Add a new syntax to override files: if the group name has a ':' in it,
it indicates that we want to override the default values of keys for
only one desktop. For example:
[org.gnome.desktop.interface:Unity]
font-name='Ubuntu 12'
Will override the settings, only if "Unity" is found in
XDG_CURRENT_DESKTOP. Multiple per-desktop overrides can be specified
for a given key: the one which comes first in XDG_CURRENT_DESKTOP will
be used.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=746592
Recognise a new 'd' option in schema keys which gives a dictionary of
per-desktop default values. This dictionary is searched for the items
found in XDG_CURRENT_DESKTOP, in the order. If nothing matches (or if
the option is missing) then the default value is used as before.
This feature was requested by Alberts Muktupāvels and this patch is
based on an approach devised by them.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=746592
There are a couple of different ways (and soon one more) to access the
default value of a key. Clean up the various places that access this to
avoid duplication.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=746592
file_copy_fallback creates new files with default permissions and
set the correct permissions after the operation is finished. This
might cause that the files can be accessible by more users during
the operation than expected. Use G_FILE_CREATE_PRIVATE for the new
files to limit access to those files.
Fedora is using https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Annobin
to try to ensure that all objects are built with hardening flags.
Pass down `CFLAGS` to ensure the SystemTap objects use them.
The existing code was generating code with undefined results that modern compilers warn about:
accounts-generated.c:204:23: warning: dereferencing type-punned pointer will break strict-aliasing rules [-Wstrict-aliasing]
(GDBusArgInfo **) &_accounts_accounts_method_info_list_cached_users_OUT_ARG_pointers,
At the moment the gdbus-unix-addresses test will fail if
G_MESSAGES_DEBUG is set, since the test checks stdout, and the
test has a g_debug call.
This commit drops the g_debug call, which isn't that useful anyway.
glib!552 (commit 9eed22b3) fixed this for the tests that failed on i686,
but this additional test failed on Debian's s390x port
(IBM z/Architecture, 64-bit big-endian).
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
This was causing a crash, because we were first removing an item, freeing
both the instance itself and the key, and then trying to reuse those.
So, in this case, instead of reassigning an item, we can just return TRUE
as we have already the item at the right place, while it's not needed to
update the modified timestamp, since no modification happened in reality.
Fixes#1588
These were callers which explicitly specified the string length to
g_utf8_validate(), when it couldn’t be negative, and hence should be
able to unconditionally benefit from the increased string handling
length.
At least one call site would have previously silently changed behaviour
if called with strings longer than G_MAXSSIZE in length.
Another call site was passing strlen(string) to g_utf8_validate(), which
seems pointless: just pass -1 instead, and let g_utf8_validate()
calculate the string length. Its behaviour on embedded nul bytes
wouldn’t change, as strlen() stops at the first one.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
This is a variant of g_utf8_validate() which requires the length to be
specified, thereby allowing string lengths up to G_MAXSIZE rather than
just G_MAXSSIZE.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
This introduces no real functional changes (except when compiling with
G_DISABLE_ASSERT, in which case it fixes the test). Mostly just a code
cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
The code was checking whether the signature provided by the blob was a
valid D-Bus signature — but that’s a superset of a valid GVariant type
string, since a D-Bus signature is zero or more complete types. A
GVariant type string is exactly one complete type.
This meant that a D-Bus message with a header field containing a variant
with an empty type signature (for example) could cause a critical
warning in the code parsing it.
Fix that by checking whether the string is a valid type string too.
Unit test included.
oss-fuzz#9810
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Parsing a D-Bus message with the signature field in the message header
of type other than ‘g’ (GVariant type signature) would cause a critical
warning. Instead, we should return a runtime error.
Includes a test.
oss-fuzz#9825
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
When validating a string to see if it’s valid UTF-8, we pass a gsize to
g_utf8_validate(), which only takes a gssize. For large gsize values,
this will result in the gssize actually being negative, which will
change g_utf8_validate()’s behaviour to stop at the first nul byte. That
would allow subsequent nul bytes through the string validator, against
its documented behaviour.
Add a test case.
oss-fuzz#10319
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
As with the previous commit, when getting a child from a serialised
tuple, check its offset against the length of the serialised data of the
tuple (excluding the length of the offset table). The offset was already
checked against the length of the entire serialised tuple (including the
offset table) — but a child should not be able to start inside the
offset table.
A test is included.
oss-fuzz#9803
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
When getting a child from a serialised variable array, check its offset
against the length of the serialised data of the array (excluding the
length of the offset table). The offset was already checked against the
length of the entire serialised array (including the offset table) — but a
child should not be able to start inside the offset table.
A test is included.
oss-fuzz#9803
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
Previously, GVariant has allowed ‘arbitrary’ recursion on GVariantTypes,
but this isn’t really feasible. We have to deal with GVariants from
untrusted sources, and the nature of GVariantType means that another
level of recursion (and hence, for example, another stack frame in your
application) can be added with a single byte in a variant type signature
in the input. This gives malicious input sources far too much leverage
to cause deep stack recursion or massive memory allocations which can
DoS an application.
Limit recursion to 128 levels (which should be more than enough for
anyone™), document it and add a test. This is, handily, also the limit
of 64 applied by the D-Bus specification (§(Valid Signatures)), plus a
bit to allow wrapping of D-Bus messages in additional layers of
variants.
oss-fuzz#9857
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
When checking whether a serialised GVariant tuple is in normal form,
it’s possible for `offset_ptr -= offset_size` to underflow and wrap
around, resulting in gvs_read_unaligned_le() reading memory outside the
serialised GVariant bounds.
See §(Tuples) in gvariant-serialiser.c for the documentation on how
tuples are serialised. Briefly, all variable-length elements in the
tuple have an offset to their end stored in an array of offsets at the
end of the tuple. The width of each offset is in offset_size. offset_ptr
is added to the start of the serialised tuple to get the offset which is
currently being examined. The offset array is in reverse order compared
to the tuple elements, hence the subtraction.
The bug can be triggered if a tuple contains a load of variable-length
elements, each of whose length is actually zero (i.e. empty arrays).
Includes a unit test.
oss-fuzz#9801
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
The CI image which this glib-2-56 branch was previously using has been
deleted from the registry (master has moved on). Tweak the CI
configuration to use the glib-2-58 image, since there doesn’t seem to be
much point in adding an image just for glib-2-56, given how little
development is still needed on this branch.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <withnall@endlessm.com>
`read_netlink_messages()` is the callback attached to the netlink socket
(G_IO_IN). It calls `g_socket_receive_message()`. There is a race
condition that if the socket is closed while there is a pending call, we
will try to receive on a closed socket, which fails.
To avoid this, we switch the order of the operations around: first
destroy the source and then close the socket.
