Accepting request 1045913 from X11:XOrg

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1045913
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/xorg-x11-server?expand=0&rev=415

U_0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-From 2e8916efe9a8566f97a4c2231891ad0f555fced1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 12:55:45 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/6] Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in
- XTestSwapFakeInput
-
-XTestSwapFakeInput assumes all events in this request are
-sizeof(xEvent) and iterates through these in 32-byte increments.
-However, a GenericEvent may be of arbitrary length longer than 32 bytes,
-so any GenericEvent in this list would result in subsequent events to be
-misparsed.
-
-Additional, the swapped event is written into a stack-allocated struct
-xEvent (size 32 bytes). For any GenericEvent longer than 32 bytes,
-swapping the event may thus smash the stack like an avocado on toast.
-
-Catch this case early and return BadValue for any GenericEvent.
-Which is what would happen in unswapped setups anyway since XTest
-doesn't support GenericEvent.
-
-ZDI-CAN 19265
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
----
- Xext/xtest.c | 5 +++--
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xext/xtest.c b/Xext/xtest.c
-index bf27eb590b..2985a4ce6e 100644
---- a/Xext/xtest.c
-+++ b/Xext/xtest.c
-@@ -502,10 +502,11 @@ XTestSwapFakeInput(ClientPtr client, xReq * req)
- 
-     nev = ((req->length << 2) - sizeof(xReq)) / sizeof(xEvent);
-     for (ev = (xEvent *) &req[1]; --nev >= 0; ev++) {
-+        int evtype = ev->u.u.type & 0x177;
-         /* Swap event */
--        proc = EventSwapVector[ev->u.u.type & 0177];
-+        proc = EventSwapVector[evtype];
-         /* no swapping proc; invalid event type? */
--        if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented) {
-+        if (!proc || proc == NotImplemented || evtype == GenericEvent) {
-             client->errorValue = ev->u.u.type;
-             return BadValue;
-         }
--- 
-2.38.1
-

U_0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-From bee46f23fbc2b2722753c3b7769c990b90c235a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:24:00 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/6] Xi: return an error from XI property changes if
- verification failed
-
-Both ProcXChangeDeviceProperty and ProcXIChangeProperty checked the
-property for validity but didn't actually return the potential error.
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
----
- Xi/xiproperty.c | 5 +++++
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
-index a36f7d61df..68c362c628 100644
---- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
-+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
-@@ -902,6 +902,8 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client)
- 
-     rc = check_change_property(client, stuff->property, stuff->type,
-                                stuff->format, stuff->mode, stuff->nUnits);
-+    if (rc != Success)
-+        return rc;
- 
-     len = stuff->nUnits;
-     if (len > (bytes_to_int32(0xffffffff - sizeof(xChangeDevicePropertyReq))))
-@@ -1141,6 +1143,9 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
- 
-     rc = check_change_property(client, stuff->property, stuff->type,
-                                stuff->format, stuff->mode, stuff->num_items);
-+    if (rc != Success)
-+        return rc;
-+
-     len = stuff->num_items;
-     if (len > bytes_to_int32(0xffffffff - sizeof(xXIChangePropertyReq)))
-         return BadLength;
--- 
-2.38.1
-

U_0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch

@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-From 6f01a643c90724f32c19985e39de3bee9b14a310 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:26:57 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/6] Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of
- ProcXIChangeProperty
-
-This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
-
-Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
-the correct stuff->num_items value the expected request size was
-truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
-
-The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes
-(depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it
-finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
-stuff->num_items bytes, i.e. 4GB.
-
-The same bug exists in ProcChangeProperty and ProcXChangeDeviceProperty,
-so let's fix that too.
-
-ZDI-CAN 19405
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
----
- Xi/xiproperty.c | 4 ++--
- dix/property.c  | 3 ++-
- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/xiproperty.c b/Xi/xiproperty.c
-index 68c362c628..066ba21fba 100644
---- a/Xi/xiproperty.c
-+++ b/Xi/xiproperty.c
-@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ ProcXChangeDeviceProperty(ClientPtr client)
-     REQUEST(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
-     DeviceIntPtr dev;
-     unsigned long len;
--    int totalSize;
-+    uint64_t totalSize;
-     int rc;
- 
-     REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xChangeDevicePropertyReq);
-@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ ProcXIChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
- {
-     int rc;
-     DeviceIntPtr dev;
--    int totalSize;
-+    uint64_t totalSize;
-     unsigned long len;
- 
-     REQUEST(xXIChangePropertyReq);
-diff --git a/dix/property.c b/dix/property.c
-index 94ef5a0ec0..acce94b2c6 100644
---- a/dix/property.c
-+++ b/dix/property.c
-@@ -205,7 +205,8 @@ ProcChangeProperty(ClientPtr client)
-     WindowPtr pWin;
-     char format, mode;
-     unsigned long len;
--    int sizeInBytes, totalSize, err;
-+    int sizeInBytes, err;
-+    uint64_t totalSize;
- 
-     REQUEST(xChangePropertyReq);
- 
--- 
-2.38.1
-

