forked from pool/xorg-x11-server
Accepting request 830081 from home:iznogood:branches:X11:XOrg
New stable release OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/830081 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/X11:XOrg/xorg-x11-server?expand=0&rev=774
This commit is contained in:
parent
fec607fe57
commit
e977430604
@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
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From f7cd1276bbd4fe3a9700096dec33b52b8440788d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
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Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 14:46:32 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 1/4] Correct bounds checking in XkbSetNames()
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CVE-2020-14345 / ZDI 11428
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
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---
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xkb/xkb.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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1 file changed, 48 insertions(+)
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Index: xserver-1.20.8+0/xkb/xkb.c
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===================================================================
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--- xserver-1.20.8+0.orig/xkb/xkb.c
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+++ xserver-1.20.8+0/xkb/xkb.c
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@@ -152,6 +152,19 @@ static RESTYPE RT_XKBCLIENT;
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#define CHK_REQ_KEY_RANGE(err,first,num,r) \
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CHK_REQ_KEY_RANGE2(err,first,num,r,client->errorValue,BadValue)
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+static Bool
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+_XkbCheckRequestBounds(ClientPtr client, void *stuff, void *from, void *to) {
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+ char *cstuff = (char *)stuff;
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+ char *cfrom = (char *)from;
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+ char *cto = (char *)to;
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+
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+ return cfrom < cto &&
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+ cfrom >= cstuff &&
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+ cfrom < cstuff + ((size_t)client->req_len << 2) &&
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+ cto >= cstuff &&
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+ cto <= cstuff + ((size_t)client->req_len << 2);
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+}
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+
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/***====================================================================***/
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int
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@@ -4045,6 +4058,8 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
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client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode2(0x04, stuff->firstType);
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return BadAccess;
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}
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+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + stuff->nTypes))
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+ return BadLength;
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old = tmp;
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tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, stuff->nTypes, client->swapped, &bad);
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if (!tmp) {
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@@ -4074,6 +4089,8 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
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}
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width = (CARD8 *) tmp;
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tmp = (CARD32 *) (((char *) tmp) + XkbPaddedSize(stuff->nKTLevels));
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+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, width, tmp))
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+ return BadLength;
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type = &xkb->map->types[stuff->firstKTLevel];
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for (i = 0; i < stuff->nKTLevels; i++, type++) {
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if (width[i] == 0)
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@@ -4083,6 +4100,8 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
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type->num_levels, width[i]);
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return BadMatch;
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}
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+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + width[i]))
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+ return BadLength;
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tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, width[i], client->swapped, &bad);
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if (!tmp) {
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client->errorValue = bad;
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@@ -4095,6 +4114,9 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
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client->errorValue = 0x08;
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return BadMatch;
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}
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+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp,
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+ tmp + Ones(stuff->indicators)))
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+ return BadLength;
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tmp = _XkbCheckMaskedAtoms(tmp, XkbNumIndicators, stuff->indicators,
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client->swapped, &bad);
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if (!tmp) {
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@@ -4107,6 +4129,9 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
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client->errorValue = 0x09;
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return BadMatch;
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}
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+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp,
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+ tmp + Ones(stuff->virtualMods)))
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+ return BadLength;
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tmp = _XkbCheckMaskedAtoms(tmp, XkbNumVirtualMods,
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(CARD32) stuff->virtualMods,
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client->swapped, &bad);
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@@ -4120,6 +4145,9 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
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client->errorValue = 0x0a;
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return BadMatch;
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}
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+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp,
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+ tmp + Ones(stuff->groupNames)))
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+ return BadLength;
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tmp = _XkbCheckMaskedAtoms(tmp, XkbNumKbdGroups,
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(CARD32) stuff->groupNames,
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client->swapped, &bad);
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@@ -4141,9 +4169,14 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
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stuff->nKeys);
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return BadValue;
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}
