Accepting request 1281086 from Base:System

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1281086
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/pcr-oracle?expand=0&rev=21

fix-bsc1230316-make-pcr4-hard-requirement.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From 55fe5c34cf41813fd91fff85281770da77913b68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
-Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2025 16:40:36 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Stop the SbatLevelRT prediction if .sbatlevel not
- available
-
-The SbatLevelRT prediction relies on the PCR4 events to locate shim.efi,
-so PCR4 has to be a hard requirement.
-
-Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
----
- src/efi-variable.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/efi-variable.c b/src/efi-variable.c
-index b70f63b..f8527cc 100644
---- a/src/efi-variable.c
-+++ b/src/efi-variable.c
-@@ -291,9 +291,9 @@ efi_variable_authority_get_record(const tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed, const char *
- 		db_name = "MokList";
- 	} else
- 	if (!strcmp(var_short_name, "SbatLevel")) {
--		if (ctx->sbatlevel != NULL)
--			return efi_sbatlevel_get_record(ctx->sbatlevel);
--		return runtime_read_efi_variable(var_name);
-+		if (ctx->sbatlevel == NULL)
-+			fatal("No reference .sbatlevel section. Please add PCR4 into the PCR index list\n");
-+		return efi_sbatlevel_get_record(ctx->sbatlevel);
- 	} else {
- 		/* Read as-is (this could be SbatLevel, or some other variable that's not
- 		 * a signature db). */
--- 
-2.43.0
-

fix-bsc1230316-predict-sbatlevelrt-sb-off.patch

@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-From 07e43365379ef5bd9fb53a45306af02025442b92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
-Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2025 14:09:34 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix SbatLevelRT prediction when Secure Boot is disabled
-
-Since shim 15.8, instead of using SBAT automatic as the default
-candidate, it always resets SbatLevel to SBAT_ORIGINAL. To make the
-prediction work for shim >= 15.8, the additinal check is added to adjust
-the SBAT candidate.
-
-Also fix POLICY_RESET for not setting sbat_reset to true and a few
-typos.
-
-Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
----
- src/efi-variable.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/efi-variable.c b/src/efi-variable.c
-index 9c56eec..b70f63b 100644
---- a/src/efi-variable.c
-+++ b/src/efi-variable.c
-@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ __tpm_event_efi_variable_build_event(const tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed, const voi
- #define POLICY_LATEST		1
- #define POLICY_AUTOMATIC	2
- #define POLICY_RESET		3
-+#define POLICY_NOTREAD		255
- 
- #define SBAT_ORIGINAL "sbat,1,2021030218\n"
- 
-@@ -169,6 +170,7 @@ efi_sbatlevel_get_record(buffer_t *sbatlevel)
- 	buffer_t *result = NULL;
- 	uint8_t secureboot;
- 	uint8_t sbatpolicy;
-+	uint32_t auto_date;
- 	uint32_t current_date;
- 	uint32_t candidate_date;
- 	bool sbat_reset = false;
-@@ -178,6 +180,11 @@ efi_sbatlevel_get_record(buffer_t *sbatlevel)
- 		return NULL;
- 	}
- 
-+	if (!fetch_sbat_datestamp(sbat_automatic, strlen(sbat_automatic), &auto_date)) {
-+		error("Unable to get datestamp of SBAT automatic\n");
-+		return NULL;
-+	}
-+
- 	buffer = runtime_read_efi_variable(SECUREBOOT_VARNAME);
- 	if (buffer == NULL || !buffer_get_u8(buffer, &secureboot))
- 		secureboot = 0;
-@@ -185,7 +192,7 @@ efi_sbatlevel_get_record(buffer_t *sbatlevel)
- 
- 	buffer = runtime_read_efi_variable(SBATPOLICY_VARNAME);
- 	if (buffer == NULL || !buffer_get_u8(buffer, &sbatpolicy))
--		sbatpolicy = POLICY_AUTOMATIC;
-+		sbatpolicy = POLICY_NOTREAD;
- 	buffer_free(buffer);
- 
- 	switch (sbatpolicy) {
-@@ -200,9 +207,24 @@ efi_sbatlevel_get_record(buffer_t *sbatlevel)
- 			infomsg("SBAT cannot be reset when Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
- 			sbat_candidate = sbat_automatic;
- 		} else {
-+			sbat_reset = true;
- 			sbat_candidate = SBAT_ORIGINAL;
- 		}
- 		break;
-+	case POLICY_NOTREAD:
-+		if (secureboot == 1) {
-+			sbat_candidate = sbat_automatic;
-+		} else {
-+			/* shim 15.8 always resets SbatLevel when Secure Boot is disabled.
-+			 * The automatic datestamp of shim 15.8 is 2023012900. */
-+			if (auto_date >= 2023012900) {
-+				sbat_reset = true;
-+				sbat_candidate = SBAT_ORIGINAL;
-+			} else {
-+				sbat_candidate = sbat_automatic;
-+			}
-+		}
-+		break;
- 	default:
- 		error("Invalid SBAT policy\n");
- 		return NULL;
-@@ -217,12 +239,12 @@ efi_sbatlevel_get_record(buffer_t *sbatlevel)
- 
- 	if (!fetch_sbat_datestamp(sbat_current, sbatlvlrt->size, &current_date)
- 	 || !fetch_sbat_datestamp(sbat_candidate, strlen(sbat_candidate), &candidate_date)) {
--		error("Unable to get SBAT timestamp\n");
-+		error("Unable to get SBAT datestamp\n");
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
- 
--	debug("Current SBAT datestampe: %u\n", current_date);
--	debug("Candidate SBAT datestampe: %u\n", candidate_date);
-+	debug("Current SBAT datestamp: %u\n", current_date);
-+	debug("Candidate SBAT datestamp: %u\n", candidate_date);
- 
- 	if (current_date >= candidate_date && sbat_reset == false) {
- 		debug("Use current SbatLevel\n");
--- 
-2.43.0
-