U_0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-From 9dc018a5a1a183e0a2cb945572454779b499430c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 13:55:32 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/6] Xi: disallow passive grabs with a detail > 255
-
-The XKB protocol effectively prevents us from ever using keycodes above
-255. For buttons it's theoretically possible but realistically too niche
-to worry about. For all other passive grabs, the detail must be zero
-anyway.
-
-This fixes an OOB write:
-
-ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice() calls DeletePassiveGrabFromList with a
-temporary grab struct which contains tempGrab->detail.exact = stuff->detail.
-For matching existing grabs, DeleteDetailFromMask is called with the
-stuff->detail value. This function creates a new mask with the one bit
-representing stuff->detail cleared.
-
-However, the array size for the new mask is 8 * sizeof(CARD32) bits,
-thus any detail above 255 results in an OOB array write.
-
-ZDI-CAN 19381
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
----
- Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 22 ++++++++++++++--------
- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
-index 2769fb7c94..c9ac2f8553 100644
---- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
-+++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
-@@ -137,6 +137,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
-         return BadValue;
-     }
- 
-+    /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never
-+     * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that
-+     * cannot work anyway, same for buttons > 255. */
-+    if (stuff->detail > 255)
-+        return XIAlreadyGrabbed;
-+
-     if (XICheckInvalidMaskBits(client, (unsigned char *) &stuff[1],
-                                stuff->mask_len * 4) != Success)
-         return BadValue;
-@@ -207,14 +213,8 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
-                                 &param, XI2, &mask);
-             break;
-         case XIGrabtypeKeycode:
--            /* XI2 allows 32-bit keycodes but thanks to XKB we can never
--             * implement this. Just return an error for all keycodes that
--             * cannot work anyway */
--            if (stuff->detail > 255)
--                status = XIAlreadyGrabbed;
--            else
--                status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail,
--                                 &param, XI2, &mask);
-+            status = GrabKey(client, dev, mod_dev, stuff->detail,
-+                             &param, XI2, &mask);
-             break;
-         case XIGrabtypeEnter:
-         case XIGrabtypeFocusIn:
-@@ -334,6 +334,12 @@ ProcXIPassiveUngrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
-         return BadValue;
-     }
- 
-+    /* We don't allow passive grabs for details > 255 anyway */
-+    if (stuff->detail > 255) {
-+        client->errorValue = stuff->detail;
-+        return BadValue;
-+    }
-+
-     rc = dixLookupWindow(&win, stuff->grab_window, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
-     if (rc != Success)
-         return rc;
--- 
-2.38.1
-

U_0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-From 06eb55528bb62f7418f740152642f2066d593bbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2022 14:53:07 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 5/6] Xext: free the screen saver resource when
- replacing it
-
-This fixes a use-after-free bug:
-
-When a client first calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes(), a struct
-ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated and added to the client's
-resources.
-
-When the same client calls ScreenSaverSetAttributes() again, a new
-struct ScreenSaverAttrRec is allocated, replacing the old struct. The
-old struct was freed but not removed from the clients resources.
-
-Later, when the client is destroyed the resource system invokes
-ScreenSaverFreeAttr and attempts to clean up the already freed struct.
-
-Fix this by letting the resource system free the old attrs instead.
-
-ZDI-CAN 19404
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
----
- Xext/saver.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xext/saver.c b/Xext/saver.c
-index f813ba08d1..fd6153c313 100644
---- a/Xext/saver.c
-+++ b/Xext/saver.c
-@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ScreenSaverSetAttributes(ClientPtr client)
-         pVlist++;
-     }
-     if (pPriv->attr)
--        FreeScreenAttr(pPriv->attr);
-+        FreeResource(pPriv->attr->resource, AttrType);
-     pPriv->attr = pAttr;
-     pAttr->resource = FakeClientID(client->index);
-     if (!AddResource(pAttr->resource, AttrType, (void *) pAttr))
--- 
-2.38.1
-

