Similar to 3837b83f, glibc memcmp is declared with the first two
arguments annotated as non-null via an attribute, which results in the
undefined behaviour sanitizer considering it to be UB to pass a null
pointer there (even if we are comparing 0 bytes, and hence not actually
dereferencing the pointer).
This shows up in /gvariant/serialiser/children when run with the
undefined behaviour sanitizer.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Similar to 3837b83f, glibc memcmp is declared with the first two
arguments annotated as non-null via an attribute, which results in the
undefined behaviour sanitizer considering it to be UB to pass a null
pointer there (even if we are comparing 0 bytes, and hence not actually
dereferencing the pointer).
This shows up in /gvariant/serialiser/children when run with the
undefined behaviour sanitizer.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Tools like this should be configurable in a cross or native file. In
particular, if we are cross-compiling (with an executable wrapper like
qemu-arm), the build system ld is not necessarily able to manipulate
host system objects.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Otherwise we'll never test the EXTERNAL-only mode, because that relies
on testing the private macros
G_CREDENTIALS_UNIX_CREDENTIALS_MESSAGE_SUPPORTED and
G_CREDENTIALS_SOCKET_GET_CREDENTIALS_SUPPORTED.
Fixes: 9f962ebe "Add a test for GDBusServer authentication"
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
This bypasses any issues we might have with containers where IPv6 is
returned by name resolution (particularly since GNOME/glib!616) but
doesn't necessarily actually work.
This comes at a minor test-coverage cost: we don't test GDBusServer's
default behaviour when told to listen on "tcp:" or "nonce-tcp:", and
on systems where IPv6 is available, we don't test it. If we want to
do those, we should perhaps do them in separate tests, and disable
those tests when binding to ::1 doesn't work.
Mitigates: GNOME/glib#1912
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
kdeinit5 overwrites argv, which in turn results in /proc/self/cmdline
being overwritten. It seems that this is done in a way that does not
necessarily guarantee that /proc/self/cmdline will end up NUL-terminated.
However, g_file_get_contents() is documented to fill a buffer of size
len + 1, where buffer[len] == '\0', even if the file's actual contents
(from buffer[0] to buffer[len-1] inclusive) did not include a NUL;
so we can safely relax this assertion slightly.
Resolves: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/issues/1923
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Whitelist a safe set of characters for use in header guards instead of
maintaining a (growing) blacklist.
The whitelist is intentionally short since reading up on all
peculiarities of the C and C++ standard for identifiers is not my idea
of fun. :)
Fixes#1379
Change a condition from one to an equivalent one to shut up a
`scan-build` warning about potentially dereferencing a `NULL` value.
This introduces no functional changes, as it’s not actually possible to
dereference a `NULL` value here (but `scan-build` can’t link the
nullability of `error` to the nullability of `result`).
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
It looks like `continue_timeout` should be returned here, rather than
being set and never read. Spotted by `scan-build`.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
g_assert() is compiled out by `G_DISABLE_ASSERT` and doesn’t give such
useful messages on failure.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
No need to clear it to NULL before every time it’s used, since we assert
that it’s never set.
This introduces no functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
This avoids failure to listen on the given address on non-Linux Unix
kernels, where abstract sockets do not exist and so unix:tmpdir is
equivalent to unix:dir.
To avoid bugs like this one recurring, run most of these tests using
the unix:dir address type, where Linux is equivalent to other Unix
kernels; just do one unix:tmpdir test, to check that we still
interoperate with libdbus when using abstract sockets on Linux.
Resolves: GNOME/glib#1920
Fixes: 9f962ebe "Add a test for GDBusServer authentication"
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Previously, we used unix:tmpdir, except in tests that verify that a
particular address type works (notably unix:dir). Now we use unix:dir
most of the time, and unix:tmpdir gets its own test instead.
This helps to ensure that the tests continue to work on non-Linux Unix
kernels, where abstract sockets do not exist and so unix:tmpdir is
equivalent to unix:dir, even in the common case where the developer has
only tried the test on Linux.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Otherwise, since GNOME/glib!1193, the listening socket won't be deleted,
and if we are not using abstract sockets (for example on *BSD), g_rmdir
will fail with ENOTEMPTY.
Fixes: 8e32b8e8 "gdbusserver: Delete socket and nonce file when stopping server"
Resolves: GNOME/glib#1921
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
The `on_run()` function could be executed in any worker thread from the
`GThreadedSocketListener`, but didn’t previously hold a strong reference
to the `GDBusServer`, which meant the server could be finalised in
another thread while `on_run()` was still running.
This was not ideal.
Hold a strong reference to the `GDBusServer` while the socket listener
is listening, i.e. between every paired call to `g_dbus_server_start()`
and `g_dbus_server_stop()`.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Fixes: #1318
Rather than when finalising it. They should be automatically recreated
if the server is re-started.
This is important for ensuring that all externally visible behaviour of
the `GDBusServer` is synchronised with calls to
g_dbus_server_{start,stop}(). Finalisation of the server object could
happen an arbitrarily long time after g_dbus_server_stop() is called.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Helps: #1318
So that the tests all end up using separate `.dbus-keyring` directories,
and hence not racing to create and acquire lock files, use
`G_TEST_OPTION_ISOLATE_DIRS` to ensure they all run in separate
disposable directories.
This has the added benefit of meaning they don’t touch the developer’s
actual `$HOME` directory.