fix-bsc1230316-predict-sbatlevelrt.patch

@@ -1,422 +0,0 @@
-From 5f73c8d655465470498c91f238788d2ffa48de81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 16:13:28 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Locate .sbatlevel section in shim.efi
-
-The .sbatlevel section in shim.efi will be used to set SbatLevelRT and
-we need the section to predict SbatLevelRT.
-
-Per PE format SPEC(*), the section name is
-
-"An 8-byte, null-padded UTF-8 encoded string. If the string is exactly 8
- 8 characters long, there is no terminating null. For longer names, this
- field contains a slash (/) that is followed by an ASCII representation
- of a decimal number that is an offset into the string table."
-
-Before looking for the .sbatlevel section, we have to get the string
-table, To get the offset to the string table:
-
-  string_table_offset = symbol_table_offset +
-                        (number_of_symbols * symbol_size)
-
-With the offset, we can go further to look for the longer section names
-and get the .sbatlevel section.
-
-(*) https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/debug/pe-format
-
-Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
----
- src/authenticode.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- src/authenticode.h |  2 ++
- 2 files changed, 77 insertions(+)
-
-Index: pcr-oracle-0.5.4/src/authenticode.c
-===================================================================
---- pcr-oracle-0.5.4.orig/src/authenticode.c
-+++ pcr-oracle-0.5.4/src/authenticode.c
-@@ -91,10 +91,14 @@ struct pecoff_image_info {
- 		uint16_t	machine_id;
- 		uint16_t	num_sections;
- 		uint32_t	symtab_offset;
-+		uint32_t	num_symbols;
- 		uint16_t	optional_hdr_size;
- 		uint32_t	optional_hdr_offset;
- 
- 		uint32_t	section_table_offset;
-+
-+		uint32_t	strtab_offset;
-+		uint32_t	strtab_size;
- 	} pe_hdr;
- 
- 	struct {
-@@ -111,6 +115,9 @@ struct pecoff_image_info {
- 	pecoff_section_t *	section;
- 
- 	authenticode_image_info_t auth_info;
-+
-+	/* The contents of .sbatlevel */
-+	buffer_t *		sbatlevel;
- };
- 
- #define MSDOS_STUB_PE_OFFSET	0x3c
-@@ -147,6 +154,7 @@ void
- pecoff_image_info_free(pecoff_image_info_t *img)
- {
- 	buffer_free(img->data);
-+	buffer_free(img->sbatlevel);
- 	free(img->display_name);
- 	free(img->data_dirs);
- 	free(img->section);
-@@ -351,6 +359,8 @@ __pecoff_process_header(buffer_t *in, pe
- 
- 	if (!__pecoff_get_u32(in, img, PECOFF_HEADER_SYMTAB_POS_OFFSET, &img->pe_hdr.symtab_offset))
- 		return false;
-+	if (!__pecoff_get_u32(in, img, PECOFF_HEADER_SYMTAB_CNT_OFFSET, &img->pe_hdr.num_symbols))
-+		return false;
- 
- 	img->pe_hdr.optional_hdr_offset = img->pe_hdr.offset + PECOFF_HEADER_LENGTH;
- 	if (!__pecoff_get_u16(in, img, PECOFF_HEADER_OPTIONAL_HDR_SIZE_OFFSET, &img->pe_hdr.optional_hdr_size))
-@@ -358,6 +368,19 @@ __pecoff_process_header(buffer_t *in, pe
- 
- 	img->pe_hdr.section_table_offset = img->pe_hdr.optional_hdr_offset + img->pe_hdr.optional_hdr_size;
- 
-+	/* String table follows symbol table immediately.
-+	 * One symbol is 18 bytes, so the offset to string table is
-+	 *   symtab_offset + num_symbols * 18
-+	 *
-+	 * ref: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/debug/pe-format#coff-string-table
-+	 *      https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/debug/pe-format#coff-symbol-table
-+	 */
-+	if (img->pe_hdr.symtab_offset != 0) {
-+		img->pe_hdr.strtab_offset = img->pe_hdr.symtab_offset + (img->pe_hdr.num_symbols * 18);
-+		if (!__pecoff_get_u32(in, img, img->pe_hdr.strtab_offset, &img->pe_hdr.strtab_size))
-+			return false;
-+	}
-+
- 	return true;
- }
- 
-@@ -451,6 +474,27 @@ __pecoff_process_optional_header(buffer_
- }
- 
- static bool
-+__pecoff_name_to_offset(char *sec_name, uint32_t *offset)
-+{
-+	uint32_t result = 0;
-+	int i;
-+
-+	if (sec_name[0] != '/')
-+		return false;
-+
-+	for (i = 1; i < 8 && sec_name[i] != '\0'; i++) {
-+		if (sec_name[i] < '0' || sec_name[i] > '9')
-+			return false;
-+
-+		result = result * 10 + sec_name[i] - '0';
-+	}
-+
-+	*offset = result;
-+
-+	return true;
-+}
-+
-+static bool
- __pecoff_process_sections(buffer_t *in, pecoff_image_info_t *info)
- {
- 	unsigned int tbl_offset = info->pe_hdr.section_table_offset;
-@@ -458,6 +502,9 @@ __pecoff_process_sections(buffer_t *in,
- 	buffer_t hdr;
- 	unsigned int i;
- 	pecoff_section_t *sec;
-+	uint32_t str_offset;
-+	char *long_name;
-+	buffer_t *sec_buf;
- 
- 	pe_debug("  Processing %u sections (table at offset %u)\n", num_sections, tbl_offset);
- 
-@@ -483,6 +530,27 @@ __pecoff_process_sections(buffer_t *in,
- 
- 		pe_debug("  Section %-8s raw %7u at 0x%08x-0x%08x\n",
- 				sec->name, sec->raw.size, sec->raw.addr, sec->raw.addr + sec->raw.size);
-+		/* Process the section names longer than 8 bytes */
-+		long_name = NULL;
-+		if (__pecoff_name_to_offset(sec->name, &str_offset) &&
-+		    str_offset < info->pe_hdr.strtab_size) {
-+			long_name = (char *)(in->data + info->pe_hdr.strtab_offset + str_offset);
-+			pe_debug("  Long Name: %s\n", long_name);
-+		}
-+
-+		/* Get sbatlevel from .sbatlevel section */
-+		if (long_name != NULL && strcmp(long_name, ".sbatlevel") == 0) {
-+			if (!(sec_buf = buffer_alloc_write(sec->raw.size)))
-+				return false;
-+
-+			if (!buffer_seek_read(in, sec->raw.addr))
-+				return false;
-+
-+			if (!buffer_copy(in, sec->raw.size, sec_buf))
-+				return false;
-+
-+			info->sbatlevel = sec_buf;
-+		}
- 	}
- 
- 	/* We are supposed to sort the sections in ascending order, but we're not doing it here, we
-@@ -506,6 +574,7 @@ __pecoff_show_header(pecoff_image_info_t
- 	pe_debug("  Architecture: %s\n", __pecoff_get_machine(img));
- 	pe_debug("  Number of sections: %d\n", img->pe_hdr.num_sections);
- 	pe_debug("  Symbol table position: 0x%08x\n", img->pe_hdr.symtab_offset);
-+	pe_debug("  String table position: 0x%08x\n", img->pe_hdr.strtab_offset);
- 	pe_debug("  Optional header size: %d\n", img->pe_hdr.optional_hdr_size);
- }
- 
-@@ -751,3 +820,9 @@ authenticode_get_signer(const pecoff_ima
- 	cert_table_free(cert_tbl);
- 	return signer;
- }
-+
-+buffer_t *
-+pecoff_image_get_sbatlevel(pecoff_image_info_t *img)
-+{
-+	return img->sbatlevel;
-+}
-Index: pcr-oracle-0.5.4/src/authenticode.h
-===================================================================
---- pcr-oracle-0.5.4.orig/src/authenticode.h
-+++ pcr-oracle-0.5.4/src/authenticode.h
-@@ -29,5 +29,7 @@ extern tpm_evdigest_t *	authenticode_get
- extern cert_table_t *	authenticode_get_certificate_table(const pecoff_image_info_t *img);
- extern parsed_cert_t *	authenticode_get_signer(const pecoff_image_info_t *);
- 
-+extern buffer_t *	pecoff_image_get_sbatlevel(pecoff_image_info_t *);
-+
- #endif /* AUTHENTICODE_H */
- 
-Index: pcr-oracle-0.5.4/src/efi-application.c
-===================================================================
---- pcr-oracle-0.5.4.orig/src/efi-application.c
-+++ pcr-oracle-0.5.4/src/efi-application.c
-@@ -315,6 +315,7 @@ __tpm_event_efi_bsa_rehash(const tpm_eve
- 	const struct efi_bsa_event *evspec = &parsed->efi_bsa_event;
- 	const char *new_application;
- 	struct efi_bsa_event evspec_clone;
-+	buffer_t *sbatlevel;
- 
- 	/* Some BSA events do not refer to files, but to some data blobs residing somewhere on a device.
- 	 * We're not yet prepared to handle these, so we hope the user doesn't mess with them, and
-@@ -348,6 +349,14 @@ __tpm_event_efi_bsa_rehash(const tpm_eve
- 		}
- 	}
- 
-+	/* Set the sbatlevel section from shim.efi */
-+	if (ctx->sbatlevel == NULL
-+	 && (sbatlevel = pecoff_image_get_sbatlevel(evspec->img_info)) != NULL) {
-+		if ((ctx->sbatlevel = buffer_alloc_write(sbatlevel->size)) == NULL
-+		 || !buffer_copy(sbatlevel, sbatlevel->size, ctx->sbatlevel))
-+			return NULL;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (ctx->use_pesign)
- 		return __efi_application_rehash_pesign(ctx, evspec->efi_partition, evspec->efi_application);
- 
-Index: pcr-oracle-0.5.4/src/efi-variable.c
-===================================================================
---- pcr-oracle-0.5.4.orig/src/efi-variable.c
-+++ pcr-oracle-0.5.4/src/efi-variable.c
-@@ -93,6 +93,159 @@ __tpm_event_efi_variable_build_event(con
- 	return bp;
- }
- 
-+#define SBATLEVELRT_VARNAME "SbatLevelRT-605dab50-e046-4300-abb6-3dd810dd8b23"
-+#define SBATPOLICY_VARNAME "SbatPolicy-605dab50-e046-4300-abb6-3dd810dd8b23"
-+#define SECUREBOOT_VARNAME "SecureBoot-8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c"
-+
-+#define POLICY_LATEST		1
-+#define POLICY_AUTOMATIC	2
-+#define POLICY_RESET		3
-+
-+#define SBAT_ORIGINAL "sbat,1,2021030218\n"
-+
-+static bool
-+parse_sbatlevel_section(buffer_t *sec, char **sbat_automatic, char **sbat_latest)
-+{
-+	uint32_t fmt_ver;
-+	uint32_t offset_auto;
-+	uint32_t offset_latest;
-+
-+	if (!buffer_get_u32le(sec, &fmt_ver)
-+	 || !buffer_get_u32le(sec, &offset_auto)
-+	 || !buffer_get_u32le(sec, &offset_latest))
-+		return false;
-+
-+	if (offset_auto >= offset_latest)
-+		return false;
-+
-+	if (!buffer_seek_read(sec, offset_auto + 4))
-+		return false;
-+	*sbat_automatic = (char *)buffer_read_pointer(sec);
-+
-+	if (!buffer_seek_read(sec, offset_latest + 4))
-+		return false;
-+	*sbat_latest = (char *)(buffer_read_pointer(sec));
-+
-+	return true;
-+}
-+
-+static bool
-+fetch_sbat_datestamp(const char *sbat, size_t size, uint32_t *datestamp)
-+{
-+	uint32_t date = 0;
-+	size_t i;
-+
-+	/* Expected string: "sbat,X,YYYYYYYYYY\n" */
-+	if (size < 17)
-+		return false;
-+
-+	if (strncmp(sbat, "sbat,", 5) != 0)
-+		return false;
-+
-+	for (i = 5; i < size && sbat[i] != ','; i++);
-+	i++;
-+	if (i >= size)
-+		return false;
-+
-+	for (; i < size && sbat[i] != '\n'; i++) {
-+		if (sbat[i] < '0' || sbat[i] > '9')
-+			return false;
-+		date = date * 10 + sbat[i] - '0';
-+	}
-+
-+	*datestamp = date;
-+	return true;
-+}
-+
-+static buffer_t *
-+efi_sbatlevel_get_record(buffer_t *sbatlevel)
-+{
-+	char *sbat_automatic;
-+	char *sbat_latest;
-+	const char *sbat_candidate;
-+	const char *sbat_current;
-+	buffer_t *buffer = NULL;
-+	buffer_t *sbatlvlrt = NULL;
-+	buffer_t *result = NULL;
-+	uint8_t secureboot;
-+	uint8_t sbatpolicy;
-+	uint32_t current_date;
-+	uint32_t candidate_date;
-+	bool sbat_reset = false;
-+
-+	if (!parse_sbatlevel_section(sbatlevel, &sbat_automatic, &sbat_latest)) {
-+		error("Unable to process SbatLevel\n");
-+		return NULL;
-+	}
-+
-+	buffer = runtime_read_efi_variable(SECUREBOOT_VARNAME);
-+	if (buffer == NULL || !buffer_get_u8(buffer, &secureboot))
-+		secureboot = 0;
-+	buffer_free(buffer);
-+
-+	buffer = runtime_read_efi_variable(SBATPOLICY_VARNAME);
-+	if (buffer == NULL || !buffer_get_u8(buffer, &sbatpolicy))
-+		sbatpolicy = POLICY_AUTOMATIC;
-+	buffer_free(buffer);
-+
-+	switch (sbatpolicy) {
-+	case POLICY_LATEST:
-+		sbat_candidate = sbat_latest;
-+		break;
-+	case POLICY_AUTOMATIC:
-+		sbat_candidate = sbat_automatic;
-+		break;
-+	case POLICY_RESET:
-+		if (secureboot == 1) {
-+			infomsg("SBAT cannot be reset when Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
-+			sbat_candidate = sbat_automatic;
-+		} else {
-+			sbat_candidate = SBAT_ORIGINAL;
-+		}
-+		break;
-+	default:
-+		error("Invalid SBAT policy\n");
-+		return NULL;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((sbatlvlrt = runtime_read_efi_variable(SBATLEVELRT_VARNAME)) == NULL) {
-+		error("Unable to read SbatLevelRT\n");
-+		return NULL;
-+	}
-+
-+	sbat_current = (const char *)buffer_read_pointer(sbatlvlrt);
-+
-+	if (!fetch_sbat_datestamp(sbat_current, sbatlvlrt->size, &current_date)
-+	 || !fetch_sbat_datestamp(sbat_candidate, strlen(sbat_candidate), &candidate_date)) {
-+		error("Unable to get SBAT timestamp\n");
-+		goto fail;
-+	}
-+
-+	debug("Current SBAT datestampe: %u\n", current_date);
-+	debug("Candidate SBAT datestampe: %u\n", candidate_date);
-+
-+	if (current_date >= candidate_date && sbat_reset == false) {
-+		debug("Use current SbatLevel\n");
-+		result = sbatlvlrt;
-+	} else {
-+		debug("Use candidate SbatLevel\n");
-+		buffer_free(sbatlvlrt);
-+
-+		/* Copy the candidate SbatLevel string without the terminating null */
-+		if ((result = buffer_alloc_write(strlen(sbat_candidate))) == NULL
-+		 || !buffer_put(result, sbat_candidate, strlen(sbat_candidate)))
-+			goto fail;
-+	}
-+
-+	return result;
-+
-+fail:
-+	buffer_free(sbatlvlrt);
-+	buffer_free(result);
-+
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
- enum {
- 	HASH_STRATEGY_EVENT,
- 	HASH_STRATEGY_DATA,
-@@ -114,6 +267,11 @@ efi_variable_authority_get_record(const
- 	} else
- 	if (!strcmp(var_short_name, "MokListRT")) {
- 		db_name = "MokList";
-+	} else
-+	if (!strcmp(var_short_name, "SbatLevel")) {
-+		if (ctx->sbatlevel != NULL)
-+			return efi_sbatlevel_get_record(ctx->sbatlevel);
-+		return runtime_read_efi_variable(var_name);
- 	} else {
- 		/* Read as-is (this could be SbatLevel, or some other variable that's not
- 		 * a signature db). */
-Index: pcr-oracle-0.5.4/src/eventlog.c
-===================================================================
---- pcr-oracle-0.5.4.orig/src/eventlog.c
-+++ pcr-oracle-0.5.4/src/eventlog.c
-@@ -1148,6 +1148,7 @@ tpm_event_log_rehash_ctx_init(tpm_event_
- void
- tpm_event_log_rehash_ctx_destroy(tpm_event_log_rehash_ctx_t *ctx)
- {
-+	buffer_free(ctx->sbatlevel);
- }
- 
- void
-Index: pcr-oracle-0.5.4/src/eventlog.h
-===================================================================
---- pcr-oracle-0.5.4.orig/src/eventlog.h
-+++ pcr-oracle-0.5.4/src/eventlog.h
-@@ -209,6 +209,8 @@ typedef struct tpm_event_log_rehash_ctx
- 	/* This get set when the user specifies --next-kernel */
- 	char *			boot_entry_path;
- 	uapi_boot_entry_t *	boot_entry;
-+
-+	buffer_t *		sbatlevel;
- } tpm_event_log_rehash_ctx_t;
- 
- #define GRUB_COMMAND_ARGV_MAX	32

