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Accepting request 311158 from network:vpn

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- Applied upstream fix for a rogue servers vulnerability, that may
  enable rogue servers able to authenticate itself with certificate
  issued by any CA the client trusts, to gain user credentials from
  a client in certain IKEv2 setups (bsc#933591,CVE-2015-4171).
  [+ 0006-strongswan-5.1.0-5.3.1_enforce_remote_auth.patch]
- Fix to apply unknown_payload patch if fips is disabled (<= 13.1)
  and renamed it to use number prefix corresponding with patch nr.
  [- strongswan-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch,
   + 0005-strongswan-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch]

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/311158
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/strongswan?expand=0&rev=61
This commit is contained in:
Dominique Leuenberger 2015-06-09 06:49:35 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
commit ba2bed6a95
4 changed files with 119 additions and 2 deletions
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0
strongswan-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch → 0005-strongswan-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch
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102
0006-strongswan-5.1.0-5.3.1_enforce_remote_auth.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
From ca1a65cc6aef2e037b529574783b7c571d1d82a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2015 10:52:34 +0200
References: bsc#933591,CVE-2015-4171
Subject: [PATCH] ikev2: Enforce remote authentication config before proceeding
with own authentication
Previously the constraints in the authentication configuration of an
initiator were enforced only after all authentication rounds were
complete. This posed a problem if an initiator used EAP or PSK
authentication while the responder was authenticated with a certificate
and if a rogue server was able to authenticate itself with a valid
certificate issued by any CA the initiator trusted.
Because any constraints for the responder's identity (rightid) or other
aspects of the authentication (e.g. rightca) the initiator had were not
enforced until the initiator itself finished its authentication such a rogue
responder was able to acquire usernames and password hashes from the client.
And if a client supported EAP-GTC it was even possible to trick it into
sending plaintext passwords.
This patch enforces the configured constraints right after the responder's
authentication successfully finished for each round and before the initiator
starts with its own authentication.
Fixes CVE-2015-4171.
---
src/libcharon/sa/ikev2/tasks/ike_auth.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 44 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/libcharon/sa/ikev2/tasks/ike_auth.c b/src/libcharon/sa/ikev2/tasks/ike_auth.c
index bf747a49edde..2554496c1916 100644
--- a/src/libcharon/sa/ikev2/tasks/ike_auth.c
+++ b/src/libcharon/sa/ikev2/tasks/ike_auth.c
@@ -112,6 +112,11 @@ struct private_ike_auth_t {
* received an INITIAL_CONTACT?
*/
bool initial_contact;
+
+ /**
+ * Is EAP acceptable, did we strictly authenticate peer?
+ */
+ bool eap_acceptable;
};
/**
@@ -879,6 +884,37 @@ static void send_auth_failed_informational(private_ike_auth_t *this,
message->destroy(message);
}
+/**
+ * Check if strict constraint fullfillment required to continue current auth
+ */
+static bool require_strict(private_ike_auth_t *this, bool mutual_eap)
+{
+ auth_cfg_t *cfg;
+
+ if (this->eap_acceptable)
+ {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ cfg = this->ike_sa->get_auth_cfg(this->ike_sa, TRUE);
+ switch ((uintptr_t)cfg->get(cfg, AUTH_RULE_AUTH_CLASS))
+ {
+ case AUTH_CLASS_EAP:
+ if (mutual_eap && this->my_auth)
+ {
+ this->eap_acceptable = TRUE;
+ return !this->my_auth->is_mutual(this->my_auth);
+ }
+ return TRUE;
+ case AUTH_CLASS_PSK:
+ return TRUE;
+ case AUTH_CLASS_PUBKEY:
+ case AUTH_CLASS_ANY:
+ default:
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+}
+
METHOD(task_t, process_i, status_t,
private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *message)
{
@@ -1014,6 +1050,14 @@ METHOD(task_t, process_i, status_t,
}
}
+ if (require_strict(this, mutual_eap))
+ {
+ if (!update_cfg_candidates(this, TRUE))
+ {
+ goto peer_auth_failed;
+ }
+ }
+
if (this->my_auth)
{
switch (this->my_auth->process(this->my_auth, message))
--
1.9.1

13
strongswan.changes
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@ -1,3 +1,16 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu Jun 4 10:54:29 UTC 2015 - mt@suse.de
- Applied upstream fix for a rogue servers vulnerability, that may
enable rogue servers able to authenticate itself with certificate
issued by any CA the client trusts, to gain user credentials from
a client in certain IKEv2 setups (bsc#933591,CVE-2015-4171).
[+ 0006-strongswan-5.1.0-5.3.1_enforce_remote_auth.patch]
- Fix to apply unknown_payload patch if fips is disabled (<= 13.1)
and renamed it to use number prefix corresponding with patch nr.
[- strongswan-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch,
+ 0005-strongswan-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch]
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Mon Jun 1 16:18:35 UTC 2015 - mt@suse.de

6
strongswan.spec
View File

@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ Patch2: %{name}_ipsec_service.patch
Patch3: %{name}_fipscheck.patch
Patch4: %{name}_fipsfilter.patch
%endif
Patch5: %{name}-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch
Patch5: 0005-strongswan-5.2.2-5.3.0_unknown_payload.patch
Patch6: 0006-strongswan-5.1.0-5.3.1_enforce_remote_auth.patch
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
BuildRequires: bison
BuildRequires: curl-devel
@ -292,8 +293,9 @@ and the load testing plugin for IKEv2 daemon.
%if %{with fipscheck}
%patch3 -p0
%patch4 -p1
%patch5 -p1
%endif
%patch5 -p1
%patch6 -p1
sed -e 's|@libexecdir@|%_libexecdir|g' \
< $RPM_SOURCE_DIR/strongswan.init.in \
> strongswan.init