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Accepting request 983936 from devel:languages:python:Factory

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- Add CVE-2015-20107-mailcap-unsafe-filenames.patch to avoid
  CVE-2015-20107 (bsc#1198511, gh#python/cpython#68966), the
  command injection in the mailcap module.
- Fix building of documentation and the universal configuration of the
  %primary_interpreter.

- Switch primary_interpreter from python38 to python310 for
  Factory (only)

- (bsc#1196784, CVE-2022-25236) Rename patch:
  support-expat-245.patch to support-expat-CVE-2022-25236-patched.patch
  and update the patch to detect expat >= 2.4.4 instead of >= 2.4.5
  as it was fully patched against CVE-2022-25236.

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/983936
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/python310?expand=0&rev=16
This commit is contained in:
Dominique Leuenberger 2022-06-23 08:22:00 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
commit d12236cfd4
4 changed files with 247 additions and 7 deletions
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136
CVE-2015-20107-mailcap-unsafe-filenames.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
From c3e7f139b440d7424986204e9f3fc2275aea3377 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Petr Viktorin <encukou@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2022 18:17:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] gh-68966: Make mailcap refuse to match unsafe
filenames/types/params
---
Doc/library/mailcap.rst | 12 ++++
Lib/mailcap.py | 26 +++++++++-
Lib/test/test_mailcap.py | 8 ++-
Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-04-27-18-25-30.gh-issue-68966.gjS8zs.rst | 4 +
4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/Doc/library/mailcap.rst
+++ b/Doc/library/mailcap.rst
@@ -60,6 +60,18 @@ standard. However, mailcap files are su
use) to determine whether or not the mailcap line applies. :func:`findmatch`
will automatically check such conditions and skip the entry if the check fails.
+ .. versionchanged:: 3.11
+
+ To prevent security issues with shell metacharacters (symbols that have
+ special effects in a shell command line), ``findmatch`` will refuse
+ to inject ASCII characters other than alphanumerics and ``@+=:,./-_``
+ into the returned command line.
+
+ If a disallowed character appears in *filename*, ``findmatch`` will always
+ return ``(None, None)`` as if no entry was found.
+ If such a character appears elsewhere (a value in *plist* or in *MIMEtype*),
+ ``findmatch`` will ignore all mailcap entries which use that value.
+ A :mod:`warning <warnings>` will be raised in either case.
.. function:: getcaps()
--- a/Lib/mailcap.py
+++ b/Lib/mailcap.py
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
import os
import warnings
+import re
__all__ = ["getcaps","findmatch"]
@@ -13,6 +14,11 @@ def lineno_sort_key(entry):
else:
return 1, 0
+_find_unsafe = re.compile(r'[^\xa1-\U0010FFFF\w@+=:,./-]').search
+
+class UnsafeMailcapInput(Warning):
+ """Warning raised when refusing unsafe input"""
+
# Part 1: top-level interface.
@@ -165,15 +171,22 @@ def findmatch(caps, MIMEtype, key='view'
entry to use.
"""
+ if _find_unsafe(filename):
+ msg = "Refusing to use mailcap with filename %r. Use a safe temporary filename." % (filename,)
+ warnings.warn(msg, UnsafeMailcapInput)
+ return None, None
entries = lookup(caps, MIMEtype, key)
# XXX This code should somehow check for the needsterminal flag.
for e in entries:
if 'test' in e:
test = subst(e['test'], filename, plist)
+ if test is None:
+ continue
if test and os.system(test) != 0:
continue
command = subst(e[key], MIMEtype, filename, plist)
- return command, e
+ if command is not None:
+ return command, e
return None, None
def lookup(caps, MIMEtype, key=None):
@@ -206,6 +219,10 @@ def subst(field, MIMEtype, filename, pli
elif c == 's':
res = res + filename
elif c == 't':
+ if _find_unsafe(MIMEtype):
+ msg = "Refusing to substitute MIME type %r into a shell command." % (MIMEtype,)
+ warnings.warn(msg, UnsafeMailcapInput)
+ return None
res = res + MIMEtype
elif c == '{':
start = i
@@ -213,7 +230,12 @@ def subst(field, MIMEtype, filename, pli
i = i+1
name = field[start:i]
i = i+1
- res = res + findparam(name, plist)
+ param = findparam(name, plist)
+ if _find_unsafe(param):
+ msg = "Refusing to substitute parameter %r (%s) into a shell command" % (param, name)
+ warnings.warn(msg, UnsafeMailcapInput)
+ return None
+ res = res + param
# XXX To do:
# %n == number of parts if type is multipart/*
# %F == list of alternating type and filename for parts
--- a/Lib/test/test_mailcap.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_mailcap.py
@@ -123,7 +123,8 @@ class HelperFunctionTest(unittest.TestCa
(["", "audio/*", "foo.txt"], ""),
(["echo foo", "audio/*", "foo.txt"], "echo foo"),
(["echo %s", "audio/*", "foo.txt"], "echo foo.txt"),
- (["echo %t", "audio/*", "foo.txt"], "echo audio/*"),
+ (["echo %t", "audio/*", "foo.txt"], None),
+ (["echo %t", "audio/wav", "foo.txt"], "echo audio/wav"),
(["echo \\%t", "audio/*", "foo.txt"], "echo %t"),
(["echo foo", "audio/*", "foo.txt", plist], "echo foo"),
(["echo %{total}", "audio/*", "foo.txt", plist], "echo 3")
@@ -207,7 +208,10 @@ class FindmatchTest(unittest.TestCase):
('"An audio fragment"', audio_basic_entry)),
([c, "audio/*"],
{"filename": fname},
- ("/usr/local/bin/showaudio audio/*", audio_entry)),
+ (None, None)),
+ ([c, "audio/wav"],
+ {"filename": fname},
+ ("/usr/local/bin/showaudio audio/wav", audio_entry)),
([c, "message/external-body"],
{"plist": plist},
("showexternal /dev/null default john python.org /tmp foo bar", message_entry))
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-04-27-18-25-30.gh-issue-68966.gjS8zs.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+The deprecated mailcap module now refuses to inject unsafe text (filenames,
+MIME types, parameters) into shell commands. Instead of using such text, it
+will warn and act as if a match was not found (or for test commands, as if
+the test failed).

