commented out). The keycat binary isn't really installed nor
supported, so we can drop it, except for the code that is used
by other SELinux patches, which is what I kept from that patch
(boo#1229072).
- Add patch submitted to upstream to fix RFC4256 implementation
so that keyboard-interactive authentication method can send
instructions and sshd shows them to users even before a prompt
is requested. This fixes MFA push notifications (boo#1229010).
* 0001-auth-pam-Immediately-report-instructions-to-clients-and-fix-handling-in-ssh-client.patch
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=274
- Update to openssh 9.8p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Add patch to fix sshd not logging in the audit failed login
attempts (submitted to upstream in
https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/516):
* fix-audit-fail-attempt.patch
- Use --enable-dsa-keys when building openssh. It's required if
the user sets the crypto-policy mode to LEGACY, where DSA keys
should be allowed. The option was added by upstream in 9.7 and
set to disabled by default.
- These two changes fix 2 of the 3 issues reported in bsc#1229650.
- Fix a dbus connection leaked in the logind patch that was
missing a sd_bus_unref call (found by Matthias Gerstner):
* logind_set_tty.patch
- Add a patch that fixes a small memory leak when parsing the
subsystem configuration option:
* fix-memleak-in-process_server_config_line_depth.patch
- Update to openssh 9.8p1:
= Security
* 1) Race condition in sshd(8) (bsc#1226642, CVE-2024-6387).
A critical vulnerability in sshd(8) was present in Portable
OpenSSH versions between 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may
allow arbitrary code execution with root privileges.
Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit
Linux/glibc systems with ASLR. Under lab conditions, the attack
requires on average 6-8 hours of continuous connections up to
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1196434
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=183
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Fix a dbus connection leaked in the logind patch that was
missing a sd_bus_unref call (found by Matthias Gerstner):
* logind_set_tty.patch
- Add a patch that fixes a small memory leak when parsing the
subsystem configuration option:
* fix-memleak-in-process_server_config_line_depth.patch
- Update to openssh 9.8p1:
= Security
* 1) Race condition in sshd(8) (bsc#1226642, CVE-2024-6387).
A critical vulnerability in sshd(8) was present in Portable
OpenSSH versions between 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may
allow arbitrary code execution with root privileges.
Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit
Linux/glibc systems with ASLR. Under lab conditions, the attack
requires on average 6-8 hours of continuous connections up to
the maximum the server will accept. Exploitation on 64-bit
systems is believed to be possible but has not been
demonstrated at this time. It's likely that these attacks will
be improved upon.
Exploitation on non-glibc systems is conceivable but has not
been examined. Systems that lack ASLR or users of downstream
Linux distributions that have modified OpenSSH to disable
per-connection ASLR re-randomisation (yes - this is a thing, no
- we don't understand why) may potentially have an easier path
to exploitation. OpenBSD is not vulnerable.
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=272
* 0001-upstream-fix-proxy-multiplexing-mode_-broken-when-keystroke.patch
- Add patch from upstream to restore correctly sigprocmask
* 0001-upstream-correctly-restore-sigprocmask-around-ppoll.patch
- Add patch from upstream to fix a logic error in
ObscureKeystrokeTiming that rendered this feature ineffective,
allowing a passive observer to detect which network packets
contained real keystrokes (bsc#1227318, CVE-2024-39894):
* 0001-upstream-when-sending-ObscureKeystrokeTiming-chaff-packets_.patch
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=271
package existed for a brief period of time during SLE 15 SP6/
Leap 15.6 development but even if it was removed from the
repositories before GM, some users might have it in their
systems from having tried a beta/RC release (boo#1227350).
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive
(bsc#1218215, CVE-2023-51385).
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=270
- Remove the recommendation for openssh-server-config-rootlogin
from openssh-server. Since the default for that config option
was changed in SLE it's not needed anymore in SLE nor in TW
(boo#1224392).
- Add a warning in %post of openssh-clients, openssh-server and
openssh-server-config-disallow-rootlogin to warn the user if
the /etc/ssh/(ssh_config.d|sshd_config.d) directories are not
being used (bsc#1223486).
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1174779
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=267
- Only for SLE15, restore the patch file removed in
Thu Feb 18 13:54:44 UTC 2021 to restore the previous behaviour
from SP5 of having root password login allowed by default
(fixes bsc#1223486, related to bsc#1173067):
* openssh-7.7p1-allow_root_password_login.patch
- Since the default value for this config option is now set to
permit root to use password logins in SLE15, the
openssh-server-config-rootlogin subpackage isn't useful there so
we now create an openssh-server-config-disallow-rootlogin
subpackage that sets the configuration the other way around
than openssh-server-config-rootlogin.
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1173783
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=266
- Make openssh-server recommend the openssh-server-config-rootlogin
package in SLE in order to keep the same behaviour of previous
SPs where the PermitRootLogin default was set to yes.
- Fix crypto-policies requirement to be set by openssh-server, not
the config-rootlogin subpackage.
- Add back %config(noreplace) tag for more config files that were
already set like this in previous SPs.
