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Accepting request 305848 from home:oertel:branches:hardware

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- added patch for bnc#930077
  0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
- added patch for bnc#930078
  0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
- added patches for bnc#930079
  0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
  0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
  0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
  0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
  0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch

OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/305848
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/hardware/wpa_supplicant?expand=0&rev=56
This commit is contained in:
Ismail Dönmez 2015-05-08 08:51:41 +00:00 committed by Git OBS Bridge
parent d4ea14d0b3
commit 81f0769d04
9 changed files with 400 additions and 0 deletions
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41
0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser
The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the
length of the information elements (int left) could end up being
negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack
buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing
so, resulting in segmentation fault.
This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service
attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses
hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based
drivers).
Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
reporting this issue.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/ap/wmm.c b/src/ap/wmm.c
index 6d4177c..314e244 100644
--- a/src/ap/wmm.c
+++ b/src/ap/wmm.c
@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
return;
}
+ if (left < 0)
+ return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */
+
/* extract the tspec info element */
if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) {
hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
--
1.9.1

73
0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
From dd2f043c9c43d156494e33d7ce22db96e6ef42c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:37:45 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 1/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix payload length validation for Commit
and Confirm
The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
overflow when processing an invalid message.
Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
reporting this issue.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
index f2b0926..a629437 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
@@ -355,6 +355,23 @@ eap_pwd_perform_commit_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
BIGNUM *mask = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
u16 offset;
u8 *ptr, *scalar = NULL, *element = NULL;
+ size_t prime_len, order_len;
+
+ if (data->state != PWD_Commit_Req) {
+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
+ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
+ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
+
+ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
+ (unsigned int) payload_len,
+ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
+ goto fin;
+ }
if (((data->private_value = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((data->my_element = EC_POINT_new(data->grp->group)) == NULL) ||
@@ -554,6 +571,18 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
int offset;
+ if (data->state != PWD_Confirm_Req) {
+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
+ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
+ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
/*
* first build up the ciphersuite which is group | random_function |
* prf
--
1.9.1

49
0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
From 5acd23f4581da58683f3cf5e36cb71bbe4070bd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2015 17:08:33 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Fix HTTP chunked transfer encoding parser
strtoul() return value may end up overflowing the int h->chunk_size and
resulting in a negative value to be stored as the chunk_size. This could
result in the following memcpy operation using a very large length
argument which would result in a buffer overflow and segmentation fault.
This could have been used to cause a denial service by any device that
has been authorized for network access (either wireless or wired). This
would affect both the WPS UPnP functionality in a WPS AP (hostapd with
upnp_iface parameter set in the configuration) and WPS ER
(wpa_supplicant with WPS_ER_START control interface command used).
Validate the parsed chunk length value to avoid this. In addition to
rejecting negative values, we can also reject chunk size that would be
larger than the maximum configured body length.
Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
reporting this issue.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/wps/httpread.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/wps/httpread.c b/src/wps/httpread.c
index 2f08f37..d2855e3 100644
--- a/src/wps/httpread.c
+++ b/src/wps/httpread.c
@@ -533,6 +533,13 @@ static void httpread_read_handler(int sd, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
if (!isxdigit(*cbp))
goto bad;
h->chunk_size = strtoul(cbp, NULL, 16);
+ if (h->chunk_size < 0 ||
+ h->chunk_size > h->max_bytes) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "httpread: Invalid chunk size %d",
+ h->chunk_size);
+ goto bad;
+ }
/* throw away chunk header
* so we have only real data
*/
--
1.9.1

66
0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit
and Confirm
The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not
checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read
overflow when processing an invalid message.
Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before
processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to
make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm
message before the previous exchanges have been completed.
Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
reporting this issue.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL;
int res = 0;
+ size_t prime_len, order_len;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response");
+ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime);
+ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order);
+
+ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)",
+ (unsigned int) payload_len,
+ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len));
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr;
int offset;
+ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)",
+ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
+ goto fin;
+ }
+
/* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */
grp = htons(data->group_num);
ptr = (u8 *) &cs;
--
1.9.1