21
python310.changes
View File

@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Jun 9 16:43:30 UTC 2022 - Matej Cepl <mcepl@suse.com>
- Add CVE-2015-20107-mailcap-unsafe-filenames.patch to avoid
CVE-2015-20107 (bsc#1198511, gh#python/cpython#68966), the
command injection in the mailcap module.
- Fix building of documentation and the universal configuration of the
%primary_interpreter.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Jun 6 22:29:23 UTC 2022 - Matej Cepl <mcepl@suse.com>
@ -240,7 +249,8 @@ Tue May 10 14:35:52 UTC 2022 - Matej Cepl <mcepl@suse.com>
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu May 5 14:35:56 UTC 2022 - Matej Cepl <mcepl@suse.com>
- Switch primary_interpreter from python38 to python310
- Switch primary_interpreter from python38 to python310 for
Factory (only)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Sat Mar 26 22:52:45 UTC 2022 - Matej Cepl <mcepl@suse.com>
@ -523,8 +533,13 @@ Sat Mar 26 22:52:45 UTC 2022 - Matej Cepl <mcepl@suse.com>
- bpo-14916: Fixed bug in the tokenizer that prevented
PyRun_InteractiveOne from parsing from the provided FD.
- Remove upstreamed patches:
- support-expat-245.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Mar 24 18:55:46 UTC 2022 - David Anes <david.anes@suse.com>
- (bsc#1196784, CVE-2022-25236) Rename patch:
support-expat-245.patch to support-expat-CVE-2022-25236-patched.patch
and update the patch to detect expat >= 2.4.4 instead of >= 2.4.5
as it was fully patched against CVE-2022-25236.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tue Feb 22 05:53:06 UTC 2022 - Steve Kowalik <steven.kowalik@suse.com>

