Accepting request 992351 from network

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/992351 OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/rsync?expand=0&rev=77
2022-08-03 19:16:32 +00:00 · 2022-08-03 19:16:32 +00:00 · a9da33b5a5
commit a9da33b5a5
parent 20c8ecb8fd 22ca0f659e
3 changed files with 408 additions and 1 deletions
--- a/rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch
+++ b/rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch
@ -0,0 +1,399 @@
+From b7231c7d02cfb65d291af74ff66e7d8c507ee871 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Wayne Davison <wayne@opencoder.net>
+Date: Sun, 31 Jul 2022 16:55:34 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Some extra file-list safety checks.
+
+---
+ exclude.c  | 130 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ flist.c    |  17 ++++++-
+ io.c       |   4 ++
+ main.c     |   7 ++-
+ receiver.c |  11 +++--
+ rsync.1.md |  44 ++++++++++++++++--
+ 6 files changed, 202 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+Index: rsync-3.2.4/exclude.c
+===================================================================
+--- rsync-3.2.4.orig/exclude.c
+++ rsync-3.2.4/exclude.c
+@@ -27,16 +27,22 @@ extern int am_server;
+ extern int am_sender;
+ extern int eol_nulls;
+ extern int io_error;
+extern int xfer_dirs;
+extern int recurse;
+ extern int local_server;
+ extern int prune_empty_dirs;
+ extern int ignore_perishable;
+extern int old_style_args;
+extern int relative_paths;
+ extern int delete_mode;
+ extern int delete_excluded;
+ extern int cvs_exclude;
+ extern int sanitize_paths;
+ extern int protocol_version;
+extern int list_only;
+ extern int module_id;
+ 
+extern char *filesfrom_host;
+ extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
+ extern unsigned int curr_dir_len;
+ extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
+@@ -44,8 +50,10 @@ extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
+ filter_rule_list filter_list = { .debug_type = "" };
+ filter_rule_list cvs_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [global CVS]" };
+ filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [daemon]" };
+filter_rule_list implied_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [implied]" };
+ 
+ int saw_xattr_filter = 0;
+int trust_sender_filter = 0;
+ 
+ /* Need room enough for ":MODS " prefix plus some room to grow. */
+ #define MAX_RULE_PREFIX (16)
+@@ -292,6 +300,125 @@ static void add_rule(filter_rule_list *l
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+/* Each arg the client sends to the remote sender turns into an implied include
+ * that the receiver uses to validate the file list from the sender. */
+void add_implied_include(const char *arg)
+{
+	filter_rule *rule;
+	int arg_len, saw_wild = 0, backslash_cnt = 0;
+	int slash_cnt = 1; /* We know we're adding a leading slash. */
+	const char *cp;
+	char *p;
+	if (old_style_args || list_only || filesfrom_host != NULL)
+		return;
+	if (relative_paths) {
+		cp = strstr(arg, "/./");
+		if (cp)
+			arg = cp+3;
+	} else {
+		if ((cp = strrchr(arg, '/')) != NULL)
+			arg = cp + 1;
+	}
+	arg_len = strlen(arg);
+	if (arg_len) {
+		if (strpbrk(arg, "*[?")) {
+			/* We need to add room to escape backslashes if wildcard chars are present. */
+			cp = arg;
+			while ((cp = strchr(cp, '\\')) != NULL) {
+				arg_len++;
+				cp++;
+			}
+			saw_wild = 1;
+		}
+		arg_len++; /* Leave room for the prefixed slash */
+		rule = new0(filter_rule);
+		if (!implied_filter_list.head)
+			implied_filter_list.head = implied_filter_list.tail = rule;
+		else {
+			rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
+			implied_filter_list.head = rule;
+		}
+		rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE + (saw_wild ? FILTRULE_WILD : 0);
+		p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + 1);
+		*p++ = '/';
+		cp = arg;
+		while (*cp) {
+			switch (*cp) {
+			  case '\\':
+				backslash_cnt++;
+				if (saw_wild)
+					*p++ = '\\';
+				*p++ = *cp++;
+				break;
+			  case '/':
+				if (p[-1] == '/') /* This is safe because of the initial slash. */
+					break;
+				if (relative_paths) {
+					filter_rule const *ent;
+					int found = 0;
+					*p = '\0';
+					for (ent = implied_filter_list.head; ent; ent = ent->next) {
+						if (ent != rule && strcmp(ent->pattern, rule->pattern) == 0)
