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Accepting request 1197474 from devel:languages:python:Factory

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- Add CVE-2024-8088-inf-loop-zipfile_Path.patch to prevent
  malformed payload to cause infinite loops in zipfile.Path
  (bsc#1229704, CVE-2024-8088).

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1197474
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/python312?expand=0&rev=19
This commit is contained in:
Dominique Leuenberger 2024-08-30 11:25:40 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
commit a7e33ce6b6
3 changed files with 158 additions and 0 deletions
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148
CVE-2024-8088-inf-loop-zipfile_Path.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
---
Lib/test/test_zipfile/_path/test_path.py | 78 ++++++++++
Lib/zipfile/_path/__init__.py | 18 ++
Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-08-11-14-08-04.gh-issue-122905.7tDsxA.rst | 1
Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-08-26-13-45-20.gh-issue-123270.gXHvNJ.rst | 3
4 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/Lib/test/test_zipfile/_path/test_path.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_zipfile/_path/test_path.py
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import contextlib
import pathlib
import pickle
import sys
+import time
import unittest
import zipfile
@@ -577,3 +578,80 @@ class TestPath(unittest.TestCase):
zipfile.Path(alpharep)
with self.assertRaises(KeyError):
alpharep.getinfo('does-not-exist')
+
+ def test_malformed_paths(self):
+ """
+ Path should handle malformed paths gracefully.
+
+ Paths with leading slashes are not visible.
+
+ Paths with dots are treated like regular files.
+ """
+ data = io.BytesIO()
+ zf = zipfile.ZipFile(data, "w")
+ zf.writestr("/one-slash.txt", b"content")
+ zf.writestr("//two-slash.txt", b"content")
+ zf.writestr("../parent.txt", b"content")
+ zf.filename = ''
+ root = zipfile.Path(zf)
+ assert list(map(str, root.iterdir())) == ['../']
+ assert root.joinpath('..').joinpath('parent.txt').read_bytes() == b'content'
+
+ def test_unsupported_names(self):
+ """
+ Path segments with special characters are readable.
+
+ On some platforms or file systems, characters like
+ ``:`` and ``?`` are not allowed, but they are valid
+ in the zip file.
+ """
+ data = io.BytesIO()
+ zf = zipfile.ZipFile(data, "w")
+ zf.writestr("path?", b"content")
+ zf.writestr("V: NMS.flac", b"fLaC...")
+ zf.filename = ''
+ root = zipfile.Path(zf)
+ contents = root.iterdir()
+ assert next(contents).name == 'path?'
+ assert next(contents).name == 'V: NMS.flac'
+ assert root.joinpath('V: NMS.flac').read_bytes() == b"fLaC..."
+
+ def test_backslash_not_separator(self):
+ """
+ In a zip file, backslashes are not separators.
+ """
+ data = io.BytesIO()
+ zf = zipfile.ZipFile(data, "w")
+ zf.writestr(DirtyZipInfo.for_name("foo\\bar", zf), b"content")
+ zf.filename = ''
+ root = zipfile.Path(zf)
+ (first,) = root.iterdir()
+ assert not first.is_dir()
+ assert first.name == 'foo\\bar'
+
+
+class DirtyZipInfo(zipfile.ZipInfo):
+ """
+ Bypass name sanitization.
+ """
+
+ def __init__(self, filename, *args, **kwargs):
+ super().__init__(filename, *args, **kwargs)
+ self.filename = filename
+
+ @classmethod
+ def for_name(cls, name, archive):
+ """
+ Construct the same way that ZipFile.writestr does.
+
+ TODO: extract this functionality and re-use
+ """
+ self = cls(filename=name, date_time=time.localtime(time.time())[:6])
+ self.compress_type = archive.compression
+ self.compress_level = archive.compresslevel
+ if self.filename.endswith('/'): # pragma: no cover
+ self.external_attr = 0o40775 << 16 # drwxrwxr-x
+ self.external_attr |= 0x10 # MS-DOS directory flag
+ else:
+ self.external_attr = 0o600 << 16 # ?rw-------
+ return self
--- a/Lib/zipfile/_path/__init__.py
+++ b/Lib/zipfile/_path/__init__.py
@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
+"""
+A Path-like interface for zipfiles.
+
+This codebase is shared between zipfile.Path in the stdlib
+and zipp in PyPI. See
+https://github.com/python/importlib_metadata/wiki/Development-Methodology
+for more detail.
+"""
+
import io
import posixpath
import zipfile
@@ -34,7 +43,7 @@ def _parents(path):
def _ancestry(path):
"""
Given a path with elements separated by
- posixpath.sep, generate all elements of that path
+ posixpath.sep, generate all elements of that path.
>>> list(_ancestry('b/d'))
['b/d', 'b']
@@ -46,9 +55,14 @@ def _ancestry(path):
['b']
>>> list(_ancestry(''))
[]
+
+ Multiple separators are treated like a single.
+
+ >>> list(_ancestry('//b//d///f//'))
+ ['//b//d///f', '//b//d', '//b']
"""
path = path.rstrip(posixpath.sep)
- while path and path != posixpath.sep:
+ while path.rstrip(posixpath.sep):
yield path
path, tail = posixpath.split(path)
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-08-11-14-08-04.gh-issue-122905.7tDsxA.rst
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+:class:`zipfile.Path` objects now sanitize names from the zipfile.
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2024-08-26-13-45-20.gh-issue-123270.gXHvNJ.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Applied a more surgical fix for malformed payloads in :class:`zipfile.Path`
+causing infinite loops (gh-122905) without breaking contents using
+legitimate characters.

7
python312.changes
View File

@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Wed Aug 28 16:54:34 UTC 2024 - Matej Cepl <mcepl@cepl.eu>
- Add CVE-2024-8088-inf-loop-zipfile_Path.patch to prevent
malformed payload to cause infinite loops in zipfile.Path
(bsc#1229704, CVE-2024-8088).
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Wed Aug 7 18:05:57 UTC 2024 - Matej Cepl <mcepl@cepl.eu>

3
python312.spec
View File

@ -186,6 +186,9 @@ Patch40: fix-test-recursion-limit-15.6.patch
# PATCH-FIX-SLE docs-docutils_014-Sphinx_420.patch bsc#[0-9]+ mcepl@suse.com
# related to gh#python/cpython#119317
Patch41: docs-docutils_014-Sphinx_420.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM CVE-2024-8088-inf-loop-zipfile_Path.patch bsc#1229704 mcepl@suse.com
# avoid denial of service in zipfile
Patch42: CVE-2024-8088-inf-loop-zipfile_Path.patch
BuildRequires: autoconf-archive
BuildRequires: automake
BuildRequires: fdupes