support
Patch400: snapshot-ioemu-save.patch
Patch401: snapshot-ioemu-restore.patch
@ -208,6 +221,7 @@ Patch440: bdrv_default_rwflag.patch
Patch442: xen-minimum-restart-time.patch
Patch443: vif-bridge.mtu.patch
Patch444: xentrace.dynamic_sized_tbuf.patch
Patch445: hotplug.losetup.patch
# Jim's domain lock patch
Patch450: xend-domain-lock.patch
# Hypervisor and PV driver Patches
@ -228,35 +242,38 @@ Patch651: ioemu-disable-scsi.patch
Patch652: ioemu-disable-emulated-ide-if-pv.patch
Patch700: hv_extid_compatibility.patch
# FATE 310510
Patch10001: xenpaging.tools_xenpaging_cleanup.patch
Patch10002: xenpaging.pageout_policy.patch
Patch10003: xenpaging.get_paged_frame.patch
Patch10004: xenpaging.makefile.patch
Patch10010: xenpaging.policy_linear.patch
Patch10011: xenpaging.pagefile.patch
Patch10012: xenpaging.xenpaging_init.patch
Patch10013: xenpaging.mem_paging_tool_qemu_flush_cache.patch
Patch10014: xenpaging.machine_to_phys_mapping.patch
Patch10015: xenpaging.populate_only_if_paged.patch
Patch10017: xenpaging.autostart.patch
Patch10018: xenpaging.signal_handling.patch
Patch10019: xenpaging.MRU_SIZE.patch
Patch10020: xenpaging.guest_remove_page.patch
Patch10021: xenpaging.mem_event_check_ring-free_requests.patch
Patch10022: xenpaging.blacklist.patch
Patch10023: xenpaging.autostart_delay.patch
Patch10024: xenpaging.page_already_populated.patch
Patch10025: xenpaging.notify_policy_only_once.patch
Patch10026: xenpaging.num_pages_equal_max_pages.patch
Patch10027: xenpaging.p2m_mem_paging_populate_if_p2m_ram_paged.patch
Patch10028: xenpaging.HVMCOPY_gfn_paged_out.patch
Patch10029: xenpaging.optimize_p2m_mem_paging_populate.patch
Patch10030: xenpaging.paging_prep_enomem.patch
Patch10031: xenpaging.print-arguments.patch
Patch10032: xenpaging.no_domain_id.patch
Patch10033: xenpaging.runtime_mru_size.patch
Patch10040: xenpaging.doc.patch
Patch10001: xenpaging.tools_xenpaging_cleanup.patch
Patch10002: xenpaging.pageout_policy.patch
Patch10003: xenpaging.get_paged_frame.patch
Patch10004: xenpaging.makefile.patch
Patch10010: xenpaging.policy_linear.patch
Patch10011: xenpaging.pagefile.patch
Patch10012: xenpaging.xenpaging_init.patch
Patch10013: xenpaging.mem_paging_tool_qemu_flush_cache.patch
Patch10014: xenpaging.machine_to_phys_mapping.patch
Patch10015: xenpaging.populate_only_if_paged.patch
Patch10017: xenpaging.autostart.patch
Patch10018: xenpaging.signal_handling.patch
Patch10019: xenpaging.MRU_SIZE.patch
Patch10020: xenpaging.guest_remove_page.patch
Patch10021: xenpaging.mem_event_check_ring-free_requests.patch
Patch10022: xenpaging.blacklist.patch
Patch10023: xenpaging.autostart_delay.patch
Patch10024: xenpaging.page_already_populated.patch
Patch10025: xenpaging.notify_policy_only_once.patch
Patch10026: xenpaging.num_pages_equal_max_pages.patch
Patch10027: xenpaging.p2m_mem_paging_populate_if_p2m_ram_paged.patch
Patch10028: xenpaging.HVMCOPY_gfn_paged_out.patch
Patch10029: xenpaging.optimize_p2m_mem_paging_populate.patch
Patch10030: xenpaging.paging_prep_enomem.patch
Patch10031: xenpaging.print-arguments.patch
Patch10032: xenpaging.no_domain_id.patch
Patch10033: xenpaging.runtime_mru_size.patch
Patch10040: xenpaging.doc.patch
# xenalyze
Patch20000: xenalyze.gcc46.patch
# Build patch
Patch99998: tmp-initscript-modprobe.patch
Patch99999: tmp_build.patch
Url: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/Research/SRG/netos/xen/
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
@ -588,7 +605,21 @@ Authors:
%prep
%setup -q -n %xen_build_dir -a 1 -a 20000
%patch20000 -p1
tar xfj %{SOURCE2} -C $RPM_BUILD_DIR/%{xen_build_dir}/tools
%patch0 -p1
%patch1 -p1
%patch2 -p1
%patch3 -p1
%patch4 -p1
%patch5 -p1
%patch6 -p1
%patch7 -p1
%patch8 -p1
%patch9 -p1
%patch10 -p1
%patch11 -p1
%patch12 -p1
%patch300 -p1
%patch301 -p1
%patch302 -p1
@ -671,6 +702,7 @@ tar xfj %{SOURCE2} -C $RPM_BUILD_DIR/%{xen_build_dir}/tools
%patch442 -p1
%patch443 -p1
%patch444 -p1
%patch445 -p1
%patch450 -p1
%patch500 -p1
%patch501 -p1
@ -716,8 +748,10 @@ tar xfj %{SOURCE2} -C $RPM_BUILD_DIR/%{xen_build_dir}/tools
#%patch10032 -p1
#%patch10033 -p1
#%patch10040 -p1
%patch99998 -p1
%patch99999 -p1
%build
XEN_EXTRAVERSION=%version-%release
XEN_EXTRAVERSION=${XEN_EXTRAVERSION#%{xvers}}