fix-event-reshash-for-cryptouuid.patch

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From bfd8520b4af3743a51046c83a1382fe1e66cc95a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
-Date: Thu, 26 Dec 2024 13:46:45 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix event rehash for grub files on system partition
-
-The crypto device logged by grub may not be 'crypto0'. It could begin
-with the 'cryptouuid' prefix like this:
-
-  cryptouuid/4203418d2b034db5b9476f013ee3dc80
-
-This commit adds the additional prefix matching for 'cryptouuid' to make
-pcr-oracle to search the file on system partition.
-
-Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
----
- src/eventlog.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/eventlog.c b/src/eventlog.c
-index 4277d42..c49599d 100644
---- a/src/eventlog.c
-+++ b/src/eventlog.c
-@@ -578,7 +578,8 @@ __tpm_event_grub_file_rehash(const tpm_event_t *ev, const tpm_parsed_event_t *pa
- 	const tpm_evdigest_t *md = NULL;
- 
- 	debug("  re-hashing %s\n", __tpm_event_grub_file_describe(parsed));
--	if (evspec->device == NULL || !strcmp(evspec->device, "crypto0")) {
-+	if (evspec->device == NULL || !strcmp(evspec->device, "crypto0") ||
-+	    !strncmp(evspec->device, "cryptouuid", strlen("cryptouuid"))) {
- 		debug("  assuming the file resides on system partition\n");
- 		md = runtime_digest_rootfs_file(ctx->algo, evspec->path);
- 	} else {
--- 
-2.43.0
-

fix-testcase-empty-efi-variables.patch

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-From 61f9b77634578c0bf0c3bf6c4b386057e8661a1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2024 14:41:38 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] testcase: fix playback on empty EFI variables
-
-For systems in UEFI Setup mode, there is no PK, KEK, or db. However,
-those variables are still recorded in the TPM event log with zero
-length. To avoid failing on reading those files, this commit changes the
-file reading flag so that testcase playback won't stop on those EFI
-variables.
-
-Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
----
- src/testcase.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/testcase.c b/src/testcase.c
-index f74238b..998aedd 100644
---- a/src/testcase.c
-+++ b/src/testcase.c
-@@ -224,12 +224,18 @@ testcase_write_file(const char *directory, const char *name, const buffer_t *bp)
- }
- 
- static buffer_t *
--testcase_read_file(const char *directory, const char *name)
-+__testcase_read_file(const char *directory, const char *name, int flags)
- {
- 	char path[PATH_MAX];
- 
- 	snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s", directory, name);
--	return runtime_read_file(path, 0);
-+	return runtime_read_file(path, flags);
-+}
-+
-+static buffer_t *
-+testcase_read_file(const char *directory, const char *name)
-+{
-+	return __testcase_read_file(directory, name, 0);
- }
- 
- testcase_t *
-@@ -314,7 +320,12 @@ testcase_record_efi_variable(testcase_t *tc, const char *name, const buffer_t *d
- buffer_t *
- testcase_playback_efi_variable(testcase_t *tc, const char *name)
- {
--	return testcase_read_file(tc->efi_directory, name);
-+	/* For systems in UEFI Setup mode, there is no PK, KEK, or db, but those
-+	 * variables are still recorded in the TPM event log with zero length.
-+	 * Set the file reading flag to skip those EFI variable files.
-+	 */
-+	return __testcase_read_file(tc->efi_directory, name,
-+				    RUNTIME_MISSING_FILE_OKAY);
- }
- 
- void
--- 
-2.35.3
-