+							found = 1;
+					}
+					if (!found) {
+						filter_rule *R_rule = new0(filter_rule);
+						R_rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE + (saw_wild ? FILTRULE_WILD : 0);
+						R_rule->pattern = strdup(rule->pattern);
+						R_rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt;
+						R_rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
+						implied_filter_list.head = R_rule;
+					}
+				}
+				slash_cnt++;
+				*p++ = *cp++;
+				break;
+			  default:
+				*p++ = *cp++;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		*p = '\0';
+		rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt;
+		arg = (const char *)rule->pattern;
+	}
+
+	if (recurse || xfer_dirs) {
+		/* Now create a rule with an added "/" & "**" or "*" at the end */
+		rule = new0(filter_rule);
+		if (recurse)
+			rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_WILD | FILTRULE_WILD2;
+		else
+			rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_WILD;
+		/* A +4 in the len leaves enough room for / * * \0 or / * \0 \0 */
+		if (!saw_wild && backslash_cnt) {
+			/* We are appending a wildcard, so now the backslashes need to be escaped. */
+			p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + backslash_cnt + 3 + 1);
+			cp = arg;
+			while (*cp) {
+				if (*cp == '\\')
+					*p++ = '\\';
+				*p++ = *cp++;
+			}
+		} else {
+			p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + 3 + 1);
+			if (arg_len) {
+				memcpy(p, arg, arg_len);
+				p += arg_len;
+			}
+		}
+		if (p[-1] != '/')
+			*p++ = '/';
+		*p++ = '*';
+		if (recurse)
+			*p++ = '*';
+		*p = '\0';
+		rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt + 1;
+		rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
+		implied_filter_list.head = rule;
+	}
+}
+
+ /* This frees any non-inherited items, leaving just inherited items on the list. */
+ static void pop_filter_list(filter_rule_list *listp)
+ {
+@@ -718,7 +845,7 @@ static void report_filter_result(enum lo
+ 			      : name_flags & NAME_IS_DIR ? "directory"
+ 			      : "file";
+ 		rprintf(code, "[%s] %sing %s %s because of pattern %s%s%s\n",
+-		    w, actions[*w!='s'][!(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_INCLUDE)],
+		    w, actions[*w=='g'][!(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_INCLUDE)],
+ 		    t, name, ent->pattern,
+ 		    ent->rflags & FILTRULE_DIRECTORY ? "/" : "", type);
+ 	}
+@@ -890,6 +1017,7 @@ static filter_rule *parse_rule_tok(const
+ 		}
+ 		switch (ch) {
+ 		case ':':
+			trust_sender_filter = 1;
+ 			rule->rflags |= FILTRULE_PERDIR_MERGE
+ 				      | FILTRULE_FINISH_SETUP;
+ 			/* FALL THROUGH */
+Index: rsync-3.2.4/flist.c
+===================================================================
+--- rsync-3.2.4.orig/flist.c
+++ rsync-3.2.4/flist.c
+@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern int need_unsorted_flist;
+ extern int sender_symlink_iconv;
+ extern int output_needs_newline;
+ extern int sender_keeps_checksum;
+extern int trust_sender_filter;
+ extern int unsort_ndx;
+ extern uid_t our_uid;
+ extern struct stats stats;
+@@ -83,8 +84,7 @@ extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
+ 
+ extern struct chmod_mode_struct *chmod_modes;
+ 
+-extern filter_rule_list filter_list;
+-extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
+extern filter_rule_list filter_list, implied_filter_list, daemon_filter_list;
+ 
+ #ifdef ICONV_OPTION
+ extern int filesfrom_convert;
+@@ -986,6 +986,19 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_ent
+ 		exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
+ 	}
+ 
+	if (*thisname != '.' || thisname[1] != '\0') {
+		int filt_flags = S_ISDIR(mode) ? NAME_IS_DIR : NAME_IS_FILE;
+		if (!trust_sender_filter /* a per-dir filter rule means we must trust the sender's filtering */
+		 && filter_list.head && check_filter(&filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) < 0) {
+			rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting excluded file-list name: %s\n", thisname);
+			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+		}
+		if (implied_filter_list.head && check_filter(&implied_filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) <= 0) {
+			rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting unrequested file-list name: %s\n", thisname);
