nodejs/nodejs16
SHA256
7
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

* CVE-2023-46809.patch: Node.js is vulnerable to the Marvin Attack

Browse Source 
(timing variant of the Bleichenbacher attack against
   PKCS#1 v1.5 padding) - (Medium) (CVE-2023-46809, bsc#1219997)
 * CVE-2024-22019.patch: http: Reading unprocessed HTTP request with
   unbounded chunk extension allows DoS attacks- (High)
   (CVE-2024-22019, bsc#1219993)
 * CVE-2024-22025.patch: fix Denial of Service by resource exhaustion
   in fetch() brotli decoding (CVE-2024-22025, bsc#1220014)
 * CVE-2024-24758.patch: ignore proxy-authorization headers
   (CVE-2024-24758, bsc#1220017)
 * CVE-2024-24806.patch: fix improper domain lookup that
   potentially leads to SSRF attacks (CVE-2024-24806, bsc#1220053)
- CVE-2023-38552.patch: Integrity checks according to policies
  can be circumvented (CVE-2023-38552, bsc#1216272)
- CVE-2023-39333.patch, wasm-fixture.tar.gz: Code injection via
  WebAssembly export names (CVE-2023-39333, bsc#1216273)
- CVE-2023-45143.patch: undici Security Release (CVE-2023-45143, bsc#1216205)
- nodejs.keyring: include new releaser keys

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/devel:languages:nodejs/nodejs16?expand=0&rev=100
This commit is contained in:
Adam Majer
2024-02-20 16:34:06 +00:00
committed by Git OBS Bridge
parent 00455b1bee
commit 1272fd04b8
7 changed files with 1352 additions and 8 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

594
CVE-2023-46809.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,594 @@
Index: node-v16.20.2/test/parallel/test-crypto-rsa-dsa-revert.js
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ node-v16.20.2/test/parallel/test-crypto-rsa-dsa-revert.js
@@ -0,0 +1,475 @@
+'use strict';
+// Flags: --security-revert=CVE-2023-46809
+const common = require('../common');
+if (!common.hasCrypto)
+ common.skip('missing crypto');
+
+const assert = require('assert');
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+
+const constants = crypto.constants;
+
+const fixtures = require('../common/fixtures');
+
+// Test certificates
+const certPem = fixtures.readKey('rsa_cert.crt');
+const keyPem = fixtures.readKey('rsa_private.pem');
+const rsaKeySize = 2048;
+const rsaPubPem = fixtures.readKey('rsa_public.pem', 'ascii');
+const rsaKeyPem = fixtures.readKey('rsa_private.pem', 'ascii');
+const rsaKeyPemEncrypted = fixtures.readKey('rsa_private_encrypted.pem',
+ 'ascii');
+const dsaPubPem = fixtures.readKey('dsa_public.pem', 'ascii');
+const dsaKeyPem = fixtures.readKey('dsa_private.pem', 'ascii');
+const dsaKeyPemEncrypted = fixtures.readKey('dsa_private_encrypted.pem',
+ 'ascii');
+const rsaPkcs8KeyPem = fixtures.readKey('rsa_private_pkcs8.pem');
+const dsaPkcs8KeyPem = fixtures.readKey('dsa_private_pkcs8.pem');
+
+const ec = new TextEncoder();
+
+const openssl1DecryptError = {
+ message: 'error:06065064:digital envelope routines:EVP_DecryptFinal_ex:' +
+ 'bad decrypt',
+ code: 'ERR_OSSL_EVP_BAD_DECRYPT',
+ reason: 'bad decrypt',
+ function: 'EVP_DecryptFinal_ex',
+ library: 'digital envelope routines',
+};
+
+const decryptError = common.hasOpenSSL3 ?
+ { message: 'error:1C800064:Provider routines::bad decrypt' } :
+ openssl1DecryptError;
+
+const decryptPrivateKeyError = common.hasOpenSSL3 ? {
+ message: 'error:1C800064:Provider routines::bad decrypt',
+} : openssl1DecryptError;
+
+function getBufferCopy(buf) {
+ return buf.buffer.slice(buf.byteOffset, buf.byteOffset + buf.byteLength);
+}
+
+// Test RSA encryption/decryption
+{
+ const input = 'I AM THE WALRUS';
+ const bufferToEncrypt = Buffer.from(input);
+ const bufferPassword = Buffer.from('password');
+
+ let encryptedBuffer = crypto.publicEncrypt(rsaPubPem, bufferToEncrypt);
+
+ // Test other input types
+ let otherEncrypted;
+ {
+ const ab = getBufferCopy(ec.encode(rsaPubPem));
+ const ab2enc = getBufferCopy(bufferToEncrypt);
+
+ crypto.publicEncrypt(ab, ab2enc);
+ crypto.publicEncrypt(new Uint8Array(ab), new Uint8Array(ab2enc));
+ crypto.publicEncrypt(new DataView(ab), new DataView(ab2enc));
+ otherEncrypted = crypto.publicEncrypt({
+ key: Buffer.from(ab).toString('hex'),
+ encoding: 'hex'
+ }, Buffer.from(ab2enc).toString('hex'));
+ }
+
+ let decryptedBuffer = crypto.privateDecrypt(rsaKeyPem, encryptedBuffer);
+ const otherDecrypted = crypto.privateDecrypt(rsaKeyPem, otherEncrypted);
+ assert.strictEqual(decryptedBuffer.toString(), input);
+ assert.strictEqual(otherDecrypted.toString(), input);
+
+ decryptedBuffer = crypto.privateDecrypt(rsaPkcs8KeyPem, encryptedBuffer);
+ assert.strictEqual(decryptedBuffer.toString(), input);
+
+ let decryptedBufferWithPassword = crypto.privateDecrypt({
+ key: rsaKeyPemEncrypted,
+ passphrase: 'password'
+ }, encryptedBuffer);
+
+ const otherDecryptedBufferWithPassword = crypto.privateDecrypt({
+ key: rsaKeyPemEncrypted,
+ passphrase: ec.encode('password')
+ }, encryptedBuffer);
+
+ assert.strictEqual(
+ otherDecryptedBufferWithPassword.toString(),
+ decryptedBufferWithPassword.toString());
+
+ decryptedBufferWithPassword = crypto.privateDecrypt({
+ key: rsaKeyPemEncrypted,
+ passphrase: 'password'
+ }, encryptedBuffer);
+
+ assert.strictEqual(decryptedBufferWithPassword.toString(), input);
+
+ encryptedBuffer = crypto.publicEncrypt({
+ key: rsaKeyPemEncrypted,
+ passphrase: 'password'
+ }, bufferToEncrypt);
+
+ decryptedBufferWithPassword = crypto.privateDecrypt({
+ key: rsaKeyPemEncrypted,
+ passphrase: 'password'
+ }, encryptedBuffer);
+ assert.strictEqual(decryptedBufferWithPassword.toString(), input);
+
+ encryptedBuffer = crypto.privateEncrypt({
+ key: rsaKeyPemEncrypted,
+ passphrase: bufferPassword
+ }, bufferToEncrypt);
+
+ decryptedBufferWithPassword = crypto.publicDecrypt({
+ key: rsaKeyPemEncrypted,
+ passphrase: bufferPassword
+ }, encryptedBuffer);
+ assert.strictEqual(decryptedBufferWithPassword.toString(), input);
+
+ // Now with explicit RSA_PKCS1_PADDING.
