forked from pool/xorg-x11-server
Accepting request 1043805 from home:dirkmueller:Factory
- Update to version xorg-server-21.1.6: * xserver 21.1.6 * Xext: fix invalid event type mask in XTestSwapFakeInput * xkb: fix some possible memleaks in XkbGetKbdByName * xkb: proof GetCountedString against request length attacks * xquartz: Fix some formatting * XQuartz: stub: Call LSOpenApplication instead of fork()/exec() - drop the following upstream patches: U_xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch U_xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch - Update to version xorg-server-21.1.5: * xkb: reset the radio_groups pointer to NULL after freeing it * Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of ProcXIChangeProperty * Xi: return an error from XI property changes if verification failed * Xext: free the screen saver resource when replacing it * Xext: free the XvRTVideoNotify when turning off from the same client * Xi: disallow passive grabs with a detail > 255 * Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in XTestSwapFakeInput * meson: Don't build COMPOSITE for XQuartz * xquartz: Move default applications list outside of the main executable * xquartz: Remove unused macro (X11LIBDIR) - drop the following upstream patches: U_0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch U_0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch U_0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch U_0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch U_0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch U_0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch U_0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1043805 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/X11:XOrg/xorg-x11-server?expand=0&rev=845
This commit is contained in:
parent
37722e6dc6
commit
810aa51f71
@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
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From 2e8916efe9a8566f97a4c2231891ad0f555fced1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 12:55:45 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/6] Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in
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XTestSwapFakeInput
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XTestSwapFakeInput assumes all events in this request are
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sizeof(xEvent) and iterates through these in 32-byte increments.
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However, a GenericEvent may be of arbitrary length longer than 32 bytes,
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so any GenericEvent in this list would result in subsequent events to be
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misparsed.
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Additional, the swapped event is written into a stack-allocated struct
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xEvent (size 32 bytes). For any GenericEvent longer than 32 bytes,
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swapping the event may thus smash the stack like an avocado on toast.
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Catch this case early and return BadValue for any GenericEvent.
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Which is what would happen in unswapped setups anyway since XTest
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doesn't support GenericEvent.
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ZDI-CAN 19265
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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---
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Xext/xtest.c | 5 +++--
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c
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index bf27eb590b..2985a4ce6e 100644
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--- a/Xext/xtest.c
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+++ b/Xext/xtest.c
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@@ -502,10 +502,11 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req)
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nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent);
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for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) {
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+ int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177;
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/* Swap event */
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- proc = EventSwapVector[ev->u.u.type & 0177];
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+ proc = EventSwapVector[evtype];
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/* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
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- if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented) {
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+ if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented || evtype == GenericEvent) {
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client->errorValue = ev->u.u.type;
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return BadValue;
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}
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--
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2.38.1
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@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
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From bee46f23fbc2b2722753c3b7769c990b90c235a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:24:00 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/6] Xi: return an error from XI property changes if
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verification failed
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Both ProcXChangeDeviceProperty and ProcXIChangeProperty checked the
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property for validity but didn't actually return the potential error.
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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---
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Xi/xiproperty.c | 5 +++++
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1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
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index a36f7d61df..68c362c628 100644
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--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
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+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
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@@ -902,6 +902,8 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client)
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rc = check_change_property(client, stuff->property, stuff->type,
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stuff->format, stuff->mode, stuff->nUnits);
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+ if (rc != Success)
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+ return rc;
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len = stuff->nUnits;
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if (len > (bytes_to_int32(0xffffffff - sizeof(xChangeDevicePropertyReq))))
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@@ -1141,6 +1143,9 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
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rc = check_change_property(client, stuff->property, stuff->type,
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stuff->format, stuff->mode, stuff->num_items);
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+ if (rc != Success)
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+ return rc;
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+
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len = stuff->num_items;
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if (len > bytes_to_int32(0xffffffff - sizeof(xXIChangePropertyReq)))
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return BadLength;
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--
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2.38.1
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@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
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From 6f01a643c90724f32c19985e39de3bee9b14a310 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:26:57 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/6] Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of
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ProcXIChangeProperty
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This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
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Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
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the correct stuff->num_items value the expected request size was
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truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
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The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
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(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
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finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
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stuff->num_items bytes, i.e. 4GB.
