39134eb9d2
on invalid state load CVE-2013-4539-qemut-tsc210x-fix-buffer-overrun-on-invalid-state-load.patch - bsc#962632 - VUL-0: CVE-2015-1779: xen: vnc: insufficient resource limiting in VNC websockets decoder CVE-2015-1779-qemuu-limit-size-of-HTTP-headers-from-websockets-clients.patch CVE-2015-1779-qemuu-incrementally-decode-websocket-frames.patch - bsc#962642 - VUL-0: CVE-2013-4537: xen: ssi-sd: buffer overrun on invalid state load CVE-2013-4537-qemut-ssi-sd-fix-buffer-overrun-on-invalid-state-load.patch - bsc#962627 - VUL-0: CVE-2014-7815: xen: vnc: insufficient bits_per_pixel from the client sanitization CVE-2014-7815-qemut-vnc-sanitize-bits_per_pixel-from-the-client.patch - bsc#962335 - VUL-0: CVE-2013-4538: xen: ssd0323: fix buffer overun on invalid state CVE-2013-4538-qemut-ssd0323-fix-buffer-overun-on-invalid-state.patch - bsc#962360 - VUL-0: CVE-2015-7512: xen: net: pcnet: buffer overflow in non-loopback mode CVE-2015-7512-qemuu-net-pcnet-buffer-overflow-in-non-loopback-mode.patch CVE-2015-7512-qemut-net-pcnet-buffer-overflow-in-non-loopback-mode.patch - bsc#961692 - VUL-0: CVE-2016-1714: xen: nvram: OOB r/w access in processing firmware configurations CVE-2016-1714-qemuu-fw_cfg-add-check-to-validate-current-entry-value.patch CVE-2016-1714-qemut-fw_cfg-add-check-to-validate-current-entry-value.patch - bsc#961358 - VUL-0: CVE-2015-8613: xen: qemu: scsi: stack based buffer overflow in megasas_ctrl_get_info OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/xen?expand=0&rev=395
31 lines
1.1 KiB
Diff
31 lines
1.1 KiB
Diff
Index: xen-4.6.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
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===================================================================
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--- xen-4.6.0-testing.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
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+++ xen-4.6.0-testing/tools/qemu-xen-traditional-dir-remote/vnc.c
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@@ -1761,6 +1761,25 @@ static int protocol_client_msg(VncState
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}
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set_encodings(vs, (int32_t *)(data + 4), limit);
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+
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+ /*
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+ * The initialization of a VNC connection can race with xenfb changing
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+ * the resolution. This happens when the VNC connection is already
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+ * established, but the client has not yet advertised has_resize, so it
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+ * won't get notified of the switch.
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+ *
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+ * Therefore we resend the resolution as soon as the client has sent its
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+ * encodings.
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+ */
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+ if (vs->has_resize) {
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+ /* Resize the VNC window */
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+ vnc_write_u8(vs, 0); /* msg id */
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+ vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
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+ vnc_write_u16(vs, 1); /* number of rects */
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+ vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, 0, 0, vs->serverds.width, vs->serverds.height, -223);
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+
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+ vnc_flush(vs);
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+ }
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break;
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case 3:
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if (len == 1)
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