+ encryptedBuffer = crypto.privateEncrypt({
+ padding: crypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING,
+ key: rsaKeyPemEncrypted,
+ passphrase: bufferPassword
+ }, bufferToEncrypt);
+
+ decryptedBufferWithPassword = crypto.publicDecrypt({
+ padding: crypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING,
+ key: rsaKeyPemEncrypted,
+ passphrase: bufferPassword
+ }, encryptedBuffer);
+ assert.strictEqual(decryptedBufferWithPassword.toString(), input);
+
+ // Omitting padding should be okay because RSA_PKCS1_PADDING is the default.
+ decryptedBufferWithPassword = crypto.publicDecrypt({
+ key: rsaKeyPemEncrypted,
+ passphrase: bufferPassword
+ }, encryptedBuffer);
+ assert.strictEqual(decryptedBufferWithPassword.toString(), input);
+
+ // Now with RSA_NO_PADDING. Plaintext needs to match key size.
+ // OpenSSL 3.x has a rsa_check_padding that will cause an error if
+ // RSA_NO_PADDING is used.
+ if (!common.hasOpenSSL3) {
+ {
+ const plaintext = 'x'.repeat(rsaKeySize / 8);
+ encryptedBuffer = crypto.privateEncrypt({
+ padding: crypto.constants.RSA_NO_PADDING,
+ key: rsaKeyPemEncrypted,
+ passphrase: bufferPassword
+ }, Buffer.from(plaintext));
+
+ decryptedBufferWithPassword = crypto.publicDecrypt({
+ padding: crypto.constants.RSA_NO_PADDING,
+ key: rsaKeyPemEncrypted,
+ passphrase: bufferPassword
+ }, encryptedBuffer);
+ assert.strictEqual(decryptedBufferWithPassword.toString(), plaintext);
+ }
+ }
+
+ encryptedBuffer = crypto.publicEncrypt(certPem, bufferToEncrypt);
+
+ decryptedBuffer = crypto.privateDecrypt(keyPem, encryptedBuffer);
+ assert.strictEqual(decryptedBuffer.toString(), input);
+
+ encryptedBuffer = crypto.publicEncrypt(keyPem, bufferToEncrypt);
+
+ decryptedBuffer = crypto.privateDecrypt(keyPem, encryptedBuffer);
+ assert.strictEqual(decryptedBuffer.toString(), input);
+
+ encryptedBuffer = crypto.privateEncrypt(keyPem, bufferToEncrypt);
+
+ decryptedBuffer = crypto.publicDecrypt(keyPem, encryptedBuffer);
+ assert.strictEqual(decryptedBuffer.toString(), input);
+
+ assert.throws(() => {
+ crypto.privateDecrypt({
+ key: rsaKeyPemEncrypted,
+ passphrase: 'wrong'
+ }, bufferToEncrypt);
+ }, decryptError);
+
+ assert.throws(() => {
+ crypto.publicEncrypt({
+ key: rsaKeyPemEncrypted,
+ passphrase: 'wrong'
+ }, encryptedBuffer);
+ }, decryptError);
+
+ encryptedBuffer = crypto.privateEncrypt({
+ key: rsaKeyPemEncrypted,
+ passphrase: Buffer.from('password')
+ }, bufferToEncrypt);
+
+ assert.throws(() => {
+ crypto.publicDecrypt({
+ key: rsaKeyPemEncrypted,
+ passphrase: Buffer.from('wrong')
+ }, encryptedBuffer);
+ }, decryptError);
+}
+
+function test_rsa(padding, encryptOaepHash, decryptOaepHash) {
+ const size = (padding === 'RSA_NO_PADDING') ? rsaKeySize / 8 : 32;
+ const input = Buffer.allocUnsafe(size);
+ for (let i = 0; i < input.length; i++)
+ input[i] = (i * 7 + 11) & 0xff;
+ const bufferToEncrypt = Buffer.from(input);
+
+ padding = constants[padding];
+
+ const encryptedBuffer = crypto.publicEncrypt({
+ key: rsaPubPem,
+ padding: padding,
+ oaepHash: encryptOaepHash
+ }, bufferToEncrypt);
+
+ let decryptedBuffer = crypto.privateDecrypt({
+ key: rsaKeyPem,
+ padding: padding,
+ oaepHash: decryptOaepHash
+ }, encryptedBuffer);
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(decryptedBuffer, input);
+
+ decryptedBuffer = crypto.privateDecrypt({
+ key: rsaPkcs8KeyPem,
+ padding: padding,
+ oaepHash: decryptOaepHash
+ }, encryptedBuffer);
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(decryptedBuffer, input);
+}
+
+test_rsa('RSA_NO_PADDING');
+test_rsa('RSA_PKCS1_PADDING');
+test_rsa('RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING');
+
+// Test OAEP with different hash functions.