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+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + stuff->nKeys))
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+ return BadLength;
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tmp += stuff->nKeys;
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}
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if ((stuff->which & XkbKeyAliasesMask) && (stuff->nKeyAliases > 0)) {
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+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp,
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+ tmp + (stuff->nKeyAliases * 2)))
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+ return BadLength;
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tmp += stuff->nKeyAliases * 2;
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}
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if (stuff->which & XkbRGNamesMask) {
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@@ -4151,6 +4184,9 @@ _XkbSetNamesCheck(ClientPtr client, Devi
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client->errorValue = _XkbErrCode2(0x0d, stuff->nRadioGroups);
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return BadValue;
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}
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+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp,
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+ tmp + stuff->nRadioGroups))
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+ return BadLength;
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tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, stuff->nRadioGroups, client->swapped, &bad);
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if (!tmp) {
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client->errorValue = bad;
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@@ -4344,6 +4380,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client)
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/* check device-independent stuff */
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tmp = (CARD32 *) &stuff[1];
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+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1))
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+ return BadLength;
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if (stuff->which & XkbKeycodesNameMask) {
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tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad);
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if (!tmp) {
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@@ -4351,6 +4389,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client)
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return BadAtom;
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}
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}
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+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1))
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+ return BadLength;
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if (stuff->which & XkbGeometryNameMask) {
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tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad);
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if (!tmp) {
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@@ -4358,6 +4398,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client)
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return BadAtom;
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}
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}
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+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1))
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+ return BadLength;
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if (stuff->which & XkbSymbolsNameMask) {
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tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad);
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if (!tmp) {
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@@ -4365,6 +4407,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client)
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return BadAtom;
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}
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}
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+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1))
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+ return BadLength;
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if (stuff->which & XkbPhysSymbolsNameMask) {
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tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad);
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if (!tmp) {
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@@ -4372,6 +4416,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client)
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return BadAtom;
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}
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}
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+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1))
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+ return BadLength;
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if (stuff->which & XkbTypesNameMask) {
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tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad);
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if (!tmp) {
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@@ -4379,6 +4425,8 @@ ProcXkbSetNames(ClientPtr client)
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return BadAtom;
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}
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}
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+ if (!_XkbCheckRequestBounds(client, stuff, tmp, tmp + 1))
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+ return BadLength;
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if (stuff->which & XkbCompatNameMask) {
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tmp = _XkbCheckAtoms(tmp, 1, client->swapped, &bad);
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if (!tmp) {
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@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
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From c940cc8b6c0a2983c1ec974f1b3f019795dd4cff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
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Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 14:49:04 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 2/4] Fix XIChangeHierarchy() integer underflow
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CVE-2020-14346 / ZDI-CAN-11429
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
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---
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Xi/xichangehierarchy.c | 2 +-
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1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
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index cbdd91258..504defe56 100644
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--- a/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
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+++ b/Xi/xichangehierarchy.c
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@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
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if (!stuff->num_changes)
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return rc;
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- len = ((size_t)stuff->length << 2) - sizeof(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
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+ len = ((size_t)client->req_len << 2) - sizeof(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
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any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) &stuff[1];
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while (stuff->num_changes--) {
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--
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2.16.4
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@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