fix_efi_measure_and_shim.patch

@@ -1,412 +0,0 @@
-From 9489d98463a596ec8e4ba9f1f4a2b2af91c0968b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 15:32:07 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 1/8] Print the measured kernel
-
-The debug output can be missleading, as print information about the
-current event log, but not about the measured element, that can be
-different as in the kernel case.
-
-Signed-off-by: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
----
- src/efi-application.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/efi-application.c b/src/efi-application.c
-index 3e80083..2fd33ec 100644
---- a/src/efi-application.c
-+++ b/src/efi-application.c
-@@ -292,6 +292,12 @@ __tpm_event_efi_bsa_rehash(const tpm_event_t *ev, const tpm_parsed_event_t *pars
- 
- 	/* The next boot can have a different kernel */
- 	if (sdb_is_kernel(evspec->efi_application) && ctx->boot_entry) {
-+		/* TODO: the parsed data type did not change, so all
-+		 * the description correspond to the current event
-+		 * log, and not the asset that has been measured.  The
-+		 * debug output can then be missleading.
-+		 */
-+		debug("Measuring %s\n", ctx->boot_entry->image_path);
- 		new_application = ctx->boot_entry->image_path;
- 		if (new_application) {
- 			evspec_clone = *evspec;
-
-From d8d97a3c233e326e0b1836b77fa08f483ea8f410 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 15:51:45 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Rename variable to cmdline
-
-Signed-off-by: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
----
- src/eventlog.c | 15 ++++++++-------
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/eventlog.c b/src/eventlog.c
-index 4277d42..377f4d6 100644
---- a/src/eventlog.c
-+++ b/src/eventlog.c
-@@ -790,8 +790,8 @@ static const tpm_evdigest_t *
- __tpm_event_systemd_rehash(const tpm_event_t *ev, const tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed, tpm_event_log_rehash_ctx_t *ctx)
- {
- 	const uapi_boot_entry_t *boot_entry = ctx->boot_entry;
--	char initrd[2048];
--	char initrd_utf16[4096];
-+	char cmdline[2048];
-+	char cmdline_utf16[4096];
- 	unsigned int len;
- 
- 	/* If no --next-kernel option was given, do not rehash anything */
-@@ -804,15 +804,16 @@ __tpm_event_systemd_rehash(const tpm_event_t *ev, const tpm_parsed_event_t *pars
- 	}
- 
- 	debug("Next boot entry expected from: %s %s\n", boot_entry->title, boot_entry->version? : "");
--	snprintf(initrd, sizeof(initrd), "initrd=%s %s",
-+	snprintf(cmdline, sizeof(cmdline), "initrd=%s %s",
- 			path_unix2dos(boot_entry->initrd_path),
- 			boot_entry->options? : "");
-+	debug("Measuring Kernel command line: %s\n", cmdline);
- 
--	len = (strlen(initrd) + 1) << 1;
--	assert(len <= sizeof(initrd_utf16));
--	__convert_to_utf16le(initrd, strlen(initrd) + 1, initrd_utf16, len);
-+	len = (strlen(cmdline) + 1) << 1;
-+	assert(len <= sizeof(cmdline_utf16));
-+	__convert_to_utf16le(cmdline, strlen(cmdline) + 1, cmdline_utf16, len);
- 
--	return digest_compute(ctx->algo, initrd_utf16, len);
-+	return digest_compute(ctx->algo, cmdline_utf16, len);
- }
- 
- /*
-
-From 4f8e3f4760ff7fe97df1e6af569d049e30f3ee06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 15:55:41 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Add debug output for initrd
-
-Signed-off-by: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
----
- src/eventlog.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/eventlog.c b/src/eventlog.c
-index 377f4d6..3574a4d 100644
---- a/src/eventlog.c
-+++ b/src/eventlog.c
-@@ -877,6 +877,7 @@ __tpm_event_tag_initrd_rehash(const tpm_event_t *ev, const tpm_parsed_event_t *p
- 	}
- 
- 	debug("Next boot entry expected from: %s %s\n", boot_entry->title, boot_entry->version? : "");
-+	debug("Measuring initrd: %s\n", boot_entry->initrd_path);
- 	return runtime_digest_efi_file(ctx->algo, boot_entry->initrd_path);
- }
- 
-
-From 90ee8dab9d972b741bc0c27a04a872afbecdef82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 18:54:04 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Add debug output during extension
-
-Signed-off-by: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
----
- src/oracle.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/oracle.c b/src/oracle.c
-index 1cafafc..0afd910 100644
---- a/src/oracle.c
-+++ b/src/oracle.c
-@@ -366,6 +366,7 @@ pcr_bank_extend_register(tpm_pcr_bank_t *bank, unsigned int pcr_index, const tpm
- static void
- predictor_extend_hash(struct predictor *pred, unsigned int pcr_index, const tpm_evdigest_t *d)
- {
-+	debug("Extend PCR#%d: %s\n", pcr_index, digest_print(d));
- 	pcr_bank_extend_register(&pred->prediction, pcr_index, d);
- }
- 
-
-From 5133fe6f3c00a41aee362a51621a278dd472497e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
-Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 14:09:03 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Update the EFI image info before rehash
-
-If the new EFI image is in a new place, the image information stored in
-the parsed event should be updated, so the rehash will use this
-information instead of the one from the event log.
-
-Signed-off-by: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
----
- src/efi-application.c | 8 ++++----
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/efi-application.c b/src/efi-application.c
-index 2fd33ec..842bca6 100644
---- a/src/efi-application.c
-+++ b/src/efi-application.c
-@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
-  */
- static const tpm_evdigest_t *	__tpm_event_efi_bsa_rehash(const tpm_event_t *, const tpm_parsed_event_t *, tpm_event_log_rehash_ctx_t *);
- static bool			__tpm_event_efi_bsa_extract_location(tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed);
--static bool			__tpm_event_efi_bsa_inspect_image(tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed);
-+static bool			__tpm_event_efi_bsa_inspect_image(struct efi_bsa_event *evspec);
- 
- static void
- __tpm_event_efi_bsa_destroy(tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed)
-@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ __tpm_event_parse_efi_bsa(tpm_event_t *ev, tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed, buffer_t
- 			assign_string(&ctx->efi_partition, evspec->efi_partition);
- 		else
- 			assign_string(&evspec->efi_partition, ctx->efi_partition);
--		__tpm_event_efi_bsa_inspect_image(parsed);
-+		__tpm_event_efi_bsa_inspect_image(evspec);
- 	}
- 
- 	return true;
-@@ -150,9 +150,8 @@ __tpm_event_efi_bsa_extract_location(tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed)
- }
- 
- static bool
--__tpm_event_efi_bsa_inspect_image(tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed)
-+__tpm_event_efi_bsa_inspect_image(struct efi_bsa_event *evspec)
- {
--        struct efi_bsa_event *evspec = &parsed->efi_bsa_event;
- 	char path[PATH_MAX];
- 	const char *display_name;
- 	buffer_t *img_data;
-@@ -302,6 +301,7 @@ __tpm_event_efi_bsa_rehash(const tpm_event_t *ev, const tpm_parsed_event_t *pars
- 		if (new_application) {
- 			evspec_clone = *evspec;
- 			evspec_clone.efi_application = strdup(new_application);
-+			__tpm_event_efi_bsa_inspect_image(&evspec_clone);
- 			evspec = &evspec_clone;
- 		}
- 	}
-
-From 93cbe02ca05297c638b1ac7f32b3da3a6cd2f684 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
-Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 14:35:07 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 6/8] Bump version to 0.5.5
-
-Signed-off-by: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
----
- configure         | 2 +-
- microconf/version | 2 +-
- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/configure b/configure
-index 1dccbdc..854cc0a 100755
---- a/configure
-+++ b/configure
-@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
- # Invoke with --help for a description of options
- #
- # microconf:begin
--# version 0.5.4
-+# version 0.5.5
- # require libtss2
- # require json
- # disable debug-authenticode
-diff --git a/microconf/version b/microconf/version
-index 7e913d9..591473f 100644
---- a/microconf/version
-+++ b/microconf/version
-@@ -1 +1 @@
--uc_version=0.5.4
-+uc_version=0.5.5
-
-From e622620a8de5eaf499265adf6c5e8d2ecdaa295b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2024 13:34:13 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 7/8] Add secure boot detector
-
-Signed-off-by: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
----
- Makefile.in       |  3 ++-
- src/eventlog.h    |  2 ++
- src/secure_boot.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
- create mode 100644 src/secure_boot.c
-
-diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
-index 02a915b..9698253 100644
---- a/Makefile.in
-+++ b/Makefile.in
-@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ ORACLE_SRCS	= oracle.c \
- 		  store.c \
- 		  util.c \
- 		  sd-boot.c \
--		  uapi.c
-+		  uapi.c \
-+		  secure_boot.c
- ORACLE_OBJS	= $(addprefix build/,$(patsubst %.c,%.o,$(ORACLE_SRCS)))
- 
- all: $(TOOLS) $(MANPAGES)
-diff --git a/src/eventlog.h b/src/eventlog.h
-index 3741b58..8af5eb0 100644
---- a/src/eventlog.h
-+++ b/src/eventlog.h
-@@ -323,4 +323,6 @@ extern bool			shim_variable_name_valid(const char *name);
- extern const char *		shim_variable_get_rtname(const char *name);
- extern const char *		shim_variable_get_full_rtname(const char *name);
- 
-+extern bool			secure_boot_enabled();
-+
- #endif /* EVENTLOG_H */
-diff --git a/src/secure_boot.c b/src/secure_boot.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..215baa6
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/src/secure_boot.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
-+/*
-+ *   Copyright (C) 2023 SUSE LLC
-+ *
-+ *   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
-+ *   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
-+ *   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
-+ *   (at your option) any later version.
-+ *
-+ *   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
-+ *   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-+ *   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
-+ *   GNU General Public License for more details.
-+ *
-+ *   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-+ *   along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
-+ *   Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
-+ *
-+ * Written by Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
-+ */
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include "bufparser.h"
-+#include "runtime.h"
-+
-+#define SECURE_BOOT_EFIVAR_NAME	"SecureBoot-8be4df61-93ca-11d2-aa0d-00e098032b8c"
-+
-+
-+bool
-+secure_boot_enabled()
-+{
-+	buffer_t *data;
-+	uint8_t enabled;
-+
-+	data = runtime_read_efi_variable(SECURE_BOOT_EFIVAR_NAME);
-+	if (data == NULL) {
-+		return false;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (!buffer_get_u8(data,  &enabled)) {
-+		 return false;
-+	}
-+
-+	return enabled == 1;
-+}
-
-From 211502ec5cac7e252f8af251ee34872f7adae9ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
-Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2024 14:52:37 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 8/8] Detect when device path is missing for kernel
-
-Signed-off-by: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
----
- src/efi-application.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- src/sd-boot.c         |  3 +++
- 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/efi-application.c b/src/efi-application.c
-index 842bca6..1f434fc 100644
---- a/src/efi-application.c
-+++ b/src/efi-application.c
-@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ static const tpm_evdigest_t *	__tpm_event_efi_bsa_rehash(const tpm_event_t *, co
- static bool			__tpm_event_efi_bsa_extract_location(tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed);
- static bool			__tpm_event_efi_bsa_inspect_image(struct efi_bsa_event *evspec);
- 
-+static bool			__is_shim_issue(const tpm_event_t *ev, const struct efi_bsa_event *evspec);
-+
- static void
- __tpm_event_efi_bsa_destroy(tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed)
- {
-@@ -114,6 +116,15 @@ __tpm_event_parse_efi_bsa(tpm_event_t *ev, tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed, buffer_t
- 		__tpm_event_efi_bsa_inspect_image(evspec);
- 	}
- 
-+	/* When the shim issue is present the efi_application will be
-+	 * empty.  The binary path will be reconstructed with the
-+	 * --next-kernel parameter, but to generate the full path the
-+	 * `efi_partition` is needed.
-+	 */
-+	if (__is_shim_issue(ev, evspec))
-+		assign_string(&evspec->efi_partition, ctx->efi_partition);
-+
-+
- 	return true;
- }
- 
-@@ -273,6 +284,31 @@ efi_application_extract_signer(const tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed)
- 	return authenticode_get_signer(evspec->img_info);
- }
- 
-+static bool __is_shim_issue(const tpm_event_t *ev, const struct efi_bsa_event *evspec)
-+{
-+	/* When secure boot is enabled and shim is installed,
-+	 * systemd-boot installs some security overrides that will
-+	 * delegate into shim (via shim_validate from systemd-boot)
-+	 * the validation of the kernel signature.
-+	 *
-+	 * The shim_validate function receives the device path from
-+	 * the firmware, and is used to load the kernel into memory.
-+	 * At the end call shim_verify from shim, but pass only the
-+	 * buffer with the loaded image.
-+	 *
-+	 * The net result is that the event log
-+	 * EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION registered by shim_verify
-+	 * will not contain the device path that pcr-oracle requires
-+	 * to rehash the binary.
-+	 *
-+	 * So far only the kernel is presenting this issue (when
-+	 * systemd-boot is used, GRUB2 needs to be evaluated), so this
-+	 * can be detected if there is an event registered in PCR 4
-+	 * without path.
-+	 */
-+	return (secure_boot_enabled() && ev->pcr_index == 4 && !evspec->efi_application);
-+}
-+
- static const tpm_evdigest_t *
- __tpm_event_efi_bsa_rehash(const tpm_event_t *ev, const tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed, tpm_event_log_rehash_ctx_t *ctx)
- {
-@@ -284,13 +320,19 @@ __tpm_event_efi_bsa_rehash(const tpm_event_t *ev, const tpm_parsed_event_t *pars
- 	 * We're not yet prepared to handle these, so we hope the user doesn't mess with them, and
- 	 * return the original digest from the event log.
- 	 */
--	if (!evspec->efi_application) {
--		debug("Unable to locate boot service application - probably not a file\n");
-+	if (!evspec->efi_application && !(__is_shim_issue(ev, evspec) && ctx->boot_entry)) {
-+		if (__is_shim_issue(ev, evspec) && !ctx->boot_entry)
-+			debug("Unable to locate boot service application - missing device path because shim issue");
-+		else
-+			debug("Unable to locate boot service application - probably not a file\n");
- 		return tpm_event_get_digest(ev, ctx->algo);
- 	}
- 
- 	/* The next boot can have a different kernel */
--	if (sdb_is_kernel(evspec->efi_application) && ctx->boot_entry) {
-+	if ((sdb_is_kernel(evspec->efi_application) || __is_shim_issue(ev, evspec)) && ctx->boot_entry) {
-+		if (__is_shim_issue(ev, evspec))
-+			debug("Empty device path for the kernel - building one based on next kernel\n");
-+
- 		/* TODO: the parsed data type did not change, so all
- 		 * the description correspond to the current event
- 		 * log, and not the asset that has been measured.  The
-diff --git a/src/sd-boot.c b/src/sd-boot.c
-index cbdaa49..ede2569 100644
---- a/src/sd-boot.c
-+++ b/src/sd-boot.c
-@@ -138,6 +138,9 @@ sdb_is_kernel(const char *application)
- 	char *path_copy;
- 	int found = 0;
- 
-+	if (!application)
-+		return false;
-+
- 	match = get_valid_kernel_entry_tokens();
- 	path_copy = strdup(application);
- 