+test_rsa('RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING', undefined, 'sha1');
+test_rsa('RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING', 'sha1', undefined);
+test_rsa('RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING', 'sha256', 'sha256');
+test_rsa('RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING', 'sha512', 'sha512');
+assert.throws(() => {
+ test_rsa('RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING', 'sha256', 'sha512');
+}, {
+ code: 'ERR_OSSL_RSA_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR'
+});
+
+// The following RSA-OAEP test cases were created using the WebCrypto API to
+// ensure compatibility when using non-SHA1 hash functions.
+{
+ const { decryptionTests } =
+ JSON.parse(fixtures.readSync('rsa-oaep-test-vectors.js', 'utf8'));
+
+ for (const { ct, oaepHash, oaepLabel } of decryptionTests) {
+ const label = oaepLabel ? Buffer.from(oaepLabel, 'hex') : undefined;
+ const copiedLabel = oaepLabel ? getBufferCopy(label) : undefined;
+
+ const decrypted = crypto.privateDecrypt({
+ key: rsaPkcs8KeyPem,
+ oaepHash,
+ oaepLabel: oaepLabel ? label : undefined
+ }, Buffer.from(ct, 'hex'));
+
+ assert.strictEqual(decrypted.toString('utf8'), 'Hello Node.js');
+
+ const otherDecrypted = crypto.privateDecrypt({
+ key: rsaPkcs8KeyPem,
+ oaepHash,
+ oaepLabel: copiedLabel
+ }, Buffer.from(ct, 'hex'));
+
+ assert.strictEqual(otherDecrypted.toString('utf8'), 'Hello Node.js');
+ }
+}
+
+// Test invalid oaepHash and oaepLabel options.
+for (const fn of [crypto.publicEncrypt, crypto.privateDecrypt]) {
+ assert.throws(() => {
+ fn({
+ key: rsaPubPem,
+ oaepHash: 'Hello world'
+ }, Buffer.alloc(10));
+ }, {
+ code: 'ERR_OSSL_EVP_INVALID_DIGEST'
+ });
+
+ for (const oaepHash of [0, false, null, Symbol(), () => {}]) {
+ assert.throws(() => {
+ fn({
+ key: rsaPubPem,
+ oaepHash
+ }, Buffer.alloc(10));
+ }, {
+ code: 'ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE'
+ });
+ }
+
+ for (const oaepLabel of [0, false, null, Symbol(), () => {}, {}]) {
+ assert.throws(() => {
+ fn({
+ key: rsaPubPem,
+ oaepLabel
+ }, Buffer.alloc(10));
+ }, {
+ code: 'ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE'
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+// Test RSA key signing/verification
+let rsaSign = crypto.createSign('SHA1');
+let rsaVerify = crypto.createVerify('SHA1');
+assert.ok(rsaSign);
+assert.ok(rsaVerify);
+
+const expectedSignature = fixtures.readKey(
+ 'rsa_public_sha1_signature_signedby_rsa_private_pkcs8.sha1',
+ 'hex'
+);
+
+rsaSign.update(rsaPubPem);
+let rsaSignature = rsaSign.sign(rsaKeyPem, 'hex');
+assert.strictEqual(rsaSignature, expectedSignature);
+
+rsaVerify.update(rsaPubPem);
+assert.strictEqual(rsaVerify.verify(rsaPubPem, rsaSignature, 'hex'), true);
+
+// Test RSA PKCS#8 key signing/verification
+rsaSign = crypto.createSign('SHA1');
+rsaSign.update(rsaPubPem);
+rsaSignature = rsaSign.sign(rsaPkcs8KeyPem, 'hex');
+assert.strictEqual(rsaSignature, expectedSignature);
+
+rsaVerify = crypto.createVerify('SHA1');
+rsaVerify.update(rsaPubPem);
+assert.strictEqual(rsaVerify.verify(rsaPubPem, rsaSignature, 'hex'), true);
+
+// Test RSA key signing/verification with encrypted key
+rsaSign = crypto.createSign('SHA1');
+rsaSign.update(rsaPubPem);
+const signOptions = { key: rsaKeyPemEncrypted, passphrase: 'password' };
+rsaSignature = rsaSign.sign(signOptions, 'hex');
+assert.strictEqual(rsaSignature, expectedSignature);
+
+rsaVerify = crypto.createVerify('SHA1');
+rsaVerify.update(rsaPubPem);
+assert.strictEqual(rsaVerify.verify(rsaPubPem, rsaSignature, 'hex'), true);
+
+rsaSign = crypto.createSign('SHA1');
+rsaSign.update(rsaPubPem);
+assert.throws(() => {
+ const signOptions = { key: rsaKeyPemEncrypted, passphrase: 'wrong' };
+ rsaSign.sign(signOptions, 'hex');
+}, decryptPrivateKeyError);
+
+//
+// Test RSA signing and verification
+//
+{
+ const privateKey = fixtures.readKey('rsa_private_b.pem');
+ const publicKey = fixtures.readKey('rsa_public_b.pem');
+
+ const input = 'I AM THE WALRUS';
+
+ const signature = fixtures.readKey(
+ 'I_AM_THE_WALRUS_sha256_signature_signedby_rsa_private_b.sha256',
+ 'hex'
+ );
+
+ const sign = crypto.createSign('SHA256');
+ sign.update(input);
+
+ const output = sign.sign(privateKey, 'hex');
+ assert.strictEqual(output, signature);
+
+ const verify = crypto.createVerify('SHA256');
+ verify.update(input);
+
+ assert.strictEqual(verify.verify(publicKey, signature, 'hex'), true);
+
+ // Test the legacy signature algorithm name.