52
0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
From 477c74395acd0123340457ba6f15ab345d42016e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:23:04 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 3/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
reassembly
The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
as a huge positive integer.
In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
index a629437..1d2079b 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
@@ -866,11 +866,23 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
* if it's the first fragment there'll be a length field
*/
if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
+ if (len < 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
+ return NULL;
+ }
tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments whose "
"total length = %d", tot_len);
if (tot_len > 15000)
return NULL;
+ if (data->inbuf) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
+ ret->ignore = TRUE;
+ return NULL;
+ }
data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "Out of memory to buffer "
--
1.9.1

50
0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
From 3035cc2894e08319b905bd6561e8bddc8c2db9fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:06 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 4/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix Total-Length parsing for fragment
reassembly
The remaining number of bytes in the message could be smaller than the
Total-Length field size, so the length needs to be explicitly checked
prior to reading the field and decrementing the len variable. This could
have resulted in the remaining length becoming negative and interpreted
as a huge positive integer.
In addition, check that there is no already started fragment in progress
before allocating a new buffer for reassembling fragments. This avoid a
potential memory leak when processing invalid message.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
index 3189105..2bfc3c2 100644
--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
@@ -942,11 +942,21 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
* the first fragment has a total length
*/
if (EAP_PWD_GET_LENGTH_BIT(lm_exch)) {
+ if (len < 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: Frame too short to contain Total-Length field");
+ return;
+ }
tot_len = WPA_GET_BE16(pos);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Incoming fragments, total "
"length = %d", tot_len);
if (tot_len > 15000)
return;
+ if (data->inbuf) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected new fragment start when previous fragment is still in use");
+ return;
+ }
data->inbuf = wpabuf_alloc(tot_len);
if (data->inbuf == NULL) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Out of memory to "
--
1.9.1

32
0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From 28a069a545b06b99eb55ad53f63f2c99e65a98f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 19:26:28 +0300
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] EAP-pwd peer: Fix asymmetric fragmentation behavior
The L (Length) and M (More) flags needs to be cleared before deciding
whether the locally generated response requires fragmentation. This
fixes an issue where these flags from the server could have been invalid
for the following message. In some cases, this could have resulted in
triggering the wpabuf security check that would terminate the process
due to invalid buffer allocation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
---
src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
index 1d2079b..e58b13a 100644
--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
@@ -968,6 +968,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
/*
* we have output! Do we need to fragment it?
*/
+ lm_exch = EAP_PWD_GET_EXCHANGE(lm_exch);
len = wpabuf_len(data->outbuf);
if ((len + EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE) > data->mtu) {
resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, data->mtu,
--
1.9.1

14
wpa_supplicant.changes
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@ -1,3 +1,17 @@
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Thu May 7 17:18:29 CEST 2015 - ro@suse.de
- added patch for bnc#930077
0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
- added patch for bnc#930078
0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
- added patches for bnc#930079
0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Fri May 1 21:14:01 UTC 2015 - zaitor@opensuse.org

23
wpa_supplicant.spec
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@ -51,6 +51,21 @@ Patch3: 0001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
Patch4: wpa_supplicant-alloc_size.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM wpa_s-D-Bus-Fix-operations-when-P2P-management-interface-is-used.patch arch#44740 zaitor@opensuse.org -- Fix Segmentation fault in wpa_supplicant. Patch taken from upstream master git.
Patch5: wpa_s-D-Bus-Fix-operations-when-P2P-management-interface-is-used.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM 0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch bnc#930077
Patch6: 0001-WPS-Fix-HTTP-chunked-transfer-encoding-parser.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM 0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch bnc#930078
Patch7: 0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM 0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch bnc#930079
Patch8: 0001-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Commi.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM 0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch bnc#930079
Patch9: 0002-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-payload-length-validation-for-Com.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM 0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch bnc#930079
Patch10: 0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM 0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch bnc#930079
Patch11: 0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
# PATCH-FIX-UPSTREAM 0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch bnc#930079
Patch12: 0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
Requires: logrotate
%if ! %{defined _rundir}
@ -91,6 +106,14 @@ cp %{SOURCE1} wpa_supplicant/.config
%patch3 -p1
%patch4 -p1
%patch5 -p1
%patch6 -p1
%patch7 -p1
%patch8 -p1
%patch9 -p1
%patch10 -p1
%patch11 -p1
%patch12 -p1
%build
cd wpa_supplicant
CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" make V=1 %{?_smp_mflags}