122
xenalyze.gcc46.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
gcc -I../xen/include -fmessage-length=0 -O2 -Wall -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -funwind-tables -fasynchronous-unwind-tables -g -g -fno-strict-aliasing -std=gnu99 -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes -Wno-unused-value -Wdeclaration-after-statement -D_LARGEFILE_SOURCE -D_LARGEFILE64_SOURCE -mno-tls-direct-seg-refs -Werror -o xenalyze xenalyze.c
xenalyze.c: In function 'weighted_percentile':
xenalyze.c:2017:9: error: variable 'progress' set but not used [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable]
xenalyze.c: In function 'self_weighted_percentile':
xenalyze.c:2105:9: error: variable 'progress' set but not used [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable]
xenalyze.c: In function 'interval_domain_short_summary_output':
xenalyze.c:2729:15: error: variable 'interval_cycles' set but not used [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable]
xenalyze.c: In function 'hvm_generic_dump':
xenalyze.c:4675:15: error: variable 'd' set but not used [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable]
xenalyze.c: In function 'sched_runstate_process':
xenalyze.c:6883:9: error: variable 'old_runstate' set but not used [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable]
xenalyze.c:6882:11: error: variable 'runstate_tsc' set but not used [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable]
xenalyze.c: In function 'cmd_parser':
xenalyze.c:9253:24: error: variable 'p' set but not used [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable]
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
---
xenalyze.hg/xenalyze.c | 21 ---------------------
1 file changed, 21 deletions(-)
Index: xen-4.1.0-testing/xenalyze.hg/xenalyze.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.1.0-testing.orig/xenalyze.hg/xenalyze.c
+++ xen-4.1.0-testing/xenalyze.hg/xenalyze.c
@@ -2016,8 +2016,6 @@ float weighted_percentile(float * A, /*
float X, t1;
unsigned long long t2;
- int progress;
-
/* Calculate total weight */
N_weight=0;
@@ -2078,15 +2076,11 @@ float weighted_percentile(float * A, /*
}
} while (I <= J); /* Keep going until our pointers meet or pass */
- progress = 0;
-
/* Re-adjust L and R, based on which element we're looking for */
if(J_weight<K_weight) {
- progress = 1;
L=I; L_weight = I_weight;
}
if(K_weight<I_weight) {
- progress = 1;
R=J; R_weight = J_weight;
}
}
@@ -2104,8 +2098,6 @@ long long self_weighted_percentile(long
long long X, t1;
- int progress;
-
/* Calculate total weight */
N_weight=0;
@@ -2165,15 +2157,11 @@ long long self_weighted_percentile(long
}
} while (I <= J); /* Keep going until our pointers meet or pass */
- progress = 0;
-
/* Re-adjust L and R, based on which element we're looking for */
if(J_weight<K_weight) {
- progress = 1;
L=I; L_weight = I_weight;
}
if(K_weight<I_weight) {
- progress = 1;
R=J; R_weight = J_weight;
}
}
@@ -2728,13 +2716,10 @@ void interval_domain_short_summary_outpu
if(P.interval.domain.d) {
struct domain_data *d;
- tsc_t interval_cycles;
int i;
d=P.interval.domain.d;
- interval_cycles = d->total_time.interval.cycles;
-
interval_time_output();
interval_cycle_percent_output(&d->total_time.interval);
@@ -4663,7 +4648,6 @@ void hvm_generic_dump(struct record_info
} *cr = (typeof(cr))ri->d;
char *evt_string, evt_number[256];
- unsigned *d;
int i, evt, is_64 = 0;
evt = ri->event - TRC_HVM_HANDLER;
@@ -4683,7 +4667,6 @@ void hvm_generic_dump(struct record_info
evt_string = evt_number;
}
- d = ri->d;
printf("%s%s %s%s [",
prefix,
ri->dump_header,
@@ -6867,8 +6850,6 @@ void sched_runstate_process(struct pcpu_
} sevt;
int perfctrs;
struct last_oldstate_struct last_oldstate;
- tsc_t runstate_tsc;
- int old_runstate;
switch(_sevt.lo)
{
@@ -6938,8 +6919,6 @@ void sched_runstate_process(struct pcpu_
* be reset, it will be reset below. */
last_oldstate = v->runstate.last_oldstate;
v->runstate.last_oldstate.wrong = RUNSTATE_INIT;
- runstate_tsc = v->runstate.tsc;
- old_runstate = v->runstate.state;
/* Close vmexits when the putative reason for blocking / &c stops.
* This way, we don't account cpu contention to some other overhead. */

4
xenalyze.hg.tar.bz2
View File

@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
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size 118364
oid sha256:6f1d68fa351de9e0d67790b038f791fec6c159530e59f1d9d03ba47f94f1095e
size 118689