+ const sign2 = crypto.createSign('RSA-SHA256');
+ sign2.update(input);
+
+ const output2 = sign2.sign(privateKey, 'hex');
+ assert.strictEqual(output2, signature);
+
+ const verify2 = crypto.createVerify('SHA256');
+ verify2.update(input);
+
+ assert.strictEqual(verify2.verify(publicKey, signature, 'hex'), true);
+}
+
+
+//
+// Test DSA signing and verification
+//
+{
+ const input = 'I AM THE WALRUS';
+
+ // DSA signatures vary across runs so there is no static string to verify
+ // against.
+ const sign = crypto.createSign('SHA1');
+ sign.update(input);
+ const signature = sign.sign(dsaKeyPem, 'hex');
+
+ const verify = crypto.createVerify('SHA1');
+ verify.update(input);
+
+ assert.strictEqual(verify.verify(dsaPubPem, signature, 'hex'), true);
+
+ // Test the legacy 'DSS1' name.
+ const sign2 = crypto.createSign('DSS1');
+ sign2.update(input);
+ const signature2 = sign2.sign(dsaKeyPem, 'hex');
+
+ const verify2 = crypto.createVerify('DSS1');
+ verify2.update(input);
+
+ assert.strictEqual(verify2.verify(dsaPubPem, signature2, 'hex'), true);
+}
+
+
+//
+// Test DSA signing and verification with PKCS#8 private key
+//
+{
+ const input = 'I AM THE WALRUS';
+
+ // DSA signatures vary across runs so there is no static string to verify
+ // against.
+ const sign = crypto.createSign('SHA1');
+ sign.update(input);
+ const signature = sign.sign(dsaPkcs8KeyPem, 'hex');
+
+ const verify = crypto.createVerify('SHA1');
+ verify.update(input);
+
+ assert.strictEqual(verify.verify(dsaPubPem, signature, 'hex'), true);
+}
+
+
+//
+// Test DSA signing and verification with encrypted key
+//
+const input = 'I AM THE WALRUS';
+
+{
+ const sign = crypto.createSign('SHA1');
+ sign.update(input);
+ assert.throws(() => {
+ sign.sign({ key: dsaKeyPemEncrypted, passphrase: 'wrong' }, 'hex');
+ }, decryptPrivateKeyError);
+}
+
+{
+ // DSA signatures vary across runs so there is no static string to verify
+ // against.
+ const sign = crypto.createSign('SHA1');
+ sign.update(input);
+ const signOptions = { key: dsaKeyPemEncrypted, passphrase: 'password' };
+ const signature = sign.sign(signOptions, 'hex');
+
+ const verify = crypto.createVerify('SHA1');
+ verify.update(input);
+
+ assert.strictEqual(verify.verify(dsaPubPem, signature, 'hex'), true);
+}
Index: node-v16.20.2/test/parallel/test-crypto-rsa-dsa.js
===================================================================
--- node-v16.20.2.orig/test/parallel/test-crypto-rsa-dsa.js
+++ node-v16.20.2/test/parallel/test-crypto-rsa-dsa.js
@@ -221,19 +221,37 @@ function test_rsa(padding, encryptOaepHa
oaepHash: encryptOaepHash
}, bufferToEncrypt);
- let decryptedBuffer = crypto.privateDecrypt({
- key: rsaKeyPem,
- padding: padding,
- oaepHash: decryptOaepHash
- }, encryptedBuffer);
- assert.deepStrictEqual(decryptedBuffer, input);
- decryptedBuffer = crypto.privateDecrypt({
- key: rsaPkcs8KeyPem,
- padding: padding,
- oaepHash: decryptOaepHash
- }, encryptedBuffer);
- assert.deepStrictEqual(decryptedBuffer, input);
+ if (padding === constants.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
+ assert.throws(() => {
+ crypto.privateDecrypt({
+ key: rsaKeyPem,
+ padding: padding,
+ oaepHash: decryptOaepHash
+ }, encryptedBuffer);
+ }, { code: 'ERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE' });
+ assert.throws(() => {
+ crypto.privateDecrypt({
+ key: rsaPkcs8KeyPem,
+ padding: padding,
+ oaepHash: decryptOaepHash
+ }, encryptedBuffer);
+ }, { code: 'ERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE' });
+ } else {
+ let decryptedBuffer = crypto.privateDecrypt({
+ key: rsaKeyPem,
+ padding: padding,
+ oaepHash: decryptOaepHash
+ }, encryptedBuffer);
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(decryptedBuffer, input);
+
+ decryptedBuffer = crypto.privateDecrypt({
+ key: rsaPkcs8KeyPem,
+ padding: padding,
+ oaepHash: decryptOaepHash
+ }, encryptedBuffer);
+ assert.deepStrictEqual(decryptedBuffer, input);
+ }
}
test_rsa('RSA_NO_PADDING');
Index: node-v16.20.2/src/crypto/crypto_cipher.cc
===================================================================
--- node-v16.20.2.orig/src/crypto/crypto_cipher.cc
+++ node-v16.20.2/src/crypto/crypto_cipher.cc
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include "node_buffer.h"
#include "node_internals.h"
#include "node_process-inl.h"
+#include "node_revert.h"
#include "v8.h"
namespace node {
@@ -1061,6 +1062,34 @@ void PublicKeyCipher::Cipher(const Funct
uint32_t padding;
if (!args[offset + 1]->Uint32Value(env->context()).To(&padding)) return;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_cipher == EVP_PKEY_decrypt &&
+ operation == PublicKeyCipher::kPrivate && padding == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING &&
+ !IsReverted(SECURITY_REVERT_CVE_2023_46809)) {
+ EVPKeyCtxPointer ctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey.get(), nullptr));
+ CHECK(ctx);
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx.get()) <= 0) {
+ return ThrowCryptoError(env, ERR_get_error());
+ }
+
+ int rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection =
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(ctx.get(), "rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection", "1");
+ // From the doc -2 means that the option is not supported.