+			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+		}
+	}
+
+ 	if (inc_recurse && S_ISDIR(mode)) {
+ 		if (one_file_system) {
+ 			/* Room to save the dir's device for -x */
+Index: rsync-3.2.4/io.c
+===================================================================
+--- rsync-3.2.4.orig/io.c
+++ rsync-3.2.4/io.c
+@@ -419,6 +419,7 @@ static void forward_filesfrom_data(void)
+ 		while (s != eob) {
+ 			if (*s++ == '\0') {
+ 				ff_xb.len = s - sob - 1;
+				add_implied_include(sob);
+ 				if (iconvbufs(ic_send, &ff_xb, &iobuf.out, flags) < 0)
+ 					exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); /* impossible? */
+ 				write_buf(iobuf.out_fd, s-1, 1); /* Send the '\0'. */
+@@ -450,9 +451,12 @@ static void forward_filesfrom_data(void)
+ 		char *f = ff_xb.buf + ff_xb.pos;
+ 		char *t = ff_xb.buf;
+ 		char *eob = f + len;
+		char *cur = t;
+ 		/* Eliminate any multi-'\0' runs. */
+ 		while (f != eob) {
+ 			if (!(*t++ = *f++)) {
+				add_implied_include(cur);
+				cur = t;
+ 				while (f != eob && *f == '\0')
+ 					f++;
+ 			}
+Index: rsync-3.2.4/main.c
+===================================================================
+--- rsync-3.2.4.orig/main.c
+++ rsync-3.2.4/main.c
+@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ extern int backup_dir_len;
+ extern int basis_dir_cnt;
+ extern int default_af_hint;
+ extern int stdout_format_has_i;
+extern int trust_sender_filter;
+ extern struct stats stats;
+ extern char *stdout_format;
+ extern char *logfile_format;
+@@ -104,7 +105,7 @@ extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
+ extern char backup_dir_buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ extern char *basis_dir[MAX_BASIS_DIRS+1];
+ extern struct file_list *first_flist;
+-extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
+extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list, implied_filter_list;
+ 
+ uid_t our_uid;
+ gid_t our_gid;
+@@ -635,6 +636,7 @@ static pid_t do_cmd(char *cmd, char *mac
+ #ifdef ICONV_CONST
+ 		setup_iconv();
+ #endif
+		trust_sender_filter = 1;
+ 	} else if (local_server) {
+ 		/* If the user didn't request --[no-]whole-file, force
+ 		 * it on, but only if we're not batch processing. */
+@@ -1516,6 +1518,8 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *
+ 		char *dummy_host;
+ 		int dummy_port = rsync_port;
+ 		int i;
+		if (filesfrom_fd < 0)
+			add_implied_include(remote_argv[0]);
+ 		/* For remote source, any extra source args must have either
+ 		 * the same hostname or an empty hostname. */
+ 		for (i = 1; i < remote_argc; i++) {
+@@ -1539,6 +1543,7 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *
+ 			if (!rsync_port && !*arg) /* Turn an empty arg into a dot dir. */
+ 				arg = ".";
+ 			remote_argv[i] = arg;
+			add_implied_include(arg);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+Index: rsync-3.2.4/receiver.c
+===================================================================
+--- rsync-3.2.4.orig/receiver.c
+++ rsync-3.2.4/receiver.c
+@@ -593,10 +593,13 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char
+ 		if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1))
+ 			rprintf(FINFO, "recv_files(%s)\n", fname);
+ 
+-		if (daemon_filter_list.head && (*fname != '.' || fname[1] != '\0')
+-		 && check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, 0) < 0) {
+-			rprintf(FERROR, "attempt to hack rsync failed.\n");
+-			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+		if (daemon_filter_list.head && (*fname != '.' || fname[1] != '\0')) {
+			int filt_flags = S_ISDIR(file->mode) ? NAME_IS_DIR : NAME_IS_FILE;
+			if (check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, filt_flags) < 0) {
+				rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting file transfer request for daemon excluded file: %s\n",
+					fname);
+				exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+			}
+ 		}
+ 
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS
+Index: rsync-3.2.4/rsync.1.md
+===================================================================
+--- rsync-3.2.4.orig/rsync.1.md
+++ rsync-3.2.4/rsync.1.md
+@@ -308,6 +308,35 @@ separate the files into different rsync
+ [`--delay-updates`](#opt) (which doesn't affect the sorted transfer order, but
+ does make the final file-updating phase happen much more rapidly).