U_0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch

@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-From 4ca304326d3b222a446aca82ec3c28ee8adf8446 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 11:20:40 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 6/6] Xext: free the XvRTVideoNotify when turning off
- from the same client
-
-This fixes a use-after-free bug:
-
-When a client first calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on a drawable with a
-TRUE onoff argument, a struct XvVideoNotifyRec is allocated. This struct
-is added twice to the resources:
-  - as the drawable's XvRTVideoNotifyList. This happens only once per
-    drawable, subsequent calls append to this list.
-  - as the client's XvRTVideoNotify. This happens for every client.
-
-The struct keeps the ClientPtr around once it has been added for a
-client. The idea, presumably, is that if the client disconnects we can remove
-all structs from the drawable's list that match the client (by resetting
-the ClientPtr to NULL), but if the drawable is destroyed we can remove
-and free the whole list.
-
-However, if the same client then calls XvdiSelectVideoNotify() on the
-same drawable with a FALSE onoff argument, only the ClientPtr on the
-existing struct was set to NULL. The struct itself remained in the
-client's resources.
-
-If the drawable is now destroyed, the resource system invokes
-XvdiDestroyVideoNotifyList which frees the whole list for this drawable
-- including our struct. This function however does not free the resource
-for the client since our ClientPtr is NULL.
-
-Later, when the client is destroyed and the resource system invokes
-XvdiDestroyVideoNotify, we unconditionally set the ClientPtr to NULL. On
-a struct that has been freed previously. This is generally frowned upon.
-
-Fix this by calling FreeResource() on the second call instead of merely
-setting the ClientPtr to NULL. This removes the struct from the client
-resources (but not from the list), ensuring that it won't be accessed
-again when the client quits.
-
-Note that the assignment tpn->client = NULL; is superfluous since the
-XvdiDestroyVideoNotify function will do this anyway. But it's left for
-clarity and to match a similar invocation in XvdiSelectPortNotify.
-
-ZDI-CAN 19400
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
----
- Xext/xvmain.c | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xext/xvmain.c b/Xext/xvmain.c
-index f627471938..2a08f8744a 100644
---- a/Xext/xvmain.c
-+++ b/Xext/xvmain.c
-@@ -811,8 +811,10 @@ XvdiSelectVideoNotify(ClientPtr client, DrawablePtr pDraw, BOOL onoff)
-         tpn = pn;
-         while (tpn) {
-             if (tpn->client == client) {
--                if (!onoff)
-+                if (!onoff) {
-                     tpn->client = NULL;
-+                    FreeResource(tpn->id, XvRTVideoNotify);
-+                }
-                 return Success;
-             }
-             if (!tpn->client)
--- 
-2.38.1
-

U_0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From 79916ec4eed724b481d24d97686d3ed05a939859 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Mon, 5 Dec 2022 15:55:54 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: reset the radio_groups pointer to NULL after
- freeing it
-
-Unlike other elements of the keymap, this pointer was freed but not
-reset. On a subsequent XkbGetKbdByName request, the server may access
-already freed memory.
-
-ZDI-CAN-19530
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
----
- xkb/xkbUtils.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/xkb/xkbUtils.c b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
-index dd089c2046..3f5791a183 100644
---- a/xkb/xkbUtils.c
-+++ b/xkb/xkbUtils.c
-@@ -1326,6 +1326,7 @@ _XkbCopyNames(XkbDescPtr src, XkbDescPtr dst)
-         }
-         else {
-             free(dst->names->radio_groups);
-+            dst->names->radio_groups = NULL;
-         }
-         dst->names->num_rg = src->names->num_rg;
- 
--- 
-2.38.1
-