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The same bug exists in ProcChangeProperty and ProcXChangeDeviceProperty,
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so let's fix that too.
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ZDI-CAN 19405
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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---
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Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++--
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dix/property.c | 3 ++-
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2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
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index 68c362c628..066ba21fba 100644
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--- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
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+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
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@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client)
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REQUEST(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
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DeviceIntPtr dev;
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unsigned long len;
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- int totalSize;
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+ uint64_t totalSize;
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int rc;
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REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
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@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
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{
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int rc;
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DeviceIntPtr dev;
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- int totalSize;
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+ uint64_t totalSize;
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unsigned long len;
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REQUEST(xXIChangePropertyReq);
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diff --git a/dix/property.c b/dix/property.c
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index 94ef5a0ec0..acce94b2c6 100644
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--- a/dix/property.c
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+++ b/dix/property.c
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@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ ProcChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
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WindowPtr pWin;
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char format, mode;
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unsigned long len;
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- int sizeInBytes, totalSize, err;
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+ int sizeInBytes, err;
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+ uint64_t totalSize;
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REQUEST(xChangePropertyReq);
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--
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2.38.1
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@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
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From 9dc018a5a1a183e0a2cb945572454779b499430c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:55:32 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/6] Xi: disallow passive grabs with a detail > 255
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The XKB protocol effectively prevents us from ever using keycodes above
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255. For buttons it's theoretically possible but realistically too niche
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to worry about. For all other passive grabs, the detail must be zero
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anyway.
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This fixes an OOB write:
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ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice() calls DeletePassiveGrabFromList with a
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temporary grab struct which contains tempGrab->detail.exact = stuff->detail.
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For matching existing grabs, DeleteDetailFromMask is called with the
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stuff->detail value. This function creates a new mask with the one bit
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representing stuff->detail cleared.
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However, the array size for the new mask is 8 * sizeof(CARD32) bits,
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thus any detail above 255 results in an OOB array write.
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ZDI-CAN 19381
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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---
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Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 22 ++++++++++++++--------
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1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
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index 2769fb7c94..c9ac2f8553 100644
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--- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
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+++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
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@@ -137,6 +137,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
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return BadValue;
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}
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+ /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never
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+ * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that
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+ * cannot work anyway, same for buttons > 255. */
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+ if (stuff->detail > 255)
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+ return XIAlreadyGrabbed;
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+
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if (XICheckInvalidMaskBits(client, (unsigned char *) &stuff[1],
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stuff->mask_len * 4) != Success)
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return BadValue;
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@@ -207,14 +213,8 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
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¶m, XI2, &mask);
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break;
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case XIGrabtypeKeycode:
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- /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never
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- * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that
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- * cannot work anyway */
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- if (stuff->detail > 255)
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- status = XIAlreadyGrabbed;
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- else
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- status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail,
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- ¶m, XI2, &mask);
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+ status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail,
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+ ¶m, XI2, &mask);
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break;
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case XIGrabtypeEnter:
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case XIGrabtypeFocusIn:
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@@ -334,6 +334,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
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return BadValue;
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}
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+ /* We don't allow passive grabs for details > 255 anyway */
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+ if (stuff->detail > 255) {
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+ client->errorValue = stuff->detail;
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+ return BadValue;
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+ }
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+
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rc = dixLookupWindow(&win, stuff->grab_window, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
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if (rc != Success)
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return rc;
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--
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2.38.1
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From 06eb55528bb62f7418f740152642f2066d593bbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 14:53:07 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 5/6] Xext: free the screen saver resource when
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replacing it
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|
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This fixes a use-after-free bug:
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When a client first calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes(), a struct
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ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated and added to the client's
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resources.
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|
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When the same client calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes() again, a new
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struct ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated, replacing the old struct. The
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old struct was freed but not removed from the clients resources.
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Later, when the client is destroyed the resource system invokes
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ScreenSaverFreeAttr and attempts to clean up the already freed struct.