This reduces the false-failure rate of `gdbus-peer` by a factor of 9 for
me on my local machine.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Fixes: #1912
There’s actually no need for them to be global or reused between unit
tests, so move them inside the test functions.
This is one step towards eliminating shared state between the unit
tests.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Helps: #1912
If the directory is overridden, for example when running tests, the
parent directory of `.dbus-keyrings` (i.e. the fake `$HOME` directory)
might not exist. Create it automatically.
This should realistically not have an effect on non-test code.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Helps: #1912
These can be hit in the tests (if multiple tests run in parallel are
racing for `~/.dbus-keyrings/org_gtk_gdbus_general.lock` for a prolonged
period) and will cause spurious test failures due to the use of
`G_DEBUG=fatal-warnings`.
Instead, allow the error messages to be inspected programmatically.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Helps: #1912
In particular, if libbdus is available, we test interoperability with
a libdbus client: see GNOME/glib#1831. Because that issue describes a
race condition, we do each test repeatedly to try to hit the failing
case.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Conceptually, a D-Bus server is really trying to determine the credentials
of (the process that initiated) a connection, not the credentials that
the process had when it sent a particular message. Ideally, it does
this with a getsockopt()-style API that queries the credentials of the
connection's initiator without requiring any particular cooperation from
that process, avoiding a class of possible failures.
The leading '\0' in the D-Bus protocol is primarily a workaround
for platforms where the message-based credentials-passing API is
strictly better than the getsockopt()-style API (for example, on
FreeBSD, SCM_CREDS includes a process ID but getpeereid() does not),
or where the getsockopt()-style API does not exist at all. As a result
libdbus, the reference implementation of D-Bus, does not implement
Linux SCM_CREDENTIALS at all - it has no reason to do so, because the
SO_PEERCRED socket option is equally informative.
This change makes GDBusServer on Linux more closely match the behaviour
of libdbus.
In particular, GNOME/glib#1831 indicates that when a libdbus client
connects to a GDBus server, recvmsg() sometimes yields a SCM_CREDENTIALS
message with cmsg_data={pid=0, uid=65534, gid=65534}. I think this is
most likely a race condition in the early steps to connect:
client server
connect
accept
send '\0' <- race -> set SO_PASSCRED = 1
receive '\0'
If the server wins the race:
client server
connect
accept
set SO_PASSCRED = 1
send '\0'
receive '\0'
then everything is fine. However, if the client wins the race:
client server
connect
accept
send '\0'
set SO_PASSCRED = 1
receive '\0'
then the kernel does not record credentials for the message containing
'\0' (because SO_PASSCRED was 0 at the time). However, by the time the
server receives the message, the kernel knows that credentials are
desired. I would have expected the kernel to omit the credentials header
in this case, but it seems that instead, it synthesizes a credentials
structure with a dummy process ID 0, a dummy uid derived from
/proc/sys/kernel/overflowuid and a dummy gid derived from
/proc/sys/kernel/overflowgid.
In an unconfigured GDBusServer, hitting this race condition results in
falling back to DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 authentication, which in practice usually
succeeds in authenticating the peer's uid. However, we encourage AF_UNIX
servers on Unix platforms to allow only EXTERNAL authentication as a
security-hardening measure, because DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1 relies on a series
of assumptions including a cryptographically strong PRNG and a shared
home directory with no write access by others, which are not necessarily
true for all operating systems and users. EXTERNAL authentication will
fail if the server cannot determine the client's credentials.
In particular, this caused a regression when CVE-2019-14822 was fixed
in ibus, which appears to be resolved by this commit. Qt clients
(which use libdbus) intermittently fail to connect to an ibus server
(which uses GDBusServer), because ibus no longer allows DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1
authentication or non-matching uids.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Closes: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/issues/1831
On Linux, if getsockopt SO_PEERCRED is used on a TCP socket, one
might expect it to fail with an appropriate error like ENOTSUP or
EPROTONOSUPPORT. However, it appears that in fact it succeeds, but
yields a credentials structure with pid 0, uid -1 and gid -1. These
are not real process, user and group IDs that can be allocated to a
real process (pid 0 needs to be reserved to give kill(0) its documented
special semantics, and similarly uid and gid -1 need to be reserved for
setresuid() and setresgid()) so it is not meaningful to signal them to
high-level API users.
An API user with Linux-specific knowledge can still inspect these fields
via g_credentials_get_native() if desired.
Similarly, if SO_PASSCRED is used to receive a SCM_CREDENTIALS message
on a receiving Unix socket, but the sending socket had not enabled
SO_PASSCRED at the time that the message was sent, it is possible
for it to succeed but yield a credentials structure with pid 0, uid
/proc/sys/kernel/overflowuid and gid /proc/sys/kernel/overflowgid. Even
if we were to read those pseudo-files, we cannot distinguish between
the overflow IDs and a real process that legitimately has the same IDs
(typically they are set to 'nobody' and 'nogroup', which can be used
by a real process), so we detect this situation by noticing that
pid == 0, and to save syscalls we do not read the overflow IDs from
/proc at all.
This results in a small API change: g_credentials_is_same_user() now
returns FALSE if we compare two credentials structures that are both
invalid. This seems like reasonable, conservative behaviour: if we cannot
prove that they are the same user, we should assume they are not.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
The compiler can’t work out from the combination of other conditions
that it’s not possible for (m2 == NULL) to hold true when memcmp() is
called, so add an explicit condition.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Fixes: #1897