fix_grub_bls_cmdline.patch

@@ -1,335 +0,0 @@
-From fca4a51b9aac712b3adc5b6b187cc31a8391bcf6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
-Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 22:44:41 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] GRUB: predict cmdline, linux and initrd lines
-
-Signed-off-by: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
----
- src/eventlog.c | 195 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
- src/eventlog.h |  26 ++++---
- 2 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/eventlog.c b/src/eventlog.c
-index db18f41..727f6a9 100644
---- a/src/eventlog.c
-+++ b/src/eventlog.c
-@@ -549,14 +549,66 @@ tpm_event_decode_uuid(const unsigned char *data)
- 	return uuid;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * For files residing on the EFI partition, grub usually formats these as
-+ * (hdX,gptY)/EFI/BOOT/some.file
-+ * Once it has determined the final root device, the device part will be
-+ * omitted (eg for kernel and initrd).
-+ */
-+static bool
-+__grub_file_parse(grub_file_t *grub_file, const char *value)
-+{
-+	if (value[0] == '/') {
-+		grub_file->device = NULL;
-+		grub_file->path = strdup(value);
-+	} else if (value[0] == '(') {
-+		char *copy = strdup(value);
-+		char *path;
-+
-+		if ((path = strchr(copy, ')')) == NULL) {
-+			free(copy);
-+			return false;
-+		}
-+
-+		*path++ = '\0';
-+
-+		grub_file->device = strdup(copy + 1);
-+		grub_file->path = strdup(path);
-+		free(copy);
-+	} else {
-+		return false;
-+	}
-+
-+	return true;
-+}
-+
-+static const char *
-+__grub_file_join(grub_file_t grub_file)
-+{
-+	static char path[PATH_MAX];
-+
-+	if (grub_file.device == NULL)
-+		snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s", grub_file.path);
-+	else
-+		snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "(%s)%s", grub_file.device, grub_file.path);
-+
-+	return path;
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+__grub_file_destroy(grub_file_t *grub_file)
-+{
-+	drop_string(&grub_file->device);
-+	drop_string(&grub_file->path);
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Handle IPL events, which grub2 and sd-boot uses to hide its stuff in
-  */
- static void
- __tpm_event_grub_file_destroy(tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed)
- {
--	drop_string(&parsed->grub_file.device);
--	drop_string(&parsed->grub_file.path);
-+	__grub_file_destroy(&parsed->grub_file);
- }
- 
- const char *
-@@ -564,10 +616,7 @@ __tpm_event_grub_file_describe(const tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed)
- {
- 	static char buffer[1024];
- 
--	if (parsed->grub_file.device == NULL)
--		snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "grub2 file load from %s", parsed->grub_file.path);
--	else
--		snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "grub2 file load from (%s)%s", parsed->grub_file.device, parsed->grub_file.path);
-+	snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "grub2 file load from %s", __grub_file_join(parsed->grub_file));
- 	return buffer;
- }
- 
-@@ -575,7 +624,7 @@ __tpm_event_grub_file_describe(const tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed)
- static const tpm_evdigest_t *
- __tpm_event_grub_file_rehash(const tpm_event_t *ev, const tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed, tpm_event_log_rehash_ctx_t *ctx)
- {
--	const struct grub_file_event *evspec = &parsed->grub_file;
-+	const grub_file_event *evspec = &parsed->grub_file;
- 	const tpm_evdigest_t *md = NULL;
- 
- 	debug("  re-hashing %s\n", __tpm_event_grub_file_describe(parsed));
-@@ -606,35 +655,11 @@ __tpm_event_grub_file_rehash(const tpm_event_t *ev, const tpm_parsed_event_t *pa
- 	return md;
- }
- 
--/*
-- * For files residing on the EFI partition, grub usually formats these as
-- * (hdX,gptY)/EFI/BOOT/some.file
-- * Once it has determined the final root device, the device part will be
-- * omitted (eg for kernel and initrd).
-- */
- static bool
- __tpm_event_grub_file_event_parse(tpm_event_t *ev, tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed, const char *value)
- {
--	if (value[0] == '/') {
--		parsed->grub_file.device = NULL;
--		parsed->grub_file.path = strdup(value);
--	} else if (value[0] == '(') {
--		char *copy = strdup(value);
--		char *path;
--
--		if ((path = strchr(copy, ')')) == NULL) {
--			free(copy);
--			return false;
--		}
--
--		*path++ = '\0';
--
--		parsed->grub_file.device = strdup(copy + 1);
--		parsed->grub_file.path = strdup(path);
--		free(copy);
--	} else {
-+	if (!__grub_file_parse(&parsed->grub_file, value))
- 		return false;
--	}
- 
- 	parsed->event_subtype = GRUB_EVENT_FILE;
- 	parsed->destroy = __tpm_event_grub_file_destroy;
-@@ -658,21 +683,87 @@ static const char *
- __tpm_event_grub_command_describe(const tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed)
- {
- 	static char buffer[128];
-+	static char *topic = NULL;
-+
-+	switch (parsed->event_subtype) {
-+	case GRUB_EVENT_COMMAND:
-+		topic = "grub2 command";
-+		break;
-+	case GRUB_EVENT_COMMAND_LINUX:
-+		topic = "grub2 linux command";
-+		break;
-+	case GRUB_EVENT_COMMAND_INITRD:
-+		topic = "grub2 initrd command";
-+		break;
-+	case GRUB_EVENT_KERNEL_CMDLINE:
-+		topic = "grub2 kernel cmdline";
-+		break;
-+	}
-+
-+	snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%s \"%s\"", topic, parsed->grub_command.string);
- 
--	if (parsed->event_subtype == GRUB_EVENT_COMMAND)
--		snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "grub2 command \"%s\"", parsed->grub_command.string);
--	else
--		snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "grub2 kernel cmdline \"%s\"", parsed->grub_command.string);
- 	return buffer;
- }
- 
- static const tpm_evdigest_t *
- __tpm_event_grub_command_rehash(const tpm_event_t *ev, const tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed, tpm_event_log_rehash_ctx_t *ctx)
- {
--	if (parsed->grub_command.string == NULL)
--		return NULL;
-+	char *str = NULL;
-+	size_t sz = 0;
-+	const tpm_evdigest_t *digest = NULL;
-+	grub_file_t file;
-+
-+	switch (parsed->event_subtype) {
-+	case GRUB_EVENT_COMMAND:
-+		str = strdup(parsed->grub_command.string);
-+		break;
-+	case GRUB_EVENT_COMMAND_LINUX:
-+		if (ctx->boot_entry && parsed->grub_command.file.path) {
-+			file = (grub_file_t) {
-+				.device = parsed->grub_command.file.device,
-+				.path = ctx->boot_entry->image_path,
-+			};
-+			sz = snprintf(NULL, 0, "linux %s %s", __grub_file_join(file), ctx->boot_entry->options);
-+			str = malloc(sz + 1);
-+			snprintf(str, sz + 1, "linux %s %s", __grub_file_join(file), ctx->boot_entry->options);
-+			debug("Hashed linux command: %s\n", str);
-+		} else
-+			str = strdup(parsed->grub_command.string);
-+		break;
-+	case GRUB_EVENT_COMMAND_INITRD:
-+		if (ctx->boot_entry && parsed->grub_command.file.path) {
-+			file = (grub_file_t) {
-+				.device = parsed->grub_command.file.device,
-+				.path = ctx->boot_entry->initrd_path,
-+			};
-+			sz = snprintf(NULL, 0, "initrd %s", __grub_file_join(file));
-+			str = malloc(sz + 1);
-+			snprintf(str, sz + 1, "initrd %s", __grub_file_join(file));
-+			debug("Hashed initrd command: %s\n", str);
-+		} else
-+			str = strdup(parsed->grub_command.string);
-+		break;
-+	case GRUB_EVENT_KERNEL_CMDLINE:
-+		if (ctx->boot_entry && parsed->grub_command.file.path) {
-+			file = (grub_file_t) {
-+				.device = parsed->grub_command.file.device,
-+				.path = ctx->boot_entry->image_path,
-+			};
-+			sz = snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s %s", __grub_file_join(file), ctx->boot_entry->options);
-+			str = malloc(sz + 1);
-+			snprintf(str, sz + 1, "%s %s", __grub_file_join(file), ctx->boot_entry->options);
-+			debug("Hashed kernel cmdline: %s\n", str);
-+		} else
-+			str = strdup(parsed->grub_command.string);
-+		break;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (str) {
-+		digest = digest_compute(ctx->algo, str, strlen(str));
-+		free(str);
-+	}
- 
--	return digest_compute(ctx->algo, parsed->grub_command.string, strlen(parsed->grub_command.string));
-+	return digest;
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -703,15 +794,29 @@ __tpm_event_grub_command_event_parse(tpm_event_t *ev, tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed
- 	keyword = copy;
- 	arg = copy + wordlen;
- 
-+	if (!strcmp(keyword, "grub_cmd") && !strncmp(arg, "linux", strlen("linux"))) {
-+		for (wordlen = 0; (cc = arg[wordlen]) && (cc != ' '); ++wordlen)
-+			;
-+		if (arg[wordlen] == ' ' && !__grub_file_parse(&parsed->grub_command.file, arg + wordlen + 1))
-+			goto failed;
-+		parsed->event_subtype = GRUB_EVENT_COMMAND_LINUX;
-+	} else
-+	if (!strcmp(keyword, "grub_cmd") && !strncmp(arg, "initrd", strlen("initrd"))) {
-+		for (wordlen = 0; (cc = arg[wordlen]) && (cc != ' '); ++wordlen)
-+			;
-+		if (arg[wordlen] == ' ' && !__grub_file_parse(&parsed->grub_command.file, arg + wordlen + 1))
-+			goto failed;
-+		parsed->event_subtype = GRUB_EVENT_COMMAND_INITRD;
-+	} else
- 	if (!strcmp(keyword, "grub_cmd")) {
- 		parsed->event_subtype = GRUB_EVENT_COMMAND;
- 	} else
- 	if (!strcmp(keyword, "kernel_cmdline")) {
-+		if (!__grub_file_parse(&parsed->grub_command.file, arg))
-+			goto failed;
- 		parsed->event_subtype = GRUB_EVENT_KERNEL_CMDLINE;
--	} else {
--		free(copy);
--		return false;
--	}
-+	} else
-+		goto failed;
- 
- 	parsed->grub_command.string = strdup(arg);
- 	for (argc = 0, s = strtok(arg, " \t"); s && argc < GRUB_COMMAND_ARGV_MAX - 1; s = strtok(NULL, " \t")) {
-@@ -725,6 +830,10 @@ __tpm_event_grub_command_event_parse(tpm_event_t *ev, tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed
- 
- 	free(copy);
- 	return true;
-+
-+failed:
-+	free(copy);
-+	return false;
- }
- 
- static void
-diff --git a/src/eventlog.h b/src/eventlog.h
-index d142744..6a8c3a4 100644
---- a/src/eventlog.h
-+++ b/src/eventlog.h
-@@ -89,10 +89,12 @@ enum {
- enum {
- 	/* IPL subtypes for grub */
- 	GRUB_EVENT_COMMAND		     = 0x0001,
--	GRUB_EVENT_FILE			     = 0x0002,
--	GRUB_EVENT_KERNEL_CMDLINE	     = 0x0003,
--	SHIM_EVENT_VARIABLE		     = 0x0004,
--	SYSTEMD_EVENT_VARIABLE		     = 0x0005,
-+	GRUB_EVENT_COMMAND_LINUX	     = 0x0002,
-+	GRUB_EVENT_COMMAND_INITRD	     = 0x0003,
-+	GRUB_EVENT_FILE			     = 0x0004,
-+	GRUB_EVENT_KERNEL_CMDLINE	     = 0x0005,
-+	SHIM_EVENT_VARIABLE		     = 0x0006,
-+	SYSTEMD_EVENT_VARIABLE		     = 0x0007,
- };
- 
- enum {
-@@ -208,6 +210,13 @@ typedef struct tpm_event_log_rehash_ctx {
- 
- #define GRUB_COMMAND_ARGV_MAX	32
- 
-+typedef struct grub_file {
-+	char *			device;
-+	char *			path;
-+} grub_file_t;
-+
-+typedef grub_file_t		grub_file_event;
-+
- /*
-  * Parsed event types
-  */
-@@ -247,13 +256,12 @@ typedef struct tpm_parsed_event {
- 		/* for GRUB_COMMAND, GRUB_KERNEL_CMDLINE */
- 		struct grub_command_event {
- 			char *		string;
--			char *		argv[GRUB_COMMAND_ARGV_MAX];
-+			char *          argv[GRUB_COMMAND_ARGV_MAX];
-+			grub_file_t	file;
- 		} grub_command;
- 
--		struct grub_file_event {
--			char *		device;
--			char *		path;
--		} grub_file;
-+		/* for GRUB_FILE */
-+		grub_file_event		grub_file;
- 
- 		struct shim_event {
- 			char *		string;