22
python310.spec
View File

@ -62,7 +62,11 @@ Obsoletes: python39%{?1:-%{1}}
%define python_pkg_name python310
# Will provide the python3-* provides
# Will do the /usr/bin/python3 and all the core links
%define primary_interpreter 1
%if 0%{?sle_version} || 0%{?suse_version} < 1550
%define primary_interpreter 0
%else
%define primary_interpreter 1
%endif
# We don't process beta signs well
%define folderversion 3.10.5
%define tarname Python-%{tarversion}
@ -160,6 +164,12 @@ Patch34: skip-test_pyobject_freed_is_freed.patch
# PATCH-FIX-SLE fix_configure_rst.patch bpo#43774 mcepl@suse.com
# remove duplicate link targets and make documentation with old Sphinx in SLE
Patch35: fix_configure_rst.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM bpo-46811 gh#python/cpython#7da97f61816f mcepl@suse.com
# NOTE: SUSE version of expat 2.4.4 is patched in SUSE for CVE-2022-25236
Patch36: support-expat-CVE-2022-25236-patched.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2015-20107-mailcap-unsafe-filenames.patch bsc#1198511 mcepl@suse.com
# avoid the command injection in the mailcap module.
Patch37: CVE-2015-20107-mailcap-unsafe-filenames.patch
BuildRequires: autoconf-archive
BuildRequires: automake
BuildRequires: fdupes
@ -187,7 +197,11 @@ BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libtirpc)
BuildRequires: mpdecimal-devel
%endif
%if %{with doc}
%if 0%{?sle_version} && 0%{?sle_version} <= 150300
BuildRequires: python3-Sphinx
%else
BuildRequires: python3-Sphinx >= 3.2.0
%endif
%if 0%{?suse_version} >= 1500
BuildRequires: python3-python-docs-theme >= 2022.1
%endif
@ -418,13 +432,13 @@ other applications.
%patch09 -p1
%patch15 -p1
%patch29 -p1
%if 0%{?suse_version} <= 1500
%patch33 -p1
%endif
%if 0%{?sle_version} && 0%{?sle_version} <= 150300
%patch33 -p1
%patch34 -p1
%endif
%patch35 -p1
%patch36 -p1
%patch37 -p1
# drop Autoconf version requirement
sed -i 's/^AC_PREREQ/dnl AC_PREREQ/' configure.ac

75
support-expat-CVE-2022-25236-patched.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
From 7da97f61816f3cadaa6788804b22a2434b40e8c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
<31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2022 08:16:09 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] bpo-46811: Make test suite support Expat >=2.4.5 (GH-31453)
(GH-31472)
Curly brackets were never allowed in namespace URIs
according to RFC 3986, and so-called namespace-validating
XML parsers have the right to reject them a invalid URIs.
libexpat >=2.4.5 has become strcter in that regard due to
related security issues; with ET.XML instantiating a
namespace-aware parser under the hood, this test has no
future in CPython.
References:
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3968
- https://www.w3.org/TR/xml-names/
Also, test_minidom.py: Support Expat >=2.4.5
(cherry picked from commit 2cae93832f46b245847bdc252456ddf7742ef45e)
Co-authored-by: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
---
Lib/test/test_minidom.py | 25 ++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2022-02-20-21-03-31.bpo-46811.8BxgdQ.rst
--- a/Lib/test/test_minidom.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_minidom.py
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import io
from test import support
import unittest
-import pyexpat
import xml.dom.minidom
from xml.dom.minidom import parse, Node, Document, parseString
@@ -1149,13 +1148,11 @@ class MinidomTest(unittest.TestCase):
# Verify that character decoding errors raise exceptions instead
# of crashing
- if pyexpat.version_info >= (2, 4, 5):
- self.assertRaises(ExpatError, parseString,
- b'<fran\xe7ais></fran\xe7ais>')
- self.assertRaises(ExpatError, parseString,
- b'<franais>Comment \xe7a va ? Tr\xe8s bien ?</franais>')
- else:
- self.assertRaises(UnicodeDecodeError, parseString,
+ # It doesn’t make any sense to insist on the exact text of the
+ # error message, or even the exact Exception … it is enough that
+ # the error has been discovered.
+ with self.assertRaises((UnicodeDecodeError, ExpatError)):
+ parseString(
b'<fran\xe7ais>Comment \xe7a va ? Tr\xe8s bien ?</fran\xe7ais>')
doc.unlink()
@@ -1617,12 +1614,10 @@ class MinidomTest(unittest.TestCase):
self.confirm(doc2.namespaceURI == xml.dom.EMPTY_NAMESPACE)
def testExceptionOnSpacesInXMLNSValue(self):
- if pyexpat.version_info >= (2, 4, 5):
- context = self.assertRaisesRegex(ExpatError, 'syntax error')
- else:
- context = self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, 'Unsupported syntax')
-
- with context:
+ # It doesn’t make any sense to insist on the exact text of the
+ # error message, or even the exact Exception … it is enough that
+ # the error has been discovered.
+ with self.assertRaises((ExpatError, ValueError)):
parseString('<element xmlns:abc="http:abc.com/de f g/hi/j k"><abc:foo /></element>')
def testDocRemoveChild(self):