SHA256
1
0
forked from pool/xen
xen/CVE-2012-5514-xsa30.patch
Charles Arnold 128dffb75f - bnc#789945 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5510: xen: Grant table version
switch list corruption vulnerability (XSA-26)
  CVE-2012-5510-xsa26.patch
- bnc#789944 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5511: xen: Several HVM operations do
  not validate the range of their inputs (XSA-27)
  CVE-2012-5511-xsa27.patch
- bnc#789951 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5513: xen: XENMEM_exchange may
  overwrite hypervisor memory (XSA-29)
  CVE-2012-5513-xsa29.patch
- bnc#789948 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5514: xen: Missing unlock in
  guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand() (XSA-30)
  CVE-2012-5514-xsa30.patch
- bnc#789950 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5515: xen: Several memory hypercall
  operations allow invalid extent order values (XSA-31)
  CVE-2012-5515-xsa31.patch
- bnc#789952 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5525: xen: Several hypercalls do not
  validate input GFNs (XSA-32)
  CVE-2012-5525-xsa32.patch
- Upstream patches from Jan
  26129-ACPI-BGRT-invalidate.patch
  26132-tmem-save-NULL-check.patch
  26134-x86-shadow-invlpg-check.patch
  26139-cpumap-masking.patch
  26148-vcpu-timer-overflow.patch (Replaces CVE-2012-4535-xsa20.patch)
  26149-x86-p2m-physmap-error-path.patch (Replaces CVE-2012-4537-xsa22.patch)
  26150-x86-shadow-unhook-toplevel-check.patch (Replaces CVE-2012-4538-xsa23.patch)
  26151-gnttab-compat-get-status-frames.patch (Replaces CVE-2012-4539-xsa24.patch)
  26179-PCI-find-next-cap.patch
  26183-x86-HPET-masking.patch
  26188-x86-time-scale-asm.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/xen?expand=0&rev=216
2012-12-03 14:47:23 +00:00

58 lines
1.7 KiB
Diff

References: CVE-2012-5514 XSA-30 bnc#789948
fix error handling of guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand()
The only user of the "out" label bypasses a necessary unlock, thus
enabling the caller to lock up Xen.
Also, the function was never meant to be called by a guest for itself,
so rather than inspecting the code paths in depth for potential other
problems this might cause, and adjusting e.g. the non-guest printk()
in the above error path, just disallow the guest access to it.
Finally, the printk() (considering its potential of spamming the log,
the more that it's not using XENLOG_GUEST), is being converted to
P2M_DEBUG(), as debugging is what it apparently was added for in the
first place.
This is XSA-30 / CVE-2012-5514.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
@@ -1117,6 +1117,9 @@ guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(st
mfn_t omfn;
int rc = 0;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ return -EPERM;
+
if ( !paging_mode_translate(d) )
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1135,8 +1138,7 @@ guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(st
omfn = p2m->get_entry(p2m, gfn + i, &ot, &a, 0, NULL);
if ( p2m_is_ram(ot) )
{
- printk("%s: gfn_to_mfn returned type %d!\n",
- __func__, ot);
+ P2M_DEBUG("gfn_to_mfn returned type %d!\n", ot);
rc = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
@@ -1160,9 +1162,9 @@ guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(st
pod_unlock(p2m);
}
+out:
gfn_unlock(p2m, gfn, order);
-out:
return rc;
}