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Fix this by letting the resource system free the old attrs instead.
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ZDI-CAN 19404
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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---
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|
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Xext/saver.c | 2 +-
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1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
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|
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diff --git a/Xext/saver.c b/Xext/saver.c
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index f813ba08d1..fd6153c313 100644
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--- a/Xext/saver.c
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+++ b/Xext/saver.c
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@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ScreenSaverSetAttributes(ClientPtr client)
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pVlist++;
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}
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if (pPriv->attr)
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- FreeScreenAttr(pPriv->attr);
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+ FreeResource(pPriv->attr->resource, AttrType);
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pPriv->attr = pAttr;
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pAttr->resource = FakeClientID(client->index);
|
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if (!AddResource(pAttr->resource, AttrType, (void *) pAttr))
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--
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2.38.1
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|
|
@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
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From 4ca304326d3b222a446aca82ec3c28ee8adf8446 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
|
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From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
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Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 11:20:40 +1000
|
|
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Subject: [PATCH xserver 6/6] Xext: free the XvRTVideoNotify when turning off
|
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from the same client
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|
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This fixes a use-after-free bug:
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|
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When a client first calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on a drawable with a
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TRUE onoff argument, a struct XvVideoNotifyRec is allocated. This struct
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|
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is added twice to the resources:
|
|
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- as the drawable's XvRTVideoNotifyList. This happens only once per
|
|
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drawable, subsequent calls append to this list.
|
|
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- as the client's XvRTVideoNotify. This happens for every client.
|
|
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|
|
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The struct keeps the ClientPtr around once it has been added for a
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client. The idea, presumably, is that if the client disconnects we can remove
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all structs from the drawable's list that match the client (by resetting
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the ClientPtr to NULL), but if the drawable is destroyed we can remove
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|
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and free the whole list.
|
|
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|
|
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However, if the same client then calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on the
|
|
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same drawable with a FALSE onoff argument, only the ClientPtr on the
|
|
||||||
existing struct was set to NULL. The struct itself remained in the
|
|
||||||
client's resources.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
If the drawable is now destroyed, the resource system invokes
|
|
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XvdiDestroyVideoNotifyList which frees the whole list for this drawable
|
|
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- including our struct. This function however does not free the resource
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|
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for the client since our ClientPtr is NULL.
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|
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|
|
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Later, when the client is destroyed and the resource system invokes