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From 144849ea27230962227e62a943b399e2ab304787 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
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Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 14:52:29 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 3/4] Fix XkbSelectEvents() integer underflow
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CVE-2020-14361 ZDI-CAN 11573
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
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---
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xkb/xkbSwap.c | 2 +-
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1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/xkb/xkbSwap.c b/xkb/xkbSwap.c
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index 1c1ed5ff4..50cabb90e 100644
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--- a/xkb/xkbSwap.c
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+++ b/xkb/xkbSwap.c
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@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ SProcXkbSelectEvents(ClientPtr client)
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register unsigned bit, ndx, maskLeft, dataLeft, size;
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from.c8 = (CARD8 *) &stuff[1];
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- dataLeft = (stuff->length * 4) - SIZEOF(xkbSelectEventsReq);
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+ dataLeft = (client->req_len * 4) - SIZEOF(xkbSelectEventsReq);
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maskLeft = (stuff->affectWhich & (~XkbMapNotifyMask));
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for (ndx = 0, bit = 1; (maskLeft != 0); ndx++, bit <<= 1) {
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if (((bit & maskLeft) == 0) || (ndx == XkbMapNotify))
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--
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2.16.4
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@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
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From 2902b78535ecc6821cc027351818b28a5c7fdbdc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
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Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 14:55:01 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 4/4] Fix XRecordRegisterClients() Integer underflow
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CVE-2020-14362 ZDI-CAN-11574
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
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---
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record/record.c | 10 +++++-----
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1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
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Index: xserver-1.20.8+0/record/record.c
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===================================================================
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--- xserver-1.20.8+0.orig/record/record.c
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+++ xserver-1.20.8+0/record/record.c
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@@ -2499,7 +2499,7 @@ SProcRecordQueryVersion(ClientPtr client
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} /* SProcRecordQueryVersion */
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static int _X_COLD
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-SwapCreateRegister(xRecordRegisterClientsReq * stuff)
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+SwapCreateRegister(ClientPtr client, xRecordRegisterClientsReq * stuff)
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{
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int i;
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XID *pClientID;
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@@ -2509,13 +2509,13 @@ SwapCreateRegister(xRecordRegisterClient
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swapl(&stuff->nRanges);
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pClientID = (XID *) &stuff[1];
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if (stuff->nClients >
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- stuff->length - bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRegisterClientsReq))
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+ client->req_len - bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRegisterClientsReq))
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return BadLength;
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for (i = 0; i < stuff->nClients; i++, pClientID++) {
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swapl(pClientID);
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}
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if (stuff->nRanges >
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- stuff->length - bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRegisterClientsReq)
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+ client->req_len - bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRegisterClientsReq)
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- stuff->nClients)
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return BadLength;
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RecordSwapRanges((xRecordRange *) pClientID, stuff->nRanges);
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@@ -2530,7 +2530,7 @@ SProcRecordCreateContext(ClientPtr clien
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swaps(&stuff->length);
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REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRecordCreateContextReq);
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- if ((status = SwapCreateRegister((void *) stuff)) != Success)
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+ if ((status = SwapCreateRegister(client, (void *) stuff)) != Success)
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return status;
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return ProcRecordCreateContext(client);
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} /* SProcRecordCreateContext */
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@@ -2543,7 +2543,7 @@ SProcRecordRegisterClients(ClientPtr cli
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swaps(&stuff->length);
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REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRecordRegisterClientsReq);
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- if ((status = SwapCreateRegister((void *) stuff)) != Success)
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+ if ((status = SwapCreateRegister(client, (void *) stuff)) != Success)
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return status;
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return ProcRecordRegisterClients(client);
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} /* SProcRecordRegisterClients */
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@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
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Avoid leaking un-initalized memory to clients by zeroing the
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whole pixmap on initial allocation.
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
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---
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dix/pixmap.c | 2 +-
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1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/dix/pixmap.c b/dix/pixmap.c
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index 1186d7dbb..5a0146bbb 100644
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--- a/dix/pixmap.c
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+++ b/dix/pixmap.c
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@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ AllocatePixmap(ScreenPtr pScreen, int pixDataSize)
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if (pScreen->totalPixmapSize > ((size_t) - 1) - pixDataSize)
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return NullPixmap;
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- pPixmap = malloc(pScreen->totalPixmapSize + pixDataSize);