+ // The default for the option is enabled and if it has been
+ // specifically disabled we want to respect that so we will
+ // not throw an error if the option is supported regardless
+ // of how it is set. The call to set the value
+ // will not affect what is used since a different context is
+ // used in the call if the option is supported
+ if (rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection <= 0) {
+ return THROW_ERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE(
+ env,
+ "RSA_PKCS1_PADDING is no longer supported for private decryption,"
+ " this can be reverted with --security-revert=CVE-2023-46809");
+ }
+ }
+
+
const EVP_MD* digest = nullptr;
if (args[offset + 2]->IsString()) {
const Utf8Value oaep_str(env->isolate(), args[offset + 2]);
Index: node-v16.20.2/src/node_revert.h
===================================================================
--- node-v16.20.2.orig/src/node_revert.h
+++ node-v16.20.2/src/node_revert.h
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ namespace node {
#define SECURITY_REVERSIONS(XX) \
XX(CVE_2021_44531, "CVE-2021-44531", "Cert Verif Bypass via URI SAN") \
XX(CVE_2021_44532, "CVE-2021-44532", "Cert Verif Bypass via Str Inject") \
-// XX(CVE_2016_PEND, "CVE-2016-PEND", "Vulnerability Title")
+ XX(CVE_2023_46809, "CVE-2023-46809", "Marvin attack on PKCS#1 padding")
enum reversion {
#define V(code, ...) SECURITY_REVERT_##code,

527
CVE-2024-22019.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,527 @@
Index: node-v16.20.2/deps/llhttp/CMakeLists.txt
===================================================================
--- node-v16.20.2.orig/deps/llhttp/CMakeLists.txt
+++ node-v16.20.2/deps/llhttp/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.5.1)
cmake_policy(SET CMP0069 NEW)
-project(llhttp VERSION 6.0.11)
+project(llhttp VERSION 6.1.0)
include(GNUInstallDirs)
set(CMAKE_C_STANDARD 99)
Index: node-v16.20.2/deps/llhttp/include/llhttp.h
===================================================================
--- node-v16.20.2.orig/deps/llhttp/include/llhttp.h
+++ node-v16.20.2/deps/llhttp/include/llhttp.h
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
#define INCLUDE_LLHTTP_H_
#define LLHTTP_VERSION_MAJOR 6
-#define LLHTTP_VERSION_MINOR 0
-#define LLHTTP_VERSION_PATCH 11
+#define LLHTTP_VERSION_MINOR 1
+#define LLHTTP_VERSION_PATCH 0
#ifndef LLHTTP_STRICT_MODE
# define LLHTTP_STRICT_MODE 0
@@ -349,6 +349,9 @@ struct llhttp_settings_s {
llhttp_cb on_headers_complete;
/* Possible return values 0, -1, HPE_USER */
+ llhttp_data_cb on_chunk_parameters;
+
+ /* Possible return values 0, -1, HPE_USER */
llhttp_data_cb on_body;
/* Possible return values 0, -1, `HPE_PAUSED` */
Index: node-v16.20.2/deps/llhttp/src/api.c
===================================================================
--- node-v16.20.2.orig/deps/llhttp/src/api.c
+++ node-v16.20.2/deps/llhttp/src/api.c
@@ -355,6 +355,13 @@ int llhttp__on_chunk_header(llhttp_t* s,
}
+int llhttp__on_chunk_parameters(llhttp_t* s, const char* p, const char* endp) {
+ int err;
+ SPAN_CALLBACK_MAYBE(s, on_chunk_parameters, p, endp - p);
+ return err;
+}
+
+
int llhttp__on_chunk_complete(llhttp_t* s, const char* p, const char* endp) {
int err;
CALLBACK_MAYBE(s, on_chunk_complete);
Index: node-v16.20.2/deps/llhttp/src/llhttp.c
===================================================================
--- node-v16.20.2.orig/deps/llhttp/src/llhttp.c
+++ node-v16.20.2/deps/llhttp/src/llhttp.c
@@ -340,6 +340,8 @@ enum llparse_state_e {
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_is_equal_content_length,
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done,
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows,
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_otherwise,
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size,
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_digit,
@@ -539,6 +541,10 @@ int llhttp__on_body(
llhttp__internal_t* s, const unsigned char* p,
const unsigned char* endp);
+int llhttp__on_chunk_parameters(
+ llhttp__internal_t* s, const unsigned char* p,
+ const unsigned char* endp);
+
int llhttp__on_status(
llhttp__internal_t* s, const unsigned char* p,
const unsigned char* endp);
@@ -1226,8 +1232,7 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal_
goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
}
case 2: {
- p++;
- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
}
default: {
goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_10;
@@ -1236,6 +1241,34 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal_
/* UNREACHABLE */;
abort();
}
+ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters:
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters: {
+ if (p == endp) {
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
+ }
+ state->_span_pos0 = (void*) p;
+ state->_span_cb0 = llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows:
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows: {
+ if (p == endp) {
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows;
+ }
+ switch (*p) {
+ case ' ': {
+ p++;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows;
+ }
+ default: {
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_otherwise:
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_otherwise: {
if (p == endp) {
@@ -1246,13 +1279,9 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal_
p++;
goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
}
- case ' ': {
- p++;
- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
- }
case ';': {
p++;
- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows;
}
default: {
goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_11;
@@ -6074,6 +6103,24 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal_
/* UNREACHABLE */;
abort();
}
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters: {
+ const unsigned char* start;
+ int err;
+
+ start = state->_span_pos0;
+ state->_span_pos0 = NULL;
+ err = llhttp__on_chunk_parameters(state, start, p);
+ if (err != 0) {
+ state->error = err;
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) (p + 1);
+ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
+ return s_error;
+ }
+ p++;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_10: {
state->error = 0x2;
state->reason = "Invalid character in chunk parameters";
@@ -8441,6 +8488,8 @@ enum llparse_state_e {
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_invoke_is_equal_content_length,
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done,
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters,
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows,
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_otherwise,
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size,
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_digit,
@@ -8635,6 +8684,10 @@ int llhttp__on_body(
llhttp__internal_t* s, const unsigned char* p,
const unsigned char* endp);
+int llhttp__on_chunk_parameters(
+ llhttp__internal_t* s, const unsigned char* p,
+ const unsigned char* endp);
+
int llhttp__on_status(
llhttp__internal_t* s, const unsigned char* p,
const unsigned char* endp);
@@ -9299,8 +9352,7 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal_
goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
}
case 2: {
- p++;
- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
}
default: {
goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_6;
@@ -9309,6 +9361,34 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal_
/* UNREACHABLE */;
abort();
}
+ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters:
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters: {
+ if (p == endp) {
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
+ }
+ state->_span_pos0 = (void*) p;
+ state->_span_cb0 = llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
+ case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows:
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows: {
+ if (p == endp) {
+ return s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows;
+ }
+ switch (*p) {
+ case ' ': {
+ p++;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows;
+ }
+ default: {
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_start_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters;
+ }
+ }
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
case s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_otherwise:
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_otherwise: {
if (p == endp) {
@@ -9319,13 +9399,9 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal_
p++;
goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
}
- case ' ': {
- p++;
- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
- }
case ';': {
p++;
- goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_parameters_ows;
}
default: {
goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_7;
@@ -13951,6 +14027,24 @@ static llparse_state_t llhttp__internal_
/* UNREACHABLE */;
abort();
}
+ s_n_llhttp__internal__n_span_end_llhttp__on_chunk_parameters: {
+ const unsigned char* start;
+ int err;
+
+ start = state->_span_pos0;
+ state->_span_pos0 = NULL;
+ err = llhttp__on_chunk_parameters(state, start, p);
+ if (err != 0) {
+ state->error = err;
+ state->error_pos = (const char*) (p + 1);
+ state->_current = (void*) (intptr_t) s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
+ return s_error;
+ }
+ p++;
+ goto s_n_llhttp__internal__n_chunk_size_almost_done;
+ /* UNREACHABLE */;
+ abort();
+ }
s_n_llhttp__internal__n_error_6: {
state->error = 0x2;
state->reason = "Invalid character in chunk parameters";
Index: node-v16.20.2/doc/api/errors.md
===================================================================
--- node-v16.20.2.orig/doc/api/errors.md
+++ node-v16.20.2/doc/api/errors.md
@@ -3043,6 +3043,18 @@ malconfigured clients, if more than 8 Ki
HTTP parsing will abort without a request or response object being created, and
an `Error` with this code will be emitted.
+<a id="HPE_CHUNK_EXTENSIONS_OVERFLOW"></a>
+
+### `HPE_CHUNK_EXTENSIONS_OVERFLOW`
+
+<!-- YAML
+added: REPLACEME
+-->
+
+Too much data was received for a chunk extensions. In order to protect against
+malicious or malconfigured clients, if more than 16 KiB of data is received
+then an `Error` with this code will be emitted.
+
<a id="HPE_UNEXPECTED_CONTENT_LENGTH"></a>
### `HPE_UNEXPECTED_CONTENT_LENGTH`
Index: node-v16.20.2/test/parallel/test-http-chunk-extensions-limit.js
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ node-v16.20.2/test/parallel/test-http-chunk-extensions-limit.js
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+'use strict';
+
+const common = require('../common');
+const http = require('http');
+const net = require('net');
+const assert = require('assert');
+
+// Verify that chunk extensions are limited in size when sent all together.
+{
+ const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
+ req.on('end', () => {
+ res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' });
+ res.end('bye');
+ });
+
+ req.resume();
+ });
+
+ server.listen(0, () => {
+ const sock = net.connect(server.address().port);
+ let data = '';
+
+ sock.on('data', (chunk) => data += chunk.toString('utf-8'));
+
+ sock.on('end', common.mustCall(function() {
+ assert.strictEqual(data, 'HTTP/1.1 413 Payload Too Large\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n');
+ server.close();
+ }));
+
+ sock.end('' +
+ 'GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n' +
+ 'Host: localhost:8080\r\n' +
+ 'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n' +
+ '2;' + 'A'.repeat(20000) + '=bar\r\nAA\r\n' +
+ '0\r\n\r\n'
+ );
+ });
+}
+
+// Verify that chunk extensions are limited in size when sent in intervals.
+{
+ const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
+ req.on('end', () => {
+ res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' });
+ res.end('bye');
+ });
+
+ req.resume();
+ });
+
+ server.listen(0, () => {
+ const sock = net.connect(server.address().port);
+ let remaining = 20000;
+ let data = '';
+
+ const interval = setInterval(
+ () => {
+ if (remaining > 0) {
+ sock.write('A'.repeat(1000));
+ } else {
+ sock.write('=bar\r\nAA\r\n0\r\n\r\n');