fix_grub_bls_entry.patch

@@ -1,188 +0,0 @@
-From b0c4c5fbdcc89b44cee2300c5a12cb5e8de0e446 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2024 22:57:17 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] GRUB with BLS measure boot entries
-
-This includes the boot entry file, the kernel and the initrd specified
-in the entry file.
-
-Signed-off-by: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
----
- src/eventlog.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++--
- src/eventlog.h |  1 +
- src/oracle.c   | 12 +++++++++---
- src/sd-boot.c  | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
- src/sd-boot.h  |  2 ++
- src/uapi.h     |  3 ++-
- 6 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/eventlog.c b/src/eventlog.c
-index 3574a4d..db18f41 100644
---- a/src/eventlog.c
-+++ b/src/eventlog.c
-@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
- #include "digest.h"
- #include "util.h"
- #include "uapi.h"
-+#include "sd-boot.h"
- 
- #define TPM_EVENT_LOG_MAX_ALGOS		64
- 
-@@ -582,8 +583,24 @@ __tpm_event_grub_file_rehash(const tpm_event_t *ev, const tpm_parsed_event_t *pa
- 		debug("  assuming the file resides on system partition\n");
- 		md = runtime_digest_rootfs_file(ctx->algo, evspec->path);
- 	} else {
--		debug("  assuming the file resides on EFI boot partition\n");
--		md = runtime_digest_efi_file(ctx->algo, evspec->path);
-+		if (sdb_is_boot_entry(evspec->path) && ctx->boot_entry_path) {
-+			debug("  getting different boot entry file from EFI boot partition: %s\n",
-+			      ctx->boot_entry_path);
-+			md = runtime_digest_rootfs_file(ctx->algo, ctx->boot_entry_path);
-+		} else
-+		if (sdb_is_kernel(evspec->path) && ctx->boot_entry) {
-+			debug("  getting different kernel from EFI boot partition: %s\n",
-+			      ctx->boot_entry->image_path);
-+			md = runtime_digest_efi_file(ctx->algo, ctx->boot_entry->image_path);
-+		} else
-+		if (sdb_is_initrd(evspec->path) && ctx->boot_entry) {
-+			debug("  getting different initrd from EFI boot partition: %s\n",
-+			      ctx->boot_entry->initrd_path);
-+			md = runtime_digest_efi_file(ctx->algo, ctx->boot_entry->initrd_path);
-+		} else {
-+			debug("  assuming the file resides on EFI boot partition\n");
-+			md = runtime_digest_efi_file(ctx->algo, evspec->path);
-+		}
- 	}
- 
- 	return md;
-diff --git a/src/eventlog.h b/src/eventlog.h
-index 8af5eb0..d142744 100644
---- a/src/eventlog.h
-+++ b/src/eventlog.h
-@@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ typedef struct tpm_event_log_rehash_ctx {
- 	const pecoff_image_info_t *next_stage_img;
- 
- 	/* This get set when the user specifies --next-kernel */
-+	char *			boot_entry_path;
- 	uapi_boot_entry_t *	boot_entry;
- } tpm_event_log_rehash_ctx_t;
- 
-diff --git a/src/oracle.c b/src/oracle.c
-index 0afd910..ac48823 100644
---- a/src/oracle.c
-+++ b/src/oracle.c
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <ctype.h>
-+#include <limits.h>
- 
- #include "oracle.h"
- #include "util.h"
-@@ -653,6 +654,7 @@ predictor_update_eventlog(struct predictor *pred)
- 	tpm_event_log_rehash_ctx_t rehash_ctx;
- 	tpm_event_t *ev, *stop_event = NULL;
- 	bool okay = true;
-+	char boot_entry_path[PATH_MAX];
- 
- 	predictor_pre_scan_eventlog(pred, &stop_event);
- 
-@@ -663,9 +665,13 @@ predictor_update_eventlog(struct predictor *pred)
- 	 * systemd ID of the next kernel entry to be booted.
- 	 * FIXME: we should probably hide this behind a target_platform function.
- 	 */
--	if (pred->boot_entry_id != NULL
--	 && !(rehash_ctx.boot_entry = sdb_identify_boot_entry(pred->boot_entry_id)))
--		fatal("unable to identify next kernel \"%s\"\n", pred->boot_entry_id);
-+	if (pred->boot_entry_id != NULL) {
-+		snprintf(boot_entry_path, sizeof(boot_entry_path),
-+			 "%s/%s", UAPI_BOOT_DIRECTORY, pred->boot_entry_id);
-+		assign_string(&rehash_ctx.boot_entry_path, boot_entry_path);
-+		if (!(rehash_ctx.boot_entry = sdb_identify_boot_entry(pred->boot_entry_id)))
-+			fatal("unable to identify next kernel \"%s\"\n", pred->boot_entry_id);
-+	}
- 
- 	for (ev = pred->event_log; ev; ev = ev->next) {
- 		tpm_evdigest_t *pcr;
-diff --git a/src/sd-boot.c b/src/sd-boot.c
-index ede2569..a16f814 100644
---- a/src/sd-boot.c
-+++ b/src/sd-boot.c
-@@ -130,10 +130,9 @@ get_valid_kernel_entry_tokens(void)
- /*
-  * This should probably use UAPI boot entry logic as well
-  */
--bool
--sdb_is_kernel(const char *application)
-+static bool
-+is_valid_entry_token(const char *application, const char *prefix)
- {
--	static const char prefix[] = "linux-";
- 	const uapi_kernel_entry_tokens_t *match;
- 	char *path_copy;
- 	int found = 0;
-@@ -151,7 +150,7 @@ sdb_is_kernel(const char *application)
- 
- 			if (!strcmp(ptr, token))
- 				found |= 1;
--			else if (!strncmp(ptr, prefix, sizeof(prefix) - 1))
-+			else if (!strncmp(ptr, prefix, strlen(prefix)))
- 				found |= 2;
- 		}
- 	}
-@@ -160,6 +159,27 @@ sdb_is_kernel(const char *application)
- 	return (found == 3);
- }
- 
-+bool
-+sdb_is_kernel(const char *application)
-+{
-+	return is_valid_entry_token(application, "linux-");
-+}
-+
-+bool
-+sdb_is_initrd(const char *application)
-+{
-+	return is_valid_entry_token(application, "initrd-");
-+}
-+
-+bool
-+sdb_is_boot_entry(const char *application)
-+{
-+	if (!application)
-+		return false;
-+
-+	return !strncmp(application, UAPI_BOOT_DIRECTORY_EFI, sizeof(UAPI_BOOT_DIRECTORY_EFI) - 1);
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Identify the next kernel and initrd given an ID
-  */
-diff --git a/src/sd-boot.h b/src/sd-boot.h
-index 0472320..ceab13d 100644
---- a/src/sd-boot.h
-+++ b/src/sd-boot.h
-@@ -43,7 +43,9 @@ typedef struct sdb_entry_list {
- } sdb_entry_list_t;
- 
- extern uapi_boot_entry_t *	sdb_identify_boot_entry(const char *id);
-+extern bool			sdb_is_boot_entry(const char *application);
- extern bool			sdb_is_kernel(const char *application);
-+extern bool			sdb_is_initrd(const char *application);
- 
- /* This will have to update the systemd json file, and add a new entry. */
- extern bool			sdb_policy_file_add_entry(const char *filename,
-diff --git a/src/uapi.h b/src/uapi.h
-index 96ca7ed..8bcb94f 100644
---- a/src/uapi.h
-+++ b/src/uapi.h
-@@ -41,7 +41,8 @@ typedef struct uapi_kernel_entry_tokens {
- 	char *		entry_token[UAPI_MAX_ENTRY_TOKENS];
- } uapi_kernel_entry_tokens_t;
- 
--#define UAPI_BOOT_DIRECTORY	"/boot/efi/loader/entries"
-+#define UAPI_BOOT_DIRECTORY_EFI	"/loader/entries"
-+#define UAPI_BOOT_DIRECTORY	"/boot/efi" UAPI_BOOT_DIRECTORY_EFI
- 
- extern uapi_boot_entry_t *	uapi_get_boot_entry(const char *id);
- extern uapi_boot_entry_t *	uapi_find_boot_entry(const uapi_kernel_entry_tokens_t *match, const char *machine_id);

