forked from pool/openssl
Accepting request 113739 from Base:System
Automatic submission by obs-autosubmit OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/113739 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssl?expand=0&rev=75
This commit is contained in:
Stephan Kulow
Git OBS Bridge
parent
350402e556
commit
5fcf0408aa
357
CVE-2012-0884.patch
Normal file
357
CVE-2012-0884.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
|
||||
Index: openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/cms/cms.h
|
||||
===================================================================
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.0c.orig/crypto/cms/cms.h
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/cms/cms.h
|
||||
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION(CMS_ContentI
|
||||
#define CMS_PARTIAL 0x4000
|
||||
#define CMS_REUSE_DIGEST 0x8000
|
||||
#define CMS_USE_KEYID 0x10000
|
||||
+#define CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT 0x20000
|
||||
|
||||
const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_type(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
|
||||
|
||||
Index: openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
|
||||
===================================================================
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.0c.orig/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
|
||||
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_E
|
||||
const EVP_CIPHER *ciph;
|
||||
X509_ALGOR *calg = ec->contentEncryptionAlgorithm;
|
||||
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *piv = NULL;
|
||||
+ unsigned char *tkey = NULL;
|
||||
+ size_t tkeylen;
|
||||
|
||||
int ok = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -139,30 +141,55 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_E
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- if (enc && !ec->key)
|
||||
+ /* Generate random session key */
|
||||
+ if (!enc || !ec->key)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- /* Generate random key */
|
||||
- if (!ec->keylen)
|
||||
- ec->keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
|
||||
- ec->key = OPENSSL_malloc(ec->keylen);
|
||||
- if (!ec->key)
|
||||
+ tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
|
||||
+ tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
|
||||
+ if (!tkey)
|
||||
{
|
||||
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
|
||||
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, ec->key) <= 0)
|
||||
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, tkey) <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
- keep_key = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- else if (ec->keylen != (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx))
|
||||
+ if (!ec->key)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ ec->key = tkey;
|
||||
+ ec->keylen = tkeylen;
|
||||
+ tkey = NULL;
|
||||
+ if (enc)
|
||||
+ keep_key = 1;
|
||||
+ else
|
||||
+ ERR_clear_error();
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (ec->keylen != tkeylen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* If necessary set key length */
|
||||
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, ec->keylen) <= 0)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
|
||||
- CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||||
- goto err;
|
||||
+ /* Only reveal failure if debugging so we don't
|
||||
+ * leak information which may be useful in MMA.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (ec->debug)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
|
||||
+ CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ else
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ /* Use random key */
|
||||
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
|
||||
+ OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
|
||||
+ ec->key = tkey;
|
||||
+ ec->keylen = tkeylen;
|
||||
+ tkey = NULL;
|
||||
+ ERR_clear_error();
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -198,6 +225,11 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_E
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
|
||||
ec->key = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ if (tkey)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen);
|
||||
+ OPENSSL_free(tkey);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
if (ok)
|
||||
return b;
|
||||
BIO_free(b);
|
||||
Index: openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
|
||||
===================================================================
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.0c.orig/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/cms/cms_env.c
|
||||
@@ -371,6 +371,8 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decryp
|
||||
unsigned char *ek = NULL;
|
||||
size_t eklen;
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
+ CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
|
||||
+ ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ktri->pkey == NULL)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -417,8 +419,14 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decryp
|
||||
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
- cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->key = ek;
|
||||
- cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->keylen = eklen;
|
||||
+ if (ec->key)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
|
||||
+ OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ ec->key = ek;
|
||||
+ ec->keylen = eklen;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
if (pctx)
|
||||
Index: openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h
|
||||
===================================================================
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.0c.orig/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h
|
||||
@@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ struct CMS_EncryptedContentInfo_st
|
||||
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
|
||||
unsigned char *key;
|
||||
size_t keylen;
|
||||
+ /* Set to 1 if we are debugging decrypt and don't fake keys for MMA */
|
||||
+ int debug;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
struct CMS_RecipientInfo_st
|
||||
Index: openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
|
||||
===================================================================
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.0c.orig/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
|
||||
@@ -611,7 +611,10 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInf
|
||||
STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
|
||||
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
|
||||
int i, r;
|
||||
+ int debug = 0;
|
||||
ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
|
||||
+ if (ris)
|
||||
+ debug = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug;
