diff --git a/U_Check-SetMap-request-length-carefully.patch b/U_Check-SetMap-request-length-carefully.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba4f486 --- /dev/null +++ b/U_Check-SetMap-request-length-carefully.patch @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +From 446ff2d3177087b8173fa779fa5b77a2a128988b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matthieu Herrb +Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2020 19:15:07 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Check SetMap request length carefully. + +Avoid out of bounds memory accesses on too short request. + +ZDI-CAN 11572 / CVE-2020-14360 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb +--- + xkb/xkb.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 92 insertions(+) + +Index: xserver-1.20.9/xkb/xkb.c +=================================================================== +--- xserver-1.20.9.orig/xkb/xkb.c ++++ xserver-1.20.9/xkb/xkb.c +@@ -2382,6 +2382,93 @@ SetVirtualModMap(XkbSrvInfoPtr xkbi, + return (char *) wire; + } + ++#define _add_check_len(new) \ ++ if (len > UINT32_MAX - (new) || len > req_len - (new)) goto bad; \ ++ else len += new ++ ++/** ++ * Check the length of the SetMap request ++ */ ++static int ++_XkbSetMapCheckLength(xkbSetMapReq *req) ++{ ++ size_t len = sz_xkbSetMapReq, req_len = req->length << 2; ++ xkbKeyTypeWireDesc *keytype; ++ xkbSymMapWireDesc *symmap; ++ BOOL preserve; ++ int i, map_count, nSyms; ++ ++ if (req_len < len) ++ goto bad; ++ /* types */ ++ if (req->present & XkbKeyTypesMask) { ++ keytype = (xkbKeyTypeWireDesc *)(req + 1); ++ for (i = 0; i < req->nTypes; i++) { ++ _add_check_len(XkbPaddedSize(sz_xkbKeyTypeWireDesc)); ++ if (req->flags & XkbSetMapResizeTypes) { ++ _add_check_len(keytype->nMapEntries ++ * sz_xkbKTSetMapEntryWireDesc); ++ preserve = keytype->preserve; ++ map_count = keytype->nMapEntries; ++ if (preserve) { ++ _add_check_len(map_count * sz_xkbModsWireDesc); ++ } ++ keytype += 1; ++ keytype = (xkbKeyTypeWireDesc *) ++ ((xkbKTSetMapEntryWireDesc *)keytype + map_count); ++ if (preserve) ++ keytype = (xkbKeyTypeWireDesc *) ++ ((xkbModsWireDesc *)keytype + map_count); ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ /* syms */ ++ if (req->present & XkbKeySymsMask) { ++ symmap = (xkbSymMapWireDesc *)((char *)req + len); ++ for (i = 0; i < req->nKeySyms; i++) { ++ _add_check_len(sz_xkbSymMapWireDesc); ++ nSyms = symmap->nSyms; ++ _add_check_len(nSyms*sizeof(CARD32)); ++ symmap += 1; ++ symmap = (xkbSymMapWireDesc *)((CARD32 *)symmap + nSyms); ++ } ++ } ++ /* actions */ ++ if (req->present & XkbKeyActionsMask) { ++ _add_check_len(req->totalActs * sz_xkbActionWireDesc ++ + XkbPaddedSize(req->nKeyActs)); ++ } ++ /* behaviours */ ++ if (req->present & XkbKeyBehaviorsMask) { ++ _add_check_len(req->totalKeyBehaviors * sz_xkbBehaviorWireDesc); ++ } ++ /* vmods */ ++ if (req->present & XkbVirtualModsMask) { ++ _add_check_len(XkbPaddedSize(Ones(req->virtualMods))); ++ } ++ /* explicit */ ++ if (req->present & XkbExplicitComponentsMask) { ++ /* two bytes per non-zero explicit componen */ ++ _add_check_len(XkbPaddedSize(req->totalKeyExplicit * sizeof(CARD16))); ++ } ++ /* modmap */ ++ if (req->present & XkbModifierMapMask) { ++ /* two bytes per non-zero modmap component */ ++ _add_check_len(XkbPaddedSize(req->totalModMapKeys * sizeof(CARD16))); ++ } ++ /* vmodmap */ ++ if (req->present & XkbVirtualModMapMask) { ++ _add_check_len(req->totalVModMapKeys * sz_xkbVModMapWireDesc); ++ } ++ if (len == req_len) ++ return Success; ++bad: ++ ErrorF("[xkb] BOGUS LENGTH in SetMap: expected %ld got %ld\n", ++ len, req_len); ++ return BadLength; ++} ++ ++ + /** + * Check if the given request can be applied to the given device but don't + * actually do anything.. +@@ -2639,6 +2726,11 @@ ProcXkbSetMap(ClientPtr client) + CHK_KBD_DEVICE(dev, stuff->deviceSpec, client, DixManageAccess); + CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x01, stuff->present, XkbAllMapComponentsMask); + ++ /* first verify the request length carefully */ ++ rc = _XkbSetMapCheckLength(stuff); ++ if (rc != Success) ++ return rc; ++ + tmp = (char *) &stuff[1]; + + /* Check if we can to the SetMap on the requested device. If this diff --git a/U_Fix-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-SetDeviceIndicators-heap-ov.patch b/U_Fix-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-SetDeviceIndicators-heap-ov.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..941fc62 --- /dev/null +++ b/U_Fix-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-SetDeviceIndicators-heap-ov.patch @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +From 87c64fc5b0db9f62f4e361444f4b60501ebf67b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matthieu Herrb +Date: Sun, 11 Oct 2020 17:05:09 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix XkbSetDeviceInfo() and SetDeviceIndicators() heap + overflows + +ZDI-CAN 11389 / CVE-2020-25712 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb +--- + xkb/xkb.