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|
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XvdiDestroyVideoNotify, we unconditionally set the ClientPtr to NULL. On
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|
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a struct that has been freed previously. This is generally frowned upon.
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|
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|
|
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Fix this by calling FreeResource() on the second call instead of merely
|
|
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setting the ClientPtr to NULL. This removes the struct from the client
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|
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resources (but not from the list), ensuring that it won't be accessed
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|
||||||
again when the client quits.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Note that the assignment tpn->client = NULL; is superfluous since the
|
|
||||||
XvdiDestroyVideoNotify function will do this anyway. But it's left for
|
|
||||||
clarity and to match a similar invocation in XvdiSelectPortNotify.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
ZDI-CAN 19400
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
|
||||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
|
||||||
---
|
|
||||||
Xext/xvmain.c | 4 +++-
|
|
||||||
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/Xext/xvmain.c b/Xext/xvmain.c
|
|
||||||
index f627471938..2a08f8744a 100644
|
|
||||||
--- a/Xext/xvmain.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/Xext/xvmain.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -811,8 +811,10 @@ XvdiSelectVideoNotify(ClientPtr client, DrawablePtr pDraw, BOOL onoff)
|
|
||||||
tpn = pn;
|
|
||||||
while (tpn) {
|
|
||||||
if (tpn->client == client) {
|
|
||||||
- if (!onoff)
|
|
||||||
+ if (!onoff) {
|
|
||||||
tpn->client = NULL;
|
|
||||||
+ FreeResource(tpn->id, XvRTVideoNotify);
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
return Success;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
if (!tpn->client)
|
|
||||||
--
|
|
||||||
2.38.1
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
From 79916ec4eed724b481d24d97686d3ed05a939859 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
|
||||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
|
||||||
Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2022 15:55:54 +1000
|
|
||||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: reset the radio_groups pointer to NULL after
|
|
||||||
freeing it
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Unlike other elements of the keymap, this pointer was freed but not
|
|
||||||
reset. On a subsequent XkbGetKbdByName request, the server may access
|
|
||||||
already freed memory.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
ZDI-CAN-19530
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
|
||||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
|
||||||
---
|
|
||||||
xkb/xkbUtils.c | 1 +
|
|
||||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/xkb/xkbUtils.c b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
|
|
||||||
index dd089c2046..3f5791a183 100644
|
|
||||||
--- a/xkb/xkbUtils.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -1326,6 +1326,7 @@ _XkbCopyNames(XkbDescPtr src, XkbDescPtr dst)
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
else {
|
|
||||||
free(dst->names->radio_groups);
|
|
||||||
+ dst->names->radio_groups = NULL;
|
|
||||||
}
|
|
||||||
dst->names->num_rg = src->names->num_rg;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
--
|
|
||||||
2.38.1
|
|
||||||
|
|
@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
From 18f91b950e22c2a342a4fbc55e9ddf7534a707d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
|
||||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
|
||||||
Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 11:23:09 +1000
|
|
||||||
Subject: [PATCH] xkb: fix some possible memleaks in XkbGetKbdByName
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
GetComponentByName returns an allocated string, so let's free that if we
|
|
||||||
fail somewhere.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
|
||||||
---
|
|
||||||
xkb/xkb.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
|
|
||||||
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Index: xorg-server-21.1.4/xkb/xkb.c
|
|
||||||
===================================================================
|
|
||||||
--- xorg-server-21.1.4.orig/xkb/xkb.c
|
|
||||||
+++ xorg-server-21.1.4/xkb/xkb.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -5940,18 +5940,32 @@ ProcXkbGetKbdByName(ClientPtr client)
|
|
||||||
xkb = dev->key->xkbInfo->desc;
|
|
||||||
status = Success;
|
|
||||||
str = (unsigned char *) &stuff[1];
|
|
||||||
- if (GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status)) /* keymap, unsupported */
|
|
||||||
- return BadMatch;
|
|
||||||
+ {
|
|
||||||
+ char *keymap = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status); /* keymap, unsupported */
|
|
||||||
+ if (keymap) {
|
|
||||||
+ free(keymap);
|
|
||||||
+ return BadMatch;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
names.keycodes = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
|
|
||||||