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1167038
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=263
- Add patch from SLE which was missing in Factory:
* Mon Jun 7 20:54:09 UTC 2021 - Hans Petter Jansson <hpj@suse.com>
- Add openssh-mitigate-lingering-secrets.patch (bsc#1186673), which
attempts to mitigate instances of secrets lingering in memory
after a session exits. (bsc#1213004 bsc#1213008)
- Rebase patch:
* openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1165549
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=259
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this (forwarded request 1150500 from hpjansson)
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150501
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=170
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
- Enhanced SELinux functionality. Added Fedora patches:
* openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
Proper handling of MLS systems and basis for other SELinux
improvements
* openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
Properly set contexts during privilege separation
* openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
Add ssh-keycat command to allow retrival of authorized_keys
on MLS setups with polyinstantiation
* openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
Additional changes to set the proper context during privilege
separation
* openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
Various changes and putting the pieces together
For now we don't ship the ssh-keycat command, but we need the patch
for the other SELinux infrastructure
This change fixes issues like bsc#1214788, where the ssh daemon
needs to act on behalf of a user and needs a proper context for this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1123220
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=252
- Update to openssh 9.3p2
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details
- Update to openssh 9.3p2 (bsc#1213504, CVE-2023-38408):
Security
========
Fix CVE-2023-38408 - a condition where specific libaries loaded via
ssh-agent(1)'s PKCS#11 support could be abused to achieve remote
code execution via a forwarded agent socket if the following
conditions are met:
* Exploitation requires the presence of specific libraries on
the victim system.
* Remote exploitation requires that the agent was forwarded
to an attacker-controlled system.
Exploitation can also be prevented by starting ssh-agent(1) with an
empty PKCS#11/FIDO allowlist (ssh-agent -P '') or by configuring
an allowlist that contains only specific provider libraries.
This vulnerability was discovered and demonstrated to be exploitable
by the Qualys Security Advisory team.
In addition to removing the main precondition for exploitation,
this release removes the ability for remote ssh-agent(1) clients
to load PKCS#11 modules by default (see below).
Potentially-incompatible changes
--------------------------------
* ssh-agent(8): the agent will now refuse requests to load PKCS#11
modules issued by remote clients by default. A flag has been added
to restore the previous behaviour "-Oallow-remote-pkcs11".
Note that ssh-agent(8) depends on the SSH client to identify
requests that are remote. The OpenSSH >=8.9 ssh(1) client does
this, but forwarding access to an agent socket using other tools
may circumvent this restriction. (forwarded request 1099810 from simotek)
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1099856
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=165
- Update to openssh 9.3p2
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details
- Update to openssh 9.3p2 (bsc#1213504, CVE-2023-38408):
Security
========
Fix CVE-2023-38408 - a condition where specific libaries loaded via
ssh-agent(1)'s PKCS#11 support could be abused to achieve remote
code execution via a forwarded agent socket if the following
conditions are met:
* Exploitation requires the presence of specific libraries on
the victim system.
* Remote exploitation requires that the agent was forwarded
to an attacker-controlled system.
Exploitation can also be prevented by starting ssh-agent(1) with an
empty PKCS#11/FIDO allowlist (ssh-agent -P '') or by configuring
an allowlist that contains only specific provider libraries.
This vulnerability was discovered and demonstrated to be exploitable
by the Qualys Security Advisory team.
In addition to removing the main precondition for exploitation,
this release removes the ability for remote ssh-agent(1) clients
to load PKCS#11 modules by default (see below).
Potentially-incompatible changes
--------------------------------
* ssh-agent(8): the agent will now refuse requests to load PKCS#11
modules issued by remote clients by default. A flag has been added
to restore the previous behaviour "-Oallow-remote-pkcs11".
Note that ssh-agent(8) depends on the SSH client to identify
requests that are remote. The OpenSSH >=8.9 ssh(1) client does
this, but forwarding access to an agent socket using other tools
may circumvent this restriction.
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1099810
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=249
- Update to openssh 9.3p1
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details
- Update to openssh 9.3p1:
= Security
* ssh-add(1): when adding smartcard keys to ssh-agent(1) with the
per-hop destination constraints (ssh-add -h ...) added in
OpenSSH 8.9, a logic error prevented the constraints from being
communicated to the agent. This resulted in the keys being added
without constraints. The common cases of non-smartcard keys and
keys without destination constraints are unaffected. This
problem was reported by Luci Stanescu.
* ssh(1): Portable OpenSSH provides an implementation of the
getrrsetbyname(3) function if the standard library does not
provide it, for use by the VerifyHostKeyDNS feature. A
specifically crafted DNS response could cause this function to
perform an out-of-bounds read of adjacent stack data, but this
condition does not appear to be exploitable beyond denial-of-
service to the ssh(1) client.
The getrrsetbyname(3) replacement is only included if the
system's standard library lacks this function and portable
OpenSSH was not compiled with the ldns library (--with-ldns).
getrrsetbyname(3) is only invoked if using VerifyHostKeyDNS to
fetch SSHFP records. This problem was found by the Coverity
static analyzer.
= New features
* ssh-keygen(1), ssh-keyscan(1): accept -Ohashalg=sha1|sha256
when outputting SSHFP fingerprints to allow algorithm
selection. bz3493
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1087770
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=247