U_xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-From 18f91b950e22c2a342a4fbc55e9ddf7534a707d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 11:23:09 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH] xkb: fix some possible memleaks in XkbGetKbdByName
-
-GetComponentByName returns an allocated string, so let's free that if we
-fail somewhere.
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
----
- xkb/xkb.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-Index: xorg-server-21.1.4/xkb/xkb.c
-===================================================================
---- xorg-server-21.1.4.orig/xkb/xkb.c
-+++ xorg-server-21.1.4/xkb/xkb.c
-@@ -5940,18 +5940,32 @@ ProcXkbGetKbdByName(ClientPtr client)
-     xkb = dev->key->xkbInfo->desc;
-     status = Success;
-     str = (unsigned char *) &stuff[1];
--    if (GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status))  /* keymap, unsupported */
--        return BadMatch;
-+    {
-+        char *keymap = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);  /* keymap, unsupported */
-+        if (keymap) {
-+            free(keymap);
-+            return BadMatch;
-+        }
-+    }
-     names.keycodes = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
-     names.types = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
-     names.compat = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
-     names.symbols = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
-     names.geometry = GetComponentSpec(&str, TRUE, &status);
--    if (status != Success)
-+    if (status == Success) {
-+        len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
-+        if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
-+            status = BadLength;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (status != Success) {
-+        free(names.keycodes);
-+        free(names.types);
-+        free(names.compat);
-+        free(names.symbols);
-+        free(names.geometry);
-         return status;
--    len = str - ((unsigned char *) stuff);
--    if ((XkbPaddedSize(len) / 4) != stuff->length)
--        return BadLength;
-+    }
- 
-     CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x01, stuff->want, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);
-     CHK_MASK_LEGAL(0x02, stuff->need, XkbGBN_AllComponentsMask);

U_xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From 11beef0b7f1ed290348e45618e5fa0d2bffcb72e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 5 Jul 2022 12:06:20 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH] xkb: proof GetCountedString against request length attacks
-
-GetCountedString did a check for the whole string to be within the
-request buffer but not for the initial 2 bytes that contain the length
-field. A swapped client could send a malformed request to trigger a
-swaps() on those bytes, writing into random memory.
-
-Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
----
- xkb/xkb.c | 5 +++++
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
-index f42f59ef3..1841cff26 100644
---- a/xkb/xkb.c
-+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
-@@ -5137,6 +5137,11 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, ClientPtr client, char **str)
-     CARD16 len;
- 
-     wire = *wire_inout;
-+
-+    if (client->req_len <
-+        bytes_to_int32(wire + 2 - (char *) client->requestBuffer))
-+        return BadValue;
-+
-     len = *(CARD16 *) wire;
-     if (client->swapped) {
-         swaps(&len);
--- 
-2.35.3
-

_service

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
   <service name="tar_scm" mode="disabled">
     <param name="url">https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver.git</param>
     <param name="scm">git</param>
-    <param name="revision">bc111a2e</param>
+    <param name="revision">xorg-server-21.1.6</param>
     <param name="versionformat">@PARENT_TAG@</param>
     <param name="versionrewrite-pattern">xorgserver(.*)</param>
     <param name="changesgenerate">enable</param>

_servicedata

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 <servicedata>
 <service name="tar_scm">
                 <param name="url">https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver.git</param>
-              <param name="changesrevision">bc111a2e67e16d4e6d4f3196ab86c22c1e278c45</param></service></servicedata>
+              <param name="changesrevision">59b6fc88ed9f4b22397a568c2483e4c558856ffa</param></service></servicedata>

xorg-server-21.1.4.tar.xz

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
-oid sha256:5cc4be8ee47edb58d4a90e603a59d56b40291ad38371b0bd2471fc3cbee1c587
-size 4940176

