switch list corruption vulnerability (XSA-26) CVE-2012-5510-xsa26.patch - bnc#789944 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5511: xen: Several HVM operations do not validate the range of their inputs (XSA-27) CVE-2012-5511-xsa27.patch - bnc#789951 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5513: xen: XENMEM_exchange may overwrite hypervisor memory (XSA-29) CVE-2012-5513-xsa29.patch - bnc#789948 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5514: xen: Missing unlock in guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand() (XSA-30) CVE-2012-5514-xsa30.patch - bnc#789950 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5515: xen: Several memory hypercall operations allow invalid extent order values (XSA-31) CVE-2012-5515-xsa31.patch - bnc#789952 - VUL-0: CVE-2012-5525: xen: Several hypercalls do not validate input GFNs (XSA-32) CVE-2012-5525-xsa32.patch - Upstream patches from Jan 26129-ACPI-BGRT-invalidate.patch 26132-tmem-save-NULL-check.patch 26134-x86-shadow-invlpg-check.patch 26139-cpumap-masking.patch 26148-vcpu-timer-overflow.patch (Replaces CVE-2012-4535-xsa20.patch) 26149-x86-p2m-physmap-error-path.patch (Replaces CVE-2012-4537-xsa22.patch) 26150-x86-shadow-unhook-toplevel-check.patch (Replaces CVE-2012-4538-xsa23.patch) 26151-gnttab-compat-get-status-frames.patch (Replaces CVE-2012-4539-xsa24.patch) 26179-PCI-find-next-cap.patch 26183-x86-HPET-masking.patch 26188-x86-time-scale-asm.patch OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/Virtualization/xen?expand=0&rev=216
58 lines
1.7 KiB
Diff
58 lines
1.7 KiB
Diff
References: CVE-2012-5514 XSA-30 bnc#789948
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fix error handling of guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand()
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The only user of the "out" label bypasses a necessary unlock, thus
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enabling the caller to lock up Xen.
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Also, the function was never meant to be called by a guest for itself,
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so rather than inspecting the code paths in depth for potential other
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problems this might cause, and adjusting e.g. the non-guest printk()
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in the above error path, just disallow the guest access to it.
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Finally, the printk() (considering its potential of spamming the log,
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the more that it's not using XENLOG_GUEST), is being converted to
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P2M_DEBUG(), as debugging is what it apparently was added for in the
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first place.
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This is XSA-30 / CVE-2012-5514.
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Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
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Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
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Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
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Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
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--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
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+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
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@@ -1117,6 +1117,9 @@ guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(st
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mfn_t omfn;
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int rc = 0;
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+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
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+ return -EPERM;
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+
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if ( !paging_mode_translate(d) )
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return -EINVAL;
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@@ -1135,8 +1138,7 @@ guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(st
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omfn = p2m->get_entry(p2m, gfn + i, &ot, &a, 0, NULL);
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if ( p2m_is_ram(ot) )
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{
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- printk("%s: gfn_to_mfn returned type %d!\n",
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- __func__, ot);
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+ P2M_DEBUG("gfn_to_mfn returned type %d!\n", ot);
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rc = -EBUSY;
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goto out;
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}
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@@ -1160,9 +1162,9 @@ guest_physmap_mark_populate_on_demand(st
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pod_unlock(p2m);
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}
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+out:
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gfn_unlock(p2m, gfn, order);
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-out:
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return rc;
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}
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