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xen/5576f143-x86-adjust-PV-I-O-emulation-functions-types.patch
Charles Arnold f158f55e6a - Update to Xen 4.5.2 
xen-4.5.2-testing-src.tar.bz2
- Drop the following
  xen-4.5.1-testing-src.tar.bz2
  552d0f49-x86-traps-identify-the-vcpu-in-context-when-dumping-regs.patch
  5576f178-kexec-add-more-pages-to-v1-environment.patch
  55780be1-x86-EFI-adjust-EFI_MEMORY_WP-handling-for-spec-version-2.5.patch
  558bfaa0-x86-traps-avoid-using-current-too-early.patch
  5592a116-nested-EPT-fix-the-handling-of-nested-EPT.patch
  559b9dd6-x86-p2m-ept-don-t-unmap-in-use-EPT-pagetable.patch
  559bc633-x86-cpupool-clear-proper-cpu_valid-bit-on-CPU-teardown.patch
  559bc64e-credit1-properly-deal-with-CPUs-not-in-any-pool.patch
  559bc87f-x86-hvmloader-avoid-data-corruption-with-xenstore-rw.patch
  559bdde5-pull-in-latest-linux-earlycpio.patch
  55a62eb0-xl-correct-handling-of-extra_config-in-main_cpupoolcreate.patch
  55a66a1e-make-rangeset_report_ranges-report-all-ranges.patch
  55a77e4f-dmar-device-scope-mem-leak-fix.patch
  55c1d83d-x86-gdt-Drop-write-only-xalloc-d-array.patch
  55c3232b-x86-mm-Make-hap-shadow-teardown-preemptible.patch
  55dc78e9-x86-amd_ucode-skip-updates-for-final-levels.patch
  55df2f76-IOMMU-skip-domains-without-page-tables-when-dumping.patch
  55e43fd8-x86-NUMA-fix-setup_node.patch
  55e43ff8-x86-NUMA-don-t-account-hotplug-regions.patch
  55e593f1-x86-NUMA-make-init_node_heap-respect-Xen-heap-limit.patch
  55f2e438-x86-hvm-fix-saved-pmtimer-and-hpet-values.patch
  55f9345b-x86-MSI-fail-if-no-hardware-support.patch
  5604f2e6-vt-d-fix-IM-bit-mask-and-unmask-of-FECTL_REG.patch
  560a4af9-x86-EPT-tighten-conditions-of-IOMMU-mapping-updates.patch
  560a7c36-x86-p2m-pt-delay-freeing-of-intermediate-page-tables.patch
  560a7c53-x86-p2m-pt-ignore-pt-share-flag-for-shadow-mode-guests.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/xen?expand=0&rev=384
2015-11-04 20:30:31 +00:00

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References: bsc#907514 bsc#910258 bsc#918984 bsc#923967
# Commit 85baced14dec2fafa9fe560969dba2ae28e8bebb
# Date 2015-06-09 15:59:31 +0200
# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
x86: adjust PV I/O emulation functions' types
admin_io_okay(), guest_io_read(), and guest_io_write() all don't need
their current "regs" parameter at all, and they don't use the vCPU
passed to them for other than obtaining its domain. Drop the former and
replace the latter by a struct domain pointer.
pci_cfg_okay() returns a boolean type, and its "write" parameter is of
boolean kind too.
All of them get called for the current vCPU (and hence current domain)
only, so name the domain parameters accordingly except in the
admin_io_okay() case, which a subsequent patch will use for simplifying
setup_io_bitmap().
Latch current->domain into a local variable in emulate_privileged_op().
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
# Commit 2d67a7a4d37a4759bcd7f2ee2d740497ad669c7d
# Date 2015-06-18 15:07:10 +0200
# Author Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
x86: synchronize PCI config space access decoding
Both PV and HVM logic have similar but not similar enough code here.
Synchronize the two so that
- in the HVM case we don't unconditionally try to access extended
config space
- in the PV case we pass a correct range to the XSM hook
- in the PV case we don't needlessly deny access when the operation
isn't really on PCI config space
All this along with sharing the macros HVM already had here.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Backport stripped down to just the pci_cfg_ok() adjustments.
