diff --git a/CVE-2014-0076.patch b/CVE-2014-0076.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e784626
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CVE-2014-0076.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+Index: openssl-1.0.1f/crypto/bn/bn.h
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.1f.orig/crypto/bn/bn.h
++++ openssl-1.0.1f/crypto/bn/bn.h
+@@ -538,6 +538,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret,
+ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret,
+ 	const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx);
+ 
++void   BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG swap, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords);
++
+ /* Deprecated versions */
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
+ BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret,int bits,int safe,
+@@ -774,12 +776,22 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf
+ 
+ #define bn_fix_top(a)		bn_check_top(a)
+ 
++#define bn_check_size(bn, bits) bn_wcheck_size(bn, ((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)
++#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) \
++       do { \
++               const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (bn); \
++               assert(words <= (_bnum2)->dmax && words >= (_bnum2)->top); \
++       } while(0)
++
+ #else /* !BN_DEBUG */
+ 
+ #define bn_pollute(a)
+ #define bn_check_top(a)
+ #define bn_fix_top(a)		bn_correct_top(a)
+ 
++#define bn_check_size(bn, bits)
++#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words)
++
+ #endif
+ 
+ #define bn_correct_top(a) \
+Index: openssl-1.0.1f/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.1f.orig/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
++++ openssl-1.0.1f/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+@@ -824,3 +824,56 @@ int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a,
+ 		}
+ 	return bn_cmp_words(a,b,cl);
+ 	}
++
++/* 
++ * Constant-time conditional swap of a and b.  
++ * a and b are swapped if condition is not 0.  The code assumes that at most one bit of condition is set.
++ * nwords is the number of words to swap.  The code assumes that at least nwords are allocated in both a and b,
++ * and that no more than nwords are used by either a or b.
++ * a and b cannot be the same number
++ */
++void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords)
++       {
++       BN_ULONG t;
++       int i;
++
++       bn_wcheck_size(a, nwords);
++       bn_wcheck_size(b, nwords);
++
++       assert(a != b);
++       assert((condition & (condition - 1)) == 0);
++       assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int));
++
++       condition = ((condition - 1) >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)) - 1;
++
++       t = (a->top^b->top) & condition;
++       a->top ^= t;
++       b->top ^= t;
++
++#define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(ind) \
++       do { \
++               t = (a->d[ind] ^ b->d[ind]) & condition; \
++               a->d[ind] ^= t; \
++               b->d[ind] ^= t; \
++       } while (0)
++
++
++       switch (nwords) {
++       default:
++               for (i = 10; i < nwords; i++) 
++                       BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(i);
++               /* Fallthrough */
++       case 10: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(9); /* Fallthrough */
++       case 9: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(8); /* Fallthrough */
++       case 8: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(7); /* Fallthrough */
++       case 7: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(6); /* Fallthrough */
++       case 6: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(5); /* Fallthrough */
++       case 5: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(4); /* Fallthrough */
++       case 4: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(3); /* Fallthrough */
++       case 3: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(2); /* Fallthrough */
++       case 2: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(1); /* Fallthrough */
++       case 1: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(0);
++       }
++#undef BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP
++}
++
+Index: openssl-1.0.1f/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.1f.orig/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
++++ openssl-1.0.1f/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c
+@@ -210,9 +210,12 @@ static int gf2m_Mxy(const EC_GROUP *grou
+ 
+ /* Computes scalar*point and stores the result in r.
+  * point can not equal r.
+- * Uses algorithm 2P of
++ * Uses a modified algorithm 2P of
+  *     Lopez, J. and Dahab, R.  "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over 
+  *     GF(2^m) without precomputation" (CHES '99, LNCS 1717).
++ *
++ * To protect against side-channel attack the function uses constant time swap,
++ * avoiding conditional branches.
+  */
+ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
+ 	const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)
+@@ -246,6 +249,11 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_mult
+ 	x2 = &r->X;
+ 	z2 = &r->Y;
+ 
++       bn_wexpand(x1, group->field.top);
++       bn_wexpand(z1, group->field.top);
++       bn_wexpand(x2, group->field.top);
++       bn_wexpand(z2, group->field.top);
++
+ 	if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(x1, &point->X, group->poly)) goto err; /* x1 = x */
+ 	if (!BN_one(z1)) goto err; /* z1 = 1 */
+ 	if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, z2, x1, ctx)) goto err; /* z2 = x1^2 = x^2 */
+@@ -270,16 +278,12 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_mult
+ 		word = scalar->d[i];
+ 		while (mask)
+ 			{
+-			if (word & mask)
+-				{
+-				if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x1, z1, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
+-				if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
+-				}
+-			else
+-				{
+-				if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+-				if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+-				}
++                       BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
++                       BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
++                       if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
++                       if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
++                       BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
++                       BN_consttime_swap(word & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
+ 			mask >>= 1;
+ 			}
+ 		mask = BN_TBIT;
diff --git a/openssl.changes b/openssl.changes
index dd31ec4..b081e45 100644
--- a/openssl.changes
+++ b/openssl.changes
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Tue Mar 25 08:11:11 UTC 2014 - shchang@suse.com
+
+- Fix bug[ bnc#869945] CVE-2014-0076: openssl: Recovering OpenSSL ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack
+  Add file: CVE-2014-0076.patch
+
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Mon Mar  3 06:44:52 UTC 2014 - shchang@suse.com
 
diff --git a/openssl.spec b/openssl.spec
index 4081e1e..57f9061 100644
--- a/openssl.spec
+++ b/openssl.spec
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ Patch15:        openssl-1.0.1e-fips.patch
 Patch16:        openssl-1.0.1e-fips-ec.patch
 Patch17:        openssl-1.0.1e-fips-ctor.patch
 Patch18:        openssl-1.0.1e-new-fips-reqs.patch
+Patch19:        CVE-2014-0076.patch
 BuildRoot:      %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
 
 %description
@@ -169,6 +170,7 @@ this package's base documentation.
 %patch16 -p1
 %patch17 -p1
 %patch18 -p1
+%patch19 -p1
 
 cp -p %{S:10} .
 cp -p %{S:11} .