commented out). The keycat binary isn't really installed nor
supported, so we can drop it, except for the code that is used
by other SELinux patches, which is what I kept from that patch
(boo#1229072).
- Add patch submitted to upstream to fix RFC4256 implementation
so that keyboard-interactive authentication method can send
instructions and sshd shows them to users even before a prompt
is requested. This fixes MFA push notifications (boo#1229010).
* 0001-auth-pam-Immediately-report-instructions-to-clients-and-fix-handling-in-ssh-client.patch
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=274
- Update to openssh 9.8p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Add patch to fix sshd not logging in the audit failed login
attempts (submitted to upstream in
https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/516):
* fix-audit-fail-attempt.patch
- Use --enable-dsa-keys when building openssh. It's required if
the user sets the crypto-policy mode to LEGACY, where DSA keys
should be allowed. The option was added by upstream in 9.7 and
set to disabled by default.
- These two changes fix 2 of the 3 issues reported in bsc#1229650.
- Fix a dbus connection leaked in the logind patch that was
missing a sd_bus_unref call (found by Matthias Gerstner):
* logind_set_tty.patch
- Add a patch that fixes a small memory leak when parsing the
subsystem configuration option:
* fix-memleak-in-process_server_config_line_depth.patch
- Update to openssh 9.8p1:
= Security
* 1) Race condition in sshd(8) (bsc#1226642, CVE-2024-6387).
A critical vulnerability in sshd(8) was present in Portable
OpenSSH versions between 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may
allow arbitrary code execution with root privileges.
Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit
Linux/glibc systems with ASLR. Under lab conditions, the attack
requires on average 6-8 hours of continuous connections up to
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1196434
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=183
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Fix a dbus connection leaked in the logind patch that was
missing a sd_bus_unref call (found by Matthias Gerstner):
* logind_set_tty.patch
- Add a patch that fixes a small memory leak when parsing the
subsystem configuration option:
* fix-memleak-in-process_server_config_line_depth.patch
- Update to openssh 9.8p1:
= Security
* 1) Race condition in sshd(8) (bsc#1226642, CVE-2024-6387).
A critical vulnerability in sshd(8) was present in Portable
OpenSSH versions between 8.5p1 and 9.7p1 (inclusive) that may
allow arbitrary code execution with root privileges.
Successful exploitation has been demonstrated on 32-bit
Linux/glibc systems with ASLR. Under lab conditions, the attack
requires on average 6-8 hours of continuous connections up to
the maximum the server will accept. Exploitation on 64-bit
systems is believed to be possible but has not been
demonstrated at this time. It's likely that these attacks will
be improved upon.
Exploitation on non-glibc systems is conceivable but has not
been examined. Systems that lack ASLR or users of downstream
Linux distributions that have modified OpenSSH to disable
per-connection ASLR re-randomisation (yes - this is a thing, no
- we don't understand why) may potentially have an easier path
to exploitation. OpenBSD is not vulnerable.
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=272
* 0001-upstream-fix-proxy-multiplexing-mode_-broken-when-keystroke.patch
- Add patch from upstream to restore correctly sigprocmask
* 0001-upstream-correctly-restore-sigprocmask-around-ppoll.patch
- Add patch from upstream to fix a logic error in
ObscureKeystrokeTiming that rendered this feature ineffective,
allowing a passive observer to detect which network packets
contained real keystrokes (bsc#1227318, CVE-2024-39894):
* 0001-upstream-when-sending-ObscureKeystrokeTiming-chaff-packets_.patch
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=271
package existed for a brief period of time during SLE 15 SP6/
Leap 15.6 development but even if it was removed from the
repositories before GM, some users might have it in their
systems from having tried a beta/RC release (boo#1227350).
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive
(bsc#1218215, CVE-2023-51385).
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=270
- Remove the recommendation for openssh-server-config-rootlogin
from openssh-server. Since the default for that config option
was changed in SLE it's not needed anymore in SLE nor in TW
(boo#1224392).
- Add a warning in %post of openssh-clients, openssh-server and
openssh-server-config-disallow-rootlogin to warn the user if
the /etc/ssh/(ssh_config.d|sshd_config.d) directories are not
being used (bsc#1223486).
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1174779
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=267
- Only for SLE15, restore the patch file removed in
Thu Feb 18 13:54:44 UTC 2021 to restore the previous behaviour
from SP5 of having root password login allowed by default
(fixes bsc#1223486, related to bsc#1173067):
* openssh-7.7p1-allow_root_password_login.patch
- Since the default value for this config option is now set to
permit root to use password logins in SLE15, the
openssh-server-config-rootlogin subpackage isn't useful there so
we now create an openssh-server-config-disallow-rootlogin
subpackage that sets the configuration the other way around
than openssh-server-config-rootlogin.
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1173783
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=266
- Make openssh-server recommend the openssh-server-config-rootlogin
package in SLE in order to keep the same behaviour of previous
SPs where the PermitRootLogin default was set to yes.
- Fix crypto-policies requirement to be set by openssh-server, not
the config-rootlogin subpackage.
- Add back %config(noreplace) tag for more config files that were
already set like this in previous SPs.
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1167038
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=263
- Add patch from SLE which was missing in Factory:
* Mon Jun 7 20:54:09 UTC 2021 - Hans Petter Jansson <hpj@suse.com>
- Add openssh-mitigate-lingering-secrets.patch (bsc#1186673), which
attempts to mitigate instances of secrets lingering in memory
after a session exits. (bsc#1213004 bsc#1213008)
- Rebase patch:
* openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1165549
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=259
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this (forwarded request 1150500 from hpjansson)
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150501
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=170
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details.
- Update to openssh 9.6p1:
= Security
* ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the
so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus
Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a
limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server
would not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
* ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while
specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned
multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied.
Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys
are unaffected.
* ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell
metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the
user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then
an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1)
could potentially perform command injection depending on what
quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive.
= Potentially incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides
a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that
can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1150500
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=255
- Enhanced SELinux functionality. Added Fedora patches:
* openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
Proper handling of MLS systems and basis for other SELinux
improvements
* openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
Properly set contexts during privilege separation
* openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
Add ssh-keycat command to allow retrival of authorized_keys
on MLS setups with polyinstantiation
* openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
Additional changes to set the proper context during privilege
separation
* openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
Various changes and putting the pieces together
For now we don't ship the ssh-keycat command, but we need the patch
for the other SELinux infrastructure
This change fixes issues like bsc#1214788, where the ssh daemon
needs to act on behalf of a user and needs a proper context for this
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1123220
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=252
- Update to openssh 9.3p2
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details
- Update to openssh 9.3p2 (bsc#1213504, CVE-2023-38408):
Security
========
Fix CVE-2023-38408 - a condition where specific libaries loaded via
ssh-agent(1)'s PKCS#11 support could be abused to achieve remote
code execution via a forwarded agent socket if the following
conditions are met:
* Exploitation requires the presence of specific libraries on
the victim system.
* Remote exploitation requires that the agent was forwarded
to an attacker-controlled system.
Exploitation can also be prevented by starting ssh-agent(1) with an
empty PKCS#11/FIDO allowlist (ssh-agent -P '') or by configuring
an allowlist that contains only specific provider libraries.
This vulnerability was discovered and demonstrated to be exploitable
by the Qualys Security Advisory team.
In addition to removing the main precondition for exploitation,
this release removes the ability for remote ssh-agent(1) clients
to load PKCS#11 modules by default (see below).
Potentially-incompatible changes
--------------------------------
* ssh-agent(8): the agent will now refuse requests to load PKCS#11
modules issued by remote clients by default. A flag has been added
to restore the previous behaviour "-Oallow-remote-pkcs11".
Note that ssh-agent(8) depends on the SSH client to identify
requests that are remote. The OpenSSH >=8.9 ssh(1) client does
this, but forwarding access to an agent socket using other tools
may circumvent this restriction. (forwarded request 1099810 from simotek)
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1099856
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=165
- Update to openssh 9.3p2
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details
- Update to openssh 9.3p2 (bsc#1213504, CVE-2023-38408):
Security
========
Fix CVE-2023-38408 - a condition where specific libaries loaded via
ssh-agent(1)'s PKCS#11 support could be abused to achieve remote
code execution via a forwarded agent socket if the following
conditions are met:
* Exploitation requires the presence of specific libraries on
the victim system.
* Remote exploitation requires that the agent was forwarded
to an attacker-controlled system.
Exploitation can also be prevented by starting ssh-agent(1) with an
empty PKCS#11/FIDO allowlist (ssh-agent -P '') or by configuring
an allowlist that contains only specific provider libraries.
This vulnerability was discovered and demonstrated to be exploitable
by the Qualys Security Advisory team.
In addition to removing the main precondition for exploitation,
this release removes the ability for remote ssh-agent(1) clients
to load PKCS#11 modules by default (see below).
Potentially-incompatible changes
--------------------------------
* ssh-agent(8): the agent will now refuse requests to load PKCS#11
modules issued by remote clients by default. A flag has been added
to restore the previous behaviour "-Oallow-remote-pkcs11".
Note that ssh-agent(8) depends on the SSH client to identify
requests that are remote. The OpenSSH >=8.9 ssh(1) client does
this, but forwarding access to an agent socket using other tools
may circumvent this restriction.