Index: xen-4.5.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.5.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ xen-4.5.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -1709,14 +1709,18 @@ static int admin_io_okay(
return ioports_access_permitted(v->domain, port, port + bytes - 1);
}
-static int pci_cfg_ok(struct domain *d, int write, int size)
+static bool_t pci_cfg_ok(struct domain *currd, bool_t write,
+ unsigned int start, unsigned int size)
{
uint32_t machine_bdf;
- uint16_t start, end;
- if (!is_hardware_domain(d))
+
+ if ( !is_hardware_domain(currd) )
return 0;
- machine_bdf = (d->arch.pci_cf8 >> 8) & 0xFFFF;
+ if ( !CF8_ENABLED(currd->arch.pci_cf8) )
+ return 1;
+
+ machine_bdf = CF8_BDF(currd->arch.pci_cf8);
if ( write )
{
const unsigned long *ro_map = pci_get_ro_map(0);
@@ -1724,9 +1728,9 @@ static int pci_cfg_ok(struct domain *d,
if ( ro_map && test_bit(machine_bdf, ro_map) )
return 0;
}
- start = d->arch.pci_cf8 & 0xFF;
+ start |= CF8_ADDR_LO(currd->arch.pci_cf8);
/* AMD extended configuration space access? */
- if ( (d->arch.pci_cf8 & 0x0F000000) &&
+ if ( CF8_ADDR_HI(currd->arch.pci_cf8) &&
boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
boot_cpu_data.x86 >= 0x10 && boot_cpu_data.x86 <= 0x17 )
{
@@ -1735,12 +1739,11 @@ static int pci_cfg_ok(struct domain *d,
if ( rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG, msr_val) )
return 0;
if ( msr_val & (1ULL << AMD64_NB_CFG_CF8_EXT_ENABLE_BIT) )
- start |= (d->arch.pci_cf8 >> 16) & 0xF00;
+ start |= CF8_ADDR_HI(currd->arch.pci_cf8);
}
- end = start + size - 1;
- if (xsm_pci_config_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, machine_bdf, start, end, write))
- return 0;
- return 1;
+
+ return !xsm_pci_config_permission(XSM_HOOK, currd, machine_bdf,
+ start, start + size - 1, write);
}
uint32_t guest_io_read(
@@ -1794,7 +1797,7 @@ uint32_t guest_io_read(
size = min(bytes, 4 - (port & 3));
if ( size == 3 )
size = 2;
- if ( pci_cfg_ok(v->domain, 0, size) )
+ if ( pci_cfg_ok(v->domain, 0, port & 3, size) )
sub_data = pci_conf_read(v->domain->arch.pci_cf8, port & 3, size);
}
@@ -1867,7 +1870,7 @@ void guest_io_write(
size = min(bytes, 4 - (port & 3));
if ( size == 3 )
size = 2;
- if ( pci_cfg_ok(v->domain, 1, size) )
+ if ( pci_cfg_ok(v->domain, 1, port & 3, size) )
pci_conf_write(v->domain->arch.pci_cf8, port & 3, size, data);
}
Index: xen-4.5.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.5.2-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ xen-4.5.2-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -2357,11 +2357,6 @@ void hvm_vcpu_down(struct vcpu *v)
static struct hvm_ioreq_server *hvm_select_ioreq_server(struct domain *d,
ioreq_t *p)
{
-#define CF8_BDF(cf8) (((cf8) & 0x00ffff00) >> 8)
-#define CF8_ADDR_LO(cf8) ((cf8) & 0x000000fc)
-#define CF8_ADDR_HI(cf8) (((cf8) & 0x0f000000) >> 16)
-#define CF8_ENABLED(cf8) (!!((cf8) & 0x80000000))
-
struct hvm_ioreq_server *s;
uint32_t cf8;
uint8_t type;
@@ -2446,11 +2441,6 @@ static struct hvm_ioreq_server *hvm_sele
}
return d->arch.hvm_domain.default_ioreq_server;
-
-#undef CF8_ADDR_ENABLED
-#undef CF8_ADDR_HI
-#undef CF8_ADDR_LO
-#undef CF8_BDF
}
int hvm_buffered_io_send(ioreq_t *p)
Index: xen-4.5.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/pci.h
===================================================================
--- xen-4.5.2-testing.orig/xen/include/asm-x86/pci.h
+++ xen-4.5.2-testing/xen/include/asm-x86/pci.h
@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
#ifndef __X86_PCI_H__
#define __X86_PCI_H__
+#define CF8_BDF(cf8) ( ((cf8) & 0x00ffff00) >> 8)
+#define CF8_ADDR_LO(cf8) ( (cf8) & 0x000000fc)
+#define CF8_ADDR_HI(cf8) ( ((cf8) & 0x0f000000) >> 16)
+#define CF8_ENABLED(cf8) (!!((cf8) & 0x80000000))
+
#define IS_SNB_GFX(id) (id == 0x01068086 || id == 0x01168086 \
|| id == 0x01268086 || id == 0x01028086 \
|| id == 0x01128086 || id == 0x01228086 \
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