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
|
||||
@@ -625,17 +628,38 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInf
|
||||
CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, pk);
|
||||
r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
|
||||
CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, NULL);
|
||||
- if (r > 0)
|
||||
- return 1;
|
||||
if (cert)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ /* If not debugging clear any error and
|
||||
+ * return success to avoid leaking of
|
||||
+ * information useful to MMA
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ if (!debug)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ ERR_clear_error();
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (r > 0)
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY,
|
||||
CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- ERR_clear_error();
|
||||
+ /* If no cert and not debugging don't leave loop
|
||||
+ * after first successful decrypt. Always attempt
|
||||
+ * to decrypt all recipients to avoid leaking timing
|
||||
+ * of a successful decrypt.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ else if (r > 0 && debug)
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ /* If no cert and not debugging always return success */
|
||||
+ if (!cert && !debug)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ ERR_clear_error();
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
@@ -694,6 +718,12 @@ int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EV
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
+ if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
|
||||
+ cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 1;
|
||||
+ else
|
||||
+ cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 0;
|
||||
+ if (!pk && !cert && !dcont && !out)
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
if (pk && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
Index: openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
|
||||
===================================================================
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.0c.orig/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
|
||||
@@ -204,11 +204,11 @@ static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned
|
||||
unsigned char *ek = NULL;
|
||||
size_t eklen;
|
||||
|
||||
- int ret = 0;
|
||||
+ int ret = -1;
|
||||
|
||||
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
|
||||
if (!pctx)
|
||||
- return 0;
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pctx) <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
@@ -235,12 +235,19 @@ static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned
|
||||
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, ek, &eklen,
|
||||
ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ ret = 0;
|
||||
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (*pek)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(*pek, *peklen);
|
||||
+ OPENSSL_free(*pek);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
*pek = ek;
|
||||
*peklen = eklen;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -500,8 +507,8 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
|
||||
int max;
|
||||
X509_OBJECT ret;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
- unsigned char *ek = NULL;
|
||||
- int eklen;
|
||||
+ unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL;
|
||||
+ int eklen, tkeylen;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((etmp=BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -537,26 +544,25 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
|
||||
|
||||
if (pcert == NULL)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ /* Always attempt to decrypt all rinfo even
|
||||
+ * after sucess as a defence against MMA timing
|
||||
+ * attacks.
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
for (i=0; i<sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ri=sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk,i);
|
||||
if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen,
|
||||
- ri, pkey) > 0)
|
||||
- break;
|
||||
+ ri, pkey) < 0)
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
ERR_clear_error();
|
||||
- ri = NULL;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- if (ri == NULL)
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
|
||||
- PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_KEY);
|
||||
- goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
- if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) <= 0)
|
||||
+ /* Only exit on fatal errors, not decrypt failure */
|
||||
+ if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
+ ERR_clear_error();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
evp_ctx=NULL;
|
||||
@@ -566,6 +572,20 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
|
||||
if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx,enc_alg->parameter) < 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* Generate random key as MMA defence */
|
||||
+ tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx);
|
||||
+ tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
|
||||
+ if (!tkey)
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey) <= 0)
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ if (ek == NULL)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ ek = tkey;
|
||||
+ eklen = tkeylen;
|
||||
+ tkey = NULL;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (eklen != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)) {
|
||||
/* Some S/MIME clients don't use the same key
|
||||
* and effective key length. The key length is
|
||||
@@ -573,11 +593,16 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if(!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(evp_ctx, eklen))
|
||||
{
|
||||
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
|
||||
- PKCS7_R_DECRYPTED_KEY_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
|
||||
- goto err;
|
||||
+ /* Use random key as MMA defence */
|
||||
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ek, eklen);
|
||||
+ OPENSSL_free(ek);
|
||||
+ ek = tkey;
|
||||
+ eklen = tkeylen;
|
||||
+ tkey = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ /* Clear errors so we don't leak information useful in MMA */
|
||||
+ ERR_clear_error();
|
||||
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx,NULL,NULL,ek,NULL,0) <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -587,6 +612,12 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(ek);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (tkey)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey,tkeylen);
|
||||
+ OPENSSL_free(tkey);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (out == NULL)
|
||||
out=etmp;
|
||||
else
|
||||
25
CVE-2012-1165.patch
Normal file
25
CVE-2012-1165.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
|
||||
Index: openssl-1.0.0g/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
