diff --git a/Bug748738_Tolerate_bad_MIME_headers.patch b/Bug748738_Tolerate_bad_MIME_headers.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 261b2ec..0000000
--- a/Bug748738_Tolerate_bad_MIME_headers.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-Index: openssl-1.0.0g/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.0g.orig/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
-+++ openssl-1.0.0g/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
-@@ -858,6 +858,10 @@ static int mime_hdr_addparam(MIME_HEADER
- static int mime_hdr_cmp(const MIME_HEADER * const *a,
- 			const MIME_HEADER * const *b)
- {
-+	if ((*a)->name == NULL || (*b)->name == NULL)
-+		return (*a)->name - (*b)->name < 0 ? -1 :
-+			(*a)->name - (*b)->name > 0 ? 1 : 0;
-+
- 	return(strcmp((*a)->name, (*b)->name));
- }
- 
diff --git a/CVE-2012-0884.patch b/CVE-2012-0884.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2fc26c6..0000000
--- a/CVE-2012-0884.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,357 +0,0 @@
-Index: openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/cms/cms.h
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.0c.orig/crypto/cms/cms.h
-+++ openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/cms/cms.h
-@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION(CMS_ContentI
- #define CMS_PARTIAL			0x4000
- #define CMS_REUSE_DIGEST		0x8000
- #define CMS_USE_KEYID			0x10000
-+#define CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT		0x20000
- 
- const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_type(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
- 
-Index: openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.0c.orig/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
-+++ openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
-@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_E
- 	const EVP_CIPHER *ciph;
- 	X509_ALGOR *calg = ec->contentEncryptionAlgorithm;
- 	unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *piv = NULL;
-+	unsigned char *tkey = NULL;
-+	size_t tkeylen;
- 
- 	int ok = 0;
- 
-@@ -139,30 +141,55 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_E
- 		}
- 
- 
--	if (enc && !ec->key)
-+	/* Generate random session key */
-+	if (!enc || !ec->key)
- 		{
--		/* Generate random key */
--		if (!ec->keylen)
--			ec->keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
--		ec->key = OPENSSL_malloc(ec->keylen);
--		if (!ec->key)
-+		tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
-+		tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
-+		if (!tkey)
- 			{
- 			CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
- 							ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- 			goto err;
- 			}
--		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, ec->key) <= 0)
-+		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, tkey) <= 0)
- 			goto err;
--		keep_key = 1;
- 		}
--	else if (ec->keylen != (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx))
-+	if (!ec->key)
-+		{
-+		ec->key = tkey;
-+		ec->keylen = tkeylen;
-+		tkey = NULL;
-+		if (enc)
-+			keep_key = 1;
-+		else
-+			ERR_clear_error();
-+		}
-+		
-+	if (ec->keylen != tkeylen)
- 		{
- 		/* If necessary set key length */
- 		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, ec->keylen) <= 0)
- 			{
--			CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
--				CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
--			goto err;
-+			/* Only reveal failure if debugging so we don't
-+   			 * leak information which may be useful in MMA.
-+   			 */
-+			if (ec->debug)
-+				{
-+				CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
-+						CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
-+				goto err;
-+				}
-+			else
-+				{
-+				/* Use random key */
-+				OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
-+				OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
-+				ec->key = tkey;
-+				ec->keylen = tkeylen;
-+				tkey = NULL;
-+				ERR_clear_error();
-+				}
- 			}
- 		}
- 
-@@ -198,6 +225,11 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_E
- 		OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
- 		ec->key = NULL;
- 		}
-+	if (tkey)
-+		{
-+		OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen);
-+		OPENSSL_free(tkey);
-+		}
- 	if (ok)
- 		return b;
- 	BIO_free(b);
-Index: openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.0c.orig/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
-+++ openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
-@@ -371,6 +371,8 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decryp
- 	unsigned char *ek = NULL;
- 	size_t eklen;
- 	int ret = 0;
-+	CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
-+	ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
- 
- 	if (ktri->pkey == NULL)
- 		{
-@@ -417,8 +419,14 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decryp