fix_loader_conf.patch

@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-From c2453df75ecdbc547e4637268dccde5cdc012881 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
-Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2024 19:12:08 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Measure systemd-boot loader.conf
-
-Since systemd-boot v255 the /loader/loader.conf file can be measured
-under a EV_EVENT_TAG event in PCR#5.
-
-This commit measure the file in the ESP.
-
-Fix #49
-
-Signed-off-by: Alberto Planas <aplanas@suse.com>
----
- src/eventlog.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
- src/eventlog.h |  7 +++++--
- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/eventlog.c b/src/eventlog.c
-index 4277d42..2e29b0e 100644
---- a/src/eventlog.c
-+++ b/src/eventlog.c
-@@ -842,6 +842,19 @@ __tpm_event_tag_destroy(tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed)
- {
- }
- 
-+static const char *
-+__tpm_event_tag_loader_conf_describe(const tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed)
-+{
-+	return "/loader/loader.conf (measured by systemd-boot)";
-+}
-+
-+static const tpm_evdigest_t *
-+__tpm_event_tag_loader_conf_rehash(const tpm_event_t *ev, const tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed, tpm_event_log_rehash_ctx_t *ctx)
-+{
-+	debug("  re-hashing /loader/loader.conf");
-+	return runtime_digest_efi_file(ctx->algo, "/loader/loader.conf");
-+}
-+
- static const char *
- __tpm_event_tag_options_describe(const tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed)
- {
-@@ -880,6 +893,7 @@ __tpm_event_tag_initrd_rehash(const tpm_event_t *ev, const tpm_parsed_event_t *p
- }
- 
- /*
-+ * Generated by systemd-boot (PCR#5), to measure loader.conf
-  * Generated by the kernel (PCR#9), to measure the cmdline and initrd
-  */
- static bool
-@@ -900,6 +914,10 @@ __tpm_event_parse_tag(tpm_event_t *ev, tpm_parsed_event_t *parsed, buffer_t *bp)
- 		return false;
- 
- 	parsed->destroy = __tpm_event_tag_destroy;
-+	if (evspec->event_id == LOADER_CONF_EVENT_TAG_ID) {
-+		parsed->rehash = __tpm_event_tag_loader_conf_rehash;
-+		parsed->describe = __tpm_event_tag_loader_conf_describe;
-+	} else
- 	if (evspec->event_id == LOAD_OPTIONS_EVENT_TAG_ID) {
- 		parsed->rehash = __tpm_event_tag_options_rehash;
- 		parsed->describe = __tpm_event_tag_options_describe;
-diff --git a/src/eventlog.h b/src/eventlog.h
-index 3741b58..d78e3da 100644
---- a/src/eventlog.h
-+++ b/src/eventlog.h
-@@ -96,8 +96,11 @@ enum {
- };
- 
- enum {
--	LOAD_OPTIONS_EVENT_TAG_ID	     = 0x8F3B22EDU,
--	INITRD_EVENT_TAG_ID		     = 0x8F3B22ECU,
-+	/* systemd-boot */
-+	LOADER_CONF_EVENT_TAG_ID             = 0xF5BC582A,
-+	/* kernel */
-+	LOAD_OPTIONS_EVENT_TAG_ID	     = 0x8F3B22ED,
-+	INITRD_EVENT_TAG_ID		     = 0x8F3B22EC,
- };
- 
- #define EFI_DEVICE_PATH_MAX		16

pcr-oracle-0.5.5.tar.xz

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
-oid sha256:f4a1392f94e18ebf3f1c7214414e92392276cb6c124bf4d976857a46a378e7eb
-size 85876

