Security Fixes
* A specially crafted query could trigger an assertion failure in message.c.
This flaw was discovered by Jonathan Foote, and is disclosed in
CVE-2015-5477. [RT #39795]
* On servers configured to perform DNSSEC validation, an assertion failure
could be triggered on answers from a specially configured server.
This flaw was discovered by Breno Silveira Soares, and is disclosed
in CVE-2015-4620. [RT #39795]
Bug Fixes
* Asynchronous zone loads were not handled correctly when the zone load was
already in progress; this could trigger a crash in zt.c. [RT #37573]
* Several bugs have been fixed in the RPZ implementation:
+ Policy zones that did not specifically require recursion could be treated
as if they did; consequently, setting qname-wait-recurse no; was
sometimes ineffective. This has been corrected. In most configurations,
behavioral changes due to this fix will not be noticeable. [RT #39229]
+ The server could crash if policy zones were updated (e.g. via
rndc reload or an incoming zone transfer) while RPZ processing
was still ongoing for an active query. [RT #39415]
+ On servers with one or more policy zones configured as slaves, if a
policy zone updated during regular operation (rather than at startup)
using a full zone reload, such as via AXFR, a bug could allow the RPZ
summary data to fall out of sync, potentially leading to an assertion
failure in rpz.c when further incremental updates were made to the zone,
such as via IXFR. [RT #39567]
+ The server could match a shorter prefix than what was
available in CLIENT-IP policy triggers, and so, an unexpected
action could be taken. This has been corrected. [RT #39481]
+ The server could crash if a reload of an RPZ zone was initiated while
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/bind?expand=0&rev=174
f94eebf621