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1099810
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=249
- Update to openssh 9.3p1
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details
- Update to openssh 9.3p1:
= Security
* ssh-add(1): when adding smartcard keys to ssh-agent(1) with the
per-hop destination constraints (ssh-add -h ...) added in
OpenSSH 8.9, a logic error prevented the constraints from being
communicated to the agent. This resulted in the keys being added
without constraints. The common cases of non-smartcard keys and
keys without destination constraints are unaffected. This
problem was reported by Luci Stanescu.
* ssh(1): Portable OpenSSH provides an implementation of the
getrrsetbyname(3) function if the standard library does not
provide it, for use by the VerifyHostKeyDNS feature. A
specifically crafted DNS response could cause this function to
perform an out-of-bounds read of adjacent stack data, but this
condition does not appear to be exploitable beyond denial-of-
service to the ssh(1) client.
The getrrsetbyname(3) replacement is only included if the
system's standard library lacks this function and portable
OpenSSH was not compiled with the ldns library (--with-ldns).
getrrsetbyname(3) is only invoked if using VerifyHostKeyDNS to
fetch SSHFP records. This problem was found by the Coverity
static analyzer.
= New features
* ssh-keygen(1), ssh-keyscan(1): accept -Ohashalg=sha1|sha256
when outputting SSHFP fingerprints to allow algorithm
selection. bz3493
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1087770
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=247
- Version update to 8.9p1:
= Security
* sshd(8): fix an integer overflow in the user authentication path
that, in conjunction with other logic errors, could have yielded
unauthenticated access under difficult to exploit conditions.
This situation is not exploitable because of independent checks in
the privilege separation monitor. Privilege separation has been
enabled by default in since openssh-3.2.2 (released in 2002) and
has been mandatory since openssh-7.5 (released in 2017). Moreover,
portable OpenSSH has used toolchain features available in most
modern compilers to abort on signed integer overflow since
openssh-6.5 (released in 2014).
Thanks to Malcolm Stagg for finding and reporting this bug.
= Potentially-incompatible changes
* sshd(8), portable OpenSSH only: this release removes in-built
support for MD5-hashed passwords. If you require these on your
system then we recommend linking against libxcrypt or similar.
* This release modifies the FIDO security key middleware interface
and increments SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR.
= New features
* ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1): add a system for
restricting forwarding and use of keys added to ssh-agent(1)
A detailed description of the feature is available at
https://www.openssh.com/agent-restrict.html and the protocol
extensions are documented in the PROTOCOL and PROTOCOL.agent
files in the source release.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): add the sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com hybrid
ECDH/x25519 + Streamlined NTRU Prime post-quantum KEX to the
default KEXAlgorithms list (after the ECDH methods but before the
prime-group DH ones). The next release of OpenSSH is likely to
make this key exchange the default method.
* ssh-keygen(1): when downloading resident keys from a FIDO token,
pass back the user ID that was used when the key was created and
append it to the filename the key is written to (if it is not the
default). Avoids keys being clobbered if the user created multiple
resident keys with the same application string but different user
IDs.
* ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): better handling for FIDO keys
on tokens that provide user verification (UV) on the device itself,
including biometric keys, avoiding unnecessary PIN prompts.
* ssh-keygen(1): add "ssh-keygen -Y match-principals" operation to
perform matching of principals names against an allowed signers
file. To be used towards a TOFU model for SSH signatures in git.
* ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1): allow pin-required FIDO keys to be added
to ssh-agent(1). $SSH_ASKPASS will be used to request the PIN at
authentication time.
* ssh-keygen(1): allow selection of hash at sshsig signing time
(either sha512 (default) or sha256).
* ssh(1), sshd(8): read network data directly to the packet input
buffer instead of indirectly via a small stack buffer. Provides a
modest performance improvement.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): read data directly to the channel input buffer,
providing a similar modest performance improvement.
* ssh(1): extend the PubkeyAuthentication configuration directive to
accept yes|no|unbound|host-bound to allow control over one of the
protocol extensions used to implement agent-restricted keys.
= Bugfixes
* sshd(8): document that CASignatureAlgorithms, ExposeAuthInfo and
PubkeyAuthOptions can be used in a Match block. PR277.
* sshd(8): fix possible string truncation when constructing paths to
.rhosts/.shosts files with very long user home directory names.
* ssh-keysign(1): unbreak for KEX algorithms that use SHA384/512
exchange hashes
* ssh(1): don't put the TTY into raw mode when SessionType=none,
avoids ^C being unable to kill such a session. bz3360
* scp(1): fix some corner-case bugs in SFTP-mode handling of
~-prefixed paths.
* ssh(1): unbreak hostbased auth using RSA keys. Allow ssh(1) to
select RSA keys when only RSA/SHA2 signature algorithms are
configured (this is the default case). Previously RSA keys were
not being considered in the default case.
* ssh-keysign(1): make ssh-keysign use the requested signature
algorithm and not the default for the key type. Part of unbreaking
hostbased auth for RSA/SHA2 keys.
* ssh(1): stricter UpdateHostkey signature verification logic on
the client- side. Require RSA/SHA2 signatures for RSA hostkeys
except when RSA/SHA1 was explicitly negotiated during initial
KEX; bz3375
* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix signature algorithm selection logic for
UpdateHostkeys on the server side. The previous code tried to
prefer RSA/SHA2 for hostkey proofs of RSA keys, but missed some
cases. This will use RSA/SHA2 signatures for RSA keys if the
client proposed these algorithms in initial KEX. bz3375
* All: convert all uses of select(2)/pselect(2) to poll(2)/ppoll(2).
This includes the mainloops in ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-agent(1)
and sftp-server(8), as well as the sshd(8) listen loop and all
other FD read/writability checks. On platforms with missing or
broken poll(2)/ppoll(2) syscalls a select(2)-based compat shim is
available.
* ssh-keygen(1): the "-Y find-principals" command was verifying key
validity when using ca certs but not with simple key lifetimes
within the allowed signers file.
* ssh-keygen(1): make sshsig verify-time argument parsing optional
* sshd(8): fix truncation in rhosts/shosts path construction.
* ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): avoid xmalloc(0) for PKCS#11 keyid for ECDSA
keys (we already did this for RSA keys). Avoids fatal errors for
PKCS#11 libraries that return empty keyid, e.g. Microchip ATECC608B
"cryptoauthlib"; bz#3364
* ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): improve the testing of credentials against
inserted FIDO: ask the token whether a particular key belongs to
it in cases where the token supports on-token user-verification
(e.g. biometrics) rather than just assuming that it will accept it.
Will reduce spurious "Confirm user presence" notifications for key
handles that relate to FIDO keys that are not currently inserted in at
least some cases. bz3366
* ssh(1), sshd(8): correct value for IPTOS_DSCP_LE. It needs to
allow for the preceding two ECN bits. bz#3373
* ssh-keygen(1): add missing -O option to usage() for the "-Y sign"
option.
* ssh-keygen(1): fix a NULL deref when using the find-principals
function, when matching an allowed_signers line that contains a
namespace restriction, but no restriction specified on the
command-line
* ssh-agent(1): fix memleak in process_extension(); oss-fuzz
issue #42719
* ssh(1): suppress "Connection to xxx closed" messages when LogLevel
is set to "error" or above. bz3378
* ssh(1), sshd(8): use correct zlib flags when inflate(3)-ing
compressed packet data. bz3372
* scp(1): when recursively transferring files in SFTP mode, create the
destination directory if it doesn't already exist to match scp(1) in
legacy RCP mode behaviour.
* scp(1): many improvements in error message consistency between scp(1)
in SFTP mode vs legacy RCP mode.
* sshd(8): fix potential race in SIGTERM handling PR289
* ssh(1), ssh(8): since DSA keys are deprecated, move them to the
end of the default list of public keys so that they will be tried
last. PR295
* ssh-keygen(1): allow 'ssh-keygen -Y find-principals' to match
wildcard principals in allowed_signers files
= Portability
* ssh(1), sshd(8): don't trust closefrom(2) on Linux. glibc's
implementation does not work in a chroot when the kernel does not
have close_range(2). It tries to read from /proc/self/fd and when
that fails dies with an assertion of sorts. Instead, call
close_range(2) directly from our compat code and fall back if
that fails. bz#3349,
* OS X poll(2) is broken; use compat replacement. For character-
special devices like /dev/null, Darwin's poll(2) returns POLLNVAL
when polled with POLLIN. Apparently this is Apple bug 3710161 -
not public but a websearch will find other OSS projects
rediscovering it periodically since it was first identified in
2005.
* Correct handling of exceptfds/POLLPRI in our select(2)-based
poll(2)/ppoll(2) compat implementation.
* Cygwin: correct checking of mbstowcs() return value.
* Add a basic SECURITY.md that refers people to the openssh.com
website.
* Enable additional compiler warnings and toolchain hardening flags,
including -Wbitwise-instead-of-logical, -Wmisleading-indentation,
-fzero-call-used-regs and -ftrivial-auto-var-init.
* HP/UX. Use compat getline(3) on HP-UX 10.x, where the libc version
is not reliable.