- 
- 	ret = 1;
- 
--	cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->key = ek;
--	cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->keylen = eklen;
-+	if (ec->key)
-+		{
-+		OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
-+		OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
-+		}
-+
-+	ec->key = ek;
-+	ec->keylen = eklen;
- 
- 	err:
- 	if (pctx)
-Index: openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.0c.orig/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h
-+++ openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h
-@@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ struct CMS_EncryptedContentInfo_st
- 	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
- 	unsigned char *key;
- 	size_t keylen;
-+	/* Set to 1 if we are debugging decrypt and don't fake keys for MMA */
-+	int debug;
- 	};
- 
- struct CMS_RecipientInfo_st
-Index: openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.0c.orig/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
-+++ openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
-@@ -611,7 +611,10 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInf
- 	STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
- 	CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
- 	int i, r;
-+	int debug = 0;
- 	ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
-+	if (ris)
-+		debug = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug;
- 	for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++)
- 		{
- 		ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
-@@ -625,17 +628,38 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInf
- 			CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, pk);
- 			r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
- 			CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, NULL);
--			if (r > 0)
--				return 1;
- 			if (cert)
- 				{
-+				/* If not debugging clear any error and
-+   				 * return success to avoid leaking of
-+   				 * information useful to MMA
-+   				 */
-+				if (!debug)
-+					{
-+					ERR_clear_error();
-+					return 1;
-+					}
-+				if (r > 0)
-+					return 1;
- 				CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY,
- 						CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR);
- 				return 0;
- 				}
--			ERR_clear_error();
-+			/* If no cert and not debugging don't leave loop
-+			 * after first successful decrypt. Always attempt
-+			 * to decrypt all recipients to avoid leaking timing
-+			 * of a successful decrypt.
-+			 */
-+			else if (r > 0 && debug)
-+				return 1;
- 			}
- 		}
-+	/* If no cert and not debugging always return success */
-+	if (!cert && !debug)
-+		{
-+		ERR_clear_error();
-+		return 1;
-+		}
- 
- 	CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
- 	return 0;
-@@ -694,6 +718,12 @@ int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EV
- 		}
- 	if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
- 		return 0;
-+	if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
-+		cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 1;
-+	else
-+		cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 0;
-+	if (!pk && !cert && !dcont && !out)
-+		return 1;
- 	if (pk && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert))
- 		return 0;
- 
-Index: openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.0c.orig/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
-+++ openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
-@@ -204,11 +204,11 @@ static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned
- 	unsigned char *ek = NULL;
- 	size_t eklen;
- 
--	int ret = 0;
-+	int ret = -1;
- 
- 	pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
- 	if (!pctx)
--		return 0;
-+		return -1;
- 
- 	if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pctx) <= 0)
- 		goto err;
-@@ -235,12 +235,19 @@ static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned
- 	if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, ek, &eklen,
- 				ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0)
- 		{
-+		ret = 0;
- 		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- 		goto err;
- 		}
- 
- 	ret = 1;
- 
-+	if (*pek)
-+		{
-+		OPENSSL_cleanse(*pek, *peklen);
-+		OPENSSL_free(*pek);
-+		}
-+		
- 	*pek = ek;
- 	*peklen = eklen;
- 
-@@ -500,8 +507,8 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
- 		int max;
- 		X509_OBJECT ret;
- #endif
--		unsigned char *ek = NULL;
--		int eklen;
-+		unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL;
-+		int eklen, tkeylen;
- 
- 		if ((etmp=BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL)
- 			{
-@@ -537,26 +544,25 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
- 
- 		if (pcert == NULL)
- 			{
-+			/* Always attempt to decrypt all rinfo even
-+			 * after sucess as a defence against MMA timing
-+			 * attacks.