|
||||
===================================================================
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.0g.orig/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.0g/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
|
||||
@@ -858,9 +858,8 @@ static int mime_hdr_addparam(MIME_HEADER
|
||||
static int mime_hdr_cmp(const MIME_HEADER * const *a,
|
||||
const MIME_HEADER * const *b)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- if ((*a)->name == NULL || (*b)->name == NULL)
|
||||
- return (*a)->name - (*b)->name < 0 ? -1 :
|
||||
- (*a)->name - (*b)->name > 0 ? 1 : 0;
|
||||
+ if (!(*a)->name || !(*b)->name)
|
||||
+ return !!(*a)->name - !!(*b)->name;
|
||||
|
||||
return(strcmp((*a)->name, (*b)->name));
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -868,6 +867,8 @@ static int mime_hdr_cmp(const MIME_HEADE
|
||||
static int mime_param_cmp(const MIME_PARAM * const *a,
|
||||
const MIME_PARAM * const *b)
|
||||
{
|
||||
+ if (!(*a)->param_name || !(*b)->param_name)
|
||||
+ return !!(*a)->param_name - !!(*b)->param_name;
|
||||
return(strcmp((*a)->param_name, (*b)->param_name));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
37
bug749210-Symmetric-crypto-errors-in-PKCS7_decrypt.patch
Normal file
37
bug749210-Symmetric-crypto-errors-in-PKCS7_decrypt.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
|
||||
Index: openssl-1.0.0g/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c
|
||||
===================================================================
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.0g.orig/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.0g/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c
|
||||
@@ -573,15 +573,30 @@ int PKCS7_decrypt(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *p
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret = SMIME_text(bread, data);
|
||||
+ if (ret > 0 && BIO_method_type(tmpmem) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(tmpmem))
|
||||
+ ret = 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
BIO_free_all(bread);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
for(;;) {
|
||||
i = BIO_read(tmpmem, buf, sizeof(buf));
|
||||
- if(i <= 0) break;
|
||||
+ if(i <= 0)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ ret = 1;
|
||||
+ if (BIO_method_type(tmpmem) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(tmpmem))
|
||||
+ ret = 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
BIO_write(data, buf, i);
|
||||
}
|
||||
BIO_free_all(tmpmem);
|
||||
- return 1;
|
||||
+ return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
15
bug749213-Free-headers-after-use.patch
Normal file
15
bug749213-Free-headers-after-use.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
|
||||
Index: openssl-1.0.0g/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
|
||||
===================================================================
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.0g.orig/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.0g/crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
|
||||
@@ -486,9 +486,9 @@ ASN1_VALUE *SMIME_read_ASN1(BIO *bio, BI
|
||||
|
||||
if(strcmp(hdr->value, "application/x-pkcs7-signature") &&
|
||||
strcmp(hdr->value, "application/pkcs7-signature")) {
|
||||
- sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
|
||||
ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1,ASN1_R_SIG_INVALID_MIME_TYPE);
|
||||
ERR_add_error_data(2, "type: ", hdr->value);
|
||||
+ sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
|
||||
sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
22
bug749735.patch
Normal file
22
bug749735.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
Index: openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
|
||||
===================================================================
|
||||
--- openssl-1.0.0c.orig/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
|
||||
+++ openssl-1.0.0c/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
|
||||
@@ -171,7 +171,16 @@ EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *k
|
||||
goto error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- key->pkey = ret;
|
||||
+ /* Check to see if another thread set key->pkey first */
|
||||
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
|
||||
+ if (key->pkey)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
|
||||
+ ret = key->pkey;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ else
|
||||
+ key->pkey = ret;
|
||||
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
|
||||
CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
@ -1,14 +1,33 @@
|
||||
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
Tue Mar 27 09:16:37 UTC 2012 - gjhe@suse.com
|
||||
|
||||
- fix bug[bnc#749735] - Memory leak when creating public keys.
|
||||
fix bug[bnc#751977] - CMS and S/MIME Bleichenbacher attack
|
||||
CVE-2012-0884
|
||||
|
||||
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
Thu Mar 22 03:24:20 UTC 2012 - gjhe@suse.com
|
||||
|
||||
- fix bug[bnc#751946] - S/MIME verification may erroneously fail
|
||||
CVE-2012-1165
|
||||
|
||||
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
Wed Mar 21 02:44:41 UTC 2012 - gjhe@suse.com
|
||||
|
||||
- fix bug[bnc#749213]-Free headers after use in error message
|
||||
and bug[bnc#749210]-Symmetric crypto errors in PKCS7_decrypt
|
||||
|
||||
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
Tue Mar 20 14:29:24 UTC 2012 - cfarrell@suse.com
|
||||
|
||||
- license update: OpenSSL
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
Fri Feb 24 02:33:22 UTC 2012 - gjhe@suse.com
|
||||
|
||||
- fix bug[bnc#748738] - Tolerate bad MIME headers in openssl's
|
||||
asn1 parser.
|
||||
CVE-2006-7250
|
||||
|
||||
-------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
Thu Feb 2 06:55:12 UTC 2012 - gjhe@suse.com
|
||||
|
||||
10
openssl.spec
10
openssl.spec
@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ Patch7: openssl-1.0.0b-aesni.patch
|
||||
#Patch8: CVE-2011-0014.patch
|
||||
Patch10: openssl-call-engine-reg-comp.patch
|
||||
Patch11: Bug748738_Tolerate_bad_MIME_headers.patch
|
||||
Patch12: bug749213-Free-headers-after-use.patch
|
||||
Patch13: bug749210-Symmetric-crypto-errors-in-PKCS7_decrypt.patch
|
||||
Patch14: CVE-2012-1165.patch
|
||||
Patch15: CVE-2012-0884.patch
|
||||
Patch16: bug749735.patch
|
||||
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
|
||||
|
||||
%description
|
||||
@ -188,6 +193,11 @@ Authors:
|
||||
#%patch8 -p1
|
||||
%patch10
|
||||
%patch11 -p1
|
||||
%patch12 -p1
|
||||
%patch13 -p1
|
||||
%patch14 -p1
|
||||
%patch15 -p1
|
||||
%patch16 -p1
|
||||
cp -p %{S:10} .
|
||||
echo "adding/overwriting some entries in the 'table' hash in Configure"
|
||||
# $dso_scheme:$shared_target:$shared_cflag:$shared_ldflag:$shared_extension:$ranlib:$arflags
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user