- Rebased patches:
* openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch
* openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-audit.patch
* openssh-8.4p1-vendordir.patch
* openssh-reenable-dh-group14-sha1-default.patch
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/960041
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=237
- Version upgrade to 8.8p1
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details
- Version update to 8.8p1:
= Security
* sshd(8) from OpenSSH 6.2 through 8.7 failed to correctly initialise
supplemental groups when executing an AuthorizedKeysCommand or
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, where a AuthorizedKeysCommandUser or
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser directive has been set to run the
command as a different user. Instead these commands would inherit
the groups that sshd(8) was started with.
Depending on system configuration, inherited groups may allow
AuthorizedKeysCommand/AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand helper programs to
gain unintended privilege.
Neither AuthorizedKeysCommand nor AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand are
enabled by default in sshd_config(5).
= Potentially-incompatible changes
* This release disables RSA signatures using the SHA-1 hash algorithm
by default. This change has been made as the SHA-1 hash algorithm is
cryptographically broken, and it is possible to create chosen-prefix
hash collisions for <USD$50K.
For most users, this change should be invisible and there is
no need to replace ssh-rsa keys. OpenSSH has supported RFC8332
RSA/SHA-256/512 signatures since release 7.2 and existing ssh-rsa keys
will automatically use the stronger algorithm where possible.
Incompatibility is more likely when connecting to older SSH
implementations that have not been upgraded or have not closely tracked
improvements in the SSH protocol. For these cases, it may be necessary
to selectively re-enable RSA/SHA1 to allow connection and/or user
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/923951
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=154
- Version upgrade to 8.8p1
* No changes for askpass, see main package changelog for
details
- Version update to 8.8p1:
= Security
* sshd(8) from OpenSSH 6.2 through 8.7 failed to correctly initialise
supplemental groups when executing an AuthorizedKeysCommand or
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, where a AuthorizedKeysCommandUser or
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser directive has been set to run the
command as a different user. Instead these commands would inherit
the groups that sshd(8) was started with.
Depending on system configuration, inherited groups may allow
AuthorizedKeysCommand/AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand helper programs to
gain unintended privilege.
Neither AuthorizedKeysCommand nor AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand are
enabled by default in sshd_config(5).
= Potentially-incompatible changes
* This release disables RSA signatures using the SHA-1 hash algorithm
by default. This change has been made as the SHA-1 hash algorithm is
cryptographically broken, and it is possible to create chosen-prefix
hash collisions for <USD$50K.
For most users, this change should be invisible and there is
no need to replace ssh-rsa keys. OpenSSH has supported RFC8332
RSA/SHA-256/512 signatures since release 7.2 and existing ssh-rsa keys
will automatically use the stronger algorithm where possible.
Incompatibility is more likely when connecting to older SSH
implementations that have not been upgraded or have not closely tracked
improvements in the SSH protocol. For these cases, it may be necessary
to selectively re-enable RSA/SHA1 to allow connection and/or user
authentication via the HostkeyAlgorithms and PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
options.
= New features
* ssh(1): allow the ssh_config(5) CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
directive to accept a "none" argument to specify the default
behaviour.
= Bugfixes
* scp(1): when using the SFTP protocol, continue transferring files
after a transfer error occurs, better matching original scp/rcp
behaviour.
* ssh(1): fixed a number of memory leaks in multiplexing,
* ssh-keygen(1): avoid crash when using the -Y find-principals
command.
* A number of documentation and manual improvements, including
bz#3340, PR139, PR215, PR241, PR257
- Additional changes from 8.7p1 release:
= Potentially-incompatible changes
* scp(1): this release changes the behaviour of remote to remote
copies (e.g. "scp host-a:/path host-b:") to transfer through the
local host by default. This was previously available via the -3
flag. This mode avoids the need to expose credentials on the
origin hop, avoids triplicate interpretation of filenames by the
shell (by the local system, the copy origin and the destination)
and, in conjunction with the SFTP support for scp(1) mentioned
below, allows use of all authentication methods to the remote
hosts (previously, only non-interactive methods could be used).
A -R flag has been added to select the old behaviour.
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): both the client and server are now using a
stricter configuration file parser. The new parser uses more
shell-like rules for quotes, space and escape characters. It is
also more strict in rejecting configurations that include options
lacking arguments. Previously some options (e.g. DenyUsers) could
appear on a line with no subsequent arguments. This release will
reject such configurations. The new parser will also reject
configurations with unterminated quotes and multiple '='
characters after the option name.
* ssh(1): when using SSHFP DNS records for host key verification,
ssh(1) will verify all matching records instead of just those
with the specific signature type requested. This may cause host
key verification problems if stale SSHFP records of a different
or legacy signature type exist alongside other records for a
particular host. bz#3322
* ssh-keygen(1): when generating a FIDO key and specifying an
explicit attestation challenge (using -Ochallenge), the challenge
will now be hashed by the builtin security key middleware. This
removes the (undocumented) requirement that challenges be exactly
32 bytes in length and matches the expectations of libfido2.
* sshd(8): environment="..." directives in authorized_keys files are
now first-match-wins and limited to 1024 discrete environment
variable names.
= New features
* scp(1): experimental support for transfers using the SFTP protocol
as a replacement for the venerable SCP/RCP protocol that it has
traditionally used. SFTP offers more predictable filename handling
and does not require expansion of glob(3) patterns via the shell
on the remote side.
* sftp-server(8): add a protocol extension to support expansion of
~/ and ~user/ prefixed paths. This was added to support these
paths when used by scp(1) while in SFTP mode.
* ssh(1): add a ForkAfterAuthentication ssh_config(5) counterpart to
the ssh(1) -f flag. GHPR231
* ssh(1): add a StdinNull directive to ssh_config(5) that allows the
config file to do the same thing as -n does on the ssh(1) command-
line. GHPR231
* ssh(1): add a SessionType directive to ssh_config, allowing the
configuration file to offer equivalent control to the -N (no
session) and -s (subsystem) command-line flags. GHPR231
* ssh-keygen(1): allowed signers files used by ssh-keygen(1)
signatures now support listing key validity intervals alongside
they key, and ssh-keygen(1) can optionally check during signature
verification whether a specified time falls inside this interval.
This feature is intended for use by git to support signing and
verifying objects using ssh keys.
* ssh-keygen(8): support printing of the full public key in a sshsig
signature via a -Oprint-pubkey flag.
= Bugfixes
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): start time-based re-keying exactly on schedule in
the client and server mainloops. Previously the re-key timeout
could expire but re-keying would not start until a packet was sent
or received, causing a spin in select() if the connection was
quiescent.
* ssh-keygen(1): avoid Y2038 problem in printing certificate
validity lifetimes. Dates past 2^31-1 seconds since epoch were
displayed incorrectly on some platforms. bz#3329
* scp(1): allow spaces to appear in usernames for local to remote
and scp -3 remote to remote copies. bz#1164
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): remove references to ChallengeResponseAuthentication
in favour of KbdInteractiveAuthentication. The former is what was in
SSHv1, the latter is what is in SSHv2 (RFC4256) and they were
treated as somewhat but not entirely equivalent. We retain the old
name as a deprecated alias so configuration files continue to work
as well as a reference in the man page for people looking for it.
bz#3303
* ssh(1)/ssh-add(1)/ssh-keygen(1): fix decoding of X.509 subject name
when extracting a key from a PKCS#11 certificate. bz#3327
* ssh(1): restore blocking status on stdio fds before close. ssh(1)
needs file descriptors in non-blocking mode to operate but it was
not restoring the original state on exit. This could cause
problems with fds shared with other programs via the shell,
bz#3280 and GHPR246
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): switch both client and server mainloops from
select(3) to pselect(3). Avoids race conditions where a signal
may arrive immediately before select(3) and not be processed until
an event fires. bz#2158
* ssh(1): sessions started with ControlPersist were incorrectly
executing a shell when the -N (no shell) option was specified.
bz#3290
* ssh(1): check if IPQoS or TunnelDevice are already set before
overriding. Prevents values in config files from overriding values
supplied on the command line. bz#3319
* ssh(1): fix debug message when finding a private key to match a
certificate being attempted for user authentication. Previously it
would print the certificate's path, whereas it was supposed to be
showing the private key's path. GHPR247
* sshd(8): match host certificates against host public keys, not
private keys. Allows use of certificates with private keys held in
a ssh-agent. bz#3524
* ssh(1): add a workaround for a bug in OpenSSH 7.4 sshd(8), which
allows RSA/SHA2 signatures for public key authentication but fails
to advertise this correctly via SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO. This causes
clients of these server to incorrectly match
PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithmse and potentially refuse to offer valid
keys. bz#3213
* sftp(1)/scp(1): degrade gracefully if a sftp-server offers the
limits@openssh.com extension but fails when the client tries to
invoke it. bz#3318
* ssh(1): allow ssh_config SetEnv to override $TERM, which is
otherwise handled specially by the protocol. Useful in ~/.ssh/config
to set TERM to something generic (e.g. "xterm" instead of
"xterm-256color") for destinations that lack terminfo entries.
* sftp-server(8): the limits@openssh.com extension was incorrectly
marked as an operation that writes to the filesystem, which made it
unavailable in sftp-server read-only mode. bz#3318
* ssh(1): fix SEGV in UpdateHostkeys debug() message, triggered when
the update removed more host keys than remain present.