-+			 */
- 			for (i=0; i<sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++)
- 				{
- 				ri=sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk,i);
- 				if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen,
--							ri, pkey) > 0)
--					break;
-+							ri, pkey) < 0)
-+					goto err;
- 				ERR_clear_error();
--				ri = NULL;
--				}
--			if (ri == NULL)
--				{
--				PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
--				      PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_KEY);
--				goto err;
- 				}
- 			}
- 		else
- 			{
--			if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) <= 0)
-+			/* Only exit on fatal errors, not decrypt failure */
-+			if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0)
- 				goto err;
-+			ERR_clear_error();
- 			}
- 
- 		evp_ctx=NULL;
-@@ -566,6 +572,20 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
- 		if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx,enc_alg->parameter) < 0)
- 			goto err;
- 
-+		/* Generate random key as MMA defence */
-+		tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx);
-+		tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
-+		if (!tkey)
-+			goto err;
-+		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey) <= 0)
-+			goto err;
-+		if (ek == NULL)
-+			{
-+			ek = tkey;
-+			eklen = tkeylen;
-+			tkey = NULL;
-+			}
-+
- 		if (eklen != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)) {
- 			/* Some S/MIME clients don't use the same key
- 			 * and effective key length. The key length is
-@@ -573,11 +593,16 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
- 			 */
- 			if(!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(evp_ctx, eklen))
- 				{
--				PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
--					PKCS7_R_DECRYPTED_KEY_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
--				goto err;
-+				/* Use random key as MMA defence */
-+				OPENSSL_cleanse(ek, eklen);
-+				OPENSSL_free(ek);
-+				ek = tkey;
-+				eklen = tkeylen;
-+				tkey = NULL;
- 				}
- 		} 
-+		/* Clear errors so we don't leak information useful in MMA */
-+		ERR_clear_error();
- 		if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx,NULL,NULL,ek,NULL,0) <= 0)
- 			goto err;
- 
-@@ -587,6 +612,12 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
- 			OPENSSL_free(ek);
- 			}
- 
-+		if (tkey)
-+			{
-+			OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey,tkeylen);
-+			OPENSSL_free(tkey);
-+			}
-+
- 		if (out == NULL)
- 			out=etmp;
- 		else
diff --git a/CVE-2012-1165.patch b/CVE-2012-1165.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2575088..0000000
--- a/CVE-2012-1165.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-Index: openssl-1.0.0g/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.0g.orig/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
-+++ openssl-1.0.0g/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
-@@ -858,9 +858,8 @@ static int mime_hdr_addparam(MIME_HEADER
- static int mime_hdr_cmp(const MIME_HEADER * const *a,
- 			const MIME_HEADER * const *b)
- {
--	if ((*a)->name == NULL || (*b)->name == NULL)
--		return (*a)->name - (*b)->name < 0 ? -1 :
--			(*a)->name - (*b)->name > 0 ? 1 : 0;
-+	if (!(*a)->name || !(*b)->name)
-+		return !!(*a)->name - !!(*b)->name;
- 
- 	return(strcmp((*a)->name, (*b)->name));
- }
-@@ -868,6 +867,8 @@ static int mime_hdr_cmp(const MIME_HEADE
- static int mime_param_cmp(const MIME_PARAM * const *a,
- 			const MIME_PARAM * const *b)
- {
-+	if (!(*a)->param_name || !(*b)->param_name)
-+		return !!(*a)->param_name - !!(*b)->param_name;
- 	return(strcmp((*a)->param_name, (*b)->param_name));
- }
- 
diff --git a/bug749210-Symmetric-crypto-errors-in-PKCS7_decrypt.patch b/bug749210-Symmetric-crypto-errors-in-PKCS7_decrypt.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 16d5c06..0000000
--- a/bug749210-Symmetric-crypto-errors-in-PKCS7_decrypt.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-Index: openssl-1.0.0g/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.0g.orig/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c
-+++ openssl-1.0.0g/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c
-@@ -573,15 +573,30 @@ int PKCS7_decrypt(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *p
- 			return 0;
- 		}
- 		ret = SMIME_text(bread, data);
-+		if (ret > 0 && BIO_method_type(tmpmem) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER)
-+		{
-+			if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(tmpmem))
-+				ret = 0;
-+		}
- 		BIO_free_all(bread);
- 		return ret;
- 	} else {
- 		for(;;) {
- 			i = BIO_read(tmpmem, buf, sizeof(buf));
--			if(i <= 0) break;
-+			if(i <= 0)
-+			{
-+				ret = 1;
-+				if (BIO_method_type(tmpmem) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER)
-+				{
-+					if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(tmpmem))
-+						ret = 0;
-+				}
-+
-+				break;
-+			}
- 			BIO_write(data, buf, i);
- 		}
- 		BIO_free_all(tmpmem);