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +Index: xserver-1.20.9/xkb/xkb.c +=================================================================== +--- xserver-1.20.9.orig/xkb/xkb.c ++++ xserver-1.20.9/xkb/xkb.c +@@ -6533,7 +6533,9 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, + unsigned changed, + int num, + int *status_rtrn, +- ClientPtr client, xkbExtensionDeviceNotify * ev) ++ ClientPtr client, ++ xkbExtensionDeviceNotify * ev, ++ xkbSetDeviceInfoReq * stuff) + { + xkbDeviceLedsWireDesc *ledWire; + int i; +@@ -6554,6 +6556,11 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, + xkbIndicatorMapWireDesc *mapWire; + XkbSrvLedInfoPtr sli; + ++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, ledWire, ledWire + 1)) { ++ *status_rtrn = BadLength; ++ return (char *) ledWire; ++ } ++ + namec = mapc = statec = 0; + sli = XkbFindSrvLedInfo(dev, ledWire->ledClass, ledWire->ledID, + XkbXI_IndicatorMapsMask); +@@ -6572,6 +6579,10 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, + memset((char *) sli->names, 0, XkbNumIndicators * sizeof(Atom)); + for (n = 0, bit = 1; n < XkbNumIndicators; n++, bit <<= 1) { + if (ledWire->namesPresent & bit) { ++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, atomWire, atomWire + 1)) { ++ *status_rtrn = BadLength; ++ return (char *) atomWire; ++ } + sli->names[n] = (Atom) *atomWire; + if (sli->names[n] == None) + ledWire->namesPresent &= ~bit; +@@ -6589,6 +6600,10 @@ SetDeviceIndicators(char *wire, + if (ledWire->mapsPresent) { + for (n = 0, bit = 1; n < XkbNumIndicators; n++, bit <<= 1) { + if (ledWire->mapsPresent & bit) { ++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, mapWire, mapWire + 1)) { ++ *status_rtrn = BadLength; ++ return (char *) mapWire; ++ } + sli->maps[n].flags = mapWire->flags; + sli->maps[n].which_groups = mapWire->whichGroups; + sli->maps[n].groups = mapWire->groups; +@@ -6668,7 +6683,7 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, + ed.deviceID = dev->id; + wire = (char *) &stuff[1]; + if (stuff->change & XkbXI_ButtonActionsMask) { +- int nBtns, sz, i; ++ int nBtns, sz, i; + XkbAction *acts; + DeviceIntPtr kbd; + +@@ -6680,7 +6695,11 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, + return BadAlloc; + dev->button->xkb_acts = acts; + } ++ if (stuff->firstBtn + stuff->nBtns > nBtns) ++ return BadValue; + sz = stuff->nBtns * SIZEOF(xkbActionWireDesc); ++ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, wire, (char *) wire + sz)) ++ return BadLength; + memcpy((char *) &acts[stuff->firstBtn], (char *) wire, sz); + wire += sz; + ed.reason |= XkbXI_ButtonActionsMask; +@@ -6701,7 +6720,8 @@ _XkbSetDeviceInfoCheck(ClientPtr client, + int status = Success; + + wire = SetDeviceIndicators(wire, dev, stuff->change, +- stuff->nDeviceLedFBs, &status, client, &ed); ++ stuff->nDeviceLedFBs, &status, client, &ed, ++ stuff); + if (status != Success) + return status; + } diff --git a/xorg-x11-server.changes b/xorg-x11-server.changes index afbcc42..c284146 100644 --- a/xorg-x11-server.changes +++ b/xorg-x11-server.changes @@ -1,3 +1,17 @@ +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Tue Dec 1 16:39:02 UTC 2020 - Stefan Dirsch + +- U_Check-SetMap-request-length-carefully.patch + * XkbSetMap Out-Of-Bounds Access: Insufficient checks on the + lengths of the XkbSetMap request can lead to out of bounds + memory accesses in the X server. (ZDI-CAN 11572, + CVE-2020-14360, bsc#1174908) +- U_Fix-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-SetDeviceIndicators-heap-ov.patch + * XkbSetDeviceInfo Heap-based Buffer Overflow: Insufficient + checks on input of the XkbSetDeviceInfo request can lead to a + buffer overflow on the head in the X server. (ZDI-CAN 11389, + CVE-2020-25712, bsc#1177596) + ------------------------------------------------------------------- Wed Sep 30 10:30:06 UTC 2020 - Stefan Dirsch diff --git a/xorg-x11-server.spec b/xorg-x11-server.spec index c8bb9dd..a6f6116 100644 --- a/xorg-x11-server.spec +++ b/xorg-x11-server.spec @@ -258,6 +258,9 @@ Patch1802: U_Revert-linux-Fix-platform-device-probe-for-DT-based-.patch Patch1803: U_Revert-linux-Fix-platform-device-PCI-detection-for-c.patch Patch1804: U_Revert-linux-Make-platform-device-probe-less-fragile.patch +Patch1901: U_Fix-XkbSetDeviceInfo-and-SetDeviceIndicators-heap-ov.patch +Patch1902: U_Check-SetMap-request-length-carefully.patch + %description This package contains the X.Org Server. @@ -412,6 +415,8 @@ sh %{SOURCE92} --verify . %{SOURCE91} %patch1802 -p1 %patch1803 -p1 %patch1804 -p1 +%patch1901 -p1 +%patch1902 -p1 %build %define _lto_cflags %{nil}