* Many manual page fixes.
- Additional changes from 8.6p1 release:
= Security
* sshd(8): OpenSSH 8.5 introduced the LogVerbose keyword. When this
option was enabled with a set of patterns that activated logging
in code that runs in the low-privilege sandboxed sshd process, the
log messages were constructed in such a way that printf(3) format
strings could effectively be specified the low-privilege code.
= New features
* sftp-server(8): add a new limits@openssh.com protocol extension
that allows a client to discover various server limits, including
maximum packet size and maximum read/write length.
* sftp(1): use the new limits@openssh.com extension (when available)
to select better transfer lengths in the client.
* sshd(8): Add ModuliFile keyword to sshd_config to specify the
location of the "moduli" file containing the groups for DH-GEX.
* unit tests: Add a TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES environment variable to
enable printing of the elapsed time in seconds of each test.
= Bugfixes
* ssh_config(5), sshd_config(5): sync CASignatureAlgorithms lists in
manual pages with the current default. GHPR174
* ssh(1): ensure that pkcs11_del_provider() is called before exit.
GHPR234
* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix problems in string->argv conversion. Multiple
backslashes were not being dequoted correctly and quoted space in
the middle of a string was being incorrectly split. GHPR223
* ssh(1): return non-zero exit status when killed by signal; bz#3281
* sftp-server(8): increase maximum SSH2_FXP_READ to match the maximum
packet size. Also handle zero-length reads that are not explicitly
banned by the spec.
- Additional changes from 8.5p1 release:
= Security
* ssh-agent(1): fixed a double-free memory corruption that was
introduced in OpenSSH 8.2 . We treat all such memory faults as
potentially exploitable. This bug could be reached by an attacker
with access to the agent socket.
= Potentially-incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8): this release changes the first-preference signature
algorithm from ECDSA to ED25519.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): set the TOS/DSCP specified in the configuration
for interactive use prior to TCP connect. The connection phase of
the SSH session is time-sensitive and often explicitly interactive.
The ultimate interactive/bulk TOS/DSCP will be set after
authentication completes.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): remove the pre-standardization cipher
rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se. It is an alias for aes256-cbc before
it was standardized in RFC4253 (2006), has been deprecated and
disabled by default since OpenSSH 7.2 (2016) and was only briefly
documented in ssh.1 in 2001.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): update/replace the experimental post-quantum
hybrid key exchange method based on Streamlined NTRU Prime coupled
with X25519. The previous sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org
method is replaced with sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com.
* ssh(1): disable CheckHostIP by default. It provides insignificant
benefits while making key rotation significantly more difficult,
especially for hosts behind IP-based load-balancers.
= New features
* ssh(1): this release enables UpdateHostkeys by default subject to
some conservative preconditions:
- The key was matched in the UserKnownHostsFile (and not in the
GlobalKnownHostsFile).
- The same key does not exist under another name.
- A certificate host key is not in use.
- known_hosts contains no matching wildcard hostname pattern.
- VerifyHostKeyDNS is not enabled.
- The default UserKnownHostsFile is in use.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): add a new LogVerbose configuration directive for
that allows forcing maximum debug logging by file/function/line
pattern-lists.
* ssh(1): when prompting the user to accept a new hostkey, display
any other host names/addresses already associated with the key.
* ssh(1): allow UserKnownHostsFile=none to indicate that no
known_hosts file should be used to identify host keys.
* ssh(1): add a ssh_config KnownHostsCommand option that allows the
client to obtain known_hosts data from a command in addition to
the usual files.
* ssh(1): add a ssh_config PermitRemoteOpen option that allows the
client to restrict the destination when RemoteForward is used
with SOCKS.
* ssh(1): for FIDO keys, if a signature operation fails with a
"incorrect PIN" reason and no PIN was initially requested from the
user, then request a PIN and retry the operation. This supports
some biometric devices that fall back to requiring PIN when reading
of the biometric failed, and devices that require PINs for all
hosted credentials.
* sshd(8): implement client address-based rate-limiting via new
sshd_config(5) PerSourceMaxStartups and PerSourceNetBlockSize
directives that provide more fine-grained control on a per-origin
address basis than the global MaxStartups limit.
= Bugfixes
* ssh(1): Prefix keyboard interactive prompts with "(user@host)" to
make it easier to determine which connection they are associated
with in cases like scp -3, ProxyJump, etc. bz#3224
* sshd(8): fix sshd_config SetEnv directives located inside Match
blocks. GHPR201
* ssh(1): when requesting a FIDO token touch on stderr, inform the
user once the touch has been recorded.
* ssh(1): prevent integer overflow when ridiculously large
ConnectTimeout values are specified, capping the effective value
(for most platforms) at 24 days. bz#3229
* ssh(1): consider the ECDSA key subtype when ordering host key
algorithms in the client.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): rename the PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes keyword to
PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms. The previous name incorrectly suggested
that it control allowed key algorithms, when this option actually
specifies the signature algorithms that are accepted. The previous
name remains available as an alias. bz#3253
* ssh(1), sshd(8): similarly, rename HostbasedKeyTypes (ssh) and
HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes (sshd) to HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms.
* sftp-server(8): add missing lsetstat@openssh.com documentation
and advertisement in the server's SSH2_FXP_VERSION hello packet.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): more strictly enforce KEX state-machine by
banning packet types once they are received. Fixes memleak caused
by duplicate SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST (oss-fuzz #30078).
* sftp(1): allow the full range of UIDs/GIDs for chown/chgrp on 32bit
platforms instead of being limited by LONG_MAX. bz#3206
* Minor man page fixes (capitalization, commas, etc.) bz#3223
* sftp(1): when doing an sftp recursive upload or download of a
read-only directory, ensure that the directory is created with
write and execute permissions in the interim so that the transfer
can actually complete, then set the directory permission as the
final step. bz#3222
* ssh-keygen(1): document the -Z, check the validity of its argument
earlier and provide a better error message if it's not correct.
bz#2879
* ssh(1): ignore comments at the end of config lines in ssh_config,
similar to what we already do for sshd_config. bz#2320
* sshd_config(5): mention that DisableForwarding is valid in a
sshd_config Match block. bz3239
* sftp(1): fix incorrect sorting of "ls -ltr" under some
circumstances. bz3248.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix potential integer truncation of (unlikely)
timeout values. bz#3250
* ssh(1): make hostbased authentication send the signature algorithm
in its SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST packets instead of the key type.
This make HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms do what it is supposed to -
filter on signature algorithm and not key type.
- Rebased patches:
* openssh-7.7p1-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-eal3.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-enable_PAM_by_default.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-host_ident.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-pts_names_formatting.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ipc_flock.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_stat.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-send_locale.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-sftp_force_permissions.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch
* openssh-7.9p1-keygen-preserve-perms.patch
* openssh-7.9p1-revert-new-qos-defaults.patch
* openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-audit.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-seccomp-clock_gettime64.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-seccomp-clock_nanosleep.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-seccomp-clock_nanosleep_time64.patch
* openssh-8.1p1-use-openssl-kdf.patch
* openssh-8.4p1-vendordir.patch
* openssh-fips-ensure-approved-moduli.patch
* openssh-link-with-sk.patch
* openssh-reenable-dh-group14-sha1-default.patch
* openssh-whitelist-syscalls.patch
- Removed openssh-fix-ssh-copy-id.patch (fixed upstream).
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/922068
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=235
- update to 8.4p1:
Security
========
* ssh-agent(1): restrict ssh-agent from signing web challenges for
FIDO/U2F keys.
* ssh-keygen(1): Enable FIDO 2.1 credProtect extension when generating
a FIDO resident key.
* ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): support for FIDO keys that require a PIN for
each use. These keys may be generated using ssh-keygen using a new
"verify-required" option. When a PIN-required key is used, the user
will be prompted for a PIN to complete the signature operation.
New Features
------------
* sshd(8): authorized_keys now supports a new "verify-required"
option to require FIDO signatures assert that the token verified
that the user was present before making the signature. The FIDO
protocol supports multiple methods for user-verification, but
currently OpenSSH only supports PIN verification.
* sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): add support for verifying FIDO webauthn
signatures. Webauthn is a standard for using FIDO keys in web
browsers. These signatures are a slightly different format to plain
FIDO signatures and thus require explicit support.
* ssh(1): allow some keywords to expand shell-style ${ENV}
environment variables. The supported keywords are CertificateFile,
ControlPath, IdentityAgent and IdentityFile, plus LocalForward and
RemoteForward when used for Unix domain socket paths. bz#3140
* ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): allow some additional control over the use of
ssh-askpass via a new $SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE environment variable,
including forcibly enabling and disabling its use. bz#69
* ssh(1): allow ssh_config(5)'s AddKeysToAgent keyword accept a time
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/863944
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=222
- Fix build breakage caused by missing security key objects:
+ Modify openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch.
+ Modify openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch.
+ Add openssh-link-with-sk.patch.
- Add openssh-fips-ensure-approved-moduli.patch (bsc#1177939).
This ensures only approved DH parameters are used in FIPS mode.
- Add openssh-8.1p1-ed25519-use-openssl-rng.patch (bsc#1173799).