names.types = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
|
|
||||||
names.compat = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
|
|
||||||
names.symbols = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
|
|
||||||
names.geometry = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
|
|
||||||
- if (status != Success)
|
|
||||||
+ if (status == Success) {
|
|
||||||
+ len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
|
|
||||||
+ if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
|
|
||||||
+ status = BadLength;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+ if (status != Success) {
|
|
||||||
+ free(names.keycodes);
|
|
||||||
+ free(names.types);
|
|
||||||
+ free(names.compat);
|
|
||||||
+ free(names.symbols);
|
|
||||||
+ free(names.geometry);
|
|
||||||
return status;
|
|
||||||
- len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
|
|
||||||
- if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
|
|
||||||
- return BadLength;
|
|
||||||
+ }
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x01, stuff->want, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
|
|
||||||
CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x02, stuff->need, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
|
|
@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
From 11beef0b7f1ed290348e45618e5fa0d2bffcb72e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
|
||||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
|
||||||
Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:06:20 +1000
|
|
||||||
Subject: [PATCH] xkb: proof GetCountedString against request length attacks
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
GetCountedString did a check for the whole string to be within the
|
|
||||||
request buffer but not for the initial 2 bytes that contain the length
|
|
||||||
field. A swapped client could send a malformed request to trigger a
|
|
||||||
swaps() on those bytes, writing into random memory.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
|
||||||
---
|
|
||||||
xkb/xkb.c | 5 +++++
|
|
||||||
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
|
|
||||||
index f42f59ef3..1841cff26 100644
|
|
||||||
--- a/xkb/xkb.c
|
|
||||||
+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
|
|
||||||
@@ -5137,6 +5137,11 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, ClientPtr client, char **str)
|
|
||||||
CARD16 len;
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
wire = *wire_inout;
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
+ if (client->req_len <
|
|
||||||
+ bytes_to_int32(wire + 2 - (char *) client->requestBuffer))
|
|
||||||
+ return BadValue;
|
|
||||||
+
|
|
||||||
len = *(CARD16 *) wire;
|
|
||||||
if (client->swapped) {
|
|
||||||
swaps(&len);
|
|
||||||
--
|
|
||||||
2.35.3
|
|
||||||
|
|
2
_service
2
_service
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
|||||||
<service name="tar_scm" mode="disabled">
|
<service name="tar_scm" mode="disabled">
|
||||||
<param name="url">https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver.git</param>
|
<param name="url">https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver.git</param>
|
||||||
<param name="scm">git</param>
|
<param name="scm">git</param>
|
||||||
<param name="revision">bc111a2e</param>
|
<param name="revision">xorg-server-21.1.6</param>
|
||||||
<param name="versionformat">@PARENT_TAG@</param>
|
<param name="versionformat">@PARENT_TAG@</param>
|
||||||
<param name="versionrewrite-pattern">xorgserver(.*)</param>
|
<param name="versionrewrite-pattern">xorgserver(.*)</param>
|
||||||
<param name="changesgenerate">enable</param>
|
<param name="changesgenerate">enable</param>
|
||||||
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||||||
<servicedata>
|
<servicedata>
|
||||||
<service name="tar_scm">
|
<service name="tar_scm">
|
||||||
<param name="url">https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver.git</param>
|
<param name="url">https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver.git</param>
|
||||||
<param name="changesrevision">bc111a2e67e16d4e6d4f3196ab86c22c1e278c45</param></service></servicedata>
|
<param name="changesrevision">59b6fc88ed9f4b22397a568c2483e4c558856ffa</param></service></servicedata>
|
@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
|
|||||||
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
|
|
||||||
oid sha256:5cc4be8ee47edb58d4a90e603a59d56b40291ad38371b0bd2471fc3cbee1c587
|
|
||||||
size 4940176
|
|
@ -1,3 +1,40 @@
|
|||||||
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||||
|
Mon Dec 19 19:54:11 UTC 2022 - dmueller@suse.com
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Update to version xorg-server-21.1.6:
|
||||||
|
* xserver 21.1.6
|
||||||
|
* Xext: fix invalid event type mask in XTestSwapFakeInput
|
||||||
|
* xkb: fix some possible memleaks in XkbGetKbdByName
|
||||||
|
* xkb: proof GetCountedString against request length attacks
|
||||||
|
* xquartz: Fix some formatting
|
||||||
|
* XQuartz: stub: Call LSOpenApplication instead of fork()/exec()
|
||||||
|
- drop the following upstream patches:
|
||||||
|
U_xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
|
||||||
|
U_xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||||
|
Sat Dec 17 17:40:15 UTC 2022 - Dirk Müller <dmueller@suse.com>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Update to version xorg-server-21.1.5:
|
||||||
|
* xkb: reset the radio_groups pointer to NULL after freeing it
|
||||||
|
* Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of ProcXIChangeProperty
|
||||||
|
* Xi: return an error from XI property changes if verification failed
|
||||||
|
* Xext: free the screen saver resource when replacing it
|
||||||
|
* Xext: free the XvRTVideoNotify when turning off from the same client
|
||||||
|
* Xi: disallow passive grabs with a detail > 255
|
||||||
|
* Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in XTestSwapFakeInput
|
||||||
|
* meson: Don't build COMPOSITE for XQuartz
|
||||||
|
* xquartz: Move default applications list outside of the main executable
|
||||||
|
* xquartz: Remove unused macro (X11LIBDIR)
|
||||||
|
- drop the following upstream patches:
|
||||||
|
U_0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch
|
||||||
|
U_0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch
|
||||||
|
U_0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch
|
||||||
|
U_0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch
|
||||||
|
U_0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch
|
||||||
|
U_0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch
|
||||||
|
U_0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||||
Tue Dec 6 14:26:07 UTC 2022 - Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch@suse.com>
|
Tue Dec 6 14:26:07 UTC 2022 - Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch@suse.com>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@ -36,16 +36,14 @@
|
|||||||
%endif
|
%endif
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Name: xorg-x11-server
|
Name: xorg-x11-server
|
||||||
Version: 21.1.4
|
Version: 21.1.6
|
||||||
Release: 0
|
Release: 0
|
||||||
URL: http://xorg.freedesktop.org/
|
URL: http://xorg.freedesktop.org/
|
||||||
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Summary: X
|
Summary: X
|
||||||
# Source URL: http://xorg.freedesktop.org/archive/individual/xserver/
|
# Source URL: http://xorg.freedesktop.org/archive/individual/xserver/
|
||||||
License: MIT
|
License: MIT
|
||||||
Group: System/X11/Servers/XF86_4
|
Group: System/X11/Servers/XF86_4
|
||||||
Source0: xorg-server-%{version}.tar.xz
|
Source0: xserver-xorg-server-%{version}.tar.xz
|
||||||
Source1: sysconfig.displaymanager.template
|
Source1: sysconfig.displaymanager.template
|
||||||
Source2: README.updates
|
Source2: README.updates
|
||||||
Source3: xorgcfg.tar.bz2
|
Source3: xorgcfg.tar.bz2
|
||||||
@ -246,17 +244,6 @@ Patch1940: U_xephyr-Don-t-check-for-SeatId-anymore.patch
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
Patch1960: u_sync-pci-ids-with-Mesa.patch
|
Patch1960: u_sync-pci-ids-with-Mesa.patch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Patch1204412: U_xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
|
|
||||||
Patch1204416: U_xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Patch1205874: U_0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch
|
|
||||||
Patch1205875: U_0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch
|
|
||||||
Patch1205876: U_0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch
|
|
||||||
Patch1205877: U_0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch
|
|
||||||
Patch1205878: U_0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch
|
|
||||||
Patch1205879: U_0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch
|
|
||||||
Patch1206017: U_0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
%description
|
%description
|
||||||
This package contains the X.Org Server.
|
This package contains the X.Org Server.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -362,7 +349,7 @@ Group: Development/Sources
|
|||||||
This package contains patched sources of X.Org Server.
|
This package contains patched sources of X.Org Server.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
%prep
|
%prep
|
||||||
%setup -q -n xorg-server-%{version} -a3
|
%setup -q -n xserver-xorg-server-%{version} -a3
|
||||||
# Early verification if the ABI Defines are correct. Let's not waste build cycles if the Provides are wrong at the end.
|
# Early verification if the ABI Defines are correct. Let's not waste build cycles if the Provides are wrong at the end.
|
||||||
sh %{SOURCE92} --verify . %{SOURCE91}
|
sh %{SOURCE92} --verify . %{SOURCE91}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -414,15 +401,6 @@ sh %{SOURCE92} --verify . %{SOURCE91}
|
|||||||
%patch1930 -p1
|
%patch1930 -p1
|
||||||
%patch1940 -p1
|
%patch1940 -p1
|
||||||
%patch1960 -p1
|
%patch1960 -p1
|
||||||
%patch1204412 -p1
|
|
||||||
%patch1204416 -p1
|
|
||||||
%patch1205874 -p1
|
|
||||||
%patch1205875 -p1
|
|
||||||
%patch1205876 -p1
|
|
||||||
%patch1205877 -p1
|
|
||||||
%patch1205878 -p1
|
|
||||||
%patch1205879 -p1
|
|
||||||
%patch1206017 -p1
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
%build
|
%build
|
||||||
# We have some -z now related errors during X default startup (boo#1197994):
|
# We have some -z now related errors during X default startup (boo#1197994):
|
||||||
|
3
xserver-xorg-server-21.1.6.tar.xz
Normal file
3
xserver-xorg-server-21.1.6.tar.xz
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
|||||||
|
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
|
||||||
|
oid sha256:a06a5c27d9ec99ee9673d9f173e2d8dc36ded69817c8cd4395b9de22375fcf2f
|
||||||
|
size 2929780
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user