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+ pPixmap = calloc(1, pScreen->totalPixmapSize + pixDataSize);
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if (!pPixmap)
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return NullPixmap;
|
4
_service
4
_service
@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
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<service name="tar_scm" mode="disabled">
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<param name="url">https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver.git</param>
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<param name="scm">git</param>
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<param name="revision">f84ad082</param>
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<param name="versionformat">@PARENT_TAG@+@TAG_OFFSET@</param>
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<param name="revision">afb77415</param>
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<param name="versionformat">@PARENT_TAG@</param>
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<param name="versionrewrite-pattern">xorgserver(.*)</param>
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<param name="changesgenerate">enable</param>
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</service>
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|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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<servicedata>
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<service name="tar_scm">
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<param name="url">https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver.git</param>
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<param name="changesrevision">f84ad082557f9cde6b8faa373eca6a0a89ba7d56</param></service></servicedata>
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<param name="changesrevision">afb77415e1fb862c322754230f63bb70fd596943</param></service></servicedata>
|
@ -1,3 +1,47 @@
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-------------------------------------------------------------------
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Thu Aug 27 19:29:29 UTC 2020 - bjorn.lie@gmail.com
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- Update to version 1.20.9:
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* Fix XRecordRegisterClients() Integer underflow
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* Fix XkbSelectEvents() integer underflow
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* Fix XIChangeHierarchy() integer underflow
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* Correct bounds checking in XkbSetNames()
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* linux: Fix platform device probe for DT-based PCI
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* linux: Fix platform device PCI detection for complex bus topologies
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* linux: Make platform device probe less fragile
|
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* fix for ZDI-11426
|
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* xfree86: add drm modes on non-GTF panels
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* present: Check valid region in window mode flips
|
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* xwayland: Handle NULL xwl_seat in xwl_seat_can_emulate_pointer_warp
|
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* xwayland: Propagate damage x1/y1 coordinates in xwl_present_flip
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* doc: Update URLs in Xserver-DTrace.xml
|
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* xwayland: Use a fixed DPI value for core protocol
|
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* xwayland: only use linux-dmabuf if format/modifier was advertised
|
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* hw/xfree86: Avoid cursor use after free
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* Update URL's in man pages
|
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* xwayland: Disable the MIT-SCREEN-SAVER extension when rootless
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* xwayland: Hold a pixmap reference in struct xwl_present_event
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* randr: Check rrPrivKey in RRHasScanoutPixmap()
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* modesetting: Fix front_bo leak at drmmode_xf86crtc_resize on XRandR rotation
|
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* xwayland: Store xwl_tablet_pad in its own private key
|
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* xwayland: Initialise values in xwlVidModeGetGamma()
|
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* xwayland: Fix crashes when there is no pointer
|
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* xwayland: Clear private on device removal
|
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* xwayland: Free all remaining events in xwl_present_cleanup
|
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* xwayland: Always use xwl_present_free_event for freeing Present events
|
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* present/wnmd: Free flip_queue entries in present_wnmd_clear_window_flip
|
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* present/wnmd: Keep pixmap pointer in present_wnmd_clear_window_flip
|
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* xwayland: import DMA-BUFs with GBM_BO_USE_RENDERING only
|
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* xwayland: Fix infinite loop at startup
|
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* modesetting: Disable pageflipping when using a swcursor
|
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* dix: do not send focus event when grab actually does not change
|
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- Drop patches fixed upstream:
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* U_0001-Correct-bounds-checking-in-XkbSetNames.patch
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* U_0002-Fix-XIChangeHierarchy-integer-underflow.patch
|
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* U_0003-Fix-XkbSelectEvents-integer-underflow.patch
|
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* U_0004-Fix-XRecordRegisterClients-Integer-underflow.patch
|
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* U_FixForZDI-11426.patch
|
||||
|
||||
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
Tue Aug 25 15:46:49 UTC 2020 - Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch@suse.com>
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
|
||||
%endif
|
||||
|
||||
Name: xorg-x11-server
|
||||
Version: 1.20.8+0
|
||||
Version: 1.20.9
|
||||
Release: 0
|
||||
URL: http://xorg.freedesktop.org/
|
||||
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
|
||||
@ -250,13 +250,6 @@ Patch1505: U_xwayland-Allow-passing-a-fd.patch
|
||||
|
||||
Patch1600: U_glamor_egl-Reject-OpenGL-2.1-early-on.patch
|
||||
|
||||
Patch1701: U_0001-Correct-bounds-checking-in-XkbSetNames.patch
|
||||
Patch1702: U_0002-Fix-XIChangeHierarchy-integer-underflow.patch
|
||||
Patch1703: U_0003-Fix-XkbSelectEvents-integer-underflow.patch
|
||||
Patch1704: U_0004-Fix-XRecordRegisterClients-Integer-underflow.patch
|
||||
|
||||
Patch1174633: U_FixForZDI-11426.patch
|
||||
|
||||
%description
|
||||
This package contains the X.Org Server.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -406,13 +399,6 @@ sh %{SOURCE92} --verify . %{SOURCE91}
|
||||
%patch1505 -p1
|
||||
%patch1600 -p1
|
||||
|
||||
%patch1701 -p1
|
||||
%patch1702 -p1
|
||||
%patch1703 -p1
|
||||
%patch1704 -p1
|
||||
|
||||
%patch1174633 -p1
|
||||
|
||||
%build
|
||||
%define _lto_cflags %{nil}
|
||||
test -e source-file-list || \
|
||||
|
@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
|
||||
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
|
||||
oid sha256:efb62209676b8ea466573a2c1eca80a17eff5eb575915926ce80b96e02507ec2
|
||||
size 3109600
|
3
xserver-1.20.9.tar.xz
Normal file
3
xserver-1.20.9.tar.xz
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
||||
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
|
||||
oid sha256:1a5cabab6e8affa957bf12bb1704334a12bd00cff9f76d66a7f0998959de55a7
|
||||
size 3130696
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user