This uses OpenSSL's RAND_bytes() directly instead of the internal
ChaCha20-based implementation to obtain random bytes for Ed25519
curve computations. This is required for FIPS compliance. (forwarded request 849311 from hpjansson)
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/849984
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=144
- Fix build breakage caused by missing security key objects:
+ Modify openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch.
+ Modify openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch.
+ Add openssh-link-with-sk.patch.
- Add openssh-fips-ensure-approved-moduli.patch (bsc#1177939).
This ensures only approved DH parameters are used in FIPS mode.
- Add openssh-8.1p1-ed25519-use-openssl-rng.patch (bsc#1173799).
This uses OpenSSL's RAND_bytes() directly instead of the internal
ChaCha20-based implementation to obtain random bytes for Ed25519
curve computations. This is required for FIPS compliance.
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/849311
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=219
- Version update to 8.3p1:
= Potentially-incompatible changes
* sftp(1): reject an argument of "-1" in the same way as ssh(1) and
scp(1) do instead of accepting and silently ignoring it.
= New features
* sshd(8): make IgnoreRhosts a tri-state option: "yes" to ignore
rhosts/shosts, "no" allow rhosts/shosts or (new) "shosts-only"
to allow .shosts files but not .rhosts.
* sshd(8): allow the IgnoreRhosts directive to appear anywhere in a
sshd_config, not just before any Match blocks.
* ssh(1): add %TOKEN percent expansion for the LocalFoward and
RemoteForward keywords when used for Unix domain socket forwarding.
* all: allow loading public keys from the unencrypted envelope of a
private key file if no corresponding public key file is present.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): prefer to use chacha20 from libcrypto where
possible instead of the (slower) portable C implementation included
in OpenSSH.
* ssh-keygen(1): add ability to dump the contents of a binary key
revocation list via "ssh-keygen -lQf /path".
- Additional changes from 8.2p1 release:
= Potentially-incompatible changes
* ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): this release removes the "ssh-rsa"
(RSA/SHA1) algorithm from those accepted for certificate signatures
(i.e. the client and server CASignatureAlgorithms option) and will
use the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm by default when the
ssh-keygen(1) CA signs new certificates.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): this release removes diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
from the default key exchange proposal for both the client and
server.
* ssh-keygen(1): the command-line options related to the generation
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/811897
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=211
- Add openssh-7.9p1-keygen-preserve-perms.patch (bsc#1150574).
This attempts to preserve the permissions of any existing
known_hosts file when modified by ssh-keygen (for instance,
with -R).
- Add patch from upstream openssh-7.9p1-revert-new-qos-defaults.patch
- Run 'ssh-keygen -A' on startup only if SSHD_AUTO_KEYGEN="yes"
in /etc/sysconfig/ssh. This is set to "yes" by default, but
can be changed by the system administrator (bsc#1139089).
- Add openssh-7.9p1-keygen-preserve-perms.patch (bsc#1150574).
This attempts to preserve the permissions of any existing
known_hosts file when modified by ssh-keygen (for instance,
with -R).
- Version update to 8.1p1:
* ssh-keygen(1): when acting as a CA and signing certificates with
an RSA key, default to using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm.
Certificates signed by RSA keys will therefore be incompatible
with OpenSSH versions prior to 7.2 unless the default is
overridden (using "ssh-keygen -t ssh-rsa -s ...").
* ssh(1): Allow %n to be expanded in ProxyCommand strings
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Allow prepending a list of algorithms to the
default set by starting the list with the '^' character, E.g.
"HostKeyAlgorithms ^ssh-ed25519"
* ssh-keygen(1): add an experimental lightweight signature and
verification ability. Signatures may be made using regular ssh keys
held on disk or stored in a ssh-agent and verified against an
authorized_keys-like list of allowed keys. Signatures embed a
namespace that prevents confusion and attacks between different
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/738544
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=135
Add openssh-7.9p1-keygen-preserve-perms.patch (bsc#1150574).
This attempts to preserve the permissions of any existing
known_hosts file when modified by ssh-keygen (for instance,
with -R).
Run 'ssh-keygen -A' on startup only if SSHD_AUTO_KEYGEN="yes"
in /etc/sysconfig/ssh. This is set to "yes" by default, but
can be changed by the system administrator (bsc#1139089).
Add openssh-7.9p1-keygen-preserve-perms.patch (bsc#1150574).
This attempts to preserve the permissions of any existing
known_hosts file when modified by ssh-keygen (for instance,
with -R).
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/738490
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=198
Version update to 8.1p1:
* ssh-keygen(1): when acting as a CA and signing certificates with
an RSA key, default to using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm.
Certificates signed by RSA keys will therefore be incompatible
with OpenSSH versions prior to 7.2 unless the default is
overridden (using "ssh-keygen -t ssh-rsa -s ...").
* ssh(1): Allow %n to be expanded in ProxyCommand strings
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Allow prepending a list of algorithms to the
default set by starting the list with the '^' character, E.g.
"HostKeyAlgorithms ^ssh-ed25519"
* ssh-keygen(1): add an experimental lightweight signature and
verification ability. Signatures may be made using regular ssh keys
held on disk or stored in a ssh-agent and verified against an
authorized_keys-like list of allowed keys. Signatures embed a
namespace that prevents confusion and attacks between different
usage domains (e.g. files vs email).
* ssh-keygen(1): print key comment when extracting public key from a
private key.
* ssh-keygen(1): accept the verbose flag when searching for host keys
in known hosts (i.e. "ssh-keygen -vF host") to print the matching
host's random-art signature too.
* All: support PKCS8 as an optional format for storage of private
keys to disk. The OpenSSH native key format remains the default,
but PKCS8 is a superior format to PEM if interoperability with
non-OpenSSH software is required, as it may use a less insecure
key derivation function than PEM's.
- Additional changes from 8.0p1 release:
* scp(1): Add "-T" flag to disable client-side filtering of
server file list.
* sshd(8): Remove support for obsolete "host/port" syntax.
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/737034
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=197
- Remove the "KexDHMin" config keyword (bsc#1127180)
It used to allow lowering of the minimal allowed DH group size,
which was increased to 2048 by upstream in the light of the Logjam
attack.
The code was broken since the upgrade to 7.6p1, but nobody noticed.
As apparently no one needs the functionality any more, let's drop
the patch.
It's still possible to use the fixed 1024-bit diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
key exchange method when working with legacy systems.
- drop openssh-7.7p1-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch
- updated patches:
openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch
openssh-7.7p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/679869
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=181
- Supplement the openssh and libx11 together to ensure this package
is installed on machines where there is X stack
- Handle brace expansion in scp when checking that filenames sent
by the server side match what the client requested [bsc#1125687]
* openssh-7.9p1-brace-expansion.patch
- Updated security fixes:
* [bsc#1121816, CVE-2019-6109] Sanitize scp filenames via snmprintf
and have progressmeter force an update at the beginning and end
of each transfer. Added patches:
- openssh-CVE-2019-6109-sanitize-scp-filenames.patch
- openssh-CVE-2019-6109-force-progressmeter-update.patch
* [bsc#1121821, CVE-2019-6111] Check in scp client that filenames
sent during remote->local directory copies satisfy the wildcard
specified by the user. Added patch:
- openssh-CVE-2019-6111-scp-client-wildcard.patch
* Removed openssh-7.9p1-scp-name-validator.patch
- Change the askpass wrapper to not use x11 interface:
* by default we use the -gnome UI (which is gtk3 only, no gnome dep)
* if desktop is KDE/LxQt we use ksshaskpass
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/677282
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=128
- Updated security fixes:
* [bsc#1121816, CVE-2019-6109] Sanitize scp filenames via snmprintf
and have progressmeter force an update at the beginning and end
of each transfer. Added patches:
- openssh-CVE-2019-6109-sanitize-scp-filenames.patch
- openssh-CVE-2019-6109-force-progressmeter-update.patch
* [bsc#1121821, CVE-2019-6111] Check in scp client that filenames
sent during remote->local directory copies satisfy the wildcard
specified by the user. Added patch:
- openssh-CVE-2019-6111-scp-client-wildcard.patch
* Removed openssh-7.9p1-scp-name-validator.patch
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/676348
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=177
- Update to 7.8p1:
* no actual changes for the askpass
- Format with spec-cleaner
- Respect cflags
- Use gtk3 rather than gtk2 which is being phased out
- Remove the mention of the SLE12 in the README.SUSE
- Install firewall rules only when really needed (<SLE15)
- Version update to 7.8p1:
* For most details see release notes file
* ssh-keygen(1): write OpenSSH format private keys by default
instead of using OpenSSL's PEM format
- Rebase patches to apply on 7.8p1 release:
* openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-audit.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-openssl_1.1.0.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-seed-prng.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
- Dropped patches: (forwarded request 642573 from scarabeus_iv)
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/642574
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=122
- Version update to 7.9p1
* No actual changes for the askpass
* See main package changelog for details
- Version update to 7.9p1
* ssh(1), sshd(8): the setting of the new CASignatureAlgorithms
option (see below) bans the use of DSA keys as certificate
authorities.
* sshd(8): the authentication success/failure log message has
changed format slightly. It now includes the certificate
fingerprint (previously it included only key ID and CA key
fingerprint).