xorg-x11-server.changes

@@ -1,3 +1,40 @@
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Mon Dec 19 19:54:11 UTC 2022 - dmueller@suse.com
+
+- Update to version xorg-server-21.1.6:
+  * xserver 21.1.6
+  * Xext: fix invalid event type mask in XTestSwapFakeInput
+  * xkb: fix some possible memleaks in XkbGetKbdByName
+  * xkb: proof GetCountedString against request length attacks
+  * xquartz: Fix some formatting
+  * XQuartz: stub: Call LSOpenApplication instead of fork()/exec()
+- drop the following upstream patches:
+  U_xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
+  U_xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Sat Dec 17 17:40:15 UTC 2022 - Dirk Müller <dmueller@suse.com>
+
+- Update to version xorg-server-21.1.5:
+  * xkb: reset the radio_groups pointer to NULL after freeing it
+  * Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of ProcXIChangeProperty
+  * Xi: return an error from XI property changes if verification failed
+  * Xext: free the screen saver resource when replacing it
+  * Xext: free the XvRTVideoNotify when turning off from the same client
+  * Xi: disallow passive grabs with a detail > 255
+  * Xtest: disallow GenericEvents in XTestSwapFakeInput
+  * meson: Don't build COMPOSITE for XQuartz
+  * xquartz: Move default applications list outside of the main executable
+  * xquartz: Remove unused macro (X11LIBDIR)
+- drop the following upstream patches:
+  U_0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch
+  U_0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch
+  U_0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch
+  U_0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch
+  U_0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch
+  U_0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch
+  U_0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch
+  
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Tue Dec  6 14:26:07 UTC 2022 - Stefan Dirsch <sndirsch@suse.com>
 

xorg-x11-server.spec

@@ -36,16 +36,14 @@
 %endif
 
 Name:           xorg-x11-server
-Version:        21.1.4
+Version:        21.1.6
 Release:        0
 URL:            http://xorg.freedesktop.org/
-BuildRoot:      %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
-
 Summary:        X
 # Source URL: http://xorg.freedesktop.org/archive/individual/xserver/
 License:        MIT
 Group:          System/X11/Servers/XF86_4
-Source0:        xorg-server-%{version}.tar.xz
+Source0:        xserver-xorg-server-%{version}.tar.xz
 Source1:        sysconfig.displaymanager.template
 Source2:        README.updates
 Source3:        xorgcfg.tar.bz2
@@ -246,17 +244,6 @@ Patch1940:      U_xephyr-Don-t-check-for-SeatId-anymore.patch
 
 Patch1960:      u_sync-pci-ids-with-Mesa.patch
 
-Patch1204412:   U_xkb-proof-GetCountedString-against-request-length-at.patch
-Patch1204416:   U_xkb-fix-some-possible-memleaks-in-XkbGetKbdByName.patch
-
-Patch1205874:   U_0001-Xtest-disallow-GenericEvents-in-XTestSwapFakeInput.patch
-Patch1205875:   U_0002-Xi-return-an-error-from-XI-property-changes-if-verif.patch
-Patch1205876:   U_0003-Xi-avoid-integer-truncation-in-length-check-of-ProcX.patch
-Patch1205877:   U_0004-Xi-disallow-passive-grabs-with-a-detail-255.patch
-Patch1205878:   U_0005-Xext-free-the-screen-saver-resource-when-replacing-i.patch
-Patch1205879:   U_0006-Xext-free-the-XvRTVideoNotify-when-turning-off-from-.patch
-Patch1206017:   U_0007-xkb-reset-the-radio_groups-pointer-to-NULL-after-fre.patch
-
 %description
 This package contains the X.Org Server.
 
@@ -362,7 +349,7 @@ Group:          Development/Sources
 This package contains patched sources of X.Org Server.
 
 %prep
-%setup -q -n xorg-server-%{version} -a3
+%setup -q -n xserver-xorg-server-%{version} -a3
 # Early verification if the ABI Defines are correct. Let's not waste build cycles if the Provides are wrong at the end.
 sh %{SOURCE92} --verify . %{SOURCE91}
 
@@ -414,15 +401,6 @@ sh %{SOURCE92} --verify . %{SOURCE91}
 %patch1930 -p1
 %patch1940 -p1
 %patch1960 -p1
-%patch1204412 -p1
-%patch1204416 -p1
-%patch1205874 -p1
-%patch1205875 -p1
-%patch1205876 -p1
-%patch1205877 -p1
-%patch1205878 -p1
-%patch1205879 -p1
-%patch1206017 -p1
 
 %build
 # We have some -z now related errors during X default startup (boo#1197994):

xserver-xorg-server-21.1.6.tar.xz

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:a06a5c27d9ec99ee9673d9f173e2d8dc36ded69817c8cd4395b9de22375fcf2f
+size 2929780