- Add CVE-2022-0391-urllib_parse-newline-parsing.patch
(bsc#1195396, CVE-2022-0391, bpo#43882) sanitizing URLs containing ASCII newline and tabs in urlparse. OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/devel:languages:python:Factory/python?expand=0&rev=312
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CVE-2022-0391-urllib_parse-newline-parsing.patch
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CVE-2022-0391-urllib_parse-newline-parsing.patch
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---
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Doc/library/urlparse.rst | 14 ++
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Doc/whatsnew/2.7.rst | 7 +
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Lib/test/test_urlparse.py | 49 ++++++++++
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Lib/urlparse.py | 12 ++
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Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2021-04-25-07-46-37.bpo-43882.Jpwx85.rst | 6 +
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5 files changed, 88 insertions(+)
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--- a/Doc/library/urlparse.rst
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+++ b/Doc/library/urlparse.rst
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@@ -248,6 +248,10 @@ The :mod:`urlparse` module defines the f
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decomposed before parsing, or is not a Unicode string, no error will be
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raised.
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+ Following the `WHATWG spec`_ that updates RFC 3986, ASCII
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+ newline ``\n``, ``\r`` and tab ``\t`` characters are stripped
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+ from the URL.
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+
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.. versionadded:: 2.2
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.. versionchanged:: 2.5
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@@ -257,6 +261,10 @@ The :mod:`urlparse` module defines the f
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Characters that affect netloc parsing under NFKC normalization will
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now raise :exc:`ValueError`.
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+ .. versionchanged:: 3.6.14
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+ ASCII newline and tab characters are stripped from the URL.
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+
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+.. _WHATWG spec: https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-basic-url-parser
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.. function:: urlunsplit(parts)
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@@ -308,6 +316,11 @@ The :mod:`urlparse` module defines the f
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.. seealso::
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+ `WHATWG`_ - URL Living standard
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+ Working Group for the URL Standard that defines URLs,
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+ domains, IP addresses, the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format,
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+ and their API.
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+
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:rfc:`3986` - Uniform Resource Identifiers
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This is the current standard (STD66). Any changes to urlparse module
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should conform to this. Certain deviations could be observed, which are
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@@ -332,6 +345,7 @@ The :mod:`urlparse` module defines the f
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:rfc:`1738` - Uniform Resource Locators (URL)
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This specifies the formal syntax and semantics of absolute URLs.
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+.. _WHATWG: https://url.spec.whatwg.org/
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.. _urlparse-result-object:
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--- a/Doc/whatsnew/2.7.rst
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+++ b/Doc/whatsnew/2.7.rst
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@@ -175,6 +175,13 @@ channel. We reuse the ftp server IP add
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requiring the old behavior, set a ``trust_server_pasv_ipv4_address``
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attribute on your FTP instance to ``True``. (See :issue:`43285`)
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+The presence of newline or tab characters in parts of a URL allows for some
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+forms of attacks. Following the WHATWG specification that updates RFC 3986,
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+ASCII newline ``\n``, ``\r`` and tab ``\t`` characters are stripped from the
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+URL by the parser :func:`urllib.parse` preventing such attacks. The removal
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+characters are controlled by a new module level variable
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+``urllib.parse._UNSAFE_URL_BYTES_TO_REMOVE``. (See :issue:`43882`)
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+
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Python 3.1 Features
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=======================
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--- a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
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+++ b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
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@@ -492,6 +492,55 @@ class UrlParseTestCase(unittest.TestCase
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p = urlparse.urlsplit(url)
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self.assertEqual(p.port, None)
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+ def test_urlsplit_remove_unsafe_bytes(self):
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+ # Remove ASCII tabs and newlines from input, for http common case scenario.
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+ url = "h\nttp://www.python\n.org\t/java\nscript:\talert('msg\r\n')/?query\n=\tsomething#frag\nment"
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+ p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
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+ self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "http")
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+ self.assertEqual(p.netloc, "www.python.org")
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+ self.assertEqual(p.path, "/javascript:alert('msg')/")
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+ self.assertEqual(p.query, "query=something")
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+ self.assertEqual(p.fragment, "fragment")
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+ self.assertEqual(p.username, None)
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+ self.assertEqual(p.password, None)
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+ self.assertEqual(p.hostname, "www.python.org")
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+ self.assertEqual(p.port, None)
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+ self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), "http://www.python.org/javascript:alert('msg')/?query=something#fragment")
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+
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+ # Remove ASCII tabs and newlines from input as bytes, for http common case scenario.