* ssh(1), sshd(8): allow most port numbers to be specified using
service names from getservbyname(3) (typically /etc/services).
* sshd(8): support signalling sessions via the SSH protocol.
A limited subset of signals is supported and only for login or
command sessions (i.e. not subsystems) that were not subject to
a forced command via authorized_keys or sshd_config. bz#1424
* ssh(1): support "ssh -Q sig" to list supported signature options.
Also "ssh -Q help" to show the full set of supported queries.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): add a CASignatureAlgorithms option for the
client and server configs to allow control over which signature
formats are allowed for CAs to sign certificates. For example,
this allows banning CAs that sign certificates using the RSA-SHA1
signature algorithm.
* sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): allow key revocation lists (KRLs) to
revoke keys specified by SHA256 hash.
* ssh-keygen(1): allow creation of key revocation lists directly
from base64-encoded SHA256 fingerprints. This supports revoking
keys using only the information contained in sshd(8)
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/643660
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=159
* There is no reason to set less secure default value, if
users need the behaviour they can still set it up themselves
- Drop patch openssh-7.7p1-blocksigalrm.patch
* We had a bug way in past about this but it was never reproduced
or even confirmed in the ticket, thus rather drop the patch
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=155
- Update to 7.8p1:
* no actual changes for the askpass
- Format with spec-cleaner
- Respect cflags
- Use gtk3 rather than gtk2 which is being phased out
- Remove the mention of the SLE12 in the README.SUSE
- Install firewall rules only when really needed (<SLE15)
- Version update to 7.8p1:
* For most details see release notes file
* ssh-keygen(1): write OpenSSH format private keys by default
instead of using OpenSSL's PEM format
- Rebase patches to apply on 7.8p1 release:
* openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-audit.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-openssl_1.1.0.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-seed-prng.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch
* openssh-7.7p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch
- Dropped patches:
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/642573
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=153
- Upgrade to 7.7p1 (bsc#1094068)
- Upgrade to 7.7p1 (bsc#1094068)
Most important changes (more details below):
* Drop compatibility support for pre-2001 SSH implementations
* sshd(1) does not load DSA keys by default
Distilled upstream log:
---- Potentially-incompatible changes
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): Drop compatibility support for some very old
SSH implementations, including ssh.com <=2.* and OpenSSH <=
3.*. These versions were all released in or before 2001 and
predate the final SSH RFCs. The support in question isn't
necessary for RFC-compliant SSH implementations.
---- New Features
* experimental support for PQC XMSS keys (Extended Hash-Based
Signatures), not compiled in by default.
* sshd(8): Add a "rdomain" criteria for the sshd_config Match
keyword to allow conditional configuration that depends on
which routing domain a connection was received on (currently
supported on OpenBSD and Linux).
* sshd_config(5): Add an optional rdomain qualifier to the
ListenAddress directive to allow listening on different
routing domains. This is supported only on OpenBSD and Linux
at present.
* sshd_config(5): Add RDomain directive to allow the
authenticated session to be placed in an explicit routing
domain. This is only supported on OpenBSD at present.
* sshd(8): Add "expiry-time" option for authorized_keys files
to allow for expiring keys.
* ssh(1): Add a BindInterface option to allow binding the (forwarded request 611002 from pcerny)
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/611071
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=118
- Upgrade to 7.7p1 (bsc#1094068)
- Upgrade to 7.7p1 (bsc#1094068)
Most important changes (more details below):
* Drop compatibility support for pre-2001 SSH implementations
* sshd(1) does not load DSA keys by default
Distilled upstream log:
---- Potentially-incompatible changes
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): Drop compatibility support for some very old
SSH implementations, including ssh.com <=2.* and OpenSSH <=
3.*. These versions were all released in or before 2001 and
predate the final SSH RFCs. The support in question isn't
necessary for RFC-compliant SSH implementations.
---- New Features
* experimental support for PQC XMSS keys (Extended Hash-Based
Signatures), not compiled in by default.
* sshd(8): Add a "rdomain" criteria for the sshd_config Match
keyword to allow conditional configuration that depends on
which routing domain a connection was received on (currently
supported on OpenBSD and Linux).
* sshd_config(5): Add an optional rdomain qualifier to the
ListenAddress directive to allow listening on different
routing domains. This is supported only on OpenBSD and Linux
at present.
* sshd_config(5): Add RDomain directive to allow the
authenticated session to be placed in an explicit routing
domain. This is only supported on OpenBSD at present.
* sshd(8): Add "expiry-time" option for authorized_keys files
to allow for expiring keys.
* ssh(1): Add a BindInterface option to allow binding the
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/611002
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=145
- Use TIRPC on suse_version >= 1500: sunrpc is deprecated and
should be replaced by TIRPC.
This has several effects:
* We get RPC support back... from build log in oS:F/standard:
[ 48s] checking rpc/types.h usability... no
[ 48s] checking rpc/types.h presence... no
[ 48s] checking for rpc/types.h... no
vs this branch:
[ 50s] checking rpc/types.h usability... yes
[ 50s] checking rpc/types.h presence... yes
[ 50s] checking for rpc/types.h... yes
AND as a side-effect, FALSE for ldapbody.c is now defined (not the
nicest of side-effects, but seems that ldap patch relies on RPC
headers to be included.
So all in all: this fixes the build failures for openSUSE Tumblewee (forwarded request 602971 from dimstar)
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/603107
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=117
- Use TIRPC on suse_version >= 1500: sunrpc is deprecated and
should be replaced by TIRPC.
This has several effects:
* We get RPC support back... from build log in oS:F/standard:
[ 48s] checking rpc/types.h usability... no
[ 48s] checking rpc/types.h presence... no
[ 48s] checking for rpc/types.h... no
vs this branch:
[ 50s] checking rpc/types.h usability... yes
[ 50s] checking rpc/types.h presence... yes
[ 50s] checking for rpc/types.h... yes
AND as a side-effect, FALSE for ldapbody.c is now defined (not the
nicest of side-effects, but seems that ldap patch relies on RPC
headers to be included.
So all in all: this fixes the build failures for openSUSE Tumblewee
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/602971
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=143
- upgrade to 7.6p1
see main package changelog for details
- Replace references to /var/adm/fillup-templates with new
%_fillupdir macro (boo#1069468)
- Update to vanilla 7.6p1
Most important changes (more details below):
* complete removal of the ancient SSHv1 protocol
* sshd(8) cannot run without privilege separation
* removal of suport for arcfourm blowfish and CAST ciphers
and RIPE-MD160 HMAC
* refuse RSA keys shorter than 1024 bits
Distilled upstream log:
- OpenSSH 7.3
---- Security
* sshd(8): Mitigate a potential denial-of-service attack
against the system's crypt(3) function via sshd(8). An
attacker could send very long passwords that would cause
excessive CPU use in crypt(3). sshd(8) now refuses to accept
password authentication requests of length greater than 1024
characters. Independently reported by Tomas Kuthan (Oracle),
Andres Rojas and Javier Nieto.
* sshd(8): Mitigate timing differences in password
authentication that could be used to discern valid from
invalid account names when long passwords were sent and
particular password hashing algorithms are in use on the
server. CVE-2016-6210, reported by EddieEzra.Harari at
verint.com
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix observable timing weakness in the CBC
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/551548
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=127
- upgrade to 7.6p1
see main package changelog for details
- Update to vanilla 7.6p1
Most important changes (more details below):
* complete removal of the ancient SSHv1 protocol
* sshd(8) cannot run without privilege separation
* removal of suport for arcfourm blowfish and CAST ciphers
and RIPE-MD160 HMAC
* refuse RSA keys shorter than 1024 bits
Distilled upstream log:
- OpenSSH 7.3
---- Security
* sshd(8): Mitigate a potential denial-of-service attack
against the system's crypt(3) function via sshd(8). An
attacker could send very long passwords that would cause
excessive CPU use in crypt(3). sshd(8) now refuses to accept
password authentication requests of length greater than 1024
characters. Independently reported by Tomas Kuthan (Oracle),
Andres Rojas and Javier Nieto.