+ clearInterval(interval);
+ }
+
+ remaining -= 1000;
+ },
+ common.platformTimeout(20),
+ ).unref();
+
+ sock.on('data', (chunk) => data += chunk.toString('utf-8'));
+
+ sock.on('end', common.mustCall(function() {
+ assert.strictEqual(data, 'HTTP/1.1 413 Payload Too Large\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n');
+ server.close();
+ }));
+
+ sock.write('' +
+ 'GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n' +
+ 'Host: localhost:8080\r\n' +
+ 'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n' +
+ '2;'
+ );
+ });
+}
+
+// Verify the chunk extensions is correctly reset after a chunk
+{
+ const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
+ req.on('end', () => {
+ res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/plain', 'connection': 'close', 'date': 'now' });
+ res.end('bye');
+ });
+
+ req.resume();
+ });
+
+ server.listen(0, () => {
+ const sock = net.connect(server.address().port);
+ let data = '';
+
+ sock.on('data', (chunk) => data += chunk.toString('utf-8'));
+
+ sock.on('end', common.mustCall(function() {
+ assert.strictEqual(
+ data,
+ 'HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n' +
+ 'content-type: text/plain\r\n' +
+ 'connection: close\r\n' +
+ 'date: now\r\n' +
+ 'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n' +
+ '\r\n' +
+ '3\r\n' +
+ 'bye\r\n' +
+ '0\r\n' +
+ '\r\n',
+ );
+
+ server.close();
+ }));
+
+ sock.end('' +
+ 'GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n' +
+ 'Host: localhost:8080\r\n' +
+ 'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n' +
+ '2;' + 'A'.repeat(10000) + '=bar\r\nAA\r\n' +
+ '2;' + 'A'.repeat(10000) + '=bar\r\nAA\r\n' +
+ '2;' + 'A'.repeat(10000) + '=bar\r\nAA\r\n' +
+ '0\r\n\r\n'
+ );
+ });
+}
Index: node-v16.20.2/tools/update-llhttp.sh
===================================================================
--- node-v16.20.2.orig/tools/update-llhttp.sh
+++ node-v16.20.2/tools/update-llhttp.sh
@@ -59,5 +59,5 @@ echo ""
echo "Please git add llhttp, commit the new version:"
echo ""
echo "$ git add -A deps/llhttp"
-echo "$ git commit -m \"deps: update nghttp2 to $LLHTTP_VERSION\""
+echo "$ git commit -m \"deps: update llhttp to $LLHTTP_VERSION\""
echo ""
Index: node-v16.20.2/lib/_http_server.js
===================================================================
--- node-v16.20.2.orig/lib/_http_server.js
+++ node-v16.20.2/lib/_http_server.js
@@ -706,6 +706,11 @@ const requestHeaderFieldsTooLargeRespons
`HTTP/1.1 431 ${STATUS_CODES[431]}\r\n` +
'Connection: close\r\n\r\n', 'ascii'
);
+const requestChunkExtensionsTooLargeResponse = Buffer.from(
+ `HTTP/1.1 413 ${STATUS_CODES[413]}\r\n` +
+ 'Connection: close\r\n\r\n', 'ascii',
+);
+
function socketOnError(e) {
// Ignore further errors
this.removeListener('error', socketOnError);
@@ -719,6 +724,9 @@ function socketOnError(e) {
case 'HPE_HEADER_OVERFLOW':
response = requestHeaderFieldsTooLargeResponse;
break;
+ case 'HPE_CHUNK_EXTENSIONS_OVERFLOW':
+ response = requestChunkExtensionsTooLargeResponse;
+ break;
case 'ERR_HTTP_REQUEST_TIMEOUT':
response = requestTimeoutResponse;
break;
Index: node-v16.20.2/src/node_http_parser.cc
===================================================================
--- node-v16.20.2.orig/src/node_http_parser.cc
+++ node-v16.20.2/src/node_http_parser.cc
@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ const uint32_t kOnExecute = 5;
const uint32_t kOnTimeout = 6;
// Any more fields than this will be flushed into JS
const size_t kMaxHeaderFieldsCount = 32;
+// Maximum size of chunk extensions
+const size_t kMaxChunkExtensionsSize = 16384;
const uint32_t kLenientNone = 0;
const uint32_t kLenientHeaders = 1 << 0;
@@ -206,6 +208,7 @@ class Parser : public AsyncWrap, public
int on_message_begin() {
num_fields_ = num_values_ = 0;
+ chunk_extensions_nread_ = 0;
url_.Reset();
status_message_.Reset();
header_parsing_start_time_ = uv_hrtime();
@@ -443,9 +446,22 @@ class Parser : public AsyncWrap, public
return 0;
}
- // Reset nread for the next chunk
+ int on_chunk_extension(const char* at, size_t length) {
+ chunk_extensions_nread_ += length;
+
+ if (chunk_extensions_nread_ > kMaxChunkExtensionsSize) {
+ llhttp_set_error_reason(&parser_,
+ "HPE_CHUNK_EXTENSIONS_OVERFLOW:Chunk extensions overflow");
+ return HPE_USER;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // Reset nread for the next chunk and also reset the extensions counter
int on_chunk_header() {
header_nread_ = 0;
+ chunk_extensions_nread_ = 0;
return 0;
}
@@ -887,6 +903,7 @@ class Parser : public AsyncWrap, public
const char* current_buffer_data_;
bool pending_pause_ = false;
uint64_t header_nread_ = 0;
+ uint64_t chunk_extensions_nread_ = 0;
uint64_t max_http_header_size_;
uint64_t headers_timeout_;
uint64_t header_parsing_start_time_ = 0;
@@ -921,6 +938,7 @@ const llhttp_settings_t Parser::settings
Proxy<DataCall, &Parser::on_header_field>::Raw,
Proxy<DataCall, &Parser::on_header_value>::Raw,
Proxy<Call, &Parser::on_headers_complete>::Raw,
+ Proxy<DataCall, &Parser::on_chunk_extension>::Raw,
Proxy<DataCall, &Parser::on_body>::Raw,
Proxy<Call, &Parser::on_message_complete>::Raw,
Proxy<Call, &Parser::on_chunk_header>::Raw,

124
CVE-2024-22025.patch Normal file
View File

File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long

32
CVE-2024-24758.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
Index: node-v16.20.2/deps/undici/src/lib/fetch/index.js
===================================================================
--- node-v16.20.2.orig/deps/undici/src/lib/fetch/index.js
+++ node-v16.20.2/deps/undici/src/lib/fetch/index.js
@@ -1200,6 +1200,13 @@ async function httpRedirectFetch (fetchP
if (!sameOrigin(requestCurrentURL(request), locationURL)) {
// https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#cors-non-wildcard-request-header-name
request.headersList.delete('authorization')
+
+ // https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#authentication-entries
+ request.headersList.delete('proxy-authorization', true)
+
+ // "Cookie" and "Host" are forbidden request-headers, which undici doesn't implement.