+ 
+## MULTI-HOST SECURITY
+
+Rsync takes steps to ensure that the file requests that are shared in a
+transfer are protected against various security issues.  Most of the potential
+problems arise on the receiving side where rsync takes steps to ensure that the
+list of files being transferred remains within the bounds of what was
+requested.
+
+Toward this end, rsync 3.1.2 and later have aborted when a file list contains
+an absolute or relative path that tries to escape out of the top of the
+transfer.  Also, beginning with version 3.2.5 (or a version patched against
+CVE-2022-29154), rsync does two more safety checks of the file list to (1)
+ensure that no extra source arguments were added into the transfer other than
+those that the client requested and (2) ensure that the file list obeys the
+exclude rules that we sent to the sender.
+
+For those that don't yet have a 3.2.5 (or a version patched against
+CVE-2022-29154) client rsync, it is safest to do a copy into a dedicated
+destination directory for the remote files rather than requesting the remote
+content get mixed in with other local content.  For example, doing an rsync copy
+into your home directory is potentially unsafe on an older rsync if the remote
+rsync is being controlled by a bad actor:
+
+>     rsync -aiv host1:dir1 ~
+
+A safer command would be:
+
+>     rsync -aiv host1:dir1 ~/host1-files
+
+ ## EXAMPLES
+ 
+ Here are some examples of how I use rsync.
+@@ -2335,6 +2364,12 @@ your home directory (remove the '=' for
+     behavior.  The environment is always overridden by manually specified
+     positive or negative options (the negative is `--no-old-args`).
+ 
+    Note that this option also disables the extra safety check added in 3.2.5
+    (or a version patched against CVE-2022-29154) that ensures that a remote
+    sender isn't including extra top-level items in the file-list that you
+    didn't request.  This side-effect is necessary because we can't know for
+    sure what names to expect when the remote shell is interpreting the args.
+
+     This option conflicts with the [`--protect-args`](#opt) option.
+ 
+ 0.  `--protect-args`, `-s`
+@@ -3766,8 +3801,13 @@ available rule prefixes:
+ 
+ 0.  `exclude, '-'` specifies an exclude pattern.
+ 0.  `include, '+'` specifies an include pattern.
+-0.  `merge, '.'` specifies a merge-file to read for more rules.
+-0.  `dir-merge, ':'` specifies a per-directory merge-file.
+0.  `merge, '.'` specifies a merge-file on the client side to read for more
+    rules.
+0.  `dir-merge, ':'` specifies a per-directory merge-file.  Using this kind of
+    filter rule requires that you trust the sending side's filter checking, and
+    thus it disables the receiver's verification of the file-list names against
+    the filter rules (since only the sender can know for sure if it obeyed all
+    the filter rules when some are per-dir merged from the sender's files).
+ 0.  `hide, 'H'` specifies a pattern for hiding files from the transfer.
+ 0.  `show, 'S'` files that match the pattern are not hidden.
+ 0.  `protect, 'P'` specifies a pattern for protecting files from deletion.
--- a/rsync.changes
+++ b/rsync.changes
@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Mon Aug  1 12:27:43 UTC 2022 - David Anes <david.anes@suse.com>
+
+- Security fix: [bsc#1201840, CVE-2022-29154]
+  * arbitrary file write vulnerability via do_server_recv function
+  * Added patch rsync-rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch
+
 -------------------------------------------------------------------
 Tue Jun 21 10:34:12 UTC 2022 - Stefan Schubert <schubi@suse.com>

--- a/rsync.spec
+++ b/rsync.spec
@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ Source10:       http://rsync.samba.org/ftp/rsync/src/rsync-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
 Source11:       http://rsync.samba.org/ftp/rsync/src/rsync-patches-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
 Source12:       %{name}.keyring
 Patch0:         rsync-no-libattr.patch
+Patch1:         rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch
 BuildRequires:  autoconf
 BuildRequires:  automake
 BuildRequires:  c++_compiler
@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ rm -f zlib/*.h

 patch -p1 < patches/slp.diff

-%patch0 -p1
+%autopatch -p1

 %build
 autoreconf -fiv