* sshd(8): Mitigate timing differences in password
authentication that could be used to discern valid from
invalid account names when long passwords were sent and
particular password hashing algorithms are in use on the
server. CVE-2016-6210, reported by EddieEzra.Harari at
verint.com
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix observable timing weakness in the CBC
padding oracle countermeasures. Reported by Jean Paul
Degabriele, Kenny Paterson, Torben Hansen and Martin
Albrecht. Note that CBC ciphers are disabled by default and
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/539322
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=122
- remaining patches that were still missing
since the update to 7.2p2 (FATE#319675):
[openssh-7.2p2-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch]
- fix forwarding with IPv6 addresses in DISPLAY (bnc#847710)
[openssh-7.2p2-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch]
- ignore PAM environment when using login
(bsc#975865, CVE-2015-8325)
[openssh-7.2p2-ignore_PAM_with_UseLogin.patch]
- limit accepted password length (prevents possible DoS)
(bsc#992533, CVE-2016-6515)
[openssh-7.2p2-limit_password_length.patch]
- Prevent user enumeration through the timing of password
processing (bsc#989363, CVE-2016-6210)
[openssh-7.2p2-prevent_timing_user_enumeration.patch]
- Add auditing for PRNG re-seeding
[openssh-7.2p2-audit_seed_prng.patch] (forwarded request 433779 from pcerny)
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/433780
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=108
- remaining patches that were still missing
since the update to 7.2p2 (FATE#319675):
[openssh-7.2p2-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch]
- fix forwarding with IPv6 addresses in DISPLAY (bnc#847710)
[openssh-7.2p2-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch]
- ignore PAM environment when using login
(bsc#975865, CVE-2015-8325)
[openssh-7.2p2-ignore_PAM_with_UseLogin.patch]
- limit accepted password length (prevents possible DoS)
(bsc#992533, CVE-2016-6515)
[openssh-7.2p2-limit_password_length.patch]
- Prevent user enumeration through the timing of password
processing (bsc#989363, CVE-2016-6210)
[openssh-7.2p2-prevent_timing_user_enumeration.patch]
- Add auditing for PRNG re-seeding
[openssh-7.2p2-audit_seed_prng.patch]
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/433779
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=113
next round of patches
- allow X forwarding over IPv4 when IPv6 sockets is not available
[openssh-7.2p2-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch]
- do not write PID file when not daemonizing
[openssh-7.2p2-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch]
- use correct options when invoking login
[openssh-7.2p2-login_options.patch]
- helper application for retrieving users' public keys from
an LDAP server
[openssh-7.2p2-ldap.patch]
- allow forcing permissions over sftp
[openssh-7.2p2-sftp_force_permissions.patch]
- do not perform run-time checks for OpenSSL API/ABI change
[openssh-7.2p2-disable-openssl-abi-check.patch]
- suggest commands for cleaning known hosts file
[openssh-7.2p2-host_ident.patch]
- sftp home chroot patch
[openssh-7.2p2-sftp_homechroot.patch]
- ssh sessions auditing
[openssh-7.2p2-audit.patch]
- enable seccomp sandbox on additional architectures
[openssh-7.2p2-additional_seccomp_archs.patch]
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/432093
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=112
- fixed url
- upgrade to 7.2p2
- changing license to 2-clause BSD to match source
- added gpg signature
- enable support for SSHv1 protocol and discourage its usage
(bsc#983307)
- enable DSA by default for backward compatibility and discourage
its usage (bsc#983784)
[openssh-7.2p2-allow_DSS_by_default.patch]
- enable trusted X11 forwarding by default
[openssh-7.2p2-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch]
- set UID for lastlog properly
[openssh-7.2p2-lastlog.patch]
- enable use of PAM by default
[openssh-7.2p2-enable_PAM_by_default.patch]
- copy command line arguments properly
[openssh-7.2p2-saveargv-fix.patch]
- do not use pthreads in PAM code
[openssh-7.2p2-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM.patch]
- fix paths in documentation
[openssh-7.2p2-eal3.patch]
- prevent race consitions triggered by SIGALRM
[openssh-7.2p2-blocksigalrm.patch]
- do send and accept locale environment variables by default
[openssh-7.2p2-send_locale.patch]
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/415094
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=106
- enable support for SSHv1 protocol and discourage its usage
(bsc#983307)
- enable DSA by default for backward compatibility and discourage
its usage (bsc#983784)
[openssh-7.2p2-allow_DSS_by_default.patch]
- upgrade to 7.2p2
upstream package without any SUSE patches
Distilled upstream log:
- OpenSSH 6.7
Potentially-incompatible changes:
* sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been
altered to remove unsafe algorithms. In particular, CBC
ciphers and arcfour* are disabled by default.
The full set of algorithms remains available if configured
explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options.
* sshd(8): Support for tcpwrappers/libwrap has been removed.
* OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 have a bug that causes ~0.2% of
connections using the curve25519-sha256@libssh.org KEX
exchange method to fail when connecting with something that
implements the specification correctly. OpenSSH 6.7 disables
this KEX method when speaking to one of the affected
versions.
New Features:
* ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket
forwarding. A remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local
Unix domain socket and vice versa or both ends may be a Unix
domain socket.
* ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for
ED25519 key types.
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/407066
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=107
[openssh-7.2p2-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch]
- set UID for lastlog properly
[openssh-7.2p2-lastlog.patch]
- enable use of PAM by default
[openssh-7.2p2-enable_PAM_by_default.patch]
- copy command line arguments properly
[openssh-7.2p2-saveargv-fix.patch]
- do not use pthreads in PAM code
[openssh-7.2p2-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM.patch]
- fix paths in documentation
[openssh-7.2p2-eal3.patch]
- prevent race consitions triggered by SIGALRM
[openssh-7.2p2-blocksigalrm.patch]
[openssh-7.2p2-send_locale.patch]
[openssh-7.2p2-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch]
[openssh-7.2p2-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch]
[openssh-7.2p2-pts_names_formatting.patch]
- check locked accounts when using PAM
[openssh-7.2p2-pam_check_locks.patch]
[openssh-7.2p2-allow_root_password_login.patch]
[openssh-7.2p2-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch]
[openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_getuid.patch,
openssh-7.2p2-seccomp_stat.patch]
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/398857
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=104
- upgrade to 7.2p2
- changing license to 2-clause BSD to match source
- enable trusted X11 forwarding by default
[-X11_trusted_forwarding]
- set UID for lastlog properly [-lastlog]
- enable use of PAM by default [-enable_PAM_by_default]
- copy command line arguments properly [-saveargv-fix]
- do not use pthreads in PAM code [-dont_use_pthreads_in_PAM]
- fix paths in documentation [-eal3]
- prevent race consitions triggered by SIGALRM [-blocksigalrm]
- do send and accept locale environment variables by default
[-send_locale]
- handle hostnames changes during X forwarding
[-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X]
- try to remove xauth cookies on exit
[-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit]
- properly format pts names for ?tmp? log files
[-pts_names_formatting]
- check locked accounts when using PAM [-pam_check_locks]
- chenge default PermitRootLogin to 'yes' to prevent unwanted
surprises on updates from older versions.
See README.SUSE for details
[-allow_root_password_login]
- Disable DH parameters under 2048 bits by default and allow
lowering the limit back to the RFC 4419 specified minimum
through an option (bsc#932483, bsc#948902)
[-disable_short_DH_parameters]
- Add getuid() and stat() syscalls to the seccomp filter
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/398802
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=103
- openssh-alloc_size.patch: anotate xmalloc.h with alloc_size
attribute so the compiler knows these functions allocate memory
so overflow or misuse can be detected sooner.
- openssh-allow_getrandom.patch; allow the getrandom(2) system
call in the seccomp sandbox, upstream commit 26ad18247213
- openssh-fix-b64_xx-detection.patch: configure.ac has incorrect
tests for b64_ntop, b64_pton on linux/glibc.
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/358392
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=96
- Cleanup with spec-cleaner
- Update of the master OpenSSH to 7.1p2
- Take refreshed and updated audit patch from redhat
* Remove our old patches:
+ openssh-6.6p1-audit1-remove_duplicit_audit.patch
+ openssh-6.6p1-audit2-better_audit_of_user_actions.patch
+ openssh-6.6p1-audit3-key_auth_usage-fips.patch
+ openssh-6.6p1-audit3-key_auth_usage.patch
+ openssh-6.6p1-audit4-kex_results-fips.patch
+ openssh-6.6p1-audit4-kex_results.patch
+ openssh-6.6p1-audit5-session_key_destruction.patch
+ openssh-6.6p1-audit6-server_key_destruction.patch
+ openssh-6.6p1-audit7-libaudit_compat.patch
+ openssh-6.6p1-audit8-libaudit_dns_timeouts.patch
* add openssh-6.7p1-audit.patch
- Reenable the openssh-6.6p1-ldap.patch
- Update the fips patch from RH build openssh-6.6p1-fips.patch
- Update and refresh openssh-6.6p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch
- Remove fips-check patch as it is merged to fips patch
* openssh-6.6p1-fips-checks.patch
- Rebase and enable chroot patch:
* openssh-6.6p1-sftp_homechroot.patch
- Reenable rebased patch for linux seed:
* openssh-6.6p1-seed-prng.patch
- Reenable key converting patch:
* openssh-6.6p1-key-converter.patch
- Version update to 7.1p2:
* various upstream bugfixes and cleanups
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/354941
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=95
- Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1
- Remove uneeded dependency on the OpenLDAP server (openldap2)
from openssh-helpers. openssh-helpers just depends on the
openldap client libraries, which will be auto-generated by rpm.
- update to 6.6p1
Security:
* sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5)
AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could
be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that
contains the characters before the wildcard character.
Features since 6.5p1:
* ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code,
which was experimental, never enabled and has been
unmaintained for some time.
* ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed
to match while processing Match blocks.
* ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results
in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse
ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This
gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded
hostname a chance to be applied.
Bugfixes:
* ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file
descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692
* sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and
systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection
is terminated during the pre-auth phase.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230190
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=95
- Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.6p1
- update to 6.6p1
Security:
* sshd(8): when using environment passing with a sshd_config(5)
AcceptEnv pattern with a wildcard. OpenSSH prior to 6.6 could
be tricked into accepting any enviornment variable that
contains the characters before the wildcard character.