--		return 1;
-+		return ret;
- 	}
- }
diff --git a/bug749213-Free-headers-after-use.patch b/bug749213-Free-headers-after-use.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 6665b7e..0000000
--- a/bug749213-Free-headers-after-use.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-Index: openssl-1.0.0g/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.0g.orig/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
-+++ openssl-1.0.0g/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
-@@ -486,9 +486,9 @@ ASN1_VALUE *SMIME_read_ASN1(BIO *bio, BI
- 
- 		if(strcmp(hdr->value, "application/x-pkcs7-signature") &&
- 			strcmp(hdr->value, "application/pkcs7-signature")) {
--			sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
- 			ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1,ASN1_R_SIG_INVALID_MIME_TYPE);
- 			ERR_add_error_data(2, "type: ", hdr->value);
-+			sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
- 			sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree);
- 			return NULL;
- 		}
diff --git a/bug749735.patch b/bug749735.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8c27096..0000000
--- a/bug749735.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-Index: openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
-===================================================================
---- openssl-1.0.0c.orig/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
-+++ openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
-@@ -171,7 +171,16 @@ EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *k
- 		goto error;
- 		}
- 
--	key->pkey = ret;
-+	/* Check to see if another thread set key->pkey first */
-+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
-+	if (key->pkey)
-+		{
-+		EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
-+		ret = key->pkey;
-+		}
-+	else
-+		key->pkey = ret;
-+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
- 	CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
- 
- 	return ret;
diff --git a/openssl-1.0.0g.tar.bz2 b/openssl-1.0.0g.tar.bz2
deleted file mode 100644
index a525af7..0000000
--- a/openssl-1.0.0g.tar.bz2
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
-oid sha256:191358567173d576dc110279285e14926751028e36d0760a4a6fab8348dccda7
-size 3215079
diff --git a/openssl-1.0.0i.tar.bz2 b/openssl-1.0.0i.tar.bz2
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e00852
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-1.0.0i.tar.bz2
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:41cc7688650540f918c151eff5676e19b819121065bfe4abf0247f3f022cf49a
+size 3241560
diff --git a/openssl.changes b/openssl.changes
index ecd44fe..402efa6 100644
--- a/openssl.changes
+++ b/openssl.changes
@@ -1,3 +1,16 @@
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Mon Apr 23 05:57:35 UTC 2012 - gjhe@suse.com
+
+- update to latest stable verison 1.0.0i
+  including the following patches:
+  CVE-2012-2110.path
+  Bug748738_Tolerate_bad_MIME_headers.patch
+  bug749213-Free-headers-after-use.patch
+  bug749210-Symmetric-crypto-errors-in-PKCS7_decrypt.patch
+  CVE-2012-1165.patch
+  CVE-2012-0884.patch
+  bug749735.patch
+
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Tue Mar 27 09:16:37 UTC 2012 - gjhe@suse.com
 
diff --git a/openssl.spec b/openssl.spec
index 75c6f6d..20b94a1 100644
--- a/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl.spec
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ AutoReqProv:    on
 %ifarch ppc64
 Obsoletes:      openssl-64bit
 %endif
-Version:        1.0.0g
+Version:        1.0.0i
 Release:        1
 Summary:        Secure Sockets and Transport Layer Security
 Url:            http://www.openssl.org/
@@ -49,12 +49,12 @@ Patch2:         bug610223.patch
 Patch7:         openssl-1.0.0b-aesni.patch
 #Patch8:         CVE-2011-0014.patch
 Patch10:        openssl-call-engine-reg-comp.patch
-Patch11:        Bug748738_Tolerate_bad_MIME_headers.patch
-Patch12:        bug749213-Free-headers-after-use.patch
-Patch13:        bug749210-Symmetric-crypto-errors-in-PKCS7_decrypt.patch
-Patch14:        CVE-2012-1165.patch
-Patch15:        CVE-2012-0884.patch
-Patch16:        bug749735.patch
+#Patch11:        Bug748738_Tolerate_bad_MIME_headers.patch
+#Patch12:        bug749213-Free-headers-after-use.patch
+#Patch13:        bug749210-Symmetric-crypto-errors-in-PKCS7_decrypt.patch
+#Patch14:        CVE-2012-1165.patch
+#Patch15:        CVE-2012-0884.patch
+#Patch16:        bug749735.patch
 BuildRoot:      %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
 
 %description
@@ -192,12 +192,12 @@ Authors:
 %patch7
 #%patch8 -p1
 %patch10
-%patch11 -p1
-%patch12 -p1
-%patch13 -p1
-%patch14 -p1
-%patch15 -p1
-%patch16 -p1
+#%patch11 -p1
+#%patch12 -p1
+#%patch13 -p1
+#%patch14 -p1
+#%patch15 -p1
+#%patch16 -p1
 cp -p %{S:10} .
 echo "adding/overwriting some entries in the 'table' hash in Configure"
 # $dso_scheme:$shared_target:$shared_cflag:$shared_ldflag:$shared_extension:$ranlib:$arflags