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xen/5677f350-x86-make-debug-output-consistent-in-hvm_set_callback_via.patch
Charles Arnold 8292994238 - bsc#960093 - VUL-0: CVE-2015-8615: xen: x86: unintentional
logging upon guest changing callback method (XSA-169)
  5677f350-x86-make-debug-output-consistent-in-hvm_set_callback_via.patch

- bsc#959387 - VUL-0: CVE-2015-8568 CVE-2015-8567: xen: qemu: net:
  vmxnet3: host memory leakage
  CVE-2015-8568-qemuu-net-vmxnet3-avoid-memory-leakage-in-activate_device.patch

- bsc#957988 - VUL-0: CVE-2015-8550: xen: paravirtualized drivers
  incautious about shared memory contents (XSA-155)
  xsa155-xen-0001-xen-Add-RING_COPY_REQUEST.patch
  xsa155-xen-0002-blktap2-Use-RING_COPY_REQUEST.patch
  xsa155-xen-0003-libvchan-Read-prod-cons-only-once.patch
  xsa155-qemuu-qdisk-double-access.patch
  xsa155-qemut-qdisk-double-access.patch
  xsa155-qemuu-xenfb.patch
  xsa155-qemut-xenfb.patch
- bsc#959006 - VUL-0: CVE-2015-8558: xen: qemu: usb: infinite loop
  in ehci_advance_state results in DoS
  CVE-2015-8558-qemuu-usb-infinite-loop-in-ehci_advance_state-results-in-DoS.patch
- bsc#958918 - VUL-0: CVE-2015-7549: xen: qemu pci: null pointer
  dereference issue
  CVE-2015-7549-qemuu-pci-null-pointer-dereference-issue.patch
- bsc#958493 - VUL-0: CVE-2015-8504: xen: qemu: ui: vnc: avoid
  floating point exception
  CVE-2015-8504-qemuu-vnc-avoid-floating-point-exception.patch
  CVE-2015-8504-qemut-vnc-avoid-floating-point-exception.patch
- bsc#958007 - VUL-0: CVE-2015-8554: xen: qemu-dm buffer overrun in
  MSI-X handling (XSA-164)
  xsa164.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/xen?expand=0&rev=393
2016-01-04 22:25:00 +00:00

41 lines
1.4 KiB
Diff

Reference: bsc#960093 CVE-2015-8615 XSA-169
Subject: x86: make debug output consistent in hvm_set_callback_via
From: Malcolm Crossley malcolm.crossley@citrix.com Mon Dec 21 13:40:48 2015 +0100
Date: Mon Dec 21 13:40:48 2015 +0100:
Git: 5c1048565ba5b240f47203bdb67572bee73d639e
The unconditional printks in the switch statement of the
hvm_set_callback_via function results in Xen log spam in non debug
versions of Xen. The printks are for debug output only so conditionally
compile the entire switch statement on debug versions of Xen only.
This is XSA-169.
Signed-off-by: Malcolm Crossley <malcolm.crossley@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Index: xen-4.6.0-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c
===================================================================
--- xen-4.6.0-testing.orig/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c
+++ xen-4.6.0-testing/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c
@@ -382,7 +382,8 @@ void hvm_set_callback_via(struct domain
spin_unlock(&d->arch.hvm_domain.irq_lock);
- dprintk(XENLOG_G_INFO, "Dom%u callback via changed to ", d->domain_id);
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+ printk(XENLOG_G_INFO "Dom%u callback via changed to ", d->domain_id);
switch ( via_type )
{
case HVMIRQ_callback_gsi:
@@ -398,6 +399,7 @@ void hvm_set_callback_via(struct domain
printk("None\n");
break;
}
+#endif
}
struct hvm_intack hvm_vcpu_has_pending_irq(struct vcpu *v)