support-ecc-srk.patch

@@ -1,413 +0,0 @@
-From 60ce42dbf61ce89012d9bc71c92c5cc92759b02c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2024 14:41:49 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Update the comment for SRK template
-
-USERWITHAUTH and NODA are set according to "TCG TPM v2.0 Provisioning
-Guidance". This commit updates the comment to add the reference.
-
-Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
----
- src/pcr-policy.c | 5 +++--
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/pcr-policy.c b/src/pcr-policy.c
-index 8f2c42c..f03b6e0 100644
---- a/src/pcr-policy.c
-+++ b/src/pcr-policy.c
-@@ -67,8 +67,9 @@ static TPM2B_PUBLIC SRK_template = {
- 	.publicArea = {
- 		.type = TPM2_ALG_RSA,
- 		.nameAlg = TPM2_ALG_SHA256,
--		/* For reasons not clear to me, grub2 derives the SRK using the NODA attribute,
--		 * which means it is not subject to dictionary attack protections. */
-+		/* Per "Storage Primary Key (SRK) Templates" in section 7.5.1 of
-+		 * TCG TPM v2.0 Provisioning Guidance 1.0 Revision 1.0, the
-+		 * template for shared SRKs sets USERWITHAUTH and NODA. */
- 		.objectAttributes = TPMA_OBJECT_RESTRICTED|TPMA_OBJECT_DECRYPT \
- 			|TPMA_OBJECT_FIXEDTPM|TPMA_OBJECT_FIXEDPARENT \
- 			|TPMA_OBJECT_SENSITIVEDATAORIGIN|TPMA_OBJECT_USERWITHAUTH \
--- 
-2.35.3
-
-
-From 0085c5a6a47f433dc69739c54b9db11796aff62e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2024 16:20:44 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Support SRK template with ECC_NIST_P256
-
-When sealing data with SRK, the data is actually encrypted with the
-symmetric key, and the selection of the asymmetric algorithm is only
-a parameter for KDF to derive the symmetric key. Compared with RSA,
-ECC NIST-P256 provides the faster key generation, so it's a better
-choice for the SRK template in general.
-
-This commit adds a new option, '--ecc-srk', to switch the default SRK
-template from the RSA one to the ECC one, so that the user can specify
-the SRK template when sealing/unsealing data.
-
-Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
----
- src/oracle.c     |  7 +++++++
- src/pcr-policy.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- src/pcr.h        |  1 +
- 3 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/oracle.c b/src/oracle.c
-index 1cafafc..f391430 100644
---- a/src/oracle.c
-+++ b/src/oracle.c
-@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ enum {
- 	OPT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY,
- 	OPT_RSA_GENERATE_KEY,
- 	OPT_RSA_BITS,
-+	OPT_ECC_SRK,
- 	OPT_INPUT,
- 	OPT_OUTPUT,
- 	OPT_AUTHORIZED_POLICY,
-@@ -125,6 +126,7 @@ static struct option options[] = {
- 	{ "public-key",		required_argument,	0,	OPT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY },
- 	{ "rsa-generate-key",	no_argument,		0,	OPT_RSA_GENERATE_KEY },
- 	{ "rsa-bits",		required_argument,	0,	OPT_RSA_BITS },
-+	{ "ecc-srk",		no_argument,		0,	OPT_ECC_SRK },
- 	{ "input",		required_argument,	0,	OPT_INPUT },
- 	{ "output",		required_argument,	0,	OPT_OUTPUT },
- 	{ "authorized-policy",	required_argument,	0,	OPT_AUTHORIZED_POLICY },
-@@ -1042,6 +1044,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	unsigned int rsa_bits = 2048;
- 	int c, exit_code = 0;
- 
-+	set_srk_alg("RSA");
-+
- 	while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "dhA:CF:LSZ", options, NULL)) != EOF) {
- 		switch (c) {
- 		case 'A':
-@@ -1109,6 +1113,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 		case OPT_RSA_BITS:
- 			opt_rsa_bits = optarg;
- 			break;
-+		case OPT_ECC_SRK:
-+			set_srk_alg("ECC");
-+			break;
- 		case OPT_INPUT:
- 			opt_input = optarg;
- 			break;
-diff --git a/src/pcr-policy.c b/src/pcr-policy.c
-index f03b6e0..f65becf 100644
---- a/src/pcr-policy.c
-+++ b/src/pcr-policy.c
-@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ struct target_platform {
- 					const stored_key_t *public_key_file);
- };
- 
--static TPM2B_PUBLIC SRK_template = {
-+static TPM2B_PUBLIC RSA_SRK_template = {
- 	.size = sizeof(TPMT_PUBLIC),
- 	.publicArea = {
- 		.type = TPM2_ALG_RSA,
-@@ -88,6 +88,35 @@ static TPM2B_PUBLIC SRK_template = {
- 	}
- };
- 
-+static TPM2B_PUBLIC ECC_SRK_template = {
-+	.size = sizeof(TPMT_PUBLIC),
-+	.publicArea = {
-+		.type = TPM2_ALG_ECC,
-+		.nameAlg = TPM2_ALG_SHA256,
-+		/* Per "Storage Primary Key (SRK) Templates" in section 7.5.1 of
-+		 * TCG TPM v2.0 Provisioning Guidance 1.0 Revision 1.0, the
-+		 * template for shared SRKs sets USERWITHAUTH and NODA. */
-+		.objectAttributes = TPMA_OBJECT_RESTRICTED|TPMA_OBJECT_DECRYPT \
-+			|TPMA_OBJECT_FIXEDTPM|TPMA_OBJECT_FIXEDPARENT \
-+			|TPMA_OBJECT_SENSITIVEDATAORIGIN|TPMA_OBJECT_USERWITHAUTH \
-+			|TPMA_OBJECT_NODA,
-+		.parameters = {
-+			.eccDetail = {
-+				.symmetric = {
-+					.algorithm = TPM2_ALG_AES,
-+					.keyBits = { .sym = 128 },
-+					.mode = { .sym = TPM2_ALG_CFB },
-+				},
-+				.scheme = { TPM2_ALG_NULL },
-+				.curveID = TPM2_ECC_NIST_P256,
-+				.kdf.scheme = TPM2_ALG_NULL
-+			}
-+		}
-+	}
-+};
-+
-+static const TPM2B_PUBLIC *SRK_template;
-+
- static const TPM2B_PUBLIC seal_public_template = {
-             .size = sizeof(TPMT_PUBLIC),
-             .publicArea = {
-@@ -107,10 +136,19 @@ static const TPM2B_PUBLIC seal_public_template = {
-             }
-         };
- 
-+void
-+set_srk_alg (const char *alg)
-+{
-+	if (strcmp(alg, "RSA") == 0)
-+		SRK_template = &RSA_SRK_template;
-+	else
-+		SRK_template = &ECC_SRK_template;
-+}
-+
- void
- set_srk_rsa_bits (const unsigned int rsa_bits)
- {
--	SRK_template.publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail.keyBits = rsa_bits;
-+	RSA_SRK_template.publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail.keyBits = rsa_bits;
- }
- 
- static inline const tpm_evdigest_t *
-@@ -609,7 +647,7 @@ esys_create_primary(ESYS_CONTEXT *esys_context, ESYS_TR *handle_ret)
- 	t0 = timing_begin();
- 	rc = Esys_CreatePrimary(esys_context, ESYS_TR_RH_OWNER,
- 			ESYS_TR_PASSWORD,
--			ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, &in_sensitive, &SRK_template,
-+			ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, &in_sensitive, SRK_template,
- 			NULL, &creation_pcr, handle_ret,
- 			NULL, NULL,
- 			NULL, NULL);
-diff --git a/src/pcr.h b/src/pcr.h
-index 4d8f816..f1dc9af 100644
---- a/src/pcr.h
-+++ b/src/pcr.h
-@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ typedef struct tpm_pcr_selection {
- 	const tpm_algo_info_t *	algo_info;
- } tpm_pcr_selection_t;
- 
-+extern void		set_srk_alg (const char *alg);
- extern void		set_srk_rsa_bits (const unsigned int rsa_bits);
- extern void		pcr_bank_initialize(tpm_pcr_bank_t *bank, unsigned int pcr_mask, const tpm_algo_info_t *algo);
- extern bool		pcr_bank_wants_pcr(tpm_pcr_bank_t *bank, unsigned int index);
--- 
-2.35.3
-
-
-From 207bd496868d65455e63aa9586bfc6e02900a4a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2024 14:53:25 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Update to conform the latest TPM 2.0 Key File
-
-For TPM 2.0 Key File, the default asymmetric algorithm of SRK is ECC
-NIST-P256, not RSA 2048. A new field 'rsaParent' is introduced to note
-the key is sealed with RSA SRK.
-
-This commit implements two new fields: description and rsaParent in
-tpm2key.c/tpm2key-asn.h and sets rsaParent when RSA SRK is used to seal
-the key. When unsealing a tpm2key, the SRK template is set to the RSA
-template if rsaParent is TRUE. Otherwise, the SRK template is switched
-to the ECC SRK template.
-
-A new testing script, test-tpm2key-ecc.sh, is also added to test the
-tpm2key file sealed with ECC SRK.
-
-Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
----
- src/pcr-policy.c    |   8 +++
- src/tpm2key-asn.h   |   4 ++
- src/tpm2key.c       |   2 +
- test-tpm2key-ecc.sh | 127 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 4 files changed, 141 insertions(+)
- create mode 100755 test-tpm2key-ecc.sh
-
-diff --git a/src/pcr-policy.c b/src/pcr-policy.c
-index f65becf..90f60ff 100644
---- a/src/pcr-policy.c
-+++ b/src/pcr-policy.c
-@@ -1505,6 +1505,11 @@ tpm2key_unseal_secret(const char *input_path, const char *output_path,
- 	if (!tpm2key_read_file(input_path, &tpm2key))
- 		return false;
- 
-+	if (tpm2key->rsaParent == 1)
-+		SRK_template = &RSA_SRK_template;
-+	else
-+		SRK_template = &ECC_SRK_template;
-+
- 	buffer_init_read(&buf, tpm2key->pubkey->data, tpm2key->pubkey->length);
- 	rc = Tss2_MU_TPM2B_PUBLIC_Unmarshal(buf.data, buf.size, &buf.rpos, &pub);
- 	if (rc != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS)
-@@ -1634,6 +1639,9 @@ tpm2key_write_sealed_secret(const char *pathname,
- 	if (!tpm2key_basekey(&tpm2key, TPM2_RH_OWNER, sealed_public, sealed_private))
- 		goto cleanup;
- 
-+	if (SRK_template->publicArea.type == TPM2_ALG_RSA)
-+		tpm2key->rsaParent = 1;
-+
- 	if (pcr_sel && !tpm2key_add_policy_policypcr(tpm2key, pcr_sel))
- 		goto cleanup;
- 
-diff --git a/src/tpm2key-asn.h b/src/tpm2key-asn.h
-index 3f1c0d7..d0cdfaa 100644
---- a/src/tpm2key-asn.h
-+++ b/src/tpm2key-asn.h
-@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ DEFINE_STACK_OF(TSSAUTHPOLICY);
-  *	policy		[1] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMPolicy OPTIONAL
-  *	secret		[2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-  *	authPolicy	[3] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF TPMAuthPolicy OPTIONAL
-+ *	description     [4] EXPLICIT UTF8String OPTIONAL
-+ *	rsaParent       [5] EXPLICIT BOOLEAN OPTIONAL
-  *	parent		INTEGER
-  *	pubkey		OCTET STRING
-  *	privkey		OCTET STRING
-@@ -89,6 +91,8 @@ typedef struct {
- 	STACK_OF(TSSOPTPOLICY) *policy;
- 	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *secret;
- 	STACK_OF(TSSAUTHPOLICY) *authPolicy;
-+	ASN1_UTF8STRING description;
-+	ASN1_BOOLEAN rsaParent;
- 	ASN1_INTEGER *parent;
- 	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *pubkey;
- 	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *privkey;
-diff --git a/src/tpm2key.c b/src/tpm2key.c
-index cabd791..af4c984 100644
---- a/src/tpm2key.c
-+++ b/src/tpm2key.c
-@@ -278,6 +278,8 @@ ASN1_SEQUENCE(TSSPRIVKEY) = {
- 	ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(TSSPRIVKEY, policy, TSSOPTPOLICY, 1),
- 	ASN1_EXP_OPT(TSSPRIVKEY, secret, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 2),
- 	ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(TSSPRIVKEY, authPolicy, TSSAUTHPOLICY, 3),
-+	ASN1_EXP_OPT(TSSPRIVKEY, description, ASN1_UTF8STRING, 4),
-+	ASN1_EXP_OPT(TSSPRIVKEY, rsaParent, ASN1_BOOLEAN, 5),
- 	ASN1_SIMPLE(TSSPRIVKEY, parent, ASN1_INTEGER),
- 	ASN1_SIMPLE(TSSPRIVKEY, pubkey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
- 	ASN1_SIMPLE(TSSPRIVKEY, privkey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
-diff --git a/test-tpm2key-ecc.sh b/test-tpm2key-ecc.sh
-new file mode 100755
-index 0000000..d87acff
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/test-tpm2key-ecc.sh
-@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
-+#!/bin/bash
-+#
-+# This script needs to be run with root privilege
-+#
-+
-+# TESTDIR=policy.test
-+PCR_MASK=0,2,4,12
-+
-+pcr_oracle=pcr-oracle
-+if [ -x pcr-oracle ]; then
-+	pcr_oracle=$PWD/pcr-oracle
-+fi
-+
-+function call_oracle {
-+
-+	echo "****************"
-+	echo "pcr-oracle $*"
-+	$pcr_oracle --target-platform tpm2.0 -d "$@"
-+}
-+
-+if [ -z "$TESTDIR" ]; then
-+	tmpdir=$(mktemp -d /tmp/pcrtestXXXXXX)
-+	trap "cd / && rm -rf $tmpdir" 0 1 2 10 11 15
-+
-+	TESTDIR=$tmpdir
-+fi
-+
-+trap "echo 'FAIL: command exited with error'; exit 1" ERR
-+
-+echo "This is super secret" >$TESTDIR/secret
-+
-+set -e
-+cd $TESTDIR
-+
-+echo "Seal the secret with PCR policy"
-+call_oracle \
-+	--from current \
-+	--input secret \
-+	--output sealed \
-+	--ecc-srk \
-+	seal-secret $PCR_MASK
-+
-+echo "Unseal the sealed with PCR policy"
-+call_oracle \
-+	--input sealed \
-+	--output recovered \
-+	unseal-secret
-+
-+if ! cmp secret recovered; then
-+	echo "BAD: Unable to recover original secret"
-+	echo "Secret:"
-+	od -tx1c secret
-+	echo "Recovered:"
-+	od -tx1c recovered
-+	exit 1
-+else
-+	echo "NICE: we were able to recover the original secret"
-+fi
-+
-+rm -f sealed recovered
-+
-+call_oracle \
-+	--rsa-generate-key \
-+	--private-key policy-key.pem \
-+	--auth authorized.policy \
-+	create-authorized-policy $PCR_MASK
-+
-+call_oracle \
-+	--private-key policy-key.pem \
-+	--public-key policy-pubkey \
-+	store-public-key
-+
-+call_oracle \
-+	--auth authorized.policy \
-+	--input secret \
-+	--output sealed \
-+	--ecc-srk \
-+	seal-secret
-+
-+for attempt in first second; do
-+	echo "Sign the set of PCRs we want to authorize"
-+	call_oracle \
-+		--policy-name "authorized-policy-test" \
-+		--private-key policy-key.pem \
-+		--from current \
-+		--input sealed \
-+		--output sealed-signed \
-+		sign $PCR_MASK
-+
-+	echo "$attempt attempt to unseal the secret"
-+	call_oracle \
-+		--input sealed-signed \
-+		--output recovered \
-+		unseal-secret
-+
-+	if ! cmp secret recovered; then
-+		echo "BAD: Unable to recover original secret"
-+		echo "Secret:"
-+		od -tx1c secret
-+		echo "Recovered:"
-+		od -tx1c recovered
-+		exit 1
-+	else
-+		echo "NICE: we were able to recover the original secret"
-+	fi
-+
-+	if [ "$attempt" = "second" ]; then
-+		break
-+	fi
-+
-+	echo "Extend PCR 12. Unsealing should fail afterwards"
-+	tpm2_pcrextend 12:sha256=21d2013e3081f1e455fdd5ba6230a8620c3cfc9a9c31981d857fe3891f79449e
-+	rm -f recovered
-+	call_oracle \
-+		--input sealed-signed \
-+		--output recovered \
-+		unseal-secret || true
-+
-+	if [ -s recovered ] && ! cmp secret recovered; then
-+		echo "BAD: We were still able to recover the original secret. Something stinks"
-+		exit 1
-+	else
-+		echo "GOOD: After changing a PCR, the secret can no longer be unsealed"
-+	fi
-+
-+	echo "Now recreate the signed PCR policy"
-+done
--- 
-2.35.3
-