Features since 6.5p1:
* ssh(1), sshd(8): removal of the J-PAKE authentication code,
which was experimental, never enabled and has been
unmaintained for some time.
* ssh(1): skip 'exec' clauses other clauses predicates failed
to match while processing Match blocks.
* ssh(1): if hostname canonicalisation is enabled and results
in the destination hostname being changed, then re-parse
ssh_config(5) files using the new destination hostname. This
gives 'Host' and 'Match' directives that use the expanded
hostname a chance to be applied.
Bugfixes:
* ssh(1): avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file
descriptor" in ssh -W. bz#2200, debian#738692
* sshd(8): allow the shutdown(2) syscall in seccomp-bpf and
systrace sandbox modes, as it is reachable if the connection
is terminated during the pre-auth phase.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): fix unsigned overflow that in SSH protocol 1
bignum parsing. Minimum key length checks render this bug
unexploitable to compromise SSH 1 sessions.
* sshd_config(5): clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears
in multiple matching Match blocks. bz#2184
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/230097
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=76
- Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.5p1
- Update to 6.5p1
Features since 6.4p1:
* ssh(1), sshd(8): support for key exchange using ECDH in
Daniel Bernstein's Curve25519; default when both the client
and server support it.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): support for Ed25519 as a public key type fo
rboth server and client. Ed25519 is an EC signature offering
better security than ECDSA and DSA and good performance.
* Add a new private key format that uses a bcrypt KDF to better
protect keys at rest. Used unconditionally for Ed25519 keys,
on demand for other key types via the -o ssh-keygen(1)
option. Intended to become default in the near future.
Details documented in PROTOCOL.key.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): new transport cipher
"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" combining Daniel Bernstein's
ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an
authenticated encryption mode. Details documented
PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients
and servers that use the obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme.
It will still be possible to connect with these
clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and
OpenSSH will refuse connection entirely in a future release.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse old proprietary clients and servers
that use a weaker key exchange hash calculation.
* ssh(1): increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups
requested for each symmetric key size. New values from NIST
Special Publication 800-57 with the upper limit specified by (forwarded request 222365 from pcerny)
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/222366
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=90
- Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.5p1
- Update to 6.5p1
Features since 6.4p1:
* ssh(1), sshd(8): support for key exchange using ECDH in
Daniel Bernstein's Curve25519; default when both the client
and server support it.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): support for Ed25519 as a public key type fo
rboth server and client. Ed25519 is an EC signature offering
better security than ECDSA and DSA and good performance.
* Add a new private key format that uses a bcrypt KDF to better
protect keys at rest. Used unconditionally for Ed25519 keys,
on demand for other key types via the -o ssh-keygen(1)
option. Intended to become default in the near future.
Details documented in PROTOCOL.key.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): new transport cipher
"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" combining Daniel Bernstein's
ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an
authenticated encryption mode. Details documented
PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients
and servers that use the obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme.
It will still be possible to connect with these
clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and
OpenSSH will refuse connection entirely in a future release.
* ssh(1), sshd(8): refuse old proprietary clients and servers
that use a weaker key exchange hash calculation.
* ssh(1): increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups
requested for each symmetric key size. New values from NIST
Special Publication 800-57 with the upper limit specified by
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/222365
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=63
- Update of the underlying OpenSSH to 6.4p1
- Update to 6.4p1
Features since 6.2p2:
* ssh-agent(1) support in sshd(8); allows encrypted hostkeys, or
hostkeys on smartcards.
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): allow optional time-based rekeying via a
second argument to the existing RekeyLimit option. RekeyLimit
is now supported in sshd_config as well as on the client.
* sshd(8): standardise logging of information during user
authentication.
* The presented key/cert and the remote username (if available)
is now logged in the authentication success/failure message on
the same log line as the local username, remote host/port and
protocol in use. Certificates contents and the key
fingerprint of the signing CA are logged too.
* ssh(1) ability to query what cryptographic algorithms are
supported in the binary.
* ssh(1): ProxyCommand=- for cases where stdin and stdout
already point to the proxy.
* ssh(1): allow IdentityFile=none
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): -E option to append debugging logs to a
specified file instead of stderr or syslog.
* sftp(1): support resuming partial downloads with the "reget"
command and on the sftp commandline or on the "get"
commandline with the "-a" (append) option.
* ssh(1): "IgnoreUnknown" configuration option to selectively
suppress errors arising from unknown configuration directives.
* sshd(8): support for submethods to be appended to required
authentication methods listed via AuthenticationMethods.
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/220466
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=58
- Update for 6.2p2
- Update to version 6.2p2
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): Added support for AES-GCM authenticated encryption
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): Added support for encrypt-then-mac (EtM) MAC modes
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): Added support for the UMAC-128 MAC
* sshd(8): Added support for multiple required authentication
* sshd(8)/ssh-keygen(1): Added support for Key Revocation Lists
* ssh(1): When SSH protocol 2 only is selected (the default), ssh(1)
now immediately sends its SSH protocol banner to the server without
waiting to receive the server's banner, saving time when connecting.
* dozens of other changes, see http://www.openssh.org/txt/release-6.2 (forwarded request 185789 from elvigia)
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/185890
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=87
- Update for 6.2p2
- Update to version 6.2p2
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): Added support for AES-GCM authenticated encryption
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): Added support for encrypt-then-mac (EtM) MAC modes
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): Added support for the UMAC-128 MAC
* sshd(8): Added support for multiple required authentication
* sshd(8)/ssh-keygen(1): Added support for Key Revocation Lists
* ssh(1): When SSH protocol 2 only is selected (the default), ssh(1)
now immediately sends its SSH protocol banner to the server without
waiting to receive the server's banner, saving time when connecting.
* dozens of other changes, see http://www.openssh.org/txt/release-6.2
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/185789
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=51
- Updated to 6.1p1, a bugfix release
Features:
* sshd(8): This release turns on pre-auth sandboxing sshd by default for
new installs, by setting UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox in sshd_config.
* ssh-keygen(1): Add options to specify starting line number and number of
lines to process when screening moduli candidates, allowing processing
of different parts of a candidate moduli file in parallel
* sshd(8): The Match directive now supports matching on the local (listen)
address and port upon which the incoming connection was received via
LocalAddress and LocalPort clauses.
* sshd(8): Extend sshd_config Match directive to allow setting AcceptEnv
and {Allow,Deny}{Users,Groups}
* Add support for RFC6594 SSHFP DNS records for ECDSA key types. bz#1978
* ssh-keygen(1): Allow conversion of RSA1 keys to public PEM and PKCS8
* sshd(8): Allow the sshd_config PermitOpen directive to accept "none" as
an argument to refuse all port-forwarding requests.
* sshd(8): Support "none" as an argument for AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
* ssh-keyscan(1): Look for ECDSA keys by default. bz#1971
* sshd(8): Add "VersionAddendum" to sshd_config to allow server operators
to append some arbitrary text to the server SSH protocol banner.
Bugfixes:
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): Don't spin in accept() in situations of file
descriptor exhaustion. Instead back off for a while.
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): Remove hmac-sha2-256-96 and hmac-sha2-512-96 MACs as
they were removed from the specification. bz#2023,
* sshd(8): Handle long comments in config files better. bz#2025
* ssh(1): Delay setting tty_flag so RequestTTY options are correctly
picked up. bz#1995
* sshd(8): Fix handling of /etc/nologin incorrectly being applied to root
on platforms that use login_cap.
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/141129
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/openSUSE:Factory/openssh?expand=0&rev=82
Features:
* sshd(8): This release turns on pre-auth sandboxing sshd by default for
new installs, by setting UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox in sshd_config.
* ssh-keygen(1): Add options to specify starting line number and number of
lines to process when screening moduli candidates, allowing processing
of different parts of a candidate moduli file in parallel
* sshd(8): The Match directive now supports matching on the local (listen)
address and port upon which the incoming connection was received via
LocalAddress and LocalPort clauses.
* sshd(8): Extend sshd_config Match directive to allow setting AcceptEnv
and {Allow,Deny}{Users,Groups}
* Add support for RFC6594 SSHFP DNS records for ECDSA key types. bz#1978
* ssh-keygen(1): Allow conversion of RSA1 keys to public PEM and PKCS8
* sshd(8): Allow the sshd_config PermitOpen directive to accept "none" as
an argument to refuse all port-forwarding requests.
* sshd(8): Support "none" as an argument for AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
* ssh-keyscan(1): Look for ECDSA keys by default. bz#1971
* sshd(8): Add "VersionAddendum" to sshd_config to allow server operators
to append some arbitrary text to the server SSH protocol banner.
Bugfixes:
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): Don't spin in accept() in situations of file
descriptor exhaustion. Instead back off for a while.
* ssh(1)/sshd(8): Remove hmac-sha2-256-96 and hmac-sha2-512-96 MACs as
they were removed from the specification. bz#2023,
* sshd(8): Handle long comments in config files better. bz#2025
* ssh(1): Delay setting tty_flag so RequestTTY options are correctly
picked up. bz#1995
* sshd(8): Fix handling of /etc/nologin incorrectly being applied to root
on platforms that use login_cap.
OBS-URL: https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/network/openssh?expand=0&rev=42
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