This adds g_string_replace(), a function that replaces instances of one string
with another in a GString. It allows the caller to specify the maximum number
of replacements to perform, and returns the number of replacements performed
to the caller.
Fixes: #225
The intention here was to assert that the length of the password fits
in a gssize. Passwords more than half the size of virtual memory are
probably excessive.
Fixes: a8b204ff "gtlspassword: Forbid very long TLS passwords"
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
gio/gsettingsschema.c: In function ‘parse_into_text_tables’:
gio/gsettingsschema.c:682:3: error: missing initializer for field ‘passthrough’ of ‘GMarkupParser’ {aka ‘struct _GMarkupParser’}
682 | GMarkupParser parser = { start_element, end_element, text };
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
gio/gsettingsschema.c:683:3: error: missing initializer for field ‘gettext_domain’ of ‘TextTableParseInfo’ [-Werror=missing-field-initializers]
683 | TextTableParseInfo info = { summaries, descriptions };
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
gio/gmenu.c: In function ‘g_menu_remove’:
gio/gmenu.c:483:47: error: comparison of integer expressions of different signedness: ‘gint’ {aka ‘int’} and ‘guint’ {aka ‘unsigned int’}
483 | g_return_if_fail (0 <= position && position < menu->items->len);
| ^
gio/gmenu.c: In function ‘g_menu_insert_item’:
gio/gmenu.c:165:32: error: comparison of integer expressions of different signedness: ‘gint’ {aka ‘int’} and ‘guint’ {aka ‘unsigned int’}
165 | if (position < 0 || position > menu->items->len)
| ^
gio/glocalfileinfo.c: In function ‘get_access_rights’:
gio/glocalfileinfo.c:932:9: error: comparison of integer expressions of different signedness: ‘uid_t’ {aka ‘unsigned int’} and ‘int’
932 | uid == parent_info->owner ||
| ^~
gio/glocalfileinfo.c: In function ‘read_link’:
gio/glocalfileinfo.c:188:21: error: comparison of integer expressions of different signedness: ‘int’ and ‘guint’ {aka ‘unsigned int’}
188 | if (read_size < size)
| ^
The public API `GIOChannel.line_term_len` is only a `guint`. Ensure that
nul-terminated strings passed to `g_io_channel_set_line_term()` can’t
exceed that length. Use `g_memdup2()` to avoid a warning (`g_memdup()`
is due to be deprecated), but not to avoid a bug, since it’s also
limited to `G_MAXUINT`.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@endlessos.org>
Helps: #2319
The public API `g_tls_password_set_value_full()` (and the vfunc it
invokes) can only accept a `gssize` length. Ensure that nul-terminated
strings passed to `g_tls_password_set_value()` can’t exceed that length.
Use `g_memdup2()` to avoid an overflow if they’re longer than
`G_MAXUINT` similarly.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@endlessos.org>
Helps: #2319
Don’t use an `int`, that’s potentially too small. In practical terms,
this is not a problem, since no socket address is going to be that big.
By making these changes we can use `g_memdup2()` without warnings,
though. Fewer warnings is good.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@endlessos.org>
Helps: #2319
Previously, the code in `convert_path()` could not handle keys longer
than `G_MAXINT`, and would overflow if that was exceeded.
Convert the code to use `gsize` and `g_memdup2()` throughout, and
change from identifying the position of the final slash in the string
using a signed offset `i`, to using a pointer to the character (and
`strrchr()`). This allows the slash to be at any position in a
`G_MAXSIZE`-long string, without sacrificing a bit of the offset for
indicating whether a slash was found.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@endlessos.org>
Helps: #2319
This allows it to handle strings up to length `G_MAXSIZE` — previously
it would overflow with such strings.
Update the several copies of it identically.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@endlessos.org>
Helps: #2319
Previously it was handled as a `gssize`, which meant that if the
`stop_chars` string was longer than `G_MAXSSIZE` there would be an
overflow.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@endlessos.org>
Helps: #2319
The members of `URL_COMPONENTS` (`winhttp_file->url`) are `DWORD`s, i.e.
32-bit unsigned integers. Adding to and multiplying them may cause them
to overflow the unsigned integer bounds, even if the result is passed to
`g_memdup2()` which accepts a `gsize`.
Cast the `URL_COMPONENTS` members to `gsize` first to ensure that the
arithmetic is done in terms of `gsize`s rather than unsigned integers.
Spotted by Sebastian Dröge.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@endlessos.org>
Helps: #2319
Convert all the call sites which use `g_memdup()`’s length argument
trivially (for example, by passing a `sizeof()` or an existing `gsize`
variable), so that they use `g_memdup2()` instead.
In almost all of these cases the use of `g_memdup()` would not have
caused problems, but it will soon be deprecated, so best port away from
it
In particular, this fixes an overflow within `g_bytes_new()`, identified
as GHSL-2021-045 by GHSL team member Kevin Backhouse.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@endlessos.org>
Fixes: GHSL-2021-045
Helps: #2319
Convert all the call sites which use `g_memdup()`’s length argument
trivially (for example, by passing a `sizeof()`), so that they use
`g_memdup2()` instead.
In almost all of these cases the use of `g_memdup()` would not have
caused problems, but it will soon be deprecated, so best port away from
it.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@endlessos.org>
Helps: #2319
Convert all the call sites which use `g_memdup()`’s length argument
trivially (for example, by passing a `sizeof()`), so that they use
`g_memdup2()` instead.
In almost all of these cases the use of `g_memdup()` would not have
caused problems, but it will soon be deprecated, so best port away from
it.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@endlessos.org>
Helps: #2319
This will replace the existing `g_memdup()` function, which has an
unavoidable security flaw of taking its `byte_size` argument as a
`guint` rather than as a `gsize`. Most callers will expect it to be a
`gsize`, and may pass in large values which could silently be truncated,
resulting in an undersize allocation compared to what the caller
expects.
This could lead to a classic buffer overflow vulnerability for many
callers of `g_memdup()`.
`g_memdup2()`, in comparison, takes its `byte_size` as a `gsize`.
Spotted by Kevin Backhouse of GHSL.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <pwithnall@endlessos.org>
Helps: GHSL-2021-045
Helps: #2319