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+ url = b"h\nttp://www.python\n.org\t/java\nscript:\talert('msg\r\n')/?query\n=\tsomething#frag\nment"
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+ p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
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+ self.assertEqual(p.scheme, b"http")
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+ self.assertEqual(p.netloc, b"www.python.org")
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+ self.assertEqual(p.path, b"/javascript:alert('msg')/")
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+ self.assertEqual(p.query, b"query=something")
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+ self.assertEqual(p.fragment, b"fragment")
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+ self.assertEqual(p.username, None)
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+ self.assertEqual(p.password, None)
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+ self.assertEqual(p.hostname, b"www.python.org")
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+ self.assertEqual(p.port, None)
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+ self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), b"http://www.python.org/javascript:alert('msg')/?query=something#fragment")
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+
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+ # any scheme
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+ url = "x-new-scheme\t://www.python\n.org\t/java\nscript:\talert('msg\r\n')/?query\n=\tsomething#frag\nment"
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+ p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
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+ self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), "x-new-scheme://www.python.org/javascript:alert('msg')/?query=something#fragment")
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+
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+ # Remove ASCII tabs and newlines from input as bytes, any scheme.
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+ url = b"x-new-scheme\t://www.python\n.org\t/java\nscript:\talert('msg\r\n')/?query\n=\tsomething#frag\nment"
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+ p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
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+ self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), b"x-new-scheme://www.python.org/javascript:alert('msg')/?query=something#fragment")
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+
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+ # Unsafe bytes is not returned from urlparse cache.
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+ # scheme is stored after parsing, sending an scheme with unsafe bytes *will not* return an unsafe scheme
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+ url = "https://www.python\n.org\t/java\nscript:\talert('msg\r\n')/?query\n=\tsomething#frag\nment"
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+ scheme = "htt\nps"
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+ for _ in range(2):
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+ p = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url, scheme=scheme)
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+ self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "https")
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+ self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), "https://www.python.org/javascript:alert('msg')/?query=something#fragment")
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+
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+
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def test_issue14072(self):
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p1 = urlparse.urlsplit('tel:+31-641044153')
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self.assertEqual(p1.scheme, 'tel')
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--- a/Lib/urlparse.py
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+++ b/Lib/urlparse.py
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@@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ scheme_chars = ('abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvw
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'0123456789'
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'+-.')
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+# Unsafe bytes to be removed per WHATWG spec
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+_UNSAFE_URL_BYTES_TO_REMOVE = ['\t', '\r', '\n']
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+
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MAX_CACHE_SIZE = 20
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_parse_cache = {}
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@@ -184,12 +187,21 @@ def _checknetloc(netloc):
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"under NFKC normalization"
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% netloc)
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+
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+def _remove_unsafe_bytes_from_url(url):
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+ for b in _UNSAFE_URL_BYTES_TO_REMOVE:
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+ url = url.replace(b, "")
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+ return url
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+
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+
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def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
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"""Parse a URL into 5 components:
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<scheme>://<netloc>/<path>?<query>#<fragment>
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Return a 5-tuple: (scheme, netloc, path, query, fragment).
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Note that we don't break the components up in smaller bits
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(e.g. netloc is a single string) and we don't expand % escapes."""
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+ url = _remove_unsafe_bytes_from_url(url)
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+ scheme = _remove_unsafe_bytes_from_url(scheme)
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allow_fragments = bool(allow_fragments)
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key = url, scheme, allow_fragments, type(url), type(scheme)
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cached = _parse_cache.get(key, None)
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--- /dev/null
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+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2021-04-25-07-46-37.bpo-43882.Jpwx85.rst
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@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
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+The presence of newline or tab characters in parts of a URL could allow
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+some forms of attacks.
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+
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+Following the controlling specification for URLs defined by WHATWG
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+:func:`urllib.parse` now removes ASCII newlines and tabs from URLs,
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+preventing such attacks.
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@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
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-------------------------------------------------------------------
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Wed Feb 9 16:49:52 UTC 2022 - Matej Cepl <mcepl@suse.com>
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- Add CVE-2022-0391-urllib_parse-newline-parsing.patch
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(bsc#1195396, CVE-2022-0391, bpo#43882) sanitizing URLs
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containing ASCII newline and tabs in urlparse.
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-------------------------------------------------------------------
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Sun Feb 6 07:43:11 UTC 2022 - Matej Cepl <mcepl@suse.com>
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@ -125,6 +125,10 @@ Patch67: CVE-2020-26116-httplib-header-injection.patch
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# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2021-4189-ftplib-trust-PASV-resp.patch bsc#1194146 mcepl@suse.com
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# Make ftplib not trust the PASV response. (gh#python/cpython#24838)
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Patch68: CVE-2021-4189-ftplib-trust-PASV-resp.patch
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# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2022-0391-urllib_parse-newline-parsing.patch bsc#1195396 mcepl@suse.com
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# whole long discussion is on bpo#43882
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# fix for santization URLs containing ASCII newline and tabs in urllib.parse
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Patch69: CVE-2022-0391-urllib_parse-newline-parsing.patch
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# COMMON-PATCH-END
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%define python_version %(echo %{tarversion} | head -c 3)
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BuildRequires: automake
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@ -260,6 +264,7 @@ other applications.
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%patch66 -p1
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%patch67 -p1
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%patch68 -p1
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%patch69 -p1
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# For patch 66
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cp -v %{SOURCE66} Lib/test/recursion.tar
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