3
0
forked from pool/libgcrypt
libgcrypt/libgcrypt-1.6.1-fips-cfgrandom.patch

135 lines
4.7 KiB
Diff
Raw Normal View History

Index: libgcrypt-1.6.1/random/random-fips.c
===================================================================
--- libgcrypt-1.6.1.orig/random/random-fips.c
+++ libgcrypt-1.6.1/random/random-fips.c
@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@
There are 3 random context which map to the different levels of
random quality:
- Generator Seed and Key Kernel entropy (init/reseed)
- ------------------------------------------------------------
- GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM /dev/random 256/128 bits
- GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM /dev/random 256/128 bits
+ Generator Seed and Key Kernel entropy (init/reseed)
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM /etc/gcrypt/rngseed+/dev/urandom 256/128 bits
+ GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM /etc/gcrypt/rngseed+/dev/urandom 256/128 bits
gcry_create_nonce GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM n/a
All random generators return their data in 128 bit blocks. If the
@@ -40,8 +40,10 @@
(SEED_TTL) output blocks; the re-seeding is disabled in test mode.
The GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM and GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM generators are
- keyed and seeded from the /dev/random device. Thus these
- generators may block until the kernel has collected enough entropy.
+ keyed and seeded with data that is loaded from the /etc/gcrypt/rngseed
+ if the device or symlink to device exists xored with the data
+ from the /dev/urandom device. This allows the system administrator
+ to always seed the RNGs from /dev/random if it is required.
The gcry_create_nonce generator is keyed and seeded from the
GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM generator. It may also block if the
@@ -560,9 +562,13 @@ get_entropy (size_t nbytes)
entropy_collect_buffer_len = 0;
#if USE_RNDLINUX
+ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (entropy_collect_cb, 0,
+ X931_AES_KEYLEN,
+ -1);
+ entropy_collect_buffer_len = 0;
rc = _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (entropy_collect_cb, 0,
X931_AES_KEYLEN,
- GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM);
+ GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
#elif USE_RNDW32
do
{
Index: libgcrypt-1.6.1/random/rndlinux.c
===================================================================
--- libgcrypt-1.6.1.orig/random/rndlinux.c
+++ libgcrypt-1.6.1/random/rndlinux.c
@@ -36,7 +36,9 @@
#include "g10lib.h"
#include "rand-internal.h"
-static int open_device (const char *name, int retry);
+#define NAME_OF_CFG_RNGSEED "/etc/gcrypt/rngseed"
+
+static int open_device (const char *name, int retry, int fatal);
static int
@@ -59,7 +61,7 @@ set_cloexec_flag (int fd)
* a fatal error but retries until it is able to reopen the device.
*/
static int
-open_device (const char *name, int retry)
+open_device (const char *name, int retry, int fatal)
{
int fd;
@@ -67,6 +69,8 @@ open_device (const char *name, int retry
_gcry_random_progress ("open_dev_random", 'X', 1, 0);
again:
fd = open (name, O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd == -1 && !fatal)
+ return fd;
if (fd == -1 && retry)
{
struct timeval tv;
@@ -111,6 +115,7 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
{
static int fd_urandom = -1;
static int fd_random = -1;
+ static int fd_configured = -1;
static unsigned char ever_opened;
int fd;
int n;
@@ -134,6 +139,11 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
close (fd_urandom);
fd_urandom = -1;
}
+ if (fd_configured != -1)
+ {
+ close (fd_configured);
+ fd_configured = -1;
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -153,20 +163,30 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add
that we always require the device to be existent but want a more
graceful behaviour if the rarely needed close operation has been
used and the device needs to be re-opened later. */
+
+ if (level == -1)
+ {
+ if (fd_configured == -1)
+ fd_configured = open_device ( NAME_OF_CFG_RNGSEED, 0, 0 );
+ fd = fd_configured;
+ if (fd == -1)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
if (level >= 2)
{
if (fd_random == -1)
{
- fd_random = open_device (NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM, (ever_opened & 1));
+ fd_random = open_device (NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM, (ever_opened & 1), 1);
ever_opened |= 1;
}
fd = fd_random;
}
- else
+ else if (level != -1)
{
if (fd_urandom == -1)
{
- fd_urandom = open_device (NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM, (ever_opened & 2));
+ fd_urandom = open_device (NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM, (ever_opened & 2), 1);
ever_opened |= 2;
}
fd = fd_urandom;