+ request.headersList.delete('cookie')
+ request.headersList.delete('host')
}
// 14. If request’s body is non-null, then set request’s body to the first return
Index: node-v16.20.2/deps/undici/undici.js
===================================================================
--- node-v16.20.2.orig/deps/undici/undici.js
+++ node-v16.20.2/deps/undici/undici.js
@@ -11167,6 +11167,9 @@ var require_fetch = __commonJS({
}
if (!sameOrigin(requestCurrentURL(request), locationURL)) {
request.headersList.delete("authorization");
+ request.headersList.delete("proxy-authorization", true);
+ request.headersList.delete("cookie");
+ request.headersList.delete("host");
}
if (request.body != null) {
assert(request.body.source != null);

26
CVE-2024-24806.patch Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
Index: node-v16.20.2/deps/uv/src/idna.c
===================================================================
--- node-v16.20.2.orig/deps/uv/src/idna.c
+++ node-v16.20.2/deps/uv/src/idna.c
@@ -273,6 +273,9 @@ long uv__idna_toascii(const char* s, con
char* ds;
int rc;
+ if (s == se)
+ return UV_EINVAL;
+
ds = d;
si = s;
@@ -307,8 +310,9 @@ long uv__idna_toascii(const char* s, con
return rc;
}
- if (d < de)
- *d++ = '\0';
+ if (d >= de)
+ return UV_EINVAL;
+ *d++ = '\0';
return d - ds; /* Number of bytes written. */
}

25
nodejs16.changes
View File

@@ -1,10 +1,29 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tue Feb 20 09:52:34 UTC 2024 - Adam Majer <adam.majer@suse.de>
* CVE-2023-46809.patch: Node.js is vulnerable to the Marvin Attack
(timing variant of the Bleichenbacher attack against
PKCS#1 v1.5 padding) - (Medium) (CVE-2023-46809, bsc#1219997)
* CVE-2024-22019.patch: http: Reading unprocessed HTTP request with
unbounded chunk extension allows DoS attacks- (High)
(CVE-2024-22019, bsc#1219993)
* CVE-2024-22025.patch: fix Denial of Service by resource exhaustion
in fetch() brotli decoding (CVE-2024-22025, bsc#1220014)
* CVE-2024-24758.patch: ignore proxy-authorization headers
(CVE-2024-24758, bsc#1220017)
* CVE-2024-24806.patch: fix improper domain lookup that
potentially leads to SSRF attacks (CVE-2024-24806, bsc#1220053)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tue Oct 17 11:52:34 UTC 2023 - Adam Majer <adam.majer@suse.de>
- CVE-2023-38552.patch: Integrity checks according to policies can be circumvented (CVE-2023-38552, bsc#1216272)
- CVE-2023-39333.patch: Code injection via WebAssembly export names (CVE-2023-39333, bsc#1216273)
- CVE-2023-38552.patch: Integrity checks according to policies
can be circumvented (CVE-2023-38552, bsc#1216272)
- CVE-2023-39333.patch, wasm-fixture.tar.gz: Code injection via
WebAssembly export names (CVE-2023-39333, bsc#1216273)
- CVE-2023-44487.patch: nghttp2 Security Release (CVE-2023-44487, bsc#1216190)
- CVE-2023-45143.patch: undici Security Release (CVE-2023-39333, bsc#1216273)
- CVE-2023-45143.patch: undici Security Release (CVE-2023-45143, bsc#1216205)
- nodejs.keyring: include new releaser keys
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Aug 10 14:33:17 UTC 2023 - Adam Majer <adam.majer@suse.de>

32
nodejs16.spec
View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
#
# spec file for package nodejs16
#
# Copyright (c) 2022 SUSE LLC
# Copyright (c) 2024 SUSE LLC
#
# All modifications and additions to the file contributed by third parties
# remain the property of their copyright owners, unless otherwise agreed
@@ -49,6 +49,11 @@ Release: 0
%bcond_with libalternatives
%endif
# nodejs20+ is not for SLE12
%if %{node_version_number} >= 20 && 0%{?suse_version} > 0 && 0%{?suse_version} < 1500
ExclusiveArch do_not_build
%endif
%if %node_version_number >= 12
%define openssl_req_ver 1.1.1
%else
@@ -135,9 +140,9 @@ Source3: nodejs.keyring
Source5: node-gyp_7.1.2.tar.xz
# Only required to run unit tests in NodeJS 10+
Source10: update_npm_tarball.sh
Source11: node_modules.tar.xz
Source11: node_modules.tar.xz
Source12: wasm-fixtures.tar.gz
Source20: bash_output_helper.bash
Source21: wasm-fixtures.tar.gz
## Patches not distribution specific
Patch1: cares_public_headers.patch
@@ -151,7 +156,11 @@ Patch68: CVE-2023-44487.patch
Patch69: CVE-2023-38552.patch
Patch70: CVE-2023-39333.patch
Patch71: CVE-2023-45143.patch
Patch72: CVE-2024-24806.patch
Patch73: CVE-2024-24758.patch
Patch74: CVE-2024-22025.patch
Patch75: CVE-2024-22019.patch
Patch76: CVE-2023-46809.patch
## Patches specific to SUSE and openSUSE
Patch100: linker_lto_jobs.patch
@@ -382,6 +391,7 @@ Provides: bundled(llhttp) = 6.0.11
Provides: bundled(ngtcp2) = 0.8.1
Provides: bundled(base64) = 0.4.0
# bundled url-ada parser, not ada
@@ -639,11 +649,15 @@ The API documentation for the Node.js JavaScript runtime.
%prep
%if ! %{git_node}
echo "`grep node-v%{version}.tar.xz %{S:1} | head -n1 | cut -c1-64` %{S:0}" | sha256sum -c
%setup -q -n node-v%{version} -a21
%setup -q -n node-v%{version}
%else
%setup -q -n node-%{version}
%endif
%if %{node_version_number} == 16
tar zxf %{S:12}
%endif
%if %{node_version_number} <= 10
rm -r deps/npm/*
pushd deps/npm
@@ -665,6 +679,7 @@ tar Jxf %{SOURCE5}
popd
%if %{node_version_number} >= 19
%else
%endif
%endif
@@ -681,9 +696,16 @@ popd
%patch69 -p1
%patch70 -p1
%patch71 -p1
%patch72 -p1
%patch73 -p1
%patch74 -p1
%patch75 -p1
%patch76 -p1
%patch100 -p1
%patch101 -p1
%if 0%{?suse_version} >= 1500 || 0%{?suse_version} == 0
%patch102 -p1
%endif
# Add check_output to configure script (not part of Python 2.6 in SLE11).
%if 0%